



In recent years, "linkage" issues-such as "trade and environ-
ment," "trade and labor," and "trade and intellectual property"-
have moved from the periphery to the center of the trade agenda.
Despite the investment of substantial diplomatic capital, meaning-
ful multilateral agreements in many of these areas have been elu-
sive. This Symposium offers an ideal opportunity to explore why
these issues have come to the fore now, and why they appear to
be so intractable. My focus is on a related question: Can the
trade regime accommodate these new issues-or do they call into
question fundamental premises of the trade regime?
While an exhaustive treatment of these questions is beyond
the scope of this paper, I will focus on a central component of
these larger issues: the serious practical and theoretical challenges
linkage issues pose to conventional understandings of the trade
regime. To do so, I first outline the leading economic, game theo-
retic, and political science models that international lawyers typi-
cally use to explain or understand the trade system. I then show
how linkage issues undermine each of these models. In particular,
by presenting different and oftentimes novel types of difficulties,
linkage issues suggest that, in each instance, the model has identi-
fied the wrong "problem." Second, the "solutions" offered by
each model rest upon a number of assumptions about the nature
of states, international markets and/or the international system.
Linkage issues pose foundational questions regarding the accuracy
and appropriateness of the assumptions underlying these models.'
Visiting Fellow, Center on International Studies, Woodrow Wilson
School of Public & International Affairs, Princeton University; Associate Pro-
fessor of Law, Temple University School of Law. B.A. 1982, Haverford Col-
lege; J.D. 1986, New York University School of Law; LL.M. 1992, Georgetown
University Law Center. This is a revised version of a paper delivered at an
American Society of International Economic Law Interest Group Conference
on "Linkage as Phenomenon: An Interdisciplinary Approach." I am indebted
to Jane Baron, Kyle Danish, Theresa Glennon, Rick Greenstein, Laura Little
and Paul Stephan for valuable comments on earlier drafts. Research for this
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By undermining these conventional models, the linkage issues
herald the "death of the trade regime" in much the same way that
Grant Gilmore detailed the "death of contract": In light of new
developments, the models, ideas, and concepts that have tradi-
tionally explained a substantive area of the law are rendered insuf-
ficient.
2
Having identified problems in the current models, I then
briefly consider the prospects for a new model of the trade sys-
tem. First, I review some of the leading scholarship that purports
to criticize the trade regime, and show why this scholarship is un-
likely to generate a new model of the trade regime. I then outline
a more general argument for why trade scholars are unlikely to
successfully develop a new, parsimonious model that can usefully
explain the linkage issues, or the trading system more generally.
Finally, by juxtaposing the types of issues presented in linkage
disputes and the institutional competence of the World Trade Or-
ganization ("WTO") dispute resolution system, I identify a para-
dox raised by continued WTO efforts to resolve controversies in-
volving linkage issues.
This paper has several goals. First, as an analytic matter, I
wish to highlight the enormous tensions between conventional
understandings of the trade regime and the current trade agenda.
Second, I seek to identify some of the practical and theoretical dif-
ficulties in generating a new overarching model of the trade sys-
tem. These arguments may help direct future scholarship into ar-
eas more likely to prove fruitful. Finally, by drawing on
economic, game theoretic, and political science scholarship, I im-
plicitly emphasize the value of blending insights from multiple
perspectives on the same phenomenon. International trade is, at
once, an economic, political, and legal phenomenon. Thus, when
this Article was supported by summer research funding provided by the Tem-
ple University School of Law.
' My claim is not that linkage issues are the only issues that raise these
foundational questions; indeed, many of these questions pre-date the ascent of"trade and" issues. Rather, the more limited claims here are that (1) linkage is-
sues highlight the deficiencies of the traditional models, and (2) the heightened
political visibility of linkage issues renders impossible the hitherto successful
strategy of ignoring or overlooking these deficiencies.
. I defend this larger thesis in Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Death of the Trade Re-
gime (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). The title alludes to




attempting to rethink the trade system, one would be well-advised
to incorporate insights from at least these three disciplines.
2. LINKAGE ISSUES AND THE EFFICIENCY MODEL
Before exploring the challenges that the linkage issues pose to
the international trading system, it is useful to briefly review the
underpinnings of this system. Why did the international com-
munity engage in the lengthy and arduous Uruguay Round nego-
tiations? What theory can explain why we need the WTO and
identify the benefits it is designed to secure?
2.1. The Efficiency Model
The leading, if not dominant, justification for the interna-
tional trade regime is the economic one. As summarized by John
Jackson, "[t]he objective [of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade ("GATT")/WTO system] is to liberalize trade that
crosses national boundaries, and to pursue the benefits described
in economic theory as 'comparative advantage.' 3 The economic
concept of comparative advantage can be traced back to the writ-
ings of David Ricardo. Ricardo argued that:
Under a system of perfectly free [international] commerce,
each country naturally devotes its capital and labour to
such employments as are most beneficial to each. This
pursuit of individual advantage is admirably connected
with the universal good of the whole. By stimulating in-
dustry, by rewarding ingenuity, and by using most effica-
ciously the peculiar powers bestowed by nature, it distrib-
utes labour most effectively and most economically:
3 John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congru-
ence or Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227, 1231 (1992); see also Ronald A.
Brand, Sustaining the Development of International Trade and Environmental
Law, 21 VT. L. REV. 823, 842 (1997) ( The fundamental goal of the WTO sys-
tem is the reduction of trade barriers through rules consistent with the underly-
ing theory of comparative advantage...."); Robert E. Hudec,GA7TLegal Re-
straints on the Use of Trade Measures Against Foreign Environmental Practices, in
2 FAIR TRADE & HARMOmNZATION 95, 108 (agdish Bhagwati & Robert E.
Hudec eds., 1996) ("The GATT's economic goa is to promote, through liberal
international trade policies, the greater effectiveness of national economies.')
[hereinafter Bhagwati & Hudec].
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while, by increasing the general mass of productions, it
diffuses general benefit ....
The theory of comparative advantage teaches that, in the ab-
sence of trade restrictions, each nation will specialize in the pro-
duction and export of goods and services that it can produce rela-
tively more efficiently than other nations. This specialization
increases the efficiency of international production and results in
increased trade and greater aggregate welfare. As a result, con-
sumers enjoy lower prices and greater availability of goods. All of
this can most efficiently occur through open and competitive
markets that accurately price goods and services, enabling the
producers in each country to discover what they are compara-
tively better at producing.
Under this theory, trade barriers are inefficient intrusions into
otherwise autonomously functioning markets, and tend to divert
resources from their most highly valued uses. In particular, tariffs
and other barriers transfer wealth from consumers to firms and
workers in protected industries. In addition, trade barriers create
"deadweight losses," reductions in the welfare of one group that
are not transferred to any other group or groups. In this way,
trade restrictions produce a net loss of global economic welfare.
By disciplining the use of trade restrictions, the trade regime re-
duces these inefficiencies and permits markets to operate without
state interference, thereby promoting global economic wealth.
For purposes of this paper, I call this understanding of the trade
regime the "efficiency model."
2.2. Challenges to the Efficiency Model
Under the efficiency model, the "problem" to be solved is
how to maximize economic welfare. The "solution" to this
"problem" is to reduce or eliminate government regulations that
4 DAVID RIcARDo, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLiTCAL ECONOMY AND
TAXATION 81 (Everyman's Library 1969) (1817). While Ricardo's theory has
undergone substantia refinement over the years, it still "continues to form the
basis of conventional trade theory...." MICHAELJ. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT
HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 2 (1995) [hereinafter
TREBILCOCK & HOWSE].
s See James Bovard, The Morality of Protectionism, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'LL. &
POL. 235, 239 (1993) (noting that protectionism harms the general public in or-
der to provide a "private benefit").
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interfere with voluntary, welfare-enhancing market exchanges.
For many of the classic problems in international trade law-
export subsidies, discriminatory treatment, and the like-this may
be a useful way of approaching the issues. But linkage issues-
particularly trade and environment and trade and labor issues-
involve different sorts of problems, in part because they often
present tensions between economic and non-economic values. As
linkage disputes multiply, it is becoming increasingly apparent
that the efficiency model's welfare maximizing calculus does not
adequately account for these non-economic values.6 Indeed, many
of these non-economic values-as expressed in, for example, laws
requiring decent working conditions or clean air and water-often
cannot be realized through trade liberalization or other market
mechanisms alone.7 Rather, they can only be achieved through
governmental action or intervention.
From the efficiency perspective, it is difficult to differentiate
labor or environmental standards that restrict trade from other
government policies that affect trade.8 Labor and environmental
laws, however, are typically not intended to and do not serve
purely economic goals: "To notice that the Endangered Species
Act is not cost-beneficial is to recognize the obvious. That is the
point of the Act, and of much of our environmental regulation."
9
6 See, e.g., Frank J. Garcia, Trade & Justice: Linking the Trade Linkage De-
bates, in, Symposium, Linkage as Phenomenon: An Interdisciplinary A pproach, 19
U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 201 (1998); Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Value,
90 Nw. U. L. REV. 658 (1996).
7 For an extended discussion of the ways in which the GATT system privi-
leges trade interests over non-economic interests, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Institu-
tional Misfits: The GA7T, the ICJ & Trade-Environment Disputes, 15MICH. J.
INT'L L. 1043 (1994) [hereinafter Dunoff, Institutional Misfits.
' For a representative discussion of how trade experts view environmental
regulations as non-tariff barriers, see Steve Charnovitz, The Regulation ofEnvi-
ronmental Standards by International Trade Agreements, 16 Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) 631, 631-33 (Aug. 25, 1992).
9 MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 16-17 (1988). Another important example involves
the Clean Air Act, which requires the EPA to set national primary ambient air
quality standards at a level that will protect the public heth wit an adequate
margin for safety, without regard to the cost of attaining the standards. See 42
U.S.C. S 7409(b)(1) (1994);see, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA,
902 F.2d 962, 972-73 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (stating that national ambient air quality
standards for particulate matter must not include consideration of cost of con-
sequent unemployment); Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1150 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (noting that the EPA is precluded from considering economic factors
when developing national ambient air quality standards for lead).
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Rather, many of these laws are grounded in normative arguments
that purport to trump or countervail market values. Thus, the
increasingly common conflicts between these bodies of law and
international trade law inescapably call into question the appro-
priate scope and limits of the efficiency model. This critical issue
is not resolved by the argument that, from within the efficiency
perspective, environmental rules are similar to other trade-
restricting rules. This response presupposes precisely the assump-
tion that the environmental rules call into question.' 0 By raising
questions about the limits of the efficiency model, the linkage is-
sues are an international legal instantiation of larger debates about
thelappropriate limits of market ordering and economic analy-
sis.
Moreover, by questioning the limits of the efficiency model,
linkage issues also raise difficult institutional issues. As we in-
habit a world of finite resources and inevitable trade-offs, who
should decide how much economic growth, or environmental
protection, we seek?12 Domestic polities typically use various in-
stitutions, such as legislatures, courts, administrative agencies, and
markets, to make such decisions. Each of these institutions has
particular strengths and capacities, and domestic polities can not
only exploit these comparative advantages, but may also benefit
from the interaction among these various institutions.1 3  The
' "The ground of the debate is elsewhere-in evaluating the justifications
of certain forms of political and economic ordering-not pre-empting that de-
bate by appealing to one possible resolution of it.... To paraphrase Keynes,
those who think they can avoid this sort of theorizing are simply in the grips of
another theory." Brian Alexander Langille, General Reflections of the Relation-
ship of Trade and Labor (Or: Fair Trade is Free Trade's Destiny), in Bhagwati &
Hudec, supra note 3, at 231, 246. Professor Langille's excellent article presents
an extended version of this argument.
For an analysis of similar debates in various domestic contexts, see Jane
B. Baron & Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Against Market Rationality: Moral Critiques of
Economic Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 431 (1996).12 ...For an insightful analysis of the ways that various international fora re-
solve these types of issues, see Joel P. Trachtman, "Trade and..." Problems,
Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 32 (1997).
13 The study of these interactions has given rise to a growing body of litera-
ture known as 'Positive Political Theory.' See, e.g., Jenna Bednar & William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path ". A Theoty of Judicial En-
forcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447 (1995); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J.
331 (1991); John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast,A Positive Theory of Statu-
tory Interpretation, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 263 (1992). I've argued else-




trade regime does not have a similarly rich institutional menu
from which to draw. 14 It lacks relevant administrative capacity
and a conventional legislative apparatus. Also, while there is a
dispute resolution process, its results have lacked formal prece-
dential effect and the process has not, to date, produced a com-
prehensive body of "common law."
15
More importantly, trade bodies, like firms, governments, law
schools, and all other institutions, have certain areas of profi-
ciency. They are well-equipped to address certain issues, and ill-
equipped to address others. There is, however, little evidence to
suggest that the WTO possesses the requisite expertise to sensibly
address many of the linkage issues. Environmental advocates
have repeatedly and persuasively detailed the GATT's shortcom-
ings with respect to "trade and environment" issues;16 even a
would likely be fruitful. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic
Analysis of International Laws: An Invitation anda Caveat (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author). See also Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey
International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) (urging focus on interactions
among domestic and international institutions and norns).
14 See, e.g., Joel P. Trachtman, The International Economic Law Revolution,
17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 33, 52-55 (1996).
is As a recent WTO Appellate Body report stated:
The generally-accepted view under GATT 1947 was that the conclu-
sions and recommendations in an adopted panel report bound the par-
ties to the dispute in that particular case, but subsequent panels did not
feel legally bound by the details and reasoning of a previous panel re-
port....
Adopted panel reports are an important part of the GATTacquis.
They are often considered by subsequent panels. They create legiti-
mate expectations among WTO Members and, therefore, shoul[ be
taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute. However,
they are not binding, except with respect to resolving the particular
dispute between the parties to that dispute. In short, their character
and their legal status have not been changed by the coming into force
of the W TOAgreement.
Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Oct. 4, 1996, at 14-15. For other discus-
sions of the legal effect of panel reports see Canada-Import Restrictions on Ice
Cream and Yoghurt, Dec. 5, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 68, 85 (1990)
(stating that prior panel reports are relevant but not dispositive); European
Economic Community-Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples Complaint
by Chile, June 22, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 93, 124 (1990) (noting
that panel is not bound by reasoning employed by prior panels). Scholarly
treatments of these issues can be found in Philip M. Nichols, GA 7T Doctrine,
36 VA. J. INT'L L. 379, 430-33 (1996); Jackson, supra note 3, at 1272-73.
16 See, e.g., DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVI-
RONMENT, AND THE FUTURE (1994); C. FORD RUNGE, FREER TRADE,
PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT: BALANCING TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND
1998]
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GATT report candidly conceded that "[t]he GATT is not
equipped to become involved in the tasks of reviewing national
environmental priorities, setting environmental standards or de-
veloping global policies on the environment." 7  Leading com-
mentators have detailed similar institutional problems in the con-
text of competition law,' 8 labor law,' 9 and intellectual property
law.20 In short, if we applied the theory of comparative advantage
to institutions, we might conclude that trade bodies were not ter-
ribly well-positioned, by virtue of mission, experience, or exper-
tise, to deal with some of the most contentious linkage issues.
ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS (1994); Steve Charnovitz, Environmental Har-
monization and Trade Policy, in TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT: LAW, Eco-
NOMICS AND POLICY (Durwood Zaelke et al. eds., 1993). I have addressed the
institutional issues in Dunoff, Institutional Misfits, supra note 7, and in Jeffrey L.
Dunoff, Resolving Trade-Environment Conflicts: The Case for Trading Institu-
tions, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 607 (1994).
17 Report by Ambassador Hidetoski Ukawa, Chairman, Group on Envi-
ronmental Measures and International Trade, 49th Session of the GATT Con-
tracting Parties, at 3 (an. 25, 1994) (on file with author).
1" As Judge Wood noted:
It is also unclear whether the WTO process would yield the right rules
in the end. Competition authorities have tried to de-politicize these
rules and to ground them instead on economic criteria. The WTO,
however, is a Tundamentally political forum, better suited to mediatingdisputes between States than to analyzing the ins and outs of relevant
market definition or the contestabiity of a particular market. Finally,
even though many (including myself) believe that the fundamental
principles of competition law can be applied universally, at a morepractical level it is not clear that the same competition rles that are
best for the United States and Europe are equally suitable for Byelarus,
Zimbabwe, and Pakistan. The level of economic development, the
strength of social and legal institutions, and the type of economy that a
country has had may require refinements in competition rules from
place to place that are better handled individually than under the um-
brella of an international organization.
Honorable Diane P. Wood, Regulation in the Single Global Market From Anar-
chy to World Federalism?, 23 OIO N.U. L. REV. 297, 307 (1996).
19 Michael Hart, Coercion or Cooperation: Social Policy and Future Trade
Negotiations, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 351, 380 (1994) ("Trade bureaucrats are not the
best officials to address the complexities of fair labor standards or other social
issues, nor are trade agreements necessarily the best instruments for addressing
them.").
20 See gqnerally Frederick M. Abbott, The Future of the Multilateral Trading
System in the Context of TRIPS, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 661
(1997) (noting respective competencies and strengths of the WTO and the
World Intellectual Property Organization).
21 See Steve Charnovitz, The World Trade Organization, Meat Hormones,




In addition, to the extent that linkage issues continue to be in-
corporated into the ever more expansive trade regime, a different
set of problems arises. The logic of the efficiency model suggests
that we understand measures which restrict trade in, for example,
environmentally harmful products, as non-tariff barriers that re-
duce aggregate welfare. Similarly, we might understand lax envi-
ronmental or labor laws as implicit subsidies to industry.22 In
other words, these laws can be 'translated' into the economic
rhetoric associated with the efficiency model. As noted above,
however, this rhetoric fails to capture fully the values embodied
in, for example, environmental laws. In this sense, to use eco-
nomic rhetoric to describe linkage issues is to use an impoverished
vocabulary: '[t]he attempt to translate our diverse valuations of
social goods, such as [worker protections] or environmental
amenities, into monetary items, 'does not account for the way we
actually think.'"'z Rather, we value diverse social goods-such as
pristine lands or endangered species-in a variety of non-economic
ways. For this reason, the use of economic rhetoric and analysis
in these contexts would obscure many of the important forms of
valuation that individuals and societies commonly use.24 I believe
that this accounts, in part, for the widespread resistance to the
this "institutional competence" argument is often raised by critics of the trade
regime, these issues should concern the regime's defenders as well. The difficul-
ties associated with linkage issues are part of a larger problem the GATT/WTO
system has with trade measures designed to serve non-trade or non-economic
values. Consider, for example, the GATT's handling of disputes arising out ofUS-Nicaragua relations in the 1980's, the suspension of Poland's MFN status
following the suppression of Solidarity, andembargoes imposed during the
Falklands/Malvmias war.
22 See, e.g., Daniel S. Ehrenberg, The Labor Link: Applying the International
Trading System to Enforce Violations of Forced and ChildtLabor, 20 YALE J. INT'L
L. 361, 379 (1995) (arguing that forced and child labor should be considered a
subsidy under international trade rules).
23 Baron & Dunoff, supra note 11, at 460-61 (citing Cass R. Sunstein, In-
commensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 800 (1994)).
24 As Cass Sunstein argues, in a world understood solely in terms of eco-
nomic rhetoric:
a loss of friendship or the death of a parent would really be like a loss
of money, thought undoubtedly a lot of it. An achievement in some-
thing that one prizes-like art or music-would be valued in the same
way as an increase in net worth, or the birth of a new child, or falling
in love, or the relief of human suffering .... A great deal would be
lost in such a world.
Sunstein, supra note 23, at 854.
1998]
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trade regime's expansion into an ever increasing number of link-
age areas.
But the problem of extending the use of economic rhetoric to
the linkage issues is not simply one of descriptive inaccuracy, or
of the reductionism associated with that rhetoric. The larger issue
is that use of this vocabulary has an important constitutive di-
mension. "[B]ecause they do not merely ascribe properties to ob-
jects, but instruct us about how to think about them, characteri-
zations do not leave the phenomena unchanged."25 To translate
environmental (and other social) goods into an economic vocabu-
lary-as the efficiency model does-is to risk changin our under-
standing of these social goods in objectionable ways. In other
words, different vocabularies "are important both because they
describe in inadequate ways and because they do not merely rede-
scribe. They also have an important constitutive dimension-that
is, they may help transform how.., we value or experience
events and relationships." 27 For this reason, the decision whether
to incorporate linkage issues into the trade regime, and the associ-
ated decision whether to apply economic rhetoric and vocabulary
to these social goods, has an often overlooked-but crucially im-
portant-transformative dimension. By threatening to transform
our understanding of certain social goods, incorporation of the
linkage issues into the trade regime threatens the social values un-
derlying these goods.28
For these reasons, debates raised by the linkage issues prob-
lematize the efficiency model's premise that the central issue to be
solved is how to maximize aggregate welfare. But, in addition,
the linkage issues suggest that the efficiency model is based on a
series of inaccurate or misleading assumptions. As noted above,
25 GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADmON
335 (1986).
26 See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43
DuKE LJ. 56 (1993). For a criticism of this argument and others associated
with the position that values are incommensura see Richard Greenstein, On
a Scale of One to Ten (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). For a so-
phisticated discussion of various ways to commensurate values in the linkage
context, see Trachtman, supra note 12.
27 Sunstein, supra note 23, at 815.
28 Ironically, then, the challenges identified in this paper run in two direc-
tions. The incorporation of linkage issues into the trade system threatens our
conventional understandings of that system. But, as the conventional models
privilege economic over non-economic values, this incorporation also threatens




the efficiency model assumes the autonomy and priority of inter-
national markets. It also assumes a sharp distinction between
government action and government inaction. The goal is to re-
duce or eliminate government interference with markets, so that
they can operate "on their own."
But markets do not simply exist "on their own." Rather, as
the legal realists persuasively demonstrated in the domestic con-
text, all markets require the establishment of numerous back-
ground norms, such as rules about property, contract, fraud,
competition and the like. These norms are not "distortions" of
the market; rather they enable functioning markets to exist at all.
Moreover, these norms reflect and express public policy; they are
created and enforced by governments. As any number of differ-
ent background norms are possible, these norms should be under-
stood as a form of economic regulation, just as we understand tra-
ditional public law to be economic regulation.
29
Much the same is true in the international context. Interna-
tional markets similarly presuppose the existence of numerous
background norms, particularly enforceable property rights. Ab-
sent such rights, markets may never develop; different concep-
tions of these background rights will give rise to vastly different
markets. A good example is the intellectual property ("IP") field.
Prior to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights ("TRIPS"), nations varied dramatically in their
definition and protection of IP rights. Absent protected or en-
forceable IP rights in certain developing countries, developed na-
tion IP holders often could not or would not do business in these
developing countries.30 Developed nation governments and pri-
vate firms claimed that lax IP regimes in developing nations pro-
duced "distorted" markets that annually cost them millions of dol-
lars in lost export sales.
3 1
29 For early articulations of this argument, see ROBERT L. HALE,
FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE GOVERNING
POWER 542-48 (1952); Robert L. Hale, Bargaininb Duress, and Economic Lib-
erty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943).
30 This problem is not new. As Stephen Ladas wrote in 1949,
"[i]nternational trade is inconceivable today without trade-marks and their ade-
quate protection." Stephen P. Ladas, The Lanham Act and International Trade,
14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 269, 269 (1949).
31 The prevailing developed nation view was well captured by EC negotia-
tor Willy de Clercq in his speech at the start of the Uruguay Round negotia-
tions:
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The TRIPS Agreement is designed to address many of these
market "distortions." This comprehensive agreement deals with
each of the main categories of intellectual property rights and es-
tablishes standards of protection and rules of enforcement. It also
obliges members to enact legislation granting aggrieved foreign in-
tellectual property owners effective remedies in domestic proceed-
ings. Finally, it provides that WTO dispute settlement mecha-
nisms will be used to resolve disputes between member states.
Presumably, this agreement will facilitate markets in many goods
and services that did not previously exist.
This suggests, however, that international markets do not
simply form spontaneously and without government interven-
tion; rather, certain government actions (i.e., those required by
TRIPS) are necessary to create or facilitate markets for certain
goods and services in the first place. Paradoxically, free interna-
tional trade, like the domestic free market, requires state interven-
tion.32 The efficiency model presupposes a distinction between
private market activity and public governmental action that link-
age issues tend to undermine.
33
For all of these reasons, the linkage issues pose serious concep-
tual challenges to the traditional understanding of the trade re-
gime embodied in the efficiency model.
The absence of adequate protection in the case of intellectual property
has led to considerable distortions in trade in certain sectors. The
GATT can and must act in parallel with other institutions in framing
principles and rules relating to the trade aspects of intellectual prop-
erty. Our aim in this area... must be to create a favorable, dynamic
climate which will give a fresh boost to the world economy.
Willy de Clercq, Speech Delivered at the Uruguay Round (Sept. 16, 1986),in
BULL. EUR. CoMMuNrIEs No. 9-1986, at 15 (1986), quoted in James J. Cal-
laghan, Analysis of the European Court ofJustice's Decision on Competence in the
World Trade Organization: Who Will Call the Shots in the Areas of Services and
Intellectual Property in the European Union?, 18 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J.
497, 504 (1996).
32 See KARL PoLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 203 (1957); see also
ERIcJ. HOBSBAWM, INDUSTRY AND EMPIRE (1971).
33 Again, my claim is not that the linkage issues are the only issues that sug-





3. LINKAGE ISSUES AND THE COLLECTIVE ACTION MODEL
3.1. The Collective Action Model
Game theory provides an alternative explanation of the trade
regime. Under this understanding, nations seek to use trade pol-
icy to maximize their welfare, but confront a Prisoner's Di-
lemma.3 4 That is, each is tempted to profit at others' expense by
manipulating trade policy in an effort to limit imports without
hurting exports. Policies to achieve these ends include higher tar-
iffs, competitive exchange rate devaluations, and similar strategies
designed to alter the flow of goods and capital. As the interna-
tional economic history of the 1930's suggests, however, once one
country adopts such a strategy, other nations are likely to follow
suit. These individual acts will, in the aggregate, lead to a massive
decline in the volume of international trade and hence reduce
global welfare. The dilemma is that the pursuit of individually ra-
tional strategies results in a sub-optimal collective outcome.
Adopting this game theoretic perspective, many scholars have
suggested that the WTO/GATT system is best understood not as
a means for maximizing the gains available through trade, but
34 See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 7-9
(1984); PETER B. KENAN, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 143-44 (3d ed.
1994); DAVID A. LAKE, POWER, PROTECTION AND FREE TRADE: INTER-
NATIONAL SOURCES OF U.S. COMMERCIAL STRATEGY, 1887-1939 (1988);
Kenneth W. Abbott, The Trading Nation's Dilemma: The Functions ofthe Law of
International Trade, 26 HARv. INT'L L.J. 501(1985) [hereinafter Abbott, Trad-
ing Nation's Dilemma]; John Conybeare, Trade Wars: A Comparative Study of
Anglo-Hanse, Franco-Italian, and Hawley-Smoot Conflicts, 38 WORLD POL. 147,
170 (1985). At times, other game theoretic models are used to describe the rela-
tionship between trading nations, such as the games of chicken and stag hunt.
See, e.g., Jonathan Macey, Chicken Wars as Prisoners' Dilemma: What's in a
Game?, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 449-50 (1989).
Of course, game theorists have not limited their sights to the international
trading system. Rather, this model has been applied to, inter alia, arms races
and arms control, nuclear nonproliferation, crisis management, military alli-
ances, monetary cooperation, and tax policy coordination. See Joseph M.
Grieco, Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation: Analysis
with an Amended Prisoner's Dilemma Model, 50 J. POL. 600, 601 n.2 (1988)
(collecting citations). As a result, some claim that the"prisoners' dilemma...
has proliferated as the key metaphor of international politics." Helen Milner,
International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations, 44 WORLD POL. 466, 467
(1992); see also Kenneth W. Abbott, Modemn International Relations Theory: A
Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335, 360 (1989)
[hereinafter Abbott, Prospectus] ("Situations characterized by P[risoners']
D[ilemma] incentives are common, if not pervasive, in international life.").
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rather as "an agreement that, at bottom, seeks to overcome the
significant coordination or collective-action problems that its
membership otherwise faces.""s For the purposes of this paper,
this understanding of the trade regime is referred to as the
"collective action" model.
The collective action model typically incorporates a number
of standard "realist" assumptions. Under this model, nations are
assumed to be the key actors in an anarchic international arena,
and state action is seen as the key variable in analyzing interna-
tional relations. Moreover, these states are assumed to be rational,
welfare-maximizing entities,3 8 with interests that sometimes over-
lap and sometimes conflict. In this context, cooperation among
independent states, while often highly desirable, becomes deeply
problematic.
Many international relations and international law scholars
argue that "[t]o avoid joint defection and gain the higher payoffs
available from cooperation, rational states.., will tend to seek in-
ternational rules and institutions designed to restrain defection."
39
35 Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard
of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 209
(1996).
36 1 refer here to the "realist" tradition of political science associated with
the writings of scholars such as Hans Morganthau, Georg Schwartzenberger,
E.H. Carr, George Kennan, and others, and not to the"Legal Realist" tradition.
For more on the political science school of realism, see, for example,HANs J.
MORGANTHAU, PoLmTcs AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER
AND PEACE 3-15 (1960) (identifying six tenets of realism); Joseph M. Grieco,
Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal
Institutionalism, 42 INT'L ORG. 485 (1988) (identifying key realist principles).
17 In this context, anarchy does not mean chaos or disorder, but that power
and authority are decentralized. See Abbott, Prospectus, supra note 34, at 337-
338. Seminal works on the anarchic nature of the international system include:
HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD
POLITICS (1977); KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS (1979) (distinguishing between hierarchic nature of domestic society
and anarchic nature of international society). For thoughtful explorations of
the assumption that the international system is anarchic, see Helen Milner, The
Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique, 17 REV.
INT'L STUD. 67 (1991); Alexander Wendt,Anarchy is What States Make of t: The
Social Construction ofPower Politics, 46 INT'L ORG. 391 (1992).
" See, e.g., Charles Lipson, International Cooperation in Economic and Secu-
ity Afairs, 37 WORLD POL. 1 (1984) "Our analysis.. presumes that the states
are coherent, unitary, rational actors. apt
39 Abbott, Prospectus, supra note 34, at 359. For a good recent overview of
"Institutionalist Theory," see generally William J. Aceves, Institutionalist Theory




International institutions can provide "a stable environment for
mutually beneficial decision-making [and at the same time] guide
and constrain behavior."40  Specifically, institutions can promote
cooperation by, inter alia, reducinj the transaction costs associ-
ated with international agreements. Institutions make it more
convenient and less costly to negotiate agreements in the first
place; contribute administrative and institutional services that re-
duce maintenance costs; and provide authoritative dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms that reduce enforcement costs. Additionally, in-
stitutions increase access to information,42 assist in the monitoring
of behavior,43 mediate disputes,44 and facilitate bargaining across
different issues.
45
Applying these insights in the trade context, one solution to
the problem of mutually destructive trade barriers producing
lower aggregate welfare, would be the creation of a multilateral
institution with binding and enforceable rules limiting such trade
barriers.46 From a game theoretic perspective, the WTO/GATT
40 Duncan Snidal, Political Economy and International Institutions, 16 INT'L
REV. L. & EcoN. 121, 127 (1996).
41 See generally ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOP-
ERATION AND DIscoRD IN THE WORLD POLIICAL ECONOMY 89-109 (1984).
42 Lack of information is considered a cause of the Prisoner's Dilemma. See
id. at 93-96.
43 See, e.g., Aceves, supra note 39, at 251-55; Paul Milgrom, The Role of Insti-
tutions in the Revival of the Trade: The Medieval Law Merchant, Private Judges
and the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1 (1990).
44 See, e.g., Aceves, supra note 39, at 253-54; ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA
CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WiTH INTERNATIONAL
REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 201-25 (1995).
45 See, e.g., Aceves, supra note 39, at 248-49; see also Ernst B. Haas, W Col-
laborate? Issue-Linkages in International Negotiations, 32 WORLD POL. 357
(1980); James K. Sebenius, Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Issues
and Parties, 37 INT'L ORG. 281 (1983).
4 Significantly, the institutional "solution" also transforms the game from
a one-shot enterprise to one that has a large (or infinite) number of plays. This
has the benefit of more accurately capturing the strategic environment that
trading nations actually face. Iterated games are thought to be more likely to
yield cooperative outcomes because "defection is in the long run unrewarding,
since the short-run gains thereby obtained will normally be outweighed by the
mutual punishment that will ensue over the long run." KEOHANE, supra note
41, at 75. If, however, the game is played a finite number of times, and if the
players know beforehand the number of games to be played, the dilemma re-
mains. See, e.g., Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, The Folk Theorem in Repeated
Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information, 54 ECONOMETRICA
443 (1982); David M. Kreps, Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Pris-
oners Dilemma, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 245 (1982). For an application of the
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system can be understood as such an institution containing such a
set of rules. As Judith Goldstein notes:
nations with common interests-such as the potential wel-
fare gains from trade liberalization-can overcome collec-
tive action problems only if some mechanism is found to
forestall cheating. According to such logic, GATT rules
were appropriate because they assuaged the fears of poten-
tial regime participants that they would receive the
'Sucker's Payoff' if they lowered tariff barriers. Interpret-
ing the breakdown of the trading system in the interwar
period as a market failure-mutual defection reflected the
decline of rules, not of common interests, in international
trade-the credit for resurgence of trade under GATT is
given to the institutionalization of efficient monitoring
and enforcement procedures.
47
Adherents of the collective action model emphasize several
features of the trade regime that help trading nations avoid the
sub-optimal outcomes associated with prisoners' dilemmas.
While the GATT has always been a binding international agree-
ment, changes to the dispute settlement system negotiated during
the Uruguay Round greatly strengthened the "enforceability" of
GATT disciplines, by expanding both the remedies available to
aggrieved parties, and the means through which compliance with
the GATT can be induced.48 From a game theoretic perspective,
this reduces the incentives to defect in any particular instance and
therefore increases the benefits of cooperation. Similarly, the on-
theory of "iterated" games to international legal issues, see John K. SetearAn
Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and
InternationalLaw, 37 HARV. INT'LL.J. 139 (1996).
47 Judith Goldstein, Creating the GA 7T Rules: Politics, Institutions and
American Policy, in MULTILATERAISM MATERS: THE THEORY AND PRAXLS
oF AN INSTrrU=ONAL FORM 201 (John Gerard Ruggie ed., 1993) [hereinafter
MULTILATERAISM MATrERi.
48 See, e.g., Curtis Reitz, Enforcement of the General Agreement on Taiffs
and Trade, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 555 (1996). Compare Judith Hippler
Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding. Less is More, 90AM. J. M'L
L. 416 (1996), with John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understand-
ing: Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 60





going monitorinj of state behavior through the Trade Policy Re-
view Mechanism 9 can deter potential violations before they oc-
cur, and thereby contribute to the efficacy of cooperative agree-
ments. Finally, by providing a forum for ongoing consultation-
as well as administrative, technical and other services through the
Secretariat-the WTO helps reduce maintenance and enforcement
costs.
3.2. Challenges to the Collective Action Model
Again, however, the linkage issues seriously challenge this
model. In particular, they problematize both the "problem" pre-
sented, which is how to avoid sub-optimal outcomes resulting
from individually rational decisions, and the solution offered,
consisting of iterative processes along with a binding international
agreement and an institution that can oversee and enforce the
agreement.
Linkage issues suggest that the problems facing the interna-
tional trading community are primarily those of distribution,
rather than those of cooperation and collaboration. 0 While dis-
tributional issues animate all the linkage issues,51 for present pur-
poses consider again the TRIPS Agreement, particularly the cen-
tral provisions that provide for minimum standards of protection
to be provided by each member. For each of the main categories
of intellectual property, the Agreement sets out the subject matter
49 Trade Policy Review Mechanism, Apr. 15, 1994, Final Act Embodying
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Annex
3, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS--RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1; 33
I.L.M. 1140 (1994). Before this agreement, trade policy review was done pursu-
ant to a decision by the contracting parties. See Functioning of the GATT Sys-
tem, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 405 (1989).
s There are, of course, various types of cooperation problems. For useful
typologies, see Lisa L. Martin, The Rational State Choice of Multilateralism, in
MULTILATERALISM MATrERS, supra note 47, at 91; Duncan Snidal, Coordina-
tion versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and
Regimes, 79 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 923 (1985); Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and
Co ~bration: Regimes in an Anarchic World, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 115
(Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983). Both the trade and collective-security areas are
often understood to present collaboration games. See, e.g., Andreas Hansen-
clever et al., Interests, Power, Knowledge: The Study of International Regimes, 40
MERSHON INT'L STUD. REV. 177 (1996) (surveying relevant literature).
51 Elsewhere, I have argued that trade and environment issues are largely
driven by distributional considerations. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Reconciling In-
ternational Trade with Preservation of the Global Commons: Can We Prosper and
Protect?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1407 (1992).
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to be protected, the rights to be conferred, and the minimum du-
ration of protection. In large part, the "standards are set at a level
comparable to those in the major industrial countries today."
5 2
While there is substantial debate over the ultimate economic
effects of the TRIPS agreement,53 there can be little doubt that an
agreement that raises worldwide intellectual property protections
to developed country levels is not likely to produce a collectively
optimal amount of global economic welfare.5 4 Neoclassical trade
theory suggests that nations will likely differ in their abilities to
innovate and to imitate.5 5 To best exploit comparative advantage,
nations that lag in innovation would likely enact relatively lax IP
regimes (at least as compared with nations that are adept at inno-
vation).5 By permitting cheap domestic imitations of foreign in-
novations, developing nations may reap significant consumer wel-
fare gains at little cost. The creation of lax IP regimes by many
developing nations therefore appears economically reasonable."
Developing nations may understand international agreements that
raise IP protection to developed nation levels to be, from their
perspective, welfare-reducing or pareto-inferior bargains.
5 8
52 Adrian Otten & Hannu Wager, Compliance with TRIPS: The Emerging
World View, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 391, 396 (1996); see also Paul EdMard
Geller, Intellectual Property in the Global Marketplace: Impact of TRIPS Dispute
Settlements?, 29 INT'L L. 99 (1995).
53 See Frederick M. Abbott, Commentary: The International Intellectual
Property Order Enters the 21st Century, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 471, 473(1996).
54 See, e.g., GENE M. GROSSMAN & ELHANAN HELPMAN, INNOVATION
AND GROWTH IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, ch. 11 (1991); TREBILCOCK &
HOWSE, supra note 4, at 251, 253-54; Allan V. Deardorff, Should Patent Protec-
tion be Exiended to All Developing Countries?, 13 WORLD ECON. 497 (1990);
Kevin Maskus, Normative Concerns in the International Protection of Intellectul
Property Rights, 14 WORLD ECON. 403 (1991).
5 See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 4, at 252.
56 See id
57 For well-developed arguments that developing nations should weaken or
eliminate their intellectual property laws, see Douglas F. Greer, The Case
Against Patent Systems in Less-Developed Countries, 8 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 223
(1973); Alan S. Gutterman, The North-South Debate Regarding the Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89 (1993); A. Samuel
Oddi, The InternationalPatent System and Third World Development: Reality or
Myth?, 1987 DuKE LJ. 831.
58 See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 4, at 251, 253; Frederick M. Ab-
bott, The WTO TRIPS Ageement and Global Economic Development, 72 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 385, 387 (1996) (noting "substantial agreement" that the TRIPS
Agreement will "likely lead to a transfer of wealth from the developing to in-




One response to this argument is that it is a mistake to view
the TRIPS agreement in isolation, and that the developing nations
traded off a "loss" in the TRIPS context to obtain "gains" else-
where, as in agriculture. 59 Even if this is true, it simply confirms
one of the fundamental differences between linkage issues and
other trade issues. The logic of the collective action model-as
well as that of the efficiency model-suggests that cooperation and
collaboration resulting in a reduction of trade distortions and an
expansion in trade will always benefit both the domestic welfare
of the liberalizing state and global economic welfare. However,
in linkage issues, trade expansion will likely benefit some states at
the expense of others. For this reason, a model that sees the cen-
Carsten Fink, The Economic Justification for the Grant of Intellectual Property
Rights: Patterns of Convergence and Conflict, 72 CH.-KENT L. REV. 439 (1996);
Garlos Alberto Primo Braga, The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights and
the GA T: A View from the South, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 243, 256 (1989)
(noting that "it is important to recognize that for a Third World country a re-
form designed to increase intellectual property rights protection will tend to
generate a welfare loss at its initial stages ). Other commentators have argued
that increased levels of protection may not even be Kaldor-Hicks efficient,
namely, the gains in economic welfare for the nations who benefit from height-
ened protection may not outweigh the losses to those nations who suffer from
it. See, e.g., Deardofff, supra note 54, at 501-05.
'9 See Abbott, supra note 53, at 471; John H. Jackson, GA TTand the Future
of International Trade Institutions, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 11, 13 (1992)
(suggesting that developed nation gains from agreements in services and intel-
lectual property rights be traded off against market access for agricultural and
textile product).
Another response is that developing nations will actually benefit from the
TRIPS agreement because enhanced eve s of IP protection will attract increased
levels of-foreign investment and technology transfer. While plausible, com-
mentators suggest that empa support f6r this argument is "sketchy and an-
ecdotal." TREBILCOCK & Hz-OWSE, supra note 4, at 252 (citing Everson, Global
Intellectual Property Rights Issues in Perspective, in GLOBAL DIMENsIONS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (M.B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993));see also
Abbott, supra note 53, at 390-91 (reviewing conflicting studies and noting the
absence of empirical evidence on this point).
A final response is to acknowledge the developingnations' "loss" resulting
from heightened IP protections, but to also point to t e important concessions
to developing nations' interests included in other provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement. For example, the Agreement includes a number of transition peri-
ods of which developing nations may take advantage. See TRIPS Agreement
art. 65. Further, TRIPS requires developed nations to provide incentives for
their companies to transfer technology to least-developed nations. See id art.
66(11. See Alison Butler, The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights:
What Is at Stake?, BULL. FED. RESERVE BANK ST. LOUIS 34 (Nov.-Dec. 1990)
(stating that developed nations should compensate developing nations for short-
1998]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J Int'l Econ. L.
tral international trade "problem" as one of cooperation and col-
laboration, with nations having a common interest in achieving a
common objective, will tend to obscure the difficult distributional
issues that are at the heart of many linkage issues.
61
Stated differently, an analytic flaw in game theoretic ap-
proaches, such as that used in the collective action model, is that
the explanatory and predictive power of these theories are driven
by the "payoff matrix."62 These payoffs, however, are always ex-
ogenous to the models. In other words, these particular payoffs
are simply assumed.63 Moreover-and even more unrealistically-
game theoretic models frequently assume that the payoffs nations
enjoy from collaboration are symmetric.64 As these outcomes are
invariably (and arbitrarily) predetermined, these models shed no
light on how the net benefits from cooperation are distributed
among various nations. But nations are rarely similarly situated,
term redistributive effects resulting from heightened intellectual property pro-
tections).
61 For political science perspectives on the collective action model's failure
to recognize the centrality of distributional issues at the time of the GATT's
founding, see Goldstein, supra note 47, at 201-02; Milner, supra note 37, at 489.
62 Payoff matrices depict the costs and benefits that states receive from co-
operation or defection. See Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the Law, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 1291 (1990) (reviewing ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO GAMETI-EORY (1989)).
63 "Standard game-theoretic analysis takes the payoffs of the parties in a
ame for a given combination of strategies as unalterable." Wayne Eastman,
Eaverything's Up for Grabs". The Coasean Story in Game-Theoretic Terms, 31
NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 4 (1996); see also ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION
OF COOPERATION 8-9 (1984) (noting that an unalterable payoff structure is an
essential element of prisoners' dilemmas); Abbott, Prospectus, supra note 34, at
356 ("Assigning payoffs is both the most important and the most problematical
aspect of definig a game. Payoffs are intended to represent subjective prefer-
ences, but true subjective preferences are necessarily fictional in the case of a
collective, inanimate entity like a state."); Milner, supra note 37, at 489.
64 Conventional presentations of the Prisoner's Dilemma:
typically [are] done in such a way that not only do the players have a
symmetric rank-ordering of outcomes, but the magnitude of cardinal-
value payoffs for each player is exactly equal in the mutual cooperation
and mutual noncooperation outcomes .... The assumption underpin-
ning this practice--wrhich is never expressed explicitly-must be that,
in either mutual cooperation or mutual noncooperation, players
achieve similar payoffs or believe this to be so. Neither assumption
may be valid ....




RETHINKING INTERNA TIONAL TRADE
national interests are typically asymmetrical, 65 and disagreements
over the distribution of the benefits of cooperation are precisely
what drive the linkage issues.
66
The challenge linkage issues pose to the collective action
model go deeper. These issues also challenge the premises upon
which the collective action model is built. As explained above,
this model incorporates classic realist assumptions about the
monolithic state.6 But linkage disputes reveal that this view of
the unitary, rational, maximizing state is incomplete and mislead-
ing.
68
Consider, for example, the extraordinary maneuverings be-
hind the U.S. Clean Air Act provisions challenged in the ver7
first "trade and environment" dispute considered by the WTO. 9
Under this law, all gasoline sold in the nation's most polluted re-
gions must, by 1995, be reformulated so as to reduce automotive
pollution. After Congress passed this provision, extensive nego-
tiations ensued among the oil industry, environmental groups and
Executive Branch officials, and the EPA issued a rule giving in-
dustry various options (for a three year period) on how to meet
65 On the increasing asymmetry among nations, see SUSAN STRANGE, THE
RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POwER 13 (1996). The idea that
asymmetrical interdependence can be a source of power has long been recog-
nized in political science. See ALBERT 0. HiRsCHMAN, NATIONAL POWER
AND THE STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN TRADE (1945).
6 Stated more formally, in the strategic environment in which trading na-
tions find themselves, situations that appear to be Prisoner's Dilemmas often
entail Coasean bargaining. See Dunoff, Death of the Trade Regime, supra note 2.
For an exploration of the relationship between the Prisoners' Dilemma and the
Coase Theorem, see Wayne Eastman, How Coasean Bargaining Entails a Pris.
oner's Dilemma, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89 (1996).
67 See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
68 Again, it is not only the linkage issues that suggest that the realist vision
of nation-states is misleading. See, e.g., Stephen D. Krassner, Compromising
Westphalia, 20 INT'L SECURITY 115 (1995-96). The realist model has been under
sustained attack by, among others, scholars attempting to articulate a liberal
conception of the international community. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Burley, To-
ward an Age 9f Liberal Nations, 33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 393 (1992); Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Liberal International Relations Theory and International Economic
Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 717 (1995). For an excellent attempt to
articulate the liberal project in the "trade and environment" context, see Bene-
dict Kingsbury, The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy, the World Trade Organization,
and the Liberal Project to Reconceptualize International Law, 5 Y.B. INT'L ENV'T
L. 1 J1994).
6 The challenged rule is set forth at 40 C.F.R. SS 80.40-.130 (1995). My
discussion of this ispute draws upon the analysis set out by Kingsbury. See
Kingsbury, supra note 68.
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the statutory standard. After much debate, it was decided that
foreign refiners should not enjoy a similar menu of options for
the three year period. This threatened to adversely and signifi-
cantly affect Venezuela, which had a substantial share of the gas
market in the northeast through its state-owned Citgo chain, and
whose fuels are high in certain types of pollutants. However, this
differential treatment was strongly supported by Sun Oil Com-
pany-not coincidentally, Citgo's main northeastern competitor
for the gasoline market. Venezuela objected to this rule, with
some support from the U.S. State Department, which apparently
focused more on the diplomatic and foreign policy aspects of the
dispute. In February 1994, Venezuela raised the issue in the
GATT. This created considerable negotiating leverage, given the
differential treatment afforded foreign producers under the rule.
70
Following bilateral consultations, the U.S. Trade Representative's
office reached a "settlement" with Venezuela under which the
EPA would reconsider the rule, and Venezuela would not pursue
GATT dispute resolution proceedings.7 1 The EPA then issued a
new proposed rule, providing that, under certain conditions, for-
eign refiners would enjoy the same treatment as domestic refiners.
Sun Oil opposed the new rule,72 arguing that USTR had capitu-
lated to Venezuela's demands. Sun lobbied congressional sup-
porters of the original rule, and thereafter Congress added a pro-
vision to an EPA appropriations bill blocking the EPA's revised
rule.73 At this point Venezuela raised the issue in the new WTO,
and following briefing and a hearing, a dispute resolution panel
found the EPA's rule to be inconsistent with the GATT.7 4 The
U.S. appealed, and the WTO Appellate Body affirmed this re-
sult.75 In December 1996, the U.S. announced that, within fifteen
70 See, e.g., Venezuela May Seek GA TI Panel on Reformulated Gas Sales in
U.S., Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), at D10 (Mar. 9, 1994).
71 See USTR Official Says Deal on Reformulated Gasoline Only Temporary,
Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), at D3 (April 1, 1994); Venezuela Resistance Ebbs as
EPA ShiftsAir Policy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 1994, at C15.
72 See Guy deJonquieres & Leyla Boulton, Struggle to Jump Green Barriers:
The WTO is Caught Between Environmental Concerns and Boosting Free Trade,
FIN. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1995, at 19.
73 See Department of Veterans Affairs, and Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 103-327, 108
Stat. 2298, 2322 (1994).
74 See United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gaso-




months, it would change its rule-due to expire on January 1,
1998 in any event-to comply with the Appellate Body report.
76
For present purposes, the merits of the challenged regulation
and the panels' reasoning are of less interest than are the com-
plex, halting, and at times contradictory positions of "the United
States" in this matter, and the essential role played by non-state
actors, such as private industry and interest groups. There actu-
ally was no "U.S. position," but a variety of different positions
held by Congress, the State Department, the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, and the United States Trade Representative.77
This, and other, GATT disputes suggest that national and interna-
tional economic policies are "made and administered by an in-
creasingly heterogeneous and intricately overlapping group of
participants, interacting in ever more varied arenas."78 Classic ra-
tionalist assumptions about the unitary rational state, incorpo-
rated into the collective action model, seem ill-equipped to ex-
plain such state behavior. Indeed, in many ways the reformulated
gasoline dispute can be better understood as a sophisticated and
multi-track political and economic dispute between Citgo and Sun
Oil over the gasoline market in the northeast, than as a dispute
75 See United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gaso-
line, Report of the Appellate Body, Gatt Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996)
reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 603 (1996). For a more detailed analysis of this report, see
Steve Charnovitz, New WTO Adjudication and its Implications for the Environ-
ment, Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA), at 851 (1996).
76 See Foreign Refiners Get Individual Baselines, Fair Treatment, Under EPA
Revised Rule, Int'l Env't Daily (BNA) (May 2, 1997). This followed an oppor-
tunity for public comment on how to comply with the WTO decision. See 61
Fed. Reg. 33703 (1996).
Inter-agency conflict is not limited to the trade realm. An impressive
body of literature discusses the extensive inter-agency negotiation process that
proceeds the articulation of the "U.S. position" in the context of treaty negotia-
tions. See, e.g., RICHARD ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW
DIRECTIONS IN SAFEGUARDING THE PLANET (1991) (discussing "the inter-
agency minuet" regarding international negotiations leaIng to ozone treaties);
Phillip R. Trimble, Arms Control and International Negotiation Theory, 25
STAN. J. INT'L L. 543 (1989) (describing arms control treaty negotiation from a
theoretical perspective). Similar domestic, political, and bureaucratic conflict
can occur ii the context of treaty withdraval as well. See Abram Chayes, An
Inquiry into the Workings of Arms Control Agreements, 85 HARv. L. REv. 905
(1972j; Robert D. Putnam, Diplomac and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427 (1988).
i7 nBJacquesdeLiSe, Of ChineSeWalls, Batterng Ramsa  uidin Permits:
Five Lessons o InerainL Econ Lw from in5 (1996) and In-
vestmen Rltos17UPAJ.ITLE N.L51,25(996).
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between the sovereign nations of Venezuela and the United
States.79 Again, a model that assumes that state interests and be-
havior are the key variables to be analyzed-as the collective ac-
tion model does-will miss the important roles played by private
individuals, interest groups and business in influencing the na-
tional and international policies of nations.
80
4. LINKAGE ISSuES AND THE EMBEDDED LIBERALISM MODEL
4.1. The Embedded Liberalism Model
Yet a third model that purports to explain the international
trading system is the "embedded liberalism" model. Most closely
identified with the writings of John Ruggie,8 1 this model focuses
79 I explore these issues in more detail in Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Problematizing
the Public-Private Distinction in WTO Dispute Resolution (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author), where I use the Reformulated Gasoline and
Kodak-Fuji disputes to illustrate the ways in which private parties are able to
use public interna l leg rocesses to serve private ends. For a good recent
example of interest group uence in the creation of U.S. domestic trade pol-
icy, consider the Administration's unsuccessful attempts to include provisions
on the Caribbean Basin Initiative ("CBI) parity in the recent tax bill. As one
staffer closely involved in the issue summarized the outcome,"[w]e've certainly
learned our lesson ... We 've been through this twice and Fruit of the Loom
has succeeded both times in blocking the measure .... That's the end of [the
issue]." GSP in Tax Package but CB1 Does Not Make Cut, Int'l Trade Daily
(BNA), at D3 (July 30, 1997).
80 The argument that linkage issues challenge the conventional realist vi-
sion of states is not equivalent to an argument that states have now been ren-
dered irrelevant. See, e.g., John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Prob-
lematizing Modernity in International Relations, 47 INT'L ORG. 139, 157-60
(1993) (noting that the emergence of postmodern political forms challenges tra-
ditional understandings of states without consigning them to irrelevance);
Janice E. Thomson & Stephen D. Krasner, Global -Transactions and the Consoli-
dation of Sovereignty, in GLOBAL CHANGES AND THEORETICAL CHALLENGES
(Ernst-Otto Czempiel & James N. Rosenau eds., 1989) (saying that claims thatstates are irrelevant are "fundamentally misplaced").
Ruggie is the former Dean of the School of International and Public Af-
fairs at Co umbia University. For purposes of this essay, I have drawn on the
following works: MUILTILATERALISM MATTERS, supra note 47; John Gerard
Ruggie, Embedded Liberalism Revisited: Institutions and Progress in International
Economic Relations, in PROGRESS IN POSTWAR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
201 (Emanuel Adler & Beverly Crawford eds., 1991) [hereinafter Ruggie, Em-
bedded Liberalism Revisited]; JOHN GERARD RUGGIE, WINNING THE PEACE:
AMERICA AND WORLD ORDER IN THE NEW ERA (1996); John Gerard Ruggie,
At Home Abroad, Abroad at Home: International Liber'alization and Domestic
Stability in the New World Economy, 24 MILLENNIUM 507 (1994) [hereinafter




less on the economic or collective action justifications for the
GATT and more on its political foundations. Under Ruggie's
formulation, one of the principal goals of the GATT's drafters
was the creation of a multilateral, nondiscriminatory trade sys-
tem. However, they did not embrace the efficiency model and
were far from being doctrinaire free traders.8 2 They instead rec-
ognized and were responsive to the widespread public rejection of
nineteenth century laissez-faire capitalism, 83 and the correspond-
ing demand for state intervention in domestic economies to pro-
tect against the dislocations associated with economic liberaliza-
tion. Thus, for example, for the British "the goal of trade policy
gimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic
Order, 36 INT'L ORG. 379 (1982) [hereinafter Ruggie, Embedded Liberalism]. A
similar understanding of the GATT's origins can be found in the writings of G.
John Ikenberry. See, e.g., G. John Ikenberry, Creating Yesterday's New World
Order: Keynesian "New Thinking" and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement, in
IDEAS AND FOREIGN PoLIcY: BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL
CHANGE 57 (udith Goldstein & Robert Keohane eds., 1993) [hereinafter Gold-
stein & Keohane]; G. John Ikenberry, The Political Origins of Bretton Woods, in
A RETROSPECTIVE ON THE BRETrON WOODS SYSTEM 155 (Michael Bordo &
Barry Eichengreen eds., 1992).
82 As a former State Department trade policy analyst stated: "No one was
committed to 'free trade'; no one expected anything like it; the term does not
appear in the GATT, which simply calls for a process of liberalization with no
stated objective." William Diebold, Jr.,From the ITO to GATT-And Back?, in
THE BRETrON WOODS-GATT SYSTEM: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT AFTER
FIFTY YEARS 152, 158 (Orin Kirshner ed., 1996). See also Jacob Viner, Conflicts
of Principle in Drafting a Trade Charter, 25 FOREIGN AFF. 612, 613 (1947)("[T]here are few free traders in the present-day world, no one pays any atten-
tion to their views, and no person in authority anywhere advocates free
trade.").
While this political reality-which is inconsistent with the assumptions of
the efficiency model-is often overlooked in current trade scholarship, it was
forcefully articulated in two of the leading contemporaneous accounts of the
inter-war years. See EDWARD HALLETT CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISES,
1919-1939 (1946); KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944).
Dean Ruggie, in his 1994 Jean Monnet Lecture, pointed out this similarity in
what are otherwise two dramatically different accounts of that historical era.
See Ruggie, Embedded Liberalism Revisited, supra note 81.
83 A contemporaneous account by the lead U.S. negotiator at the time
states:
There is no hope that a multilateral trading system can be maintained
in the face of widespread and protracted unemployment. Where the
objectives of domestic stability and international freedom come into
conflict, the former will be given priority .... It would be futile to
insist that stability must always give way to freedom. The best that
can be hoped for is a workable compromise.
CLAIRE WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE 131 (1949).
1998]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J Int'l Econ. L.
was full employment; trade liberalization was an acceptable strat-
egy only to the extent that it met this goal."84 Given these politi-
cal constraints, the diplomatic puzzle was how to design a liberal
economic system that would maintain an active domestic role for
the state.
8 5
The embedded liberalism model understands the GATT as in-
corporating a series of complex compromises designed to achieve
these varied ends. Thus, while the agreement was designed to
progressively lower tariffs and other trade barriers, its drafters
also included a diverse set of exceptions and exemptions designed
to protect a variety of domestic social policies.8 6 For example, al-
though quantitative restrictions were generally prohibited, they
were expressly permitted for balance of payments difficulties,
"explicitly including payments difficulties that resulted from do-
mestic policies designed to secure full employment."17 Through a
series of such compromises, the GATT was structured in a man-
ner that sought gains from trade but simultaneously "promised to
minimize socially disruptive domestic adjustment costs as well as
any national economic and political vulnerabilities" resulting
from international specialization. 8 Dean Ruggie has labeled this
compromise structure "embedded liberalism": a form of eco-
nomic liberalism embedded in a larger commitment to interven-
tionist domestic policies.8 9 Under this model, the "embedded lib-
84 Goldstein, supra note 47, at 215. As the British negotiator stated, the
purpose of multilateral trade agreements was to"achieve an agreement as to the
manner in which the nations can co-operate for the promotion of the highest
level of employment and the maintenance of demand and can bring some de-
gree of regulation into world trade and commerce." RICHARD GARDNER,
STERiiNG-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY 271 (1969).
85 See Ruggie, Embedded Liberalism, supra note 81, at 393.
86 See id. at 393.
87 kLd at 397 (italics omitted). Frieder Roessler has suggested that this provi-
sion addressing the relationship between trade and monetary policies was one
of the first linkage issues addressed by the GATT. Frieder Roessler, Domestic
Policy Objectives and the Multilateral Trade Order, in THE WTO AS AN
INTERNATIONAL INSTrTUTION (Anne 0. Krueger ed., 1997).
88 Ruggie, Embedded Liberalism, supra note 81, at 399. More recent trade
liberalization efforts are often accompanied by similar efforts to cushion the
domestic impacts of liberalized trade. A good recent example of this is the
NAFTA Transitional Adjustment Assistance Act, designed to mitigate any
negative impacts the NAFTA might have on U.S. workers. 19 U.S.C. S 2331
(1996).




eralism" compromise reflected a form of multilateralism compati-
ble with the requirements of domestic stability.90
4.2. Challenges to the Embedded Liberalism Model
Again, the linkage issues present a challenge to this under-
standing of the trade regime. First, the embedded liberalism
compromise afforded nations wide latitude over their domestic
policies, free of interference by other nations. But successful chal-
lenges to, for example, environmental or labor practices, and new
WTO disciplines in other linkage areas, limit government author-
ity in these areas and tend to undermine the policy tolerance cen-
tral to the embedded liberalism compromise. In short, "countries
which reduce international barriers to either goods or capital sac-
rifice domestic autonomy in the hope of a higher standard of liv-
ing. 0
1
Moreover, this loss of autonomy does not affect all govern-
ments and interests equally.92 Rather, the disciplines imposed by
the WTO are more likely to significantly constrain progressive or
left governments than conservative or right governments." The
expanded trade regime has placed pressure on nations with "high"
90 Id. at 399 (noting embedded liberalism would "minimize socially disrup-
tive domestic adjustment costs"). Ruggie's account of the embedded liberalism
compmise has not gone unchallenged. See Anne-Marie Burley, Regulating the
Worl: Multilateralism, International Law, and the Projection of the New Deal
Regulatory State, in MULTILATERALISM MATTERS, supra note 47, at 125
(focusing on the domestic roots of the existence of international institutions,
rather than the ways in which these institutions have had to accommodate do-
mestic interventionism); Goldstein, supra note 47, at 225 (noting that embedded
liberalism was an "unintended consequence" of a series of political compromises
designed to ensure U.S. and British participation in international trade regime).
Assaf Razin & Andrew Rose, Business Cycle Volatility and Openness, in
CAPITAL MOBILITY: THE IMPACT OF CONSUMPTION, INVESTMENT AND
GROWTH (Leonardo Leiderman & Assaf Razin eds.; 1994).
92 The nature of economic liberalization's effects on domestic politics var-
ies across nations due to, inter alia, inequality among states, see Andrew Hurrell
& Ngaire Woods, Globalization and Inequality, 24 MILLENNIUM 447 (1995), as
well as differing political and economic conditions. See, e.g., INTERNA-
TIONALIZATION AND DOMESTIC POLITICS (Robert 0. Keohane & Helen Mil-
ner eds., 1996) [hereinafter INTERNATIONALIZATION] (exploring effects of
globalization on various industrialized democracies, former socialist nations,
andarts of the developing world).
See, e.g., Helen V. Milner & Robert 0. Keohane, Internationalization
and Domestic Politics: An Introduction, in INTERNATIONALIZATION, supra note
92, at 16-18. In this regard, increased capital mobility will likely have a greater
impact than trade openness. Id. at 18.
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environmental regulations and "low" intellectual property stan-
dards. Similarly, other forms of economic liberalization, includ-
ing increased capital mobility, tend to reduce the efficacy of gov-
ernment intervention in the economy and to liberate market
forces, thereby constraining the prospects for progressive political
strategies.94  Moreover, the liberalization that gives rise to the
linkage agenda also privileges certain domestic interests over oth-
ers.95 For example, to the extent that trade and investment liber-
alization give mobile firms bargaining advantages over relatively
immobile labor, they can threaten "exit" to magnify their "voice"
in domestic politics.
%
Second, by constraining governments' policy options, the
trade regime's expansion into linkage areas also affects the embed-
ded liberalism compromise as it historically worked at the domes-
tic level. As previously explained, under this compromise, gov-
ernments were to have wide latitude to intervene in domestic
economies to manage the dislocations caused by trade liberaliza-
tion. But, by restricting the regulatory and policy tools that gov-
ernments can use, GATT's expansion into new areas of domestic
policy threatens jovernments' ability to deliver their end of this
"social compact." To mention just one example: over time, the
social compact in poverty-stricken India has included the provi-
sion of inexpensive pharmaceuticals. Consequently, under Indian
law, patents have not been available for pharmaceutical prod-
ucts.9' As Indira Gandhi told the World Health Assembly, "[t]he
idea of a better ordered world is one in which medical discoveries
14 For nuanced treatments of this argument, see Geoffrey Garrett, Capital
Mobility, Trade and the Domestic Politics of Economic Policy, 49 INT'L ORG. 657
(1995); Geoffrey Garrett & Peter Lange, Political Responses to Interdependence:
What's "left"for the Left?, 45 INT'L ORG. 539 (1991). It is possible to distinguish
between the effects caused by reductions in barriers to trade and reductions in
restrictions on capital mobility. See, e.g., Razin & Rose, supra note 91.
95 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Frieden & Ronald Rogowski, The Impact of the Inter-
national Economy on National Policies: An Analytical Overview, in INTER-
NATIONALIZATION, supra note 92, at 25, 36-42.
96 See Milner & Keohane, supra note 92, at 243, 244.
97 See Ruggie, International Liberalization, supra note 81, at 524.
98 The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39 Sec. 5(a)-(b) (1970) (India). For more on
the history of Indian Patent law and the treatment of pharmaceuticals, see B.K.
Kayla, Patent Protection and the Pharmaceutical Indstry, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 151 (K.R.G. Nair & Ashok Kumar eds., 1994); HEINZ
REDWOOD, NEW HORIZONS IN INDIA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF PHAR-




will be free of patents and there will be no profiteering from life
and death."99 But, under the TRIPS Agreement, the Indian gov-
ernment will be obliged to provide patent protection to pharma-
ceuticals, which will likely increase the cost of medicines, and im-
pede the government's ability to deal with India's crushing
poverty.10 As GATT disciplines continue to expand into new
substantive areas, governments may discover, with increasing fre-
quency, that they have inadvertently subverted their ability to
manage the domestic consequences of liberalized trade in goods,
services and capital.' 0 '
Moreover, these limits on domestic regulatory options in
linkage areas threaten to provoke a negative reaction from the
public. Public reaction to the GATT's "tuna-dolphin" panel re-
ports, or to the labor issues raised by the NAFTA, illustrate that
public concern over linkage issues will not be limited to a particu-
lar panel report or recommendation, but can turn into a more
general hostility toward trade regimes.102  The political dynamic
R. Michael Gadbaw & Leigh A. Kenny, India, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 86 (R. Michael
Gadbaw & Timothy J. Richards eds., 1988) (quoting from May 1, 1982 address).
100 See, e.g., Patents: The U.S. Turns on the Heat; India: U.S. Complains to
World Trade Organization that Country Fails to Give Patent Protection-for Phar-
maceutical and Agricultural Chemicals, Bus. WORLD, Aug. 28, 1996. The In-
dian example has even led aprominent advocate of liberalized trade, Jagdish
Bhagwati to acknowledge before a Senate Subcommitte that WTO expansion
into linkage areas threatens to overreach, and hence prompt a public bacdash.
Similar issues arise in the dispute on India's balance of payments system and
import restrictions on various consumer goods. See, e.g., India's Import Control
Compromise Not Enough to Resolve WTO Dispute, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), at
D7 (July 2, 1997) (noting that the Indian Prime Minister cannot make addi-
tional concessions on import tariffs "because of domestic political restraints").
101 See, e.g., Ruggie, International Liberalization, supra note 81. For sophis-
ticated treatments of this issue, see INTERNATIONALIZATION AND DOMESTIC
POLrrIES (Robert Keohane & Helen V. Milner eds., 1996); Geoffrey Garrett,
Capital Mobility, Trade and the Domestic Politics of Economic Policy 49 INT'L
ORG. 657 (1995).
Moreover, this incapacity highlights the growing asymmetry among sover-
eign states in their ability to exercise authority over the domestic economy.
For more on this, see STRANGE, supra note 65, at 13.
102 Significantly, this backlash cuts across the domestic political spectrum.
For example, after the WTO Appellate Body concluded that provisions of the
U.S. Clean Air Act were GATT-inconsistent, Senator Bob Dole stated: "We
should decide what our environmental laws should be. We should decide what
kinds of regulations are necessary to protect our environment. We should de-
cide that our children deserve cleaner air and purer water, not some bureaucrat
in Geneva." Dole Calls for Passage of Bill to Set Up WTO Review Commission,
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that resulted in President Clinton's failure to obtain "fast-track"
authority illustrates how these concerns can be exploited in ways
that threaten to undermine multilateral trade initiatives. This is
why the perception that trade bodies have overstepped their ap-
propriate limits can easily escalate into a larger lejitimacy critique
that undermines public support for trade regimes.
These political tensions reflect a deeper challenge that linkage
issues pose to the embedded liberalism model. That model is
premised upon a sharp distinction between matters within domes-
tic jurisdiction and those of international concern. However, the
emergence of the linkage issues reflects the blurring of the line be-
tween domestic and international economic policy. Increasingly,
the "international" includes any policy which has an important
impact on international transaction flows.' 4 This explains the
pressures for WTO disciplines in new areas. Any such efforts,
however, in the areas of intellectual property, labor, environ-
ment, and competition unavoidably challenge the assumptions
underlying the embedded liberalism model.
For all of these reasons, the trade regime's expansion into
linkage areas tends to undermine the conventional understanding
of that regime as embodied in the "embedded liberalism" model.
Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), at D4 (May 3, 1996). Dole repeated his calls for pas-
sage of a WTO review commission to prevent U.S. rights from being"trampled" in Geneva. See id
Environmental activists sounded similar themes:
In its outcome, tone, and reasoning, the ruling of the World Trade Or-
ganization's appellate body against U.S. Clean Air Act rules provides a
real life example of the WTO's threat to environmental and health
protections, democratic policy making and national sovereignty ....
Of course, it is the World Trade Organization, not U.S. policy, which
needs to be changed. The Clinton Administration and the Republican
Congress must not cave-in to the World Trade Organization.... As a
policy matter, the U.S. must draw a line: international trade law can-
not be made by secretive panels on an ad hoc basis.
Lori Wallach, Director of Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch,Press Statement
ofApr. 29, 1996 Oast modified Apr. 30, 1996) < http://igc-apc.org/Press/>.
I develop this argument in Jeffrey L. Dunoff, "Trade and": Recent Devel-
opments in Trade Policy and Scholarship-And Their Surprising Political Implica-
tions, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 759 (1997). For a more generalized approach
to the legitimacy issue in the context of the trade regime, see Paul B. Stephan,
Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 681 (1997).




5. TOWARD A NEW MODEL?
If linkage issues undermine the conventional models, should
trade scholars attempt to develop a new model of the trade re-
gime?10 5 What utility might a new model have? This section out-
lines some of the ways in which a new model would be useful. It
then demonstrates that, to date, trade scholarship has not sug-
gested a new model, and very briefly suggests why such a model is
highly unlikely. Finally, it identifies a paradox that this poses for
WTO efforts to resolve linkage disputes.
5.1. The Power ofldeas
Why might a new model of the trade regime be useful? The
deceptively simple reason is that in economic policy, as elsewhere,
ideas matter.10 While it is now fashionable in international legal
scholarship to focus on the role of interests in trade policy, do-
mestic and international trade policy cannot be explained satisfac-
torily solely in terms of international or domestic economic in-
terests. Rather, as a number of international relations scholars
suggest, attention should be paid to the role and power of ideas.10 7
105 Rather than develop a new model, one might instead attempt to reform
and rehabilitate the old models. For present purposes, I take no position on
whether more sophisticated economic or game theoretic models could account
for the difficulties described above. My interest is in the models used in inter-
national legal discourse. Trade lawyers and international law scholars are gen-
erally unlikely to keep abreast of the most recent theoretical writings in other
disciplines including, for example, economics and political science, and are un-
likely to successfully use more complex models -borrowed from these disci-
plines. Indeed, a central virtue of the conventional models is their relative sim-
plicity. International lawyers would be more likely to use a new simple model
than an improved but relatively more complex version of one of the conven-
tional models.
106 The claim that ideas exert an independent influence upon economic pol-
icy has a long and distinguished lineage. Max Weber famously called ideas the
"switchmen" on history's tracks," and John Maynard Keynes emphasized the
influence of "defunct economists" upon political leaders. See JOHN MAYNARD
KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY
383 (1936); Max Weber, Social Psychology of the World Religions, in FROM MAX
WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 267, 280 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds.,
1958) ("Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men's con-
duct. Yet very frequently 'world images' that have been created by 'ideas' have,
like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by
the dynamic of interest.").
1 Recent political science works that explore this theme include,JuDmi
GOLDSTEIN, IDEAS, INTERESTS AND AMERICAN TRADE POLICY (1993); ERNST
HAAS, WHEN KNOWLEDGE IS POWER: THREE MODELS OF CHANGE IN
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The argument here is not that ideas are the determinate force in
trade policy-making; rather the more limited claims are (1) an
overemphasis on state interests is incomplete, and an approach
that recognizes the power of ideas is a valuable, if not necessary,
supplement to current or future understandings of the trade re-
gime; and (2) significant changes in trade policy require the devel-
opment of a theoretical alternative to the dominant model(s).
Following other authors who examine the role of ideas in pol-
icy, I understand the terms "ideas" and "models" to refer to
"principled beliefs," which specify "criteria for distinguishing
right from wrong, and just from unjust," "causal beliefs" which
"derive authority from shared consensus of recognized elites," and
worldviews.' 0 8  Many important economic ideas-including the
three models outlined above-incorporate each of these aspects.
It is well beyond the scope of this Article to attempt to de-
scribe the intricate and complex interplay between economic
ideas, state power, administrative structure and domestic interest
groups. Rather, I very briefly summarize only a small portion of
a large body of political science writings on the power of ideas.
While this literature argues that ideas influence policy-making, the
difficulty comes in describing this role. I read the literature to
suggest that ideas are important in several different ways. Perhaps
most importantly, they can provide "road maps" to policy mak-
ers, increasing clarity about goals or strategies for achieving par-
ticular goals. 0 Given continuing uncertainty over the basic
workings of the trade system," 0 and the difficulty of accurately
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (1990); PETER HALL, POLITICAL POWER
OF ECONOMIC IDEAS (1989); IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY (Robert 0. Keo-
hane & Judith Goldstein eds., 1993); KATHRYN SmKINK, IDEAS AND IN-
STITUTIONS: DEVELOPMENTALiSM IN ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL (1991).
Trenchant criticisms of the "ideas literature" can be found in Mark W. Blyth,
Any More Bright Ideas? The Ideational Turn of Comparative Political Economy,
29 COMP. POL. 229 (1997); Mark Laffey & Jutta Weldes, Beyond Belief- Ideas
and Symbolic Technologies in the Study ofInternational Relations, 3 EUR. J. INT'L
REL. 193.
'0' Goldstein & Keohane, supra note 81, at 8-11, see also, Goldstein, IDEAS,
INTERESTS AND AMERICAN TRADE POLICY, supra note 107. I believe that
Kuhn's work is an important influence on these descriptions of the power of
economic ideas. See THOMAS J. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1962).
109 See Goldstein, IDEAS, INTERESTS AND AMERICAN TRADE POLICY, su-
pra note 107, at 3, 254; IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 107, at 13-17.
110 As evidence of this confusion, consider that many leading scholars em-




predicting the effects of various policies, political actors "must
rely on conceptual frameworks to make sense of the world and
their place in it.""' In other words, "a state perceives its interna-
tional economic interests on the basis of a set of ideas or beliefs
about how the world economy works and what opportunities ex-
ist within it."" 2 These ideas or beliefs guide government officials
as they identify national interests and goals. But the identification
of interests and goals is not, in itself, sufficient to generate policy.
Inhabiting a world "shrouded in uncertainty" and marked by lim-
ited information and bounded rationality, policy makers fre-
quently may not know which among several strategies will pro-
duce a desired outcome. Under such conditions, ideas can suggest
causal relationships and rationales for action." 3 Stated differently,
"these policy ideas can function like flashlights, guiding policy
makers by illuminating a specific path through the darkness of
crisis and confusion, and providing policy makers with strategies
for governance."
n4
Ideas also exert political influence by making possible the re-
shaping of domestic political alignments. A classic example is
postwar economic policy in Britain." 5 Broadly speaking, the La-
bour government was committed to nationalization and central
planning to promote efficiency and growth, while the Conserva-
tive opposition embraced a traditional laissez faire policy, and de-
nied any governmental responsibility for economic stability and
growth. It appeared that no common ground was possible. But
both parties subsequently embraced Keynesian economic ideas,
including ideas about macro-economic demand management, al-
though for different reasons. As Albert Hirschman argues,
"[h]ere is an excellent example of how a new economic idea can
affect political history: it can supply an entirely new common
the theories underlying these models appear to be inconsistent. See, e.g., Daniel
A. Farber, Environmental Federalism in a Global Economy, 83 VA. L. REV. 1283,
1287 (1997) (identifying examples of inconsistencies).
11 KATHLEEN R. McNAMARA, THE CURRENCY OF IDEAS: MONETARY
POLMCS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 57 (1998).
11 Ngaire Woods, Economic Ideas and International Relations: Beyond Ra.
tional Neglect 39 INT'L STUD. Q. 161, 161 (1995).
113 See Goldstein & Keohane, supra note 81, at 16.
114 MCNAMARA, supra note 111, at 58.
115 This discussion follows Margaret Weir, Ideas and Politics: The Acceptance
of Keynesianism in Britain and the United States, in POLmcAL POWER OF
ECONOMIC IDEAS, supra note 107, at 53.
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ground for positions between which there existed previously no
middle ground whatever."116  Generalizing from this and other
examples,1 7 political scientists argue that ideas can act as "focal
points that define cooperative solutions or act as a coalitional
glue."118
Moreover, ideas have power when they become embedded in
political institutions. For example, U.S. trade law has incorpo-
rated various ideas about "unfair" trade over the years. But even
when an idea that prompts a law falls out of favor, it does not
necessarily follow that the law justified by this idea gets repealed.
Rather, laws and institutions are 'sticky,' and laws typically re-
main available for parties to invoke and courts to apply. This
persistence of otherwise outdated ideas through institutional iner-
tia helps to explain the otherwise incoherent patterns of protec-
tionism found in U.S. trade law." 9 This argument is congruent
with a central theme of this paper: the three dominant models
have outlived their usefulness, yet continue to exert substantial in-
fluence over our understanding of the international trade system.
Finally, this literature suggests that significant changes in trade
policy must be preceded, or accompanied, by the development of
a politically salient theoretical alternative to the dominant model.
The leading alternative to the dominant efficiency model for
many years, however, has been protectionism. This is hardly a
politically viable alternative; it is closely associated with failed
Depression-era trade policies, and-quite properly-lacks wide-
spread public or elite support. At present, as at the time of
GATT's founding, fears that protectionism will produce retalia-
tory trade restrictions, declining trade, and economic contraction
haunt policymakers.120
To date, legal scholarship on international trade has paid little
attention to the role of ideas. But the "ideas literature" stands as
116 Albert 0. Hirschman, How the Keynesian Revolution Was Exported from
the United States, and Other Comments, in POLITICAL POWER OF ECONOMIC
IDEAS, supra note 107, at 347, 356.
117 Other examples are identified in Peter A. Hall, Introduction, in PO-
IICAL POWER OF ECONOMIC IDEAS, supra note 107, at 3, 12-13.
118 IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 107, at 17-20.
119 See, e.g., Michael Borrus & Judith Goldstein, United States Trade Protec-
tionism: Institutions, Norms, and Practices, 8Nw. J. INT'LL. & BUS. 328, 332-36
(1987); Judith Goldstein, The Political Economy of Trade: Institutions of Protec-
tion, 80 AM. POL. SC. REV. 161, 164-66 (1986).




an implicit critique of several more common approaches to trade
law and policy. First, it takes aim at those who dismiss ideas as
mere ideology, or worse, as illusions and propaganda. 2 1  While
ideas can surely be used for purely instrumental purposes, as
demonstrated above, this is not the only role they play in the pol-
icy arena.
Second, the "ideas literature" challenges those who understand
trade policy as simply a subset or component of a nation's overall
international relationships. An important strand of international
political science literature argues that a nation's trade policy re-
flects its relative power position in the international system. This
power derives from, inter alia, the relative size and economic
strength of the nation vis-a-vis other nations, and is thought to
drive different trade strategies. But this argument cannot ex-
plain why nations with similar "power" pursue different trade
policies, or why nations maintain their commitments to a particu-
lar trade policy, even when that nation is experiencing a relative
gain or decline in its "power." Similarly, it cannot explain why
nations simultaneously pursue more liberal policies in certain sec-
tors, such as manufactured goods and services, and more interven-
tionist policies in other sectors, such as agriculture.
23
Finally, the "ideas literature" stands as an implicit critique of
public choice scholars who explain trade policy as a result of in-
terest group deal-making. Identification of the relevant interests
and parties is a valuable exercise, but it rarely tells the whole
121 For a strong version of this argument, see Stephen Krasner, Westphalia
and All That, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 107, at 238, 257
("Ideas have not made possible alternatives that did not previously exist; they
legitimated political practices that were already facts on the ground. Ideas have
been one among several instruments that actors have invoked to promote their
own mundane interests.").
122 See, e.g., DAVID LAKE, POWER PROTECTION AND FREE TRADE: THE
INTERNATIONAL SOURCES OF UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL STRATEGY 1887-
1939 (1988); Robert 0. Keohane, The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes
in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977, in CHANGE IN THE INTER-
NATIONAL SYsTEM 131 (Ole R. Iolsti et al. eds., 1980); Stephen D. Krasner,
State Power and the Structure of International Trade, 28 WORLD POL. 317, 317-
19 (1976).
"3 See Judith Goldstein, The Impact of Ideas on Trade Policy: The Origins of
U.S. Agricultural and Manufacturing Policies, 43 INT'L ORG. 31, 31-33 (1989)
(outlining how the U.S. pursued widely divergent policies in manufacturing and
agricultural sectors in the post-War period).
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story. 24 While a nation may support an expanding economy,
high wages, stringent environmental protections, and the liberal
international economic order, identification of the relevant inter-
ests is typically insufficient for predicting any particular policy
outcome when governments attempt to harmonize such incom-
patible goals. Again, attention to the power and roles of ideas
serves as a useful supplement to the more traditional ways of ana-
lyzing trade policy. Moreover, calling attention to the role of
ideas may be particularly important at a time when public choice
and other explanations that understand trade policy as reflecting
material interests are ascendant.
5.2. Does Scholarship on Linkage Issues Suggest a New Model?
As linkage issues have moved from the periphery to the center
of the political agenda, a critical body of scholarship has emerged.
Much of this scholarship purports to critique the ways in which
the trade regime has approached linkage issues. "Trade and envi-
ronment" is perhaps the most contentious of the linkage issues,
and provides an important illustration of these arguments.
The environmental community has identified a number of
concerns associated with liberalized trade. First, they argue that
liberalized trade may promote unsustainable consumption of
natural resources and increased waste production. ' 5 Second,
trade liberalization agreements contain market access provisions
that can be used to challenge domestic environmental regula-
tions.126 Third, nations with lax environmental regulations are
thought to enjoy a competitive advantage in a global marketplace,
creating political pressure in nations with high environmental
standards to reduce their level of environmental protection.
127
124 See generally Jeffrey L. Dunoff, From Green to Global: Toward the Trans-
formation of International Environmental Law, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 241,
261-63 (1995) (critiquing public choice analysis of domestic and international
trade poicy).
125 ESTY, supra note 16, at 2.
126 The Tuna-Dolphin dispute is the most famous illustration of this point.
Id. at 29.
127 See idi at 1-2. Empirical support for the competitiveness claim appears
to be limited. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Understanding Asia's Economic and
Environmental Crises, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. (forthcoming 1998)
(reviewing various studies); Kristen H. Engel, State Environmental Standard Set-ting: Is There a Race" and Is It "To the Bottom'?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 321-37
1997) in domestic context, that environmental standards are a minorfactor inn mocation decisions); Richard B. Stewart, EnvironmentalRegulation
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Finally, environmentalists seek the ability to use trade measures as
leverage in global environmental protection efforts.
128
Many trade law specialists have strongly resisted arguments
raised in much of the critical scholarship, insisting that the envi-
ronmentalists' agenda threatens to undermine the liberalized trade
regime.129 This scholarship has been attacked for urging a greater
freedom for national governments to regulate trade in restrictive
ways. From this perspective, the environmentalists' arguments
sharply challenge the trade regime's raison d'tre, which is to limit
the ability of national governments to interfere with trade. A re-
lated objection is that the critics' arguments for imposing duties
on, or banning trade in, products produced in environmentally
harmful ways undermine the doctrine of comparative advantage,
the phenomenon that drives international trade in the first
place.
130
A shift in perspective, however, might suggest that the hostil-
ity of trade specialists to much of this "critical" scholarship should
be tempered. For instance, that even the environmental and labor-
critics of trade regimes define the problems as "trade and..." top-
ics, already presupposes a certain perspective on the issues. The
"critical" scholarship is largely devoted to discussions of how en-
vironmental or labor issues can be accommodated within the ex-
isting (or slightly modified) b6dy of international trade law.
and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039 (1993) (arguing that
competitiveness effects of environmental regulations are modest).
12s See ESTY, supra note 16, at 2.
"Many trade scholars-both lawyers and economists-view the increas-
ing preoccupation with 'fair trade' [associated with environmental and labor
standards] as the most fundamental challenge or threat to the liberal trading or-
der that has arisen in recent decades." Robert Howse & Michael J. Trebilcock,
The Fair Trade-Free Trade Debate: Trade, Labor and the Environment, 16 INT'L
REv. L. & ECON. 61 (1996) (citations omitted). A representative sampling of
traditional scholarship can be found in FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION,
supra note 3. Similar sentiments are voiced by the corporate community. At a
recent American Society of International Law Annual Meeting, an IBM
spokesperson declared: "Frankly, I don't view trade and environment-'green
trade'-as the biggest threat to trade. I view the whole panoply of trade and is-
sues as the threat to trade." Khristine Hall, Trade and the Environment: The
Business Point of View, 1994 AM. SOC. INT'L L. PROC. 495, 495.
130 See, e.g., Piritta Sorsa, GA 7T and Environment, 15 WORLD ECON. 115,
123 (1992) (stating that such trade measures would "work against the re-
ali[z]ation of comparative advantage... [and] would undermine the rule-based
nature of the GATT and would reduce the opportunities for gains from spe-
ciali[z]ation through trade").
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Thus, as outlined above, discussions of coercive labor practices or
abysmal environmental laws are often transformed into discus-
sions of implicit subsidies or competitive advantage.',' Similarly,
"critical" scholarship devotes substantial attention to perceived
shortcomings in the GATT/WTO dispute resolution procedures,
and suggests a number of reforms in these processes. But, by as-
suming the priority of trade law, and by assuming that linkage is-
sues will be resolved pursuant to trade body procedures, critics
implicitly assure the privileging of trade values over labor and en-
vironmental values. 1 2  In this sense, the "critical" scholarship
lacks significant critical bite.
A similar conclusion results when we focus on the structure,
rather than the details, of the critics' argument. When critics ar-
gue that disparate regulations distort trade flows, and that gov-
ernments should intervene to correct these distortions, they pre-
suppose the existence of "undistorted" or "normal" trade flows.
33
That is, they presuppose the priority and autonomy of interna-
tional markets in goods. 34 In short, the "critics" tend to adopt
the most fundamental assumptions of the efficiency model and
therefore tend to reinforce the assumptions underlying the domi-
nant model of the trade regime.
For these reasons, the linkage literature that is ostensibly criti-
cal of the trade regime neither offers nor suggests a new model.
But perhaps, as Alexander Bickel famously suggested, "[n]o an-
swer is what the wrong question begets."' 5  Perhaps the critics,
including myself, have been mistaken in criticizing this literature
for failing to develop a new model. Indeed perhaps the very
131 For a recent example in the labor area, see generally, Ehrenberg, supra
note 22 (asserting that forced and child labor violates customary international
law and should be considered a state subsidy under the WTO).
132 See Dunoff, Institutional Misfits, supra note 7.
133 See Ileana M. Porras, The Puzzling Relationship Between Trade and Envi-
ronment: NAFTA, Competitiveness, and the Pursuit of Environmental Welfare
Objectives, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 65, 79 & n.20.
134 For critiques of the idea of autonomous international markets, see Ken-
neth W. Abbott, "Economic" Issues and Political Participation: The Evolving
Boundaries of International Federalism, 18 CARDozo L. REv. 971 (1996); Dun-
off, supra note 103, at 759; Joel R. Paul, Free Trade, Regulatory Competition and
the Autonomous Market Fallacy, 1 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 29 (1995); Daniel K. Ta-
rullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International Trade, 100 HARv. L.
REv. 546 (1987).
135 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE




search for a new model, akin to the "efficiency" or "collective ac-
tion" models, is itself mistaken. In a very different context-the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution-Larry Lessig
has described two possible responses to doctrinal and theoretical
incoherence in an area of the law:
Come then the theorists, with two sorts of replies. The
first looks for a principle, or set of principles, with which
to explain and justify this complicated array. The idea is
to unify the doctrine around a principled core, and the be-
lief is that there will be this one principle, or small set of
principles, that can stand outside any particular First
Amendment context, yet guide First Amendment inquiry
in every First Amendment context. In this way is the ap-
proach Rawlsian-not in substance but in form. It is the
search for.., the "free speech principle"-the project of
Alexander Meiklejohn, and Martin Redish, and Geoffrey
Stone, and the work of a generation of constitutional law.
The second reply begins not in the sky, as it were, but on
the ground. It asks not what is the free speech principle,
then to be applied in every free speech context, but rather,
what are the contexts within which the free speech princi-
ple applies, and how do these contexts, and the free speech
ideals within them, differ. In political philosophy, it is the
approach of Michael Walzer-asking (about a theory of
justice) not what is the principle of justice that gets applied
in each context of justice, but what are the principles of
justice inherent in the separate spheres within which jus-
tice questions get raised, how do they relate, and how do
we draw boundaries between these separate spheres.
1 36
While I cannot detail the full argument here, I want to suggest
that perhaps we face a similar choice in the linkage context. We
can adopt a Rawlsian approach and attempt to generate a
136 Lawrence Lessi , Post Constitutionalism, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1422, 1422-
23 (1996) (citations onutted).
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"linkage" principle that will guide inquiry in all of the linkage ar-
eas. But such attempts, to date, have proven exceedingly unsatis-
factory. It may be more likely that there is no simple principle or
parsimonious model that can neatly tie together the disparate
threads running through the various linkage issues. Perhaps, as
suggested above, the relationships among the competing values
implicated in the various linkage issues are simply too complex to
collapse into a model where one or a few values are prioritized as
fundamental. If so, then international trade scholars ought to dis-
continue their attempts to fashion a new model; instead they
ought to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the various
models available, and pull from each of these models insights that
can help illuminate the difficult challenges posed by the linkage
issues.
5.3. Linkage Issues and WTO Dispute Resolution: A Paradox
Many of the features that render linkage issues so difficult for
the conventional models also render them difficult for WTO dis-
pute resolution. Many trade scholars have criticized panels for re-
solving linkage disputes in a way that obscures or ignores the con-
flicting values at stake. We have urged panels to more
forthrightly articulate and balance the diverse interests at issue.
But notwithstanding this scholarship, panels continue to slight the
underlying values. Why is this?
When evaluating WTO approaches to linkage issues, we
should pay close attention to the institutional roles and politics of
the WTO. In particular, it is instructive to contrast WTO dispute
resolution with other domestic and international fora. When a
domestic legislature or international negotiating body confronts,
for example, a trade and environment issue, there would be rela-
tively little objection to it openly announcing that it is resolving a
value conflict through majoritarian processes. We expect such
bodies to confront and resolve conflicting values. But this is not
true of WTO panels. While there has long been debate over
whether GATT dispute resolution should be a "rule-based" sys-
tem or a more flexible, diplomatic mechanism, 137 the Uruguay
137 See JOHN H. JAcKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND
PoLIcY OF INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMIc RELATIONS 85-88 (1989) (claiming
that the diplomatic mechanism would have at least implicit reference to the




Round Dispute Settlement Understanding represents a clear vic-
tory for the leglists who advocated a rule-based, binding adjudi-
catory system. WTO dispute resolution is not supposed to be
simply another forum for the resolution of politicized value con-
flicts.
Ironically, panels that created and applied sensitive, multifac-
tored tests truer to the underlying values at stake in linkage issues
would undermine their institutional position. Why? Precisely
because of the ways in which-as the contributions to this Sym-
posium demonstrate-the linkage issues are so controversial and
contested. To be sure, many issues of international trade policy
are contested. But the linkage issues are today contested in a par-
ticular way, one that appears to take them outside of the "legal"
domain and squarely into the "political" domain. 39 WTO panels,
like domestic courts, have maximum legitimacy when they work
with clear legal authority or apply non-controversial understand-
ings to particular fact patterns. But when there is no clear author-
ity or shared understandings, a court's, or WTO panel's, decision
will appear inappropriately "political." The heightened politicali-
zation of many of the linkage issues renders them, at present, ef-
fectively non-justiciable. Thus, much of the most influential
scholarship on linkage issues asks WTO panels to draw difficult
lines in the midst of a larger political struggle; but it is precisely
this contestedness that would make it difficult for a panel to apply
any nuanced test in a way that would appear consistent. Inconsis-
tent results in these areas would be understood as a signal that
WTO panels were using politics-not law-to resolve particular
disputes. However, particularly given the understandings con-
tained in the Uruguay Round's Dispute Settlement Understand-
ing, the "delegalization" of WTO dispute resolution proceedings
threatens the delegitimization of these proceedings. As a leading
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51, 69-78 (1987); Dunoff, InstitutionalMisfits, supra note 7,
at 1124-25; Phillip R. Trimble, International Trade and the "Rule of Law," 83
MICH. L. REv. 1016 (1985).
138 This discussion assumes a distinction between "law" and" olitics" that
has been under sustained attack. For present purposes, I assume t ie validity of
this distinction, which is at the heart of much writing about GATT/WTO dis-
pute resolution.
139 The arguments here draw heavily on Lawrence Lessig's similar set of
arguments regarding the adjudication of contested issues by domestic courts.
See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORD. L. REv. 1365
(1997; Lessig, Post Constitutionalism, supra note 136; Lawrence Lessig, Under-
standing Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395 (1995).
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proponent of legalized, rule-based dispute resolution states,
"[i]nappropriate panel 'activism' could well alienate members,
thus threatening the stability of the GATT/WTO dispute settle-
ment procedure itself."'
40
All of this suggests a paradox. As scholars, it should be part of
our mission to identify and weigh the various competing interests
in controversial linkage areas. To do so constitutes a theoretical
advance. But to be useful, a theory must be capable of practical
application. And a critical dimension of current practice is the in-
stitutional constraints WTO panels operate under. What an ele-
gant theory of the linkage issues needs is a politically salient way
to apply it.
141
In short, I now believe that it is no answer to say that WTO
panels should "struggle openly" about the value conflicts raised by
linkage issues; in this context, open struggle is likely to be self-
defeating. 42 So our dilemma is that while the three conventional
models are no longer adequate, no new overarching model is
likely to replace them. Our paradox is that while the panels' ju-
risprudence seems terribly ill-equipped to sensibly resolve trade
issues, the development of a more refined and appropriate ap-
proach by WTO panels seems politically unfeasible.
6. CONCLUSION
In recent years, linkage issues have moved to the forefront of
trade policy and scholarship. However, these issues have proven
to be particularly difficult and divisive. In this Article, I have
tried to demonstrate several of the ways in which these issues
challenge our conventional understandings of the trade regime. In
particular, I have shown how the linkage issues problematize each
of the three leading models-the efficiency, collective action, and
embedded liberalism models-used to describe the trade regime.
These new issues thus demonstrate the practical and theoretical
need for reconceptualizing our understanding of this regime.
I have then tried to show that, notwithstanding these short-
comings, the traditional models-and in particular the efficiency
model-nevertheless have important political consequences. In
140 Croley & Jackson, supra note 35, at 212.
141 See Lessig, Post Constitutionalism, supra note 136, at 1449 (making simi-
lar arguments about courts in the domestic context).
14 See Croley & Jackson, supra note 35, at 212; Lessig, Post Const-
itutionalism, supra note 136, at 1449.
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particular, I have outlined how liberalized trade and the triumph
of the efficiency model affect domestic politics, and how they
constrain national autonomy. Moreover, I have suggested that
those who oppose these policies must generate their own model
of the trade regime. Absent such a model, the reformers are un-
likely to be able successfully to advocate for policy changes.
I then suggested that the "critical" scholarship on linkage is-
sues is unlikely to generate a new model, and introduced a
broader argument against the likelihood of a new model to re-
place the conventional models. This leads to a difficult paradox
when WTO panels hear controversial linkage disputes: While the
development and application of complex multi-factored analyses
may be entirely appropriate in linkage areas, the institutional po-
sition of WTO dispute resolution panels makes this politically
unfeasible.
The end of the effectiveness of the leading models does not
mean the end of international trade, or of the WTO/GATT sys-
tem. To the contrary, international trade continues to expand,
and the WTO/GATT system is surely alive and well. But poli-
cymakers, scholars and citizens can understand these develop-
ments more or less accurately. I have argued that the linkage is-
sues render conventional understandings of the trade regime no
longer viable. By exploring insights from economic, political sci-
ence, and legal scholarship, this Article implicitly calls for a crea-
tive synthesis of ideas and insights from various disciplines as part
of our efforts to rethink international trade.
1998]
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TRADE AND JUSTICE: LINKING THE TRADE
LINKAGE DEBATES
FRANKJ. GARCIA*
"I think we get very tangled up when we say, What is our hu-
man rights policy and how does it interact with our trade policy?... I
do not believe that human rights should be a key element of trade pol-
icy....
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the linkage between international trade and
various other aspects of social life and concern, or as it is com-
monly referred to, the "trade and "phenomenon, has been the
subject of increasing attention within academic and policy circles.
2
* Frank J. Garcia, Assistant Professor, Florida State University ("FSU")
College of Law. This Article is a revised version, in essay form, of a paper pre-
sented by the author at a conference entitled, "Linkages as a Phenomenon: An
Interdisciplinary Approach," sponsored by the American Society of Interna-
tional Law's International Economic Law Interest Group in December, 1997.
The author would like to thank the conference participants for their valuable
insights, and his colleagues Paolo Annino, Lois Shepherd, and Jim Rossi for
their comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Work on this Article was sup-
ported by a summer grant from the FSU College of Law. This Article is a pre-
liminary reflection undertaken as part of a larger inquiry into the relationship
between political philosophy and contemporary international economic law,
begun while the author was a Fulbright Scholar in the spring of 1997 in Uru-
guay. The author would like to thank Dr. Oscar Sarlo of the University of the
Republic in Montevideo, Uruguay, for his invaluable support and insight dur-
ing the early stages of this project, and the Fulbright Commission for its finan-
cial support.
Claudia Dreifus, Ready for Takeoff, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 17, 1997, S 6
(Maazine), at 30 (quoting Philip M. Condit, C.E.O., Boeing Company).
Trade linkage is not a new phenomenon, particularly with regard to the
link between trade and labor standards. See Virginia Leary, Workers Rights and
International Trade, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 175, 182-85
9Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996) (examining the link between
domestic labor standards and international competitiveness asserted in nine-
teenth century labor reform debates); Frieder Roessler, Domestic Policy Objec.
tives and the Multilateral Trade Order, in THE WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL
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The response from the trade community to such linkages has not
been one of unalloyed welcome.' However, rather than respond
to the multitude of issues and problems being linked to trade in
ORGANIZATION 213 (Anne 0. Krueger ed., 1998), reprnted in 19 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 201 (1998) (noting links between employment, balance of pay-
ments issues, and fair labor standards recognized in 1947-48 conference leading
to the Havana Charter and in the Charter itself. However, in the last five
years the literature devoted to these and other linkages has mushroomed, with
the trade and environment link arguably leading the way. See, e.g., DANIEL C.
ESTY, GREENING THE GATT (1994); Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade,
Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 459 (1994). Other
recognized or asserted linkage fields include: human rights, see, e.g., James F.
Smith, NAFTA and Human Rights: A Necessary Linkage, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
793 (1994); Patricia Stirling, The Use of Tr;ade Sanctions as an Enforcement
Mechanism for Basic Human Rights: A Proposal for Addition to the W orld Trade
Organization, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1996), development, see, e.g.,
Bartram S. Brown, Develo ing Countries in the International Trade Order, 14 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 347 (1994), competition law,see, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Toward
Worl Antitrust and Market Access, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1997), intellectual
poperty, see, e.g., Frank J. Garcia, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in the
o Am ercan Free rade Ageement A Successul Ca se ofRegional Trade Regu-
lation, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 817 (1993), and culture, see, e.g., John
David Donaldson, "Television Without Frontiers" The Continuing Tension Be-
tween Liberal Free Trade and European Cultural Integrity, 20 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 90 (1996); W. Ming Shao, Is There No Business Like Show Business? Free Trade
and Cultural Protectionism, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 105 (1995), to name a few. See
generally Jeffrey L. Dunoff, "Trade and: Recent Developments in Trade Policy
and Scholarship-And Their Surprising Political Implications, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& BUS. 759 (1996-97) (assessing recent linkage scholarship).
Some links, like investment and intellectual property, have been readily
received by the trade community, as is evidenced by their inclusion in modern
trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA"), see North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, chs.
11, 17, 32 I.L.M. 639, 670, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures ("TRIMS") and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
("TRIPS"), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994). However, other links to areas such as the
environment, human rights, and competition law are resisted, see, e.g., Steve
Charnovitz, The World Trade Organization and Social Issues, 28 J. WORLD
TRADE 17, 24 (1994) ("The issues of environment and labour are often reviewed
rather negatively by the trade camp."); Fox, supra note 2, at 10-12 (noting that
the United States resists the linkage between trade and antitrust law); Smith,
supra note 2, at 806-17 (charting U.S. reluctance to embrace disciplined unilat-
eral human rights linkages); Spencer W. Waller, The Internationalization ofAn-
titrust Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. REV. 343, 344-45 (1987) (noting that interna-
tional attempts at integrated transnational competition law are generally
ineffective, with the United States playing an ambivalent role), and cautionary
notes are sounded about linkage in general. See, e.g., Roessler, supra note 2, at
14-15 (arguing that such linkages undermine both the trade order and attain-




the manner that a ship captain might rail against a sudden increase
in barnacles, 4 the trade law and policy community should wel-
come this abundance as a sign of the increasing prevalence and
impact of trade law throughout all aspects of the societies of coun-
tries engaged in trade, economic integration, and international
economic relations generally. This dramatic increase in the quan-
tity, scope and reach of international economic law is often re-
ferred to as the "'international economic law revolution,'" 5 and
the trade linkage phenomenon is one aspect of it.
As international economic law increases in scope and effect, it
will become increasingly important to define which issues, prob-
lems, and questions are legitimately within its jurisdiction, and
how such issues are to be decided. As international economic re-
lations grow more sophisticated, cooperative, and legalized, the
rules and decisions of international economic law encroach more
and more on other areas of social concern, such as environmental
protection, labor law, development assistance, and non-economic
human rights. Are these other areas of concern alien to interna-
tional economic law, and are the linkages and conflicts among
these issues and traditional trade law and policy mere "border
conflicts," conflicts at the margin? Or are they central, even con-
stitutive, of modern international economic law? And how shall
these issues and conflicts be decided?
It is in this context that recognition of the role of justice in in-
ternational economic law can make a contribution to the analysis
of the "trade and " debates. A re-examination of the classical
roots of the Western concept of justice, i.e., Justice as Right Or-
der,6 and the relationship between justice, or morality generally,
Roessler exhibits a note of weary frustration by stating:
Many of the proposals to pursue environmentalobjectives through the
multilateral trade order have features that resemble those of past failed
linkages between trade policy instruments and domestic policy objec-
tives. Again proposals are made that would permitthe use of trade
measures in the pursuit of policy objectives that cannot be attained ef-
ficiently with trade policy instruments. And, again, the hoped-for
cross-fertilization is likely to turn into cross-contamination.
Roessler, supra note 2, at 15 (emphasis added).
5 See Joel P. Trachtman, The International Economic Law Revolution, 17 U.
PA.J. INT'L ECON. L. 33, 36 (1996).
This Article confines itself to the moral and political tradition that traces
its ancestry to classical Greece. Outside of the West, other traditions explore
fundamental questions of social order under different rubrics, such as i or
dbarma. See generally SuRYA P. SINHA, LEGAL POLYCENTIuCITY AND
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and law, suggests that, in fact, we must consider the claims of jus-
tice when we try to talk about international economic law.
Moreover, as this Article will seek to illustrate, certain problems
in international economic relations, including trade linkage prob-
lems, can usefully be examined as problems involving the often
conflicting claims of justice in the context of international eco-
nomic law.
Section Two of this Article introduces the concept of justice as
a sort of "linkage" itself, joining order with value in legal and so-
cial thought, and outlines how justice as "Right Order" is related
to the analysis of international economic law. Section Three ap-
plies this view to the "trade and - " debate, suggesting how such
an analysis could contribute to our understanding of trade linkage
problems. As the title of this Article suggests, such an examina-
tion reveals that the question of justice is actually implicit in the
many "trade and " linkages currently under discussion. Un-
derstanding how this is so may contribute to improving the ques-
tions being asked, and perhaps suggest what the answers might
look like.
2. JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
2.1. Justice as Right Order
In the Western tradition, thinking about justice and its rela-
tion to law is as old as organized political life, indeed as old as the
tradition itself.9 In Protagoras, Plato writes that a sense of justice
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996) (surveying Western, Chinese, Indian, and African
approaches to social order). It may be that in these traditions such concepts
play an analogous role to the concept of justice, linking order to value in social
life, but that is a question left for another day.
7 Philip Nichols suggests that many trade disputes, and in particular dis-
putes involving linkage issues, conceal underlying conflicts in societal values.
See Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 NW. U. L. REv. 658, 659-61
(1996).
8 This Article does not develop or adopt a substantive conception of jus-
tice, for example, a Rawlsian conception of justice as fairness. The Article aims,
rather, to suggest how the concept of justice might function in our analysis of
international economic law.
9 See, e.g., CARL JOACHIM FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 191 (2d ed. 1963) (noting that the problem of the




is a prerequisite to living a civic life, to living in community.'0
Why? Because the non-violent resolution of disputes, a corner-
stone, if not the sine qua non, of civic life, requires that losing par-
ties understand outcomes as "right," as consistent with fundamen-
tal values." In other words, as "just."
Over 2,000 years later, we find social psychologists stating, in
modern parlance, essentially the same point. Klaus Scherer, in his
introduction to an interdisciplinary study of justice research,
writes that justice, understood as social outcomes justified by re-
course to principles accepted by the community, is a basic and in-
dispensable principle for any kind of human social association.
1 2
This assertion relies on the grounds that human beings exhibit a
powerful emotional response to the perception of injustice that no
social system can afford to ignore.
The notion of social outcomes, then, is essential to any mean-
ingful concept of justice. 13 When we speak of justice, however,
we speak of social outcomes not in a descriptive sense, but in an
evaluative or justificatory sense. In other words, we speak of the
acceptability of outcomes. 14 If we consider an outcome just, we
consider it acceptable, and its acceptability involves reference to
particular criteria. Thus our notion of justice is quite closely
linked conceptually and etymologically to justification.1
5
The particular criteria by which the acceptability of an out-
come is evaluated will depend on the theoretical framework used
for the analysis, and on the discipline posing the general ques-
10 See PLATO, PROTAGORAS 20-21 (Benjamin Jowett & Martin Ostwald
trans., Liberal Arts Press 1965).
1 See id.
12 See Klaus R. Scherer, Issues in the Study of Justice, in JUSTICE: INTER-
DISCIPLINARY PERsPEcTIvEs 1-14 (Klaus R. Scherer ed., 1992).
13 In emphasizing social outcomes, this Article does not mean to deny the
importance to the study of justice of the processes of outcome allocation,
known in law and social psychology as procedural justice, to an overall theory
of justice. See John Bell, Justice and the Law, in JUSTICE: INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12, at 127 (noting the centrality of procedural justice
to legal writing on justice); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice Research, 1 SOC.
JUST. RES. 41 (1987) (surveying contemporary psychological research on proce-
dural justice).
14 See John Bell & Eric Schokkaert, Interdisciplinary Theory and Research on
Justice, inJUSTICE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12, at 237.
15 See Scherer, supra note 12, at 2; see also SERGE-CHRISTOPHE KOLM,
MODERN THEORIES OF JUSTICE 7 (1996); Jeremy Waldron, Theoretical Founda-
tions of Liberalism, 37 PHIL. Q. 127 (1987).
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tion. 16 While a social scientist may study the effects of certain
variables on our evaluations of acceptability, such as the subjective
influence of social representations on individual perceptions of in-
justice; the effects of status, achievement, power, and social
stratification on the distribution of social goods;" or the effects of
different principles of distribution on the economic system, 19 it
falls to philosophy, in particular moral and political philosophy,
to articulate the substantive moral principles by which we judge
the acceptability of individual and social behavior.
Moral and political philosophy are concerned with the order
we bring to our social relations, both on the level of individual
decisions and relationships, and in terms of the basic structure of
our social institutions.20 Phrased in terms of the acceptability of
outcomes, moral and political philosophy provide certain modes
of justification, namely, in terms of moral and political norms, for
individual decision-making and social organization.
The classical roots of our tradition of political philosophy
yield two fundamental, related, but significantly different starting
points on the nature of the concept of justice: the Platonic and
the Aristotelian.21 While neither explicitly replaces the other, and
16 Disciplines which have studied the question of justice include: philoso-
phy, law, psychology, sociology, and economics. In each discipline, the justifi-
cation of outcomes is studied in a slightly different aspect. See generally Scherer,
supra note 12, at 11-14.
17 See Kjell Tbrnblom, The Social Psychology of Distributive Justice, in
JUSTICE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12, at 177-236
(discussing social psychology).
I8 See Wil Arts & Romke Van der Veen, SociologicalApproaches to Distribu-
tive and Procedural Justice, in JuSTIcE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, su-
pra note 12, at 143-76.
19 See Erik Schokkaert, The Economics of Distributive Justice, Welfare and
Freedom, in JUSTICE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12, at 65-
113. Scherer notes that, normatively, economic analyses of justice may advance
the substantive position that efficiency equals justice. See Scherer, supra note
12, at 10, 12.
20 See WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLICAL PHILOSOPHY 6
(1990). The distinction, never very clear, between moral and political philoso-
phy can be expressed as follows: moral philosophy concerns the questions of
what we are to do, and political philosophy concerns that subset of questions
involving what we are to do when state power and authority are involved.21 Ral o
I am following Rawls in relying on a distinction between the "concept"
of justice and the many varying "conceptions" of justice, the former consisting
of "the role which these different sets of principles, these different conceptions,




both in fact are complementary, each emphasizes a different as-
pect of justice, and both have had a fundamental influence in
shaping our culture's investigation of justice.2
Plato's sense of justice is comprehensive and magisterial. Jus-
tice is .Riht Order, both within the individual soul and within
the polis. Put another way, it is the concept of Justice that links
the terms according to which social life is organized with a theory
of value, or what is "Good."24 The "Rightness" of a given order
depends on the particular relationship of the parts to the whole,
which depends on other matters including a theory of human na-
ture and a theory of value.25 But the function of the concept of
justice, independent of the substantive conception, is to link the
Tom Campbell objects to the concept/conception distinction regarding
justice, questioning whether any putative "concept" of justice can truly be neu-
tral regarding substantive principles of justice. See TOM CAMPBELL, JUSTICE 5-
6 (1988). However, in proposing his concept of justice as "treatment in accor-
dance with desert," Campbell reveals that he has blurred the con-
cept/conception distinction and is, in fact, advancing a substantive conception
ofjustice as a concept of justice. Id In this Article, I have sought to preserve
this distinction in advancing the concept of justice as Right Order, which I be-
lieve more closely approximates Campbell's own criteria for a neutral func-
tional concept.
22 See FRIEDRICH, supra note 9, at 26 (crediting Plato and Aristotle with
together laying the foundation for all subsequent inquiries into law and justice
in the West).
2 See id at 13 (describing the root of Plato's comprehensive concept of jus-
tice in pre-Socratic notions of law as nomos, or sacred custom, which "is the or-
der which embraces all").
24 Friedrich acknowledges that for Plato there is a close and essential link
between law and ethics. See id at 15, 18; see also HANS KELSEN, WHAT IS
JUSTICE? 101 (1957) (noting that Platonic justice rests on the idea of the Good).
25 In other words, the substantive view of justice Plato adopts is a particu-
lar account of the proper order among the elements of society, based on-his par-
ticular view of human nature and the Good. In Plato's case, the order advo-
cated-his substantive theory of justice-is one of justice as "rational control,"
with the philosopher king at the head; the guardians in between; and the arti-
sans at the bottom. See PLATO, REPUBLIC, 441e-442d, 444d (G.M.A. Gube
trans., 1992). It is a hierarchy of rational ability and character traits, in which
each takes the place most fitting for his or her particular constellation of abili-
ties and traits. Those with the more prized of the Greek virtues-valor and ra-
tionality-are accorded pride of place. It is not an egalitarian vision, nor is it
particularly attractive to a modern audience.
Later Platonists such as Augustine would modify the nature of the relation-
ships according to more egalitarian principles, while maintaining the funda-
mental Platonic insight that justice is Right Order. See Ernest L. Fortin, St
Augustine, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 180-91 (Leo Strauss & Jo-
seph Cropsey eds., 3d ed. 1987).
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social order to a theory of the desirable state or outcome of social
relationships.26 In other words, the acceptability of the particular
social order depends on its resemblance to the Good.27 Thus, for
Plato, any question concerning the organization of social life can
be framed as a question concerning justice.
28
In contrast, Aristotle's analysis of justice, while arguably more
influential, is somewhat narrower and more technical than
Plato's. Aristotle's inquiry into justice begins with a distinction
between justice in general as the supreme virtue,29 and secific
forms of justice, with the latter being his principle interest. Spe-
cific forms of justice and injustice concern aspects of one's social
relations that involve gain, and whether what one has gained one
has gained "graspingly" or in proportion to one's proper share.
Out of this distinction arises the further distinction between
types of specific justice for which Aristotle is best known: the
distributive and the corrective. 3' Distributive justice is "that
which is manifested in distributions of honour or money or the
other things that fall to be divided among those who have a share
in the constitution," which may be allotted among its members in
equal or unequal shares. 32 This aspect of specific justice thus in-
volves the division of social goods, of goods which can be divided
26 See discussion supra note 21.
2 See Alan Ryan, Introduction to JUSTICE 15 (Alan Ryan ed., 1993) (stating
that, for Plato, Justice holds all the other virtues in place, and in this way is a
mirror for reason itself).
28 See id. at 7 (stating that, for Socrates, justice is inherent in the organiza-
tion of the whole, whether the whole in question is the individual soul or soci-
ety in general).
This discussion may have particular relevance in connection with the trade
and environment debate. See infra notes 109-18 and accompanying text.
29 Aristotle describes general justice, or justice in the broadest sense, as con-
sisting of all aspects of one's relationship to one's fellows conducted according
to virtue, and injustice, in this sense, as conducting such relationships in a man-
ner contrary to virtue. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in INTRODUCTION
TO ARISTOTLE, 300, bk. V, ch. 1 (Richard McKeon ed., 1947) [hereinafterEth-
ics]. In this characterization of the concept of justice Aristotle is clearly reflect-
ing Plato's views.
30 See id. at 400-02, bk. V, ch. 2.
31 Subsequent commentators on justice generally take this distinction as
their starting point. See Ryan, supra note 27, at 9 (noting that most modern
writers on justice begin with these two distinctions). It is less frequently re-
called that this distinction follows the earlier distinction between general, or
Platonic, justice and specific justice.




or allocated, and which can be divided socially, by custom, opin-
ion, informal decisions, and formal allocative mechanisms.33  In
order to evaluate a particular division, one need only identify the
particular conception of justice, the substantive principle, which
would guide such allocative decisions towards a just result.
Corrective justice is a restorative form of justice; of putting
into balance something that has come out of balance because of an
injustice.3" It could be considered the elimination of gain from
acts of injustice. 36 If, as a result of voluntary or involuntary deal-
ings with one's fellows, a party ends up with either more or less
than what is properly its share of the subject of the transaction,
37
Aristotle would say that this is an injustice, and the solution to
33 The notion of division among members of a group or community, or
those who "have a share in the constitution," a, raises the question of whether
this aspect of specific justice applies to any group in which allocation of social
goods occurs, or if some particular type of socia or political link, i.e., one that
requires a shared constitution or membership in a polity, is a precondition to
the claims of distributive justice. This issue arises again in the contention that
distributive justice does not apply to trade agreements because, to the extent
they affect such allocations, they do so across polities and do not affect mem-
bers of the same polity. Of course, one can argue that trade agreements them-
selves form a sort of constitution, creating the relevant type of relationship
among all individuals who are subject to their provisions. See discussion infra
note 61.
34Aristotle's substantive principle of distributive justice is akin to our no-
tion of equality or fairness, but like Plato's version, it is not an egalitarian fair-
n.ess. Aristotle did not conceive of a society of equals, but one of proper shares,
in which ability, economic status, and character should result in what we would
consider an unequal distribution of goods; it could be called proportionate
equality or proportionate fairness. See Ethics, supra note 29, at 402-04, bk. V,
ch. 3.
" See id at 404-07, bk. V, ch. 4. Corrective justice is often referred to as
retributive, in that it is associated with criminal punishment, but it is not re-
lated to modern notions of retribution and is more properly concerned with
correcting an injustice.
31 Aristotle conceives of corrective justice as applying to what can be trans-lated as "transactions," both voluntary n noutr ns See FRIEDRICH,
supra note 9, at 22 (noting that this distinction roughly mirrors the distinction
between contract and tort .
37 The proper share here is not according to the merit-oriented proportions
of distributive justice, but is more akin to the simple sum of the party's gain less
loss at the start of the interaction, and the change envisioned by the terms of
the interaction itself. See Ethics, supra note 29, at 404-07, bk. V, ch. 4.
Here again, it is useful to recall the distinction between the concept of cor-
rective justice and Aristotle's substantive conception of what constituted cor-
rective justice and injustice.
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this injustice is to restore to each party the balance between loss
and gain that was theirs before the transaction.
3 8
Aristotle's two-fold characterization of justice has been enor-
mously influential. Students of justice, since Aristotle, treat ques-
tions involving the allocation of social goods, such as wealth, ad-
vantage, and opportunity as issues of distributive justice,39 and
questions involving the propriety of gain as issues of corrective
justice. 40 It can sometimes be forgotten that Aristotle himself ac-
knowledged that he was working within a larger framework of
justice as Right Order. 41 When considered in that context, Aris-
totle's categorizations can be seen as enabling us to more precisely
apply the general concept of justice as Right Order to the evalua-
tion of the justice of particular distributive or corrective situa-
tions.
The ensuing history of Western reflection on the problem of
justice involves competing substantive answers to the basic ques-
tion of what constitutes the Right Order, either generally or with
respect to a particular area of social concern. A comprehensive
survey of the dominant substantive theories of justice in the West,
let alone the world, is beyond the scope of this Article, despite its
undeniable relevance to any definitive account of the nature of
justice in international economic law.42 However, in order to
carry out at least the suggestive tasks of the present work, some
38 See id This applies even in the case of physical injury, where Aristotle
acknowledges that it strains the metaphor to speak of the aggressor as gaining
from the injury to the victim. See id
See, e.g., KOLM, supra note 15, at 4 (" ustice is a central question of all
life in society.... [I]t is By nature 'social' and 'distributive. ") (emphasis added).
40 See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRiVATE LAW (1995)
(elaborating an Aristotelian model of the corrective nature of private law).
41 See supra text accompanying note 29. This aspect of Aristotle's analysis
is often misunderstood or criticized. See CAMPBELL, sup-a note 21, at 5 ("[Ilt is
best to follow Aristotle... where, having distinguished between justice as the
'complete virtue' and justice as 'a part of virtue', he goes on to concentrate on
the latter."); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 157-58 (1961) (writing en-
tirely of justice in the specific, Aristotelian sense and criticizing more general
uses of the term).
42 Such a survey is part of a larger project on the general question of justice
in international economic law, from which this Article is drawn. The inter-
ested reader is directed to consult any of the several excellent surveys available.
See generally BRIAN BARRY, THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE (1973);
CAMPBELL, supra note 21; JAMES P. STERBA, How TO MAKE PEOPLE JUST




general observations concerning Western theories of justice are in
order.
To begin with, particular theories of justice, be they liberal or
Marxist, individualistic or communitarian, contractarian or utili-
tarian, share several traits in common.43 First, each theory must
explicitly or implicitly account for the possibility of moral
knowledge. 44 Second, each theory presents a certain account of
the organization of social relations in terms of whatever moral
principles are identified as most relevant. Third, and perhaps
most important for the purposes of this Article, each theory must
present an account of the sort of rationale one must have for any
version of the organization of social relations. Restated in terms
of the acceptability of outcomes, different philosophical theories
of justice provide particular standards of justification or accept-
ability, by which outcomes can be evaluated and accepted or criti-
cized.
Since the Enlightenment, if not the Protestant Reformation,
45
the dominant philosophical approach to matters of government
and society in the West has been liberalism. Liberalism is a noto-
riously difficult term to define. For the purposes of this Article, I
shall adopt the approach suggested by Jeremy Waldron and focus
on liberalism as a theory of justice, a "view about the justification• "46
of social arrangements. In Waldron's reconstruction of liberal-
ism, the liberal commitment to freedom and to respect for indi-
vidual human will and capacities generates a requirement that "all
4' Alasdair Macntyre cautions that it is misleading to compare different
philosophers' substantive views, or conceptions, of justice, on the grounds that
these conceptions are heavily dependent on their context, namely an underly-
ing theory of political rationality and a socio-historic tradition. See ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 1-11, 389-92 (1988).
However, I believe the discussion which follows evades this objection, in that
the common traits identified are the sort of formal qualities of theories of jus-
tice which Macntyre himself investigates and reports.
44 Underlying the search for a persuasive conception of justice is a debate in
moral epistemology. Moral philosophers have been preoccupied, throughout
the last two centuries, with the possibility of moral knowledge. See Bernard
Cullen, Philosophical Theories of Justice, in JUSTICE: INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12, at 17. In other words, a precondition for a per-
suasive theory of justice is the articulation of rationally convincing grounds for
our knowledge of moral categories such as justice.
"s See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xxiv (1993).
46 Waldron, supra note 15, at 128; see alsoMICHAELJ. SANDEL, LIBERALISM
AND THE LIMrs OF JUSTICE 1 (1982) ('L]iberalism' is above all a theory about
justice ... .
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aspects of the social should either be made acceptable or be capa-
ble of being made acceptable to every last individual."47 In other
words, it is a fundamental requirement of liberal theories of jus-
tice that the acceptability of outcomes be demonstrable to any and
all affected individuals.
On this view, the differences among liberal theories of justice
are disagreements over particular principles which claim the abil-
ity to meet this stringent test. Thus, for example, utilitarian,
48
egalitarian 49 and libertarian5 0 theories of justice, while they each
may differ in the types of justification they suggest for outcomes, 5
47 See Waldron, supra note 15, at 128.
48 The utilitarian account of justice is generally traced to the writings of
Mill and Bentham, see JOHN STUART MILL, UTLTARIANISM (1863) and
JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION (1789), reprinted in THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON
TO MILL (Edwin A. Burtt ed., 1967), and until the publication of John Rawls'A
THEORY OF JUSTICE, was considered dominant in the field. See RAWLS, supra
note 20, at 22-27. See generally UTILITY AND RIGHTS (R.G. Frey ed., 1984).
Initially, utilitarianism conceived of the moral rightness of an act in terms of its
capacity to produce happiness for the members of society. See MILL, supra, at
900. "Happiness" has since been generalized into the concept of "welfare" or"utility," variously conceived of as hedonic satisfaction, desirable mental states,
simple preference satisfaction, or rational preference satisfaction. See generally
KYMLICKA, supra note 20, at 12-18.
49 Liberal egalitarianism, of which John Rawls' theory is the foremost ex-
ample, considers justice to be a matter of the equitable distribution of basic so-
cial goods such as rights, resources, and opportunities according to some con-
cept of "fair shares" that limits an otherwise unlimited utilitarian calculation.
See, e.g., RAWLS, supa note 45, at 7-11; Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality?, 10
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185-246, 283-345 (1981). See generallyKYMLICKA, supra note
20, at 50-55.
50 Libertarians assert the fundamental primac of individual rights, in par-
ticular rights to property-broadly conceived, and therefore see justice in terms
of respect for these rights. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND
UTOPIA (1974). See generally KYMLICKA, supra note 20, at 95-98.
51 Utilitarianism would justify outcomes in terms of the degree to which
they maximize utility, regardless of whose utility. In terms of the preference-
satisfaction model ofutility, a just outcome is one which satisfies the greatest
number of informed preferences, even if that means that the preferences of
some will go unsatisfied, and even if, more disturbingly, the inclusion of
"illegitimate" preferences, or preferences for outcomes such as racial discrimina-
tion, which we might question on other moral grounds, means a denial to un-
popular groups of what we would want to consider basic rights. See MILL, su-
pra note 48, at 947 ("[J]ustice is [merely] a name for certain moral requirements
which, [although high on] the scale of social utility, [may be overruled' in the
utilitarian calculus]."). See generally KYMLICKA, supra note 20, at 18-30.
Egalitarian theories would justify outcomes with reference to the particular




are all liberal theories in that they claim to be able to justify out-
comes to any and all affected individuals. 52 What is key in liberal
theories of justice is the centrality of individual liberty and indi-
vidual rights to the purpose and role of government and to the es-
tablishment of the social order generally. In other words, a pre-
condition to justice is that the social order reflect and promote
individual liberty and individual rights.53 The extent to which
each theory differs suggests the conflicts and contradictions
within liberalism; which may also surface as liberal theories of
justice are applied to international economic law.
an outcome will be just if it is in accord with the dictates of the "difference
principle," namely that "[a]ll social primary goods... are to be distributed
equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the ad-
vantage of the least favored." RAWUS, supra note 45, at 303. Libertarianism
would justify outcomes in terms of their degree of respect for fundamental
property rights, thus objecting to any utilitarian calculus or egalitarian redistri-
ution as unjust insofar as these treat rights as contingent or subject to state re-
allocation. For Nozick, social justice in the Rawlsian model is impossible, in
that any redistributive mechanism contradicts the basic tenet of a free society
and a free market, namely the primacy of individual choice and individual
rights. See NOZICK, supra note 50, at ix, 155-60; KYMLICKA, supra note 20, 96-
107.
52 Despite the fact that some preferences will go unsatisfied and the prob-
lem of illegitimate preferences, utilitarianism is at least in principle a liberal
theory in that, formally speaking, each person's preferences count, and count
equally, in the utility-maximization calculus. See BENTHAM, supra note 48, at
804 (describing evaluation of merits of legislation in terms of aggregate of indi-
vidual pain and pleasure); see also KYMLICKA, supra note 20, at 25-30.
Egalitarian theories are clearly liberal in that their basic premise is the
moral equality of individuals; the justification for any distribution scheme in-
volves individual rights and the individual economic effects of choices and cir-
cumstances and, in Rawls' case, the theory is based on the argument that any
rational individual in the "Original Position" would choose his principle of jus-
tice. See RAWLM, supra note 45, at 19-21. See generally KYMLICKA, supra note
20, 58-66.
Libertarian theories are, of course, liberal, even if they oppose"liberal" re-
distributive policies, because they are based on the primacy of individual choice
and individual rights. For Nozick, rights precede justice. See NOZICK, supra
note 50, at ix ("Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group
may do to them.").
53 In contrast, Marxist theories of justice-that accept the concept of justice
at all-propose a radically different, communal measure of justice, as do com-
munitarian theories, which are essentially non-Marxist critiques of liberal ac-
counts of justice. See generally KYMLICKA, supra note 20, at 160-237; STEVEN
LUKES, MARXISM AND MORALITY (1985); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM
AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982). In these approaches, outcomes are just if
they can be made acceptable to certain groups, despite the fact that they may
not be justifiable to certain affected individuals.
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2.2. Right Order and Social Allocation in International
Economic Law
The centrality of justice to the analysis and construction of in-
ternational economic law is evident in the nature of the concept
of justice itself. In the Platonic concept of justice as Right Order,
whenever we consider the proper order of any aspect of social re-
lations, we are considering a question of justice. In the Aristote-
lian elaboration of this concept, when law and public institutions
affect the allocation of social benefits or the correction of im-
proper gain, they are raising questions of distributive and correc-
tive justice.
Therefore, it is necessarily true that every time the question of
the proper order of a given aspect of international economic rela-
tions arises, one is considering a question of justice.5 4 Moreover,
where law is a primary tool for establishing the social order, ques-
tions of justice in international economic relations will arise as
questions of international economic law. International economic
law does indeed affect fundamental decisions about the allocation
of social benefits among states and among their citizens, including
benefits such as economic advantages, preferences, and opportuni-
ties; wealth and property rights; information;sz and the protec-
tion of the law itself. ' International economic law also involves
mechanisms for the identification and correction of improper gain
through dispute resolution mechanisms, on the interstate5 9 and
54 This conclusion depends on the applicability of the concept of justice,
first developed as Right Order within a political community, then as Right Or-
der between political communities. See znfra note 61.
5 Such benefits include, for example, tariff rates, tariff preferences, rights
of establishment, and provision of services.
56 Among this category of rights are, for example, development assistance,
trade finance, and intellectual property protection.
57 Access to information is affected by transnational issues such as trans-
parency requirements and technical assistance.
Whether, for example, economic sanctions are available to increase the
effectiveness of human rights rotections, or whether countries can protect en-
vironmental resources through embargo statutes.
" For example, dispute settlement mechanisms such as NAFTA's chapter
20 and the WTO panel process can be understood as institutions for the appli-
cation of corrective justice. See, e.g., Trade Injustice, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1997,
at A22 (criticizing WTO panel's failure to censure allegedly protectionist prac-




private60 levels. Such influence on the part of international eco-
nomic law must therefore be evaluated in terms of theories of dis-
tributive and corrective justice.
60 The case law of the European Court of Justice and NAFTA's investor
arbitration provisions are examples of the international application of correc-
tivejustice to private party conduct.
' The fact that one is confronting justice issues in relations among states,
and among disparate social systems and peoples, rather than within a single
state or social system, raises important theoretical questions that can only be
touched on in this Article. First, one might assert that obligations to do justice
are, by their very nature, not suited to extension beyond the boundaries
(presumed territorial) of a given political community. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra
note 45, at 12, 272 n.9; RAWLS, supra note 21, at 7-8, 457 (noting that a theory
of justice presupposes a closed society that seeks justice within a closed system,
not including justice between nations). However, this view may be an artifact
of social contractarian arguments for political morality, rather than a general
limitation inherent to moral obligations by their very nature. See Anthony
D'Amato & Kristen Engel, State Responsibility for the Exportation of Nuclear
Power Technology, 74 VA. L. REV. 1011, 1043-46 (1988) (discussing tensions be-
tween universal and socially contingent aspects of social contractarian ap-
proaches to political philosophy). It has, in fact, been vigorously asserted that
territorial boundaries are irrelevant to moral obligations. See Fernando R.
Tes6n, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 CoLuM. L. REv. 53, 82-83
(1992) ("The contingent division of the world into discrete nation-states does
not transform political freedom from an ethical imperative into a mere his-
tory."); D'Amato & Engel, supra, at 1042 ("[A] national boundary is an artifi-
cial, as well as a moralfy irrelevant, boundary with respect to moral obliga-
tions."). Moreover, Rawls has been criticized for failing to extend the original
position to its logical transnational application. See CHRISTOPHER D. STONE,
HE GNAT IS OLDER THAN MAN 253-62 (1993). Finally, to the extent that ob-
ligations of justice depend upon some form of shared political community, it
may be that international economic relations, particularly economic integration
systems, establish the requisite form or level of transnational community. See
D'Amato & Engel, supra at 1046-47 ("The requirements of justice apply to in-
stitutions and practices... in which social activity produces relative or absolute
benefits or burdens that would not exist if the social activity did not take
place.") (quoting CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLIcAL THEORY AND INTER-
NATIONAL RELATIONS 131 (1979)); supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
It can also be argued that, in the international community, as it exists to-
cday, obligations of justice are tempered or superseded by some form of realpoli-
tik, see Terry Nardin, Realism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Rule of Law, 81 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. 415-16 (1987) (arguing that realism dictates that foreign policy
be guided by prudent strategies for national survival, not morality), or that ef-
forts at promoting justice will inevitably be perceived as "cultural imperialism,
paternalism or worse." Alfred P. Rubin,A Skeptical View, 47 U. CHI. L. REv.
403, 405 (1980) (reviewing CHARLES R. BErrz's POLITICAL THEORY AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1979)). However, this sort of pragmatic or utili-
tarian reasoning can itself be criticized on moral grounds as treating absolute
moral obligations as discretionary.
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The importance of recognizing this link between trade and
justice increases with the globalization of the world economy and
the development of international economic law. The greater the
scope and importance of international economic law as a feature
of international economic relationships, and the deeper its impact
throughout the societies of trading states beyond traditional eco-
nomic issues such as tariff rates and investment rules, the more we
must be concerned with its normative impact and implications.
In other words, the broader the law's ordering power, and the
more its "order" impinges on our attempts and our ability to
"order" other aspects of our society, the more we must be con-
cerned with the "Rightness" or the "justice" of the resulting inter-
national economic order.
In addition to the conceptual links discussed thus far between
justice, international economic relations, and international eco-
nomic law, there are very particular reasons why our jurispru-
dence requires us to consider, or at the very least does not excuse
us from considering, what claims a concept of justice might make
on the construction of international economic law. This assertion
shall be explored in connection with the three principle accounts
of the relationship between justice and law, which also apply to
the question of the relationship between justice and international
economic law: the traditional naturalist view, the modern natu-
ralist view, and the positivist view.
There are many forms of naturalism, from the classical natu-
ralism of Greece and Rome63 through the systematic, magisterial• • 64
naturalism of Aquinas and up to the various modern naturalisms65 66 •6
of Fuller, 5 Finnis, and even Dworkin.67 In its strongest form,
62 There are, of course, other accounts of law and its relationship with mo-
rality, including legal realism, critical legal studies, and historical jurisprudence.
The three accounts discussed in this Article were chosen because of their his-
tonc importance.
63 See generally J.M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL
THEORY 19-21, 57-63 (1992).
64 See St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, questions 90-95, reprinted in
INTRODUCTION TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 609-50 (Anton C. Pegis ed., 1948)
[hereinafter AQUINAS].
65 See LONL. FULLER, THE MORALITYOFLAW (1964).
6 See JOHN FINNS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1988).
67 In his Dunwoody lecture, Dworkin reluctantly accepts the label of"naturalist" insofar as that means his theory "makes the content of law some-
times depend on the correct answer to some moral question." Ronald A.




of which Aquinas is the foremost medieval exponent and Finnis
the leading modern representative,69 naturalism asserts two linked
propositions: that knowledge of objective moral truth is possi-
ble, ° and that humanly promulgated law must conform to the
dictates or norms of this moral truth in order to be considered
fully valid law.7 ' While Aquinas and Finnis acknowledge the exis-
tence of morally questionable laws,72 both Aquinas and Finnis
would regard such "law" as fatally defective although Aquinas,
and to a greater extent Finnis, might nevertheless acknowledge
their status as law in some sense.
In contrast, both Fuller and Dworkin conceive of the moral-
ity which they see as relevant to law as something less than the
objective morality of traditional naturalism. Fuller's morality is a
limited one, confined to what he terms the morality of law it-
self,7 4 and thus his naturalism could be called a "limited" natural-
ism. Dworkin, while seeking to express a link to broader moral
principles, sees that morality as the morality of the relevant
1991). However, in important respects his stance is beyond the natural-
ist/positivist distinction. See id.
6S See AQUINAS, supra note 64.
69 On Finnis' role as a leading modern exponent of traditionalnaturalism,
see Neil MacCormick, Natural Law and the Separation of Law and Morals, in
NATURAL LAW THEoRY 105 (Robert P. George ed., 1992) (crediting Finnis
with the powerful contemporary restatement of the classical tradition). Re-
garding Finnis' own views, see FINNIS, supra note 66.
70 See AQUINAS, supra note 64, at question 91, art. 2 (noting that natural
law is rational human nature's participation, through reason, in eternal truths);
see also FINNIS, supra note 66, at 59-99 (arguing that the seven basic values of ex-
istence can be identified as self-evident through rational introspection).
71 See AQOUINAS, supra note 64, at question 91, art. 3 (noting that human
laws proceed from practical reasoning upon the precepts of natural law);id at
question 95, art. 2 ("[E]very human law has just so much of the nature of law as
it is derived from the law of nature."); see also Hans Kelsen, Foundation of the
Natural Law Doctrine, 1973 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 2, 83-111 reprinted in 1
NATURAL LAW 125 (John Finnis ed., 1991).
7 See AQUINAS, sup-a note 64, at question 93, art. 3 (recognizing existence
of unjust or wicked laws); see also FINNIS, supra note 66.
73 See AQUINAS, supra note 64, at question 93, art. 3 (noting that even an
unjust law retains some appearance of law through its promulgation by one in
authority, though its principal character is of violence, not lawi);FIwNIs, supra
note 66, at 363-66 (arguing that to say unjust laws are not laws distorts a com-
plex relationship, as unjust law may still be law in a technical sense but not
worthy of obedience as law).
74 See FULLER, supra note 65, at 38-44 (reviewing the basic elements of law's
morality).
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community, not a particular moral order based in God's will or
an objective natural order.75 This results in a sort of "open" natu-
ralism, where what is necessary is a link to moral principles, and
not the possibility of an objectively identifiable universal moral
76view.
With respect to either form of naturalism, the demands of jus-
tice will be expressed as fundamental claims upon international
economic law and its actors, insofar as international economic law
claims to be law, and its actors attempt to operate within that law.
The heart of the naturalist view of international economic law
can be expressed syllogistically as follows:
(1) international economic law consists of the regulation of in-
ternational economic activity through law;
(2) all law, insofar as it claims the status of law, must be just;
(3) therefore, international economic law, insofar as it claims
to be law, must be just.
The differences among the various naturalisms lies in their dif-
ferent versions of the minor premise, according to their definition
of justice as it is relevant to law, and their account of the relation-
ship.77
The distinctiveness of the modern positivist view lies in its
substitution of an essentially formal description of the defining
characteristic of law for what had heretofore been an essentially
75 See Dworkin, supra note 67.
76 "In principle, natural law theory may adopt any ethics." Deryck Bey-
leveld & Roger Brownsword, The Practical Difference Between Natural-Law The-
ory and Legal Positivism, in 2 NATURAL LAW, supra note 67, at 138.
77 The traditional naturalist view would go beyond the bare assertion of
the minor premise and assert a particular substantive standard of justice for in-
ternational economic law, derived from a philosophical or theological account
of objective morality. Modern naturalism would assert, in the limited natural-
ist version, that international economic law, as is required of all law, must con-
form to the basic morality of law in order to have such status. However, these
claims are more limited than the moral claims which traditional naturalism
might impose on international economic law. The open naturalist view would
assert that international economic law, at least in the context of dispute resolu-
tion, must have recourse to some theory of justice, but would not specify or de-
fend any particular theory, asserting rather the link itself. Thus, one could say
that the McDougal/Lasswell approach to international law is a form of natural-
ism in that it does not attempt to argue for the key values of a universal order
of human dignity as part of its theory of law, but does maintain that a link be-
tween law and these vralues, however established, accordingly it plays an essen-
tial role in the appraisal and critique of public order systems. See MYRES S.




normative one.7 In 8he Concept of Law, for example, H.L.A.
Hart provides a sophisticated account of law as a system of pri-
mary and secondary rules.79 The conflict between this view of
law and naturalism lies not in any positivist account of the formal
qualities of legal systems, but in the separability thesis: the asser-
tion that such a view is a sufficient account of the nature and
function of law, separate from any reference to the law's moral-
ity.80
Using Hart's theory as an example, the positivist view of in-
ternational economic law can also be expressed syllogistically, il-
lustrating the contrast to natural law as well:
(1) international economic law consists of the regulation of in-
ternational economic activity through law;
(2) all law, insofar as it claims the status of law, must consist of
a system of primary and secondary rules;
(3) therefore, international economic law, insofar as it claims
to be law, must consist of a system of primary and secondary
rules.
Any mention of justice is absent from the minor premise, and
therefore necessarily absent from the conclusion.
What is particularly noteworthy for our purposes is that, in
spite of his insistence on the formal independence of law and mo-
rality as a definitional and constitutive matter, Hart took great
pains to point out that law in fact could not and should not be
evaluated independently from morality. To begin with, Hart ac-
knowledges a fundamental similarity between a narrowly defined
version of justice as fairness and certain essential properties of law
78 Law, in this view, is to be seen as "merely" or "essentially" certain types
of statements, declarations, or rules that qualify as law because of their formal
characteristics and not by reference to moral principles. Hart, for example,
characterizes law's "essence" as the union of primary and secondary rules, and
contrasts this to traditional naturalist accounts of this essence as consisting of
the necessary link between law and morality. See HART, supra note 41, at 151-
55.
79 The "primary" rules of law governing behavior recognizable in primitive
and modern legal systems are themselves established, administered, and changed
through the application of "secondary" ruleswhich characterize mature legal
systems, chiefamong these being the rule of recognition. See id.
8o See id. at 185-87; see, e.g., David Lyons, Moral Aspects of Legal Theory, in
RONALD DWORKin AND CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENcE 49 (Marshall Co-
hen ed., 1984).
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as a rule system.8 ' Moreover, of all the claims of morality, the
claims of justice are privileged in their criticism of law, because
justice, in the sense of treating like cases alike, is very much like
the notion of proceeding by a rule.82 However, in neither case
does Hart admit the claim that legal systems and laws, in order to
be so considered, must comply with the broader claims of natural
law, or with the claims of justice more broadly defined, which are
very distinct from the nature of law.83 Law's morality, broadly
speaking, is not rooted in law itself, but in the moral obligations
we are subject to in private and public life on the basis of inde-
pendent philosophical or theological commitments. Nevertheless,
Hart does contemplate and indeed advocate the moral critique of
substantive law. In fact, he considers the positivist definition of
law to facilitate an accurate moral critique of law.
84
From a positivist standpoint, therefore, the demands of justice
on international economic law will take the form of policies to be
pursued through such law, either as a matter of independent
moral obligation or simple prudence. The positivist argument
presupposes no necessary link between international economic
law and justice, or any other value, at a definitional level, beyond
a shared concern for the application of rules. To the extent inter-
national economic law is created or evaluated with reference to
the substantive claims of justice, this may reflect simply the deci-
sion of the law-makers or analysts that it is prudent or useful for
international economic law to be just. Alternatively, a positivist
might conclude that international economic law must be just, but
In Hart's account of the relationship of justice to law, he admits a close
link between the administration of law and Aristotelian notions of equality in
distribution and correction. See HART, supra note 41, at 160-62.
12 See id at 161.
83 Hart thus explicitly relies on a narrow Aristotelian concept of specific
justice, distinguishing it from broader moral claims. This is vital for him be-
cause, as we have seen, he admits a special link between this sort of justice and
law. See discussion supra Section 2.1. If he accepted the broader view of justice,
it would both resemble less the administrative requirements of rule systems and
in fact admit the entire naturalist argument.
" Hart contends that the naturalist assertion, that unjust laws are not laws,
is muddled and merely confuses the issues at stake. He suggests, instead, that
the conflict is precisely over obedience to a valid law that may nevertheless be
"'too iniquitous to obey or apply.' See HART, supra note 41, at 205.
As Hart explains, a positivist analysis of law squarely presents us with the
choice among greater and lesser evils and injustices involved when, for example,





for reasons of obligations rooted in political or moral philosophy,
rather than its nature as law.8 s However, in neither case is there
any sense in which positivism is an obstacle to or substitute for
the normative evaluation of international economic law, nor does
it diminish the importance of theories of justice to such an evalua-
tion on independent moral or prudential grounds.8 6
2.3. International Economic Law and the Claims offustice
One's view of the nature and force of the actual claims of jus-
tice on international economic law will differ according to one's
position on the relation of law to moraliV generally, and accord-
ing to one's substantive theory of justice. It is beyond the scope
of this Article to address all substantive theories of justice and the
richness of their possible claims on international economic law,
nor will this Article fully develop one substantive position on jus-
tice and apply to it to the richness of issues in international eco-
nomic law. Rather, what this Article will attempt in what fol-
lows is to suggest, in an illustrative manner, how theories of
justice could entail particular claims on international economic
law. In the section which follows, this type of general relation-
ship will be explored in connection with the trade linkage issue.
First, and most importantly from a Western standpoint, the
claims of justice will affect the threshold question of the rule of
law in international economic relations, and on this there is wide
agreement. Fundamental to any conception of Western justice is88
a commitment to the rule of law. Such a commitment is also
recognized by traditional trade theorists as a cornerstone of our
attempts to regulate international economic relations through in-
85 Of course, a positivist's particular view of the requirements of justice in
international economic law will depend on the substantive theory of justice to
which that positivist is committed.
86 In fact, one can extrapolate from Hart's writings that positivism facili-
tates the normative evaluation of international economic law, and might, in
some limited way, even require it.
87 There is, however, no view of international economic law that does not
presuppose or entail some answer to the question of what constitutes the Right
Order, with the possible exception of a chaotic one. Even an anarchic view of
international law embodies one view of the Right Order.
88 See Aristotle, Politics, in ARISTOTLE, supra note 29, at 598 ("[Llaws,
when good, should be supreme."); CAMPBELL, supra note 21, at 23-27 (noting
that the rule of law ideal is linked both to substantive justice-consistent appli-
cation of just rules-and formal justice-consistency of rule application as an
independent principle of justice).
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ternational economic law.8 9 This commitment to the rule of law
as a principle of western justice necessarily implies that interna-
tional economic law systems, in particular their institutional
mechanisms, are subject to evaluation and critique according to
how effectively they uphold, advance, or undercut the rule of law
in international economic relations.
90
Western theories of justice can also serve to justify, from a
normative standpoint, the fundamental economic concept of lib-
eralization of trade. The core trade and integration commitment
to liberalize trade naturally reflects the principles of trade eco-
nomics, in which liberalized trade contributes to increased wel-
fare due to gains in efficiency and the unfettered operation of
comparative advantage. In doing so, however, liberalized trade
also contributes directly to the achievement of the core aim of
liberal justice, in that such welfare increases are a necessary pre-
condition to a more just distribution of wealth and an improved
standard of living for the least advantaged. 9' Trade liberalization
also directly reflects the fundamental commitment to individual
liberty common to all Western theories of justice, in that it di-
89 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 85-88 (1989)
(arguing that a rule-oriented approach should predominate in international eco-
nomic relations). But see Phillip R. Trimble, International Trade and the "Rule
of Law," 83 MICH. L. REv. 1016, 1030 (1984-85) (suggesting that GATT's major
advantage lay in its ambiguous, flexible, and non-lega approach).
In fact, the modern international economic law movement has been at the
forefront of the expansion of the rule of law in international relations generally
See John H. Jackson, International Economic Law: Reflections on te
"Boilerroom" of International Relations, 10 AM. U. .. INT'L L. & POL'Y 595, 596
("[]t is plausible to suggest that ninety percent of international law work is in
reality international economic law in some form or another."); Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Organizations, 17 Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 398, 399 (1996-97) ("[International economiclaw] has become one of
the most important foreign policy instruments for promoting not only eco-
nomic welfare but also individual freedom and rule of law.").
90 See generally Petersmann, supra note 89, at 428-29, 431, 451 (evaluating
rule of law aspects of select international economic law institutions).91 ~ ta mre istuon
See Petersmann, supra note 89, at 400 (noting that market institutions
regulated by economic law "are an indispensable complement of human rights
for [the promotion of] human well-being"). See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 8, 203-22 (1997) (noting that markets play
an important, albeit limited role in a basic rights system, for example in the de-
velopment of constitutional democracies in Eastern Europe). This assumes, of





rectly expands the scope for unfettered individual decision-
making in economic activity.
92
Justice also plays a central role in the evaluation of interna-
tional economic law institutions. Institutions created through in-
ternational economic agreements, such as the World Trade Or-
ganization ("WTO") and the NAFTA Commission, can be
analyzed from a variety of perspectives independent of moral and
political philosophy. However, a justice perspective can clarify
the implications of the design and operation of such institutions
for the realization of our fundamental values, affecting for exam-
ple how trade institutions reach decisions and resolve disputes.
93
3. JUSTICE AND THE "TRADE AND" PHENOMENON
So far, the assertion that the claims of justice are essential to
the analysis of international economic law is not likely to excite
much controversy, even among those who maintain what one
scholar has termed the "Efficiency Model" of trade law in which
trade is strictly a matter of economic efficiency and welfare.
94
That is, in part, because the issues discussed thus far, such as the
rule of law, elimination of trade barriers, and the construction
and operation of trade institutions, can be seen from the vantage
point of traditional economic theory as simply part of what trade
is "about."
95
92 See Petersmann, supra note 89, at 400 (noting that properly functioning
market institutions (i.e., markets regulated by economic liw) are an indispensa-
ble complement of human rights for promoting individual autonomy). On this
view government intervention in trade throu-h tariffs and non-tariff barriers,
for example, is inadvisable insofar as it reduces individual economic liberty.
9' For example, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann's work applying constitutional-
ism theory to the WTO and other international economic law institutions
points out several aspects of trade liberalization systems which advance or re-
flect fundamental liberal commitments to justice in social and economic rela-
tions, including: separation of powers, protection of fundamental rights, neces-
sity and proportionality rules, and democratic participation. See id. at 429-32.
See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Rethinking International Trade, in Symposium,
Linkage as Phenomenon: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 201 (1998); infra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
9' Of course, there may be some controversy about the precise outcomes
that different normative theories may dictate. For example, to the extent con-
stitutionalism theory suggests that binding dispute resolution is to be preferred
on normative grounds over simple advisory opinions, this claim might be re-
sisted by those who see the decision as a purely functional or political one. See
supra notes 89-90.
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However, the implications of justice for international eco-
nomic law become more controversial when one moves beyond
these sorts of issues to a consideration of other trade policy issues
raised by the current "trade and" debate. This debate forces us to
consider questions involving gross economic inequalities, conflict-
ing concepts of human dignity and environmental protection,
other heavily value-laden issues such as "culture" and "property,"
and the role of such questions in trade law at all. In discussing
linkages such as "trade and development," "trade and labor,"
"trade and the environment," and "trade and human rights," we
are delving more deeply and perhaps more problematically into
the nature of the relationship between trade and justice.
3.1. Recognizing the Linkage Between Justice and the "Trade
. and "Debate
Each "trade and " debate has, at its root, a question or se-
ries of questions which are about justice. Perhaps the most fun-
damental question is this: Who shall we trade with, and on what
terms? More particularly, we may ask the following: What are
the moral implications for us if our trading partners are, as a
whole, much poorer than ourselves?96 What if our trading part-
ner's society is highly stratified, such that the gains from trade
only go to a few?9 What if a trading partner has a different or no
conception of environmental harm and environmental protec-
tion? What if our trading partners have a radically different (or
lack any) concept of human dignity?99 Can we use the trading
system to redistribute global wealth across states, encourage more
equitable distributions of wealth within states, change or enforce
human dignity laws, or protect the environment in such cases,
even at some cost to liberal trading principles? Should we?
It is the main contention of this Article that these questions,
and the similar questions underlying each of the major "trade
and" debates, are inescapably moral questions, i.e., they are ques-
tions of justice. They are justice questions because they are ques-
tions of order, and they are inquiries into the Right Order for the
96 See infra notes 100-08 and accompanying text.
97 See infra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
9: See infra notes 115-24 and accompanying text.




given set of social relationships they presuppose or establish. '1 °
They are questions of justice because their resolution depends
upon our making decisions as to the allocation of social goods and
social burdens, and may involve an investigation into the propri-
ety of certain gains and the correction of improper gain.'
The link between trade and the inequalities of various kinds
that exist between trading states is a fitting place to begin explor-
ing this contention, as the link is an ancient and perhaps constitu-
tive one. On the one hand, the theory of comparative advantage
suggests that certain inequalities are the sine qua non of trade, in
that it is the disparity in resource distribution which offers trad-
ing states the key opportunity to specialize. 1°2 However, the
more troublesome aspect of the link between trade and inequali-
ties in levels of development among states has also been recog-
nized since the early days of the study of trade itself, consisting of
the manifold opportunities for outright predation and con-
quest,'0 3 as well as for the pursuit of other inherently self-serving
policies such as mercantilism, 104 presented to developed states in
their trade relations with the less-developed world.
100 That they involve relationships across societies and national boundaries,
it is argued, need not alter the basis ol moral obligation. See supra note 61.
101 For example, Dunoff writes that trade and issues such as intellectual
property highlight the fact that interstate, distributional questions are at the
center of international trade policy, challenging one view common in the litera-
ture that cooperation or collaboration, rather than distribution, is the key issue.
See Dunoff, supra note 94.
102 See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMIcS 668 (1973) (noting that the
starting point for comparative advantage is diversity in conitions of produc-
tion between different countries).
103 In his seminal work, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, Adam Smith writes:
Folly and injustice seem to have been the principles which presided
over and directed the first project of establishing [the American] colo-
nies; the folly of hunting alfter gold and silver mines, and the injustice
of coveting the possession of a country whose harmless natives, far
from having ever injured the people of Europe, had received the first
adventurers with every mark of kindness and hospitality.... [I]t was
not the wisdom and policy, but the disorder and injustice ofthe Euro-
pean governments which peopled and cultivated America.
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 350-51 (Kathryn Sutherland ed., 1993).
104 See id. at 351-52.
When [the North and South American colonies] were effectuated, and
had become so considerable as to attract the attention of the mother
country, the first regulations which she made with regard to them had
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The problem of trade and inequality is a paradigmatic case of
the link between trade and justice. The distribution of social
goods between the richer and the poorer is a central concern of
theories of justice.'05 Public debate concerning the relations be-
tween richer and poorer states as a matter of justice peaked within
international economic law with the birth and demise of the
movement for a New International Economic Order
("NIEO"). °6 While the NIEO may have failed as a political mat-
ter, this does not mean that the arguments asserted by NIEO ad-
vocates have been refuted.
One can discern in the debate over trade and development a
range of positions traceable to the principal Western substantive
theories of justice. Perhaps the most familiar reply to the ques-
tion "What is our duty to developing states in structuring our
trade relationships?" might consist of utilitarian justifications for
various types of assistance to underdeveloped states, such as an
appeal to increased stability in international relations or to the
creation of larger and stronger markets of consumers for our
products. *10 An egalitarian liberal approach, however, might re-
ject such utilitarian reasoning despite an apparent agreement in
outcomes, and argue instead for the existence of a moral duty to
aid poorer states based on deontological moral principles. Rawls'
difference principle, for example, could be extended to cover eco-
always in view to secure to herself the monopoly of their commerce;
to confine their market, and to enlarge her own at their expense, and,
consequently, rather to damp and discourage, than to quicken and
forward the course of their prosperity.
Id.
105 This is certainly true as applied to domestic society, and, it is argued,
would hold equally true where the richer and the poorer are states and not just
individuals. See supra note 61.
106 The New International Economic Order, or NIEO, was a movement
among developing countries within the United Nations ("UN") to force a shift
in international economic relations away from structurally disadvantageous
policies towards a more equitable relationship between developed and develop-
ing countries. See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Eco-
nomic Order, G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 3, U.N.
Doc. A/9559 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 715. Despite the adoption of the
founding resolution and the Charter of Economic RigTts and Duties of States,
G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 1, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975),
the movement has been widely ackn-owledged as a failure. See generally Bartram
S. Brown, Developing Countries in the International Trade Order, 14 N. ILL. U.
L. REv. 347 (1994); Robert E. Hudec, GA 7Tand the Developing Countries, 1992
COLuM. Bus. L. REv. 67.




nomic relations with less advantaged states, leading to a duty to
effect wealth redistributions across national boundaries beyond
those that are justifiable on utilitarian lines.10 8 A libertarian view,
in contrast, would question such principles and resist any such
trans-boundary redistribution in favor of some minimal notion of
procedural fairness or fairness of opportunity on the part of less
advantaged states.
10 9
Whatever one's view as to the appropriate answer to these
questions, simply understanding the trade-development link as a
justice issue involving the problem of inequality implies that we
are not free to govern our economic relationships with poorer na-
tions solely with regard to the politics of the moment. Moreover,
viewing the trade and development linkage as a justice matter
raises the question of how one can consistently be a redistributive
egalitarian at home and a libertarian or political realist abroad."0
Given the nature of our concept of justice, it becomes incumbent
on those seeking to establish an economic order that does not
consider the claims of less developed states to articulate a norma-
tive basis for this position. In other words, they must explain
why such an order would be Right.
A related, and far more controversial, inequality problem in-
volves the inequalities within the societies of trading states and
whether, as a matter of distributive justice, trading states are obli-
gated to take into account such inequalities in their trade and eco-
10' See D'Amato & Engel, supra note 61, at 1047; STONE, supra note 61, at
255-60.
109 The classic libertarian-egalitarian conflict involves a fundamental disa-
greement over the moral legitimacy of state-effected wealth redistribution. In
this context, the debate would be over the legitimacy of such redistributions
effected through trade agreements between states. However, even if one con-
cedes to the libertarian the assertion that the free market may be the best
mechanism for basic distribution questions, the criticism can be made that the
moral basis for this position is substantially undermined by the reality of ine-
quality, particularly gross inequality, in natural "endowments." What is there
to uarantee that the open market exchanges do not further erode or deny the
basic rights of the weaker party? The liberal objection, that there can be no
freedom where two sides are grossly unequal, emerged in the early nineteenth
century in the work of T.H. Green and others. See KELLY, supra note 63, at
306. Therefore, the state has a role in setting the basic conditions for a mean-
ingful exchange, a moral exchange. Id.
110 1 am not so much questioning the validity of a libertarian view, but the
consistency of simultaneously holding both commitments.
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nomic integration systems."' At a normative level, the assertion
that distributive inequalities within a society are justice matters
can scarcely be gainsaid. But do states have a duty to consider
inequality problems within their trading partners? Moreover, at
an empirical level, one can distinguish between the distributive
inequalities which might exist in a state relatively independent of
trade and its effects, and the well-recognized fact that the effects of
trade itself can vary widely with regard to groups within trading
states; some grou Fs may suffer great harm while the state as a
whole prospers. Even if one were unwilling to recognize a
duty to consider domestic inequalities generally, might not this
empirical distinction between "types" or "sources" of inequality
suggest a duty to consider trade-related inequalities?
From a utilitarian viewpoint, one might consider such con-
cern useful or desirable but decide that the significant practical
difficulties in responding to these trans-boundary concerns, and
the potential friction from claims of meddling in internal affairs,
would render the cost of such policies too high in relation to the
benefit potentially to be achieved. A liberal Kantian analysis of
international law, however, would suggest that recognition of
such concerns and the ensuing responsibility are unavoidable as a
matter of respect for individual rights." 3 A communitarian
analysis would agree with the need to consider the effects of trade
on the disadvantaged in a trading partner's society, but would
suggest that the relevant unit of analysis is the group rather than
. Traditionally, the economic disadvantages of individuals within their
own states were not considered a legitimate subject for international law, which
favored the black box or billiard ball approach to state relations. Recently,
however, this view of international law has undergone significant criticism and
modification from the human rights movement and particularly from feminist
theorists of international law, who have attacked the public/private distinction
as inimical to the rights of women within state societies. See Hilary Charles-
worth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 613,
625-30 (1991).
" See JACKSON, supta note 89, at 16; see also Philip Alston, International
Trade as an Instrument of Positive Human Rights Policy, 4 HuM. RTS. Q. 155,
177 (1982) (noting that the ILO advocates trade liberalization that addresses
possible adverse labor and distribution effects); Enrique R. Carrasco, Law, Hi-
erarchy, and Vulnerable Groups in Latin America: Towards a Communal Model of
Development in a Neoliberal World, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 221, 275 (1994) (noting
that economic neoliberalism has not addressed, and may have worsened, the
condition of vulnerable groups).
113 See Tes6n, supra note 61, at 81-84 (arguing that human rights protec-




the individual, and that trading states have an affirmative duty to
act to improve the plight of vulnerable groups.14 In contrast, a
libertarian might limit a state's duty, both at home and abroad, to
attempts to encourage policies in our trading partners that favor
individual rights and the protection of private property. 1 5 In any
event, the simple assertion that, whatever one's duty is to one's
less fortunate fellows, that duty does not apply across national
boundaries, is not likely to go unchallenged in contemporary de-
bates over the justice of failing to consider the stratification of
one's trading partners."1
6
The trade and environment linkagelby contrast, has been at
the forefront of the linkage movement. Environmentalists are
114 See Carrasco, supra note 112, at 305 (arguing that economic regulation
must give priority to conditions affecting vulnerable groups).
11 Alternatively, a libertarian might maintain that states have no role at all
with respect to the domestic policies of other states, stemming from a view of
states as "libertarian individuals" facing regulatory intervention both horizon-
tally from one another and vertically from international regimes.
,16 From the perspective of one's moral obligation, why should our con-
cern for those with an inequitable share of resources be affected by the inter-
vening modality of a state? Sovereignty is the traditional answer, but it may
not be an adequate one. Perhaps it is legitimate to assert that sovereignty pre-
vents us from forcing our notion of equitable distributions on another trading
partner. But might it not be the case that sovereignty is more likely to be raised
by us, ourselves, to avoid the assertion that we have a duty, rather than by the
intended beneficiaries of our concern? With respect to the collapse of the
Mexican economy and the devaluation of the peso in 1994, Jorge Castaneda as-
serts the complicity of the United States in its decision to ignore the undemo-
cratic politics and unequal wealth distribution accompanying Mexico's trade
liberalization reforms. "[N]o one, it seems, was willing to analyze the over-
whelming evidence of abuses and financial mismanagement in Mexico since
1988.... Those surprised by the economic collapse and the stench of it all had
simply neglected to open their eyes." JORGE G. CASTANEDA, THE MEXICAN
SHOCK: ITS MEANING FOR THE UNITED STATEs 4-5 (1995).
117 The trade and environment linkage has been actively in the public eye
since the early 1990s. Thomas J. Schoenbaum notes that, while the GATT es-
tablished a Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade in 1971,
it did not meet until 1991. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and
Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM.
J. INT'L L. 268, 268 (1997). The early 1990's also saw the publication of path-
breaking works such as Daniel Esty's Greening the GAT. Trade, Environment
and the Future; see generally ESTY, supra note 2, and a series of GATT panel re-
ports destined to have a significant impact on the trade and environment de-
bate. See GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on U.S. Restrictions on Im-
ports of Tuna, GATT Doc. DS20/R (1994),reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 839; GATT
Dispute Settlement Panel Report on U.S. Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
Aug. 16, 1991 GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993), reprinted in 30 I.L.M.
1594 (the Tuna/Dolphin decisions).
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attracted to the possibility of putting the tremendous leverage af-
forded by the threat of trade sanctions in the service of ensuring
compliance with environmental protection obligations," 8 and
have concerns about the trade regulatory system adversely affect-
ing their regulatory goals and systems. 119 In much the same way,
the trade community fears the environmentalists' interference
will undermine the trading system.
120
It is not necessarily clear, at first blush, how the trade and en-
vironment linkage reflects a debate over justice. Even if one were
to concede an ethical obligation to protect the natural world,
12 1
how does this come within that category of obligations we recog-
nize as justice, for example, in the traditional Aristotelian sense of
an allocation of social goods, since it involves obligations to non-
human entities?199
118 This is evidenced by several recent treaties such as the Basel Convention
and the Montreal Protocol. See, e.g., Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22,
1989, S. TREATY Doc. No. 5 (1991), 28 I.L.M. 657; Montreal Protocol on
Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1989).
119 Environmentalists' concerns include the fear that trade liberalization
principles such as national treatment will be used to override conflicting provi-
sions in statutory and treaty-based environmental protection measures, as in the
Tuna/Dolphin example, and that the principle of comparative advantage will
be used to legitimize a "race to the bottom" in terms of lax environmentalpro-
tection laws. See Daniel C. Esty, Unpacking the "Trade and Environment" Con-
flict, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1259, 1260-61 (1994).
120 This includes the threat that legitimate protective devices which consti-
tute exceptions to trade disciplines can easily be deployed for illegitimate pro-
tectionist purposes. See JACKSON, supra note 89, at 201; Roessler, supra note 2,
at 227. Additionally, there is a concern that permitting domestic measures de-
signed to compensate for different levels of environmental regulations will un-
dermine differences in comparative advantage resulting from sovereign policy
choices and constitute a form of meddling in states' environmental policies. See
generally Esty, supra note 119, at 1261-62 (providing a general summary of
trade-oriented concerns about environmental regulatioi).
There is also a concern that trade related environmental protection is not
the optimal tool for environmental protection, threatening to introduce new
and unproductive sources of conflict into an already contentious trade commu-
nity with little to show for it in either environmental protection or trade en-
hancement. See Roessler, supra note 2, at 228.
12' Advocates of a human ethical obligation to protect the environment
have done so on a variety of grounds. See generaly RODERICK F. NASH, THE
RIGHTS OF NATURE 121-60 (1989) (reviewing the historical development of
ethical theories affording rights to non-humans and the natural world).
22 The classical concept of jice employed here-justice as Right Order-




The trade and environment debate does, in fact, raise issues
which can be considered to be justice issues, or issues involving
Right Order decisions. First, the broad Platonic vision of justice
as Right Order could be construed to include efforts to order the
relationships between human beings and the natural world ac-
cording to what is Right. 123 Debates over the acceptable limits of
accommodation of one's ethical obligation to the environment in
the face of competing economic interests presuppose such an ex-
tension. These debates also reflect a divergence between conse-
quentialist approaches to this issue, such as utilitarianism, which
can justify no link at all or a weak or flexible one, 124 and non-
consequentialist forms of moral reasoning, such as Kantian moral-
ity and other forms of egalitarian liberalism, which reject this sort
of reasoning where ethical obligations to the environment are
concerned. For example, Richard Stewart argues that in evaluat-
ing the competing interests at stake in the trade and environment
linkage, a utilitarian analysis based on Mill is more effective rather
than non-consequentialist forms of analysis, a position challenged
by Robert Housman explicitly on Kantian grounds.1
25
Second, public decisions concerning environmental protection
can be seen as Aristotelian allocations of social benefits and bur-
dens, in that such decisions inevitably involve the allocation of
rights and duties involving the scope of permitted environmental
activity. The "Environmental Justice" movement adopts this ap-
proach, examining the extent to which the burdens of environ-
mental regulation, and the costs of environmental degradation,
One may well ask if our obligation to act justly embraces duties to non-human
entities such as plant or animal species or ecosystems.
123 The effort to structure the human-nature relationship according to a
recognition or grant of legal rights in the natural world woula be one example
of this view. See generally CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE
STANDING? (1996).
124 Consequentialist moral theories judge the morality of actions solely ac-
cording to the nature of their consequences. See ALAN DONAGAN, THE
THEORY OF MORAL=rY 190 (1977). Utilitarianism is its "most persuasive and
most thoroughly investigated variety." Id. at 192.
125 See Robert F. Housman, A Kantian Approach to Trade and the Environ-
ment, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1373, 1376-77 1992); Richard B. Stewart,Inter-
national Trade and Environment Lessons From the Federal Experience, 49 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1329, 1332 (1992). Cf Holly Doremus, Patching the Ark. Im-proving Legal Protection of Biological Diversity, 18 ECOLoGY L.Q. 265, 275-81
(1991) (arguing that utilitarian and deontological.arguments for preservation of
biological diversity differ in the scope of effective protection they justify).
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are disproportionately borne by the disadvantaged, and treating
this as a problem of distributive justice.1
26
The trade and human rights debate also raises difficult justice
problems. They are justice problems because they involve the al-
location of basic social goods such as rights, which in our tradi-
tion are perhaps the most highly valued of all social goods. They
are difficult because they arise in a context of conflict over fun-
damental values, as revealed by different states' conceptions of in-
dividual and~roup rights, 127 and different accounts of the place of
such rights,' and the appropriate response to such conflicts,
129
within international economic law.
More specifically, the trade and human rights linkage involves
a debate over the effects of trade and trade law on the allocation
of human rights and on their effectiveness. 130 The most contro-
126 See generally Gerald Torres, Environmental Justice: The Legal Meaning of
a Social Movement, 15 J.L. & CoM. 597 (1996) (surveying history of and objec-
tions to the environmental justice concept).
127 A key aspect of Western conceptions of justice is respect for fundamen-
tal human rights. This commitment is the basis for the tremendous post-war
development of human rights protection within public international law. But
not all trading states share the same conception of human rights, whether
within the Western tradition or outside of it, and not all trading states share the
same view of how differences in human rights and the values they reflect should
be ignored, accommodated or challenged in international economic relations.2 8 There is some consensus concerning a core of individual economic
rights such as labor and employment rights, but no consensus as to how such
rights should be taken into account in trade relationships. See WTO Singapore
Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(96)/DEC/W (Dec. 13, 1996); 36 I.L.M. 218
(1997) (providing that the WTO affirms commitment to international labor
standards but eschews jurisdiction over trade and labor issues, suggesting ILO as
forum). There is even less consensus with respect to non-economic human
rights and how such rights should figure into trade and integration systems. See
Stirling, supra note 2, at 1, 8-13, 39-40.
129 Stirling notes that trade sanctions, paradoxically, are in principle the
most effective, and, in practice, often the least effective means of enforcing hu-
man rights, as their use is often resented by the target state and is at the same
time the subject of political manipulation by interest groups in sanctioning
states. See id. at 2-3.
130 Trade agreements can require as a precondition a strengthened rule of
law within the trading partners' society, which can have an indirect systemic
effect on improving rights protection. Second, specific economically-related
rights such as the property rights of innovators can be linked to trade conces-
sions. Third, trade concessions can be used as incentives to reward progressive
democratic governments, which can secure human rights reforms and even cre-
ate more of a ground-swell for further reform. Fourth, trade sanctions can be
used as a weapon for ensuring compliance with human rights obligations




versial form of trade-human rights linkage is the use of trade sanc-
tions as a weapon for ensuring compliance with human rights ob-
ligations stemming from other non-economic agreements. Are
we morally obligated to use trade agreements or trade concessions
to punish human rights violators through economic sanctions for
noncompliance with human rights conventions? At a minimum,
are we obligated to refrain from granting them trade concessions?
Is this a right use of trade?
First, consider the position against linkage, namely that trade
relationships with human rights violators ought to continue un-
abated. It is not difficult to see why this course of conduct would
be considered morally questionable on its face, in that continued
trade has at least the appearance of contributing to the wealth and
economic power of the violators and, in fact, may lead directly to
their ability to carry out their repressive practices.132 This view,
however, can be justified on several grounds. A utilitarian has no
difficulty in supporting relatively unrestricted trade, if he or she is
convinced that the best road towards fuller rights protection in
the future is a moderately repressive open market regime in the
short term, or a policy of constructive engagement, as the Clinton
administration adopted in its China decision. 3 3 A utilitarian can
also justify completely unrestricted trade, on the grounds that
trade flows best when it flows freest, and future general welfare
increases are the best road to human rights.
In contrast, both egalitarian and libertarian approaches would
be opposed to a utilitarian analysis, measuring as it does the utility
of rights protection abroad, and our trade-related measures for
enhancing it, against the utility of permitting or ignoring rights
violations abroad, or of refraining from the potential domestic
trade agreements and integration systems, to the extent they themselves reflect
fundaniental concepts of justice such as democratic participation and the rule of
law, can also strengthen the human rights climate in international law.
131 See id at 42-45 (noting that a properly designed sanctions regime can be
an effective human rights tool); Alston, supra note 112, at 168-69 (noting that
the relative inefficacy of sanctions argues for more constructive system of ex
ante incentives).
132 Witness the speed with which military equipment and military-oriented
exports are suspended even where the general link to human rights is resisted.
133 See Randall Green, Human Rights and Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Rates
for Product from the People's Republic of China, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV.
611 (1994) ( rguing that supporting economic development in China through
MFN andother policies is the best way to promote human rights in China).
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trade-related costs of trade-oriented rights measures. 3 4 As with
the trade and environment linkage, the struggle underlying the
trade-human rights linkage may be between utilitarian approaches
to this issue, which can justify no link at all or a weak or flexible
one, and non-consequentialist forms of moral reasoning, such as
Kantian morality and other forms of egalitarian liberalism, which
reject this sort of reasoning where human rights are concerned.
135
As with the trade and inequality link, the trade and human rights
link forces us to consider the consistency of our commitments,
specifically whether one can be an egalitarian liberal or libertarian
as far as rights issues at home go, and a utilitarian on rights issues
abroad.
3.2. Changing the Linkage Discourse
Despite the justice implications of the linkages discussed
above, linkage issues may not always be approached or even rec-
ognized as justice questions. The dominant perspective of both
sides to any linkage issues tends towards what can be character-
ized as the External View, in which each opposing camp on the
linkage issue views the other camps' claims and modes of analysis
as external to its own concerns and commitments. Within the
trade policy side, the External View is best represented by those
adhering to the Efficiency Model, trade theorists who view trade
law principally in economic terms as a matter of enhancing effi-
ciency and the general welfare. 136 From the viewpoint of Effi-
ciency Model adherents, the non-trade camp is seen as trying to
get in the way or "gum up the works" with what are at best ex-
traneous concerns such as human rights or environmental protec-
134 One might even see a curious alignment between egalitarian and liber-
tarian views on this point, as both theories place a fundamental emphasis on
individual rights and their protection as a cornerstone of a just society.
135 See Tes6n, supra note 61, at 64-65.
136 Adam Smith is the classical exponent of the view that the unimpeded
free market is the best guarantor of ultimate economic well-being. See KELLY,
supra note 63, at 303; SMITH, supra note 103; see also JACKSON, supra note 89, at
8-9 (naming efficiency-based increases in general welfare as the pre-emment goal
of trade law); Robert E. Hudec, GA 7T Legal Restraints on the Use of Trade
Measures Against Foreign Environmental Practices, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND
HARMONIZATION, supra note 2, at 95, 108 ("The GATT's economic goal is to





tion,137 and what may be at worst simple protectionism. 3 8  The
non-trade side of the External View can be represented by the
"Green" movement in international trade, for whom the interna-
tional economic law regime is seen as adversely affecting its efforts
to establish their vision of a just order with regard to the envi-
ronment.
139
Recognizing trade linkage questions as justice questions inevi-
tably changes our approach to the trade linkage debates. First of
all, regarding the framework of the debate, the External view be-
comes ultimately untenable, because trade policy cannot be con-
sidered as independent of the concerns raised by the various trade
linkage debates. The alternative, or "Integrated View," suggested
by a justice perspective requires recognition of the fact that con-
flicts between traditional trade policy and other areas of social
policy involve branches of the same tree, and that this tree is the
construction of a just society.140  Environmental and human
rights advocates, for example, cannot be viewed as bounders or
gate crashers at the trade policy party. Rather, they raise funda-
mental questions that are inescapable within trade policy, for they
raise questions of justice, and trade policy exists and operates
within the larger inquiry as to justice.
137 See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 23 (citing objection by GATT and
WTO members to efforts in 1991 and 1994 to begin work on labor and envi-
ronment issues, on the basis that such issues were not "trade issue[s]"); Hudec,
supra note 136 (arguing that GATT has a good reason to be skeptical of linkage
claims).
138 See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 32 ("Simplistic demands for drastic
trade remedies against so-called eco-dumping or social dumping sometimes bear
a striking similarity to more conventionald forms of protectionist rhetoric. . .2'
(citin then-GATT Director General, Peter Sutherland).
" The outcry over the GATT Tuna-Dolphin dispute is a classic example
of this framework, in which the trade community's rules and fora are viewed
by the environmentalists as serious obstacles to the accomplishment of their
objectives, in that case the protection of dolphins through the United States
Marine Mammal Protection Act. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187;GATTDispute Settlement Panel
Report on U.S. Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, supra note 117. See generally
James Cameron, The GATT and the Environment, in PHIIURE SANDS,
GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW 100, 100-21 (1994).
140 Recognizing the link between trade and justice means a recognition by
linkage partisans that their common search for justice binds them far more than
their different views divide them, and that each side is engaged in a search for
justice, and seeks to enact their vision of it in a given area of social concern.
The problem, of course, is that those areas of social concern, in fact, overlap,
and each community may have conflicting visions of the Right Order and con-
flicting criteria of justification of justice.
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Second, in answering linkage questions, we must consider the
implications of our various substantive theories of justice on each
of these issues. The fact that they are justice questions means that
the debate and resolution of trade linkage issues must include
comprehensive and systematic normative analysis, which is an es-
sential part of how we answer any question involving social goals
and social values. 14' From a justice perspective, linkage debates
are not merely disputes over the accommodation by trade policy
of exogamous priorities, but rather involve disagreements at the
level of normative theory, over the proper construction of a just
society. Particular linkages such as "trade and inequality," "trade
and human rights," and "trade and the environment" present a se-
ries of debates within and among substantive theories of justice,
and concerning the relationship of international economic law to
justice. The fact that there is disagreement reveals that, with re-
gard to each particular area of social concern, we lack consensus as
to what, precisely, the Right Order should be.
142
Rendering such normative conflicts more transparent is all the
more critical in view of the fact that the Efficiency Model would,
at first glance, seem to stand outside the Justice question, suggest-
ing explicitly or implicitly that it takes no position on justice
questions, and that considerations of justice (often read as distri-
butional equity) have no place in trade law so understood.'43 This
Article has argued that trade linkage questions cannot be defini-
tively resolved a-normatively, and that it is an error of the Effi-
141 See Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 21 (noting that one similarity between
environmental and labor issues in trade is that "[m]orality has always been a
concern with labour[sic] and is becoming increasingly so with the environ-
ment"). There are, of course, other ways of analyzing these issues which are
equall important, such as the descriptive and prescriptive modes of the social
scientific tradition, which can complement, but not replace, a normative analy-
sis or a normative answer.
142 Circumstances have changed; technology has advanced; international
economic law has developed; fundamental values are in conflict; and the range
of options for "rightly ordering" each of these corners of society is represented
more fully by the views of the trade and non-trade partisans taken together,
than by either side separately.
143 Trade law, on this view, is about comparative advantage, efficiency, and
welfare. See, e.g., Ronald Brand, Sustaining the Development of International
Trade Law, 21 VT. L. REV. 823, 842 (1997) (The fundamental goal of the WTO
system is the reduction of trade barriers through rules consistent with the un-




ciency Model to consider itself a convenient, neutral manner in
which to resolve these issues. There is no such stance.
144
In fact, when one considers the question of justice and its rela-
tion to international economic law, as outlined above, one is im-
mediately struck by the fact that the Efficiency Model of interna-
tional economic law is actually one response to the question of
what constitutes the Right Order.' 45 On this view of interna-
tional economic relations, justice is best served through a system
of international economic law that promotes free market ex-
changes among private parties and within the state "market" for
trade agreements. Such market exchanges will promote effi-
ciency, enable comparative advantage to operate, and enhance the
general welfare of the market participants. 46 Neoliberal eco-
nomic arguments against linkages thus presuppose a substantive
theory of justice. They are not neutral arguments to preserve
trade policy from unwarranted normative baggage, but rather
normative arguments towards a different vision of the Right Or-
der. 1
47
144 Trade linkage issues thus flush the neo-liberal economic trade viewpoint
out of its assumed neutrality and into the mudpit of normative brawling, wihere
it belongs.
145 Put another way, Efficiency Model advocates rely on the positive analy-
sis of economists while ignoring the normative aspects of economic theory,
which modern economists themselves take little cognizance of despite a histori-
cal tradition of theorizing as to the proper ends of economic activity. See EDW.
E. ZAJAC, THE POLiICAL ECONOMY OF FAIRNESS 69-78 (1995); Daniel M.
Hausman & Michael S. McPherson, Taking Ethics Seriously: Economics and Con-
temporary Moral Philosophy, 31 J. ECON. Lrr. 671, 675-76, 677-78 (citing the
moial presuppositions and implications of welfare economics, and the inter-
mingling of positive and normative analysis in such economics).
'M This view may reflect the conclusion that the only professional contri-
bution economists can make to the justice debate is analysis of what contributes
to these modest but necessary ingredients in a just society. In that case, the po-
sition is consistent with modem economics' eschewal of ethical theory beyond
their own methodological limits. See ZAJAC, supra note 145, at 76-77; Hausman
& McPherson, supra note 145, at 671-78 (citing modern economists' relative ig-
norance of moral theory, and arguing for the importance of moral theory to
effective economic analysis). However, it must be recognized that efficiency
and welfare, while arguably necessary, are not sufficient, in themselves, to ex-
press all our intuitions about just outcomes.
Alternatively, to the extent that this view is an assertion that efficiency is a
sufficient justification of outcomes, it runs counter to most liberal theory and
ignores the significant distributional issues raised by economic activity. See
ZAJAC, supra note 145, at 77.
147 The claims of justice, be it libertarian justice or utilitarian justice, are
satisfied on this view solely through maximizing individual economic liberty
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Finally, the articulation of trade linkage positions, in terms of
substantive theories of justice, makes it possible to recognize po-
tentially useful areas of agreement on a normative level among
differing linkage views. At its most basic level, international eco-
nomic law and policy can be seen as committed to and advancing
key tenets of Western theories of justice in the area of economic
relations. For example, the core values of free trade and economic
integration (increases in general welfare through trade liberaliza-
tion, nondiscrimination, and the implementation of treaty-based
regulatory schemes) reflect core principles of a liberal theory of
justice such as liberty, equality of opportunity, and the rule of
law. 148 Thus, Efficiency Paradigm advocates and those with other
linkage viewpoints can find common ground, for example, in
trade linkage approaches that advocate measures which strengthen
the rule of law and the effectiveness of institutions in interna-
tional economic relations as part of a linkage scheme.
3.3. Towards a just Resolution of Trade Linkage Issues
Recognizing the link between trade linkage issues and justice
can also contribute to a more just resolution of those linkage is-
sues. It becomes possible to evaluate techniques and options for
resolving linkage conflicts in an analytic framework that draws
out their underlying normative commitments and implications.
Various trade policy mechanisms have been developed by states
and international economic institutions for managing conflicts
among linkage areas. 149 Efficiency alone is an inadequate basis on
which to formulate policy in areas which involve so many inter-
ests, costs, risks, and opportunities." 0 Furthermore, trade linkage
and minimizing governmental interference with market decisions, eschewing
the distributive or social justice contentions of liberal egalitarian justice.
148 Cf Petersmann, supra note 89, at 406 ("[I]ndividual liberties and action-
able property rights are preconditions for the proper functioning of eco-
nomic. .. markets, and for maximization of individua autonomy, human well-
beinw, economic efficiency and social welfare in a free society.").
The current trade linkage debate is dominated by a bewildering variety
of issues and techniques, including rule-making issues such as harmonization,
domestic versus multilateral standiards, and priority schemes for rule conflicts;
enforcement issues such as admission criteria, conditionality, suspension of
concessions and trade sanctions; and institutional issues including jurisdiction,
comnetence, participation by NGOs, debates over decision-making criteria.
See Dunoff, supra note 94; Nichols, supra note 7, at 707 ("[T]he multi-
tude of efficient states cannot be narrowed to one by excising all goals except




issues can not be resolved solely at the level of a choice of techni-
cal or doctrinal tools. Techniques to manage these issues involve
prioritizing between certain trade liberalization values and other
aspects of the liberal view of justice, such as human rights. As
such, they contain deeply embedded normative assumptions,
which must be addressed as such. 15' A justice perspective may
thus serve both to put the quest for efficiency within a larger
normative context and to supplement this line of inquiry with a
more adequate framework for policy formulation.
One principal practical implication of a normative analysis of
trade linkage techniques would be that certain existing policies or
practices now considered to be discretionary on the part of the
implementing state could come to be seen as in fact obligatory, on
the basis of that state's moral obligations to its trading partners.
For example, in the trade and development area the principle of
asymmetry or preferential treatment for developing countries is a
principal instrument in managing inequality problems, and is as
old as the GATT system.' 52 However, much of the trade between
developed and developing countries is conducted under some
form of unilateral trade preference program 53 which disfavors to
some degree exports of manufactured goods which are directly
competitive with the manufactured goods of developed states.'5
4
151 What is lacking today is a comprehensive analysis from the perspective
of the developed states of the ethical relationship between developed and devel-
oping states, and the articulation of the implications of such an analysis for the
current trading system. This lack of consensus reflects debates, within the
West, on justice itself, as well as the debate within trade law between the Effi-
ciency Model and other models of economic justice.
12 The Havana Charter contained extensive provisions detailing preferen-
tial treatment for industrializing developing countries. See Brown, supra note 2,
at 358-59. Unfortunately, the Havana Charter never went into force; the re-
suiting GATT had a much weaker regime for developing countries; and the
amendments adding part IV, in 1966, did not fully remedy the situation. See id.
at 359.
... In 1971, the GATT Contracting Parties approved a waiver authorizing,
but not requiring, developed states to extend preferential tariff rates to develop-
ing country exports on a non-reciprocal basis for ten years. In 1979, the waiver
for the resulting Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP") was made perma-
nent. See ia at 362-63. Most developed countries have some form of GSP pro-
gram, including members of the European Community and the United States.
See, eg.,19 U.S.C. S 2461 (1994).
1s4 Despite its widespread implementation, the GSP effort is widely judged
a failure, as most often the exports of greatest interest to developing countries
are not covered, and the complexity and discretionary nature of the program
undermine its utility. See generally Brown, supra note 2, at 362-63.
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It may be that under some form of redistributive or feminist the-
ory of justice one could articulate a moral obligation to permit
the preferential export of competitive goods.15 5 Justice may also
require that such discretionary unilateral preferences be sup-
planted by nondiscretionary bilateral treaty commitments for
preferential treatment, 156 together with non-discretionary trade-
related development aid and other ways of recognizing inequality
in trade relationships. 
15
A second, related effect would be that certain existing linkage
tools now considered legitimate, even attractive, might come to
be seen as unattractive or even unjust if normatively reevalu-
ated. 15  For example, one linkage tool often employed and advo-
cated in the human rights and environment debates is the practice
of trade conditionality, which in this context means linking trade
preferences and other advantageous trade treatment with adher-
ence to certain values as reflected in appropriate treaties involving
the environment, human rights, etc.1  This approach is popular
155 For example, under the Rawlsian difference principle inequalities are to
be justified by their working to the advantage of the least favored, which would
mean, in this instance, that preferential or unequal trade treatment must be
structured to favor the interests of developing country exporters over devel-
oped country competitors.
The ethic of care articulated by feminist philosophers, as applied to inter-
national relations, might require a similar result. See Charlesworth et al., supra
note 111, at 615-16.
16 Such a transition can play an important interim role in an evolving
process of regional integration. See Frank J. Garcia, "America's Agreements!-
An Interim Stage in Building the Free Trade Area of the Americas, 35 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 63, at 98-106 (1997).
157 See Bernard Cullen, Philosophical Theories offiustice, in JUSTICE: IN-
TERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12, at 28 (describing Barry's notion
that justice might require a non-discretionary system of interstate development
aid).
158 One broad, systemic effect of a justice perspective on linkage issues
might be the elimination of certain options on the basis of a widespread rejec-
tion of utilitarianism or consequentialism generally.
159 One example of this practice is the requirement that EC member and
associated states be parties to the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom. See Smith, supra note 2, at 808-09.
Therefore, if a state is to participate in European integration, it must recognize
certain human rights norms. The China MFN debate is a key example of this
issue, and of the failure of the Clinton administration to follow through on its
initial impetus to recognize and respect this link. See Robert S. Greenber&er,
Restraint f Trade: Cacophony of Voices Drowns Out Message From U.S. to China,





with non-trade interest groups, as it suggests in the strongest pos-
sible terms the conditioning state's commitment to the relevant
aspect of justice linked to the trade benefits in question. 160  This
approach is equally unpopular with the neoliberally-oriented
trade community, which sees such efforts as a serious threat to the
fundamental economic principles of trade theory and a stalking
horse for arbitrary discrimination.
The issue of trade conditionality is ideally suited for analysis
from a justice perspective. On this issue, the neoliberal economic
view of justice militates against conditionality on trade economic
grounds, but has no answer when faced with the assertion that
such a position undermines other commitments stemming equally
from a liberal view of justice, in that it enriches states pursuing
values contrary to our own. However, the facially liberal argu-
ment in favor of conditionality seems to ignore that, at least with
respect to developing countries (often the most popular targets for
conditionality due to their relative vulnerability), a wealthy state
might be under a moral duty to give preferential trade treatment
and even direct aid that might preclude conditionality altogether.
In other words, if justice requires that wealthy states assist the de-
velopment of poorer states through trade preferences and outright
wealth transfers, then conditionality would be a violation of that
moral duty, regardless of its possible advantages in the pursuit of
other aims.
161
The trade and environment link in particular has highlighted a
third area in which a justice perspective may have practical impli-
cations, namely the issue of determining the proper forum and
decisional criteria for the institutional resolution of trade linkage
conflicts.162 Institutional dispute settlement bodies confronted
160 See, e.., Charnovitz, supra note 3, at 22 (citing conditionality practices
with approval).
161 Certain conditions tied to ensuring that the aid go where it is intended,
i.e., to benefit the lot of the poorest, miglt, of course, be justifiable. However,
links to rights not implicated in the subject of the aid (free speech or free emi-
gration rights, for example) would not be justifiable, because they presume dis-
cretion over the grant of assistance where that grant might, in fact, be a moral
obligation.
62 Environmentalists roundly criticized the GATT decision-making proc-
ess in the first Tuna-Dolphin case, United States-Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991), in which the first explicit trade linkage issues was
resolved in an international legal forum, for failing to take cognizance of envi-
ronmental policy issues and for clumsily handling these matters in a piecemeal
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with linkage issues must be capable of making decisions that ad-
dress the wide range of social values at stake.163 To date, the
GATT, as a principal trade-based forum for handling linkage is-
sues, has not passed the test, at least in the view of non-trade link-
age interest groups.164
As a threshold matter, justice might require for example that
the forum chosen be one which most closely embodies our proce-
dural standards for just decision making and dispute resolution.
165
In this respect, one key aspect already prominent in trade policy
debates is participation by interest groups, an issue with clear
overtones of democratic theory. 166  Once such institutions are
chosen, a justice perspective requires a careful analysis of the prin-
ciples and criteria employed in making decisions involving link-. 167
age issues. Normative preferences which may well predeter-
mine the outcome of linkage decisions are likely to be embedded
fashion. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defog-
ging the Debate, 27 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 459 (1994).
163 As Joel Trachtman writes, "[N]o society can afford to make decisions in
an unintegrated fashion." Trachtman, supra note 5, at 57. The risks for institu-
tions such as the WTO in ignoring the fundamental values at stake in their de-
cisions are highlighted by Philip Nichols in Trade Without Values. See Nichols,
supra note 7, at 702-07.
164 See, e.g., ESTY, supra note 2, at 1268.
[T]he GATT stands as one of the most successful international organi-
zations ever created. But the GATT's legitimacy does not translate out
of the trade context, and the organization has little credibility in envi-
ronmental matters. When a case involves mixed issues of 'trade and
environment,' the GATT does not offer a suitable forum for resolu-
tion of the dispute, as the institution lacks the expertise and neutrality
to balance trade and environmental policies. The GATT's perceived
lack of technical capacity and neutrality, and therefore legitimacy, as a
decision-making body in the environmental realm presents a nearly in-
surmountable obstace to peace in the war between environmentalists
and free traders.
Idl But see Stewart, supra note 125, at 1349 ("While amendments to the GATT
to deal more specifically with trade and environment issues may well be desir-
able, the current GATT text provides sufficient flexibility to afford environ-
mental values equal footing with free trade values.").
165 See Petersmann, supra note 89.
166 See Robert F. Housman, Democratizing International Trade Decision-
Making, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 699 (1994).
167 See generally Joel P. Trachtman, "Trade and..." Problems, Cost-Benefit
Analysis and Subsidiarity, 9 EUR. J. INT'LL. 32 (1997).
[Vol 19:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss2/7
1998] TRADE AND JUSTICE 433
in such criteria.1 68 For example, it has been argued that in the
analysis of GATT dispute settlement involving trade-environment
issues, certain criteria such as "proof of endangerment" mask utili-




In any successful revolution, there comes a moment of truth
when the former revolutionaries must finally confront the chal-
lenge of governance, and the international economic law revolu-
tion is no different. The trade linkage phenomenon, in particular,
is forcing international economic law to wrestle with its own
normative assumptions and implications across a broad range of
issues. One should expect no less of a system of governance that
so promises to affect all aspects of global social policy.
Successfully managing trade linkage issues means, for the trade
policy community, accepting that the linkages come from within
and not from without. Even if one maintains the neoliberal eco-
nomic view of justice in international economic law, it must at
least be conceded that advocates of linkage issues are acting from
other answers to the same question, the question of justice, and
that it is a shared question.
Furthermore, the resolution of linkage issues cannot be sought
exclusively on the doctrinal level. The resolution needs to be ar-
ticulated normatively, as an attempt to resolve dilemmas and ten-
sions within the liberal vision, and between liberalism and other
candidates for Right Order. From the perspective of justice, the
debate within international economic law over linkage issues re-
flects debates within various aspects of Western moral and politi-
cal theory, and especially within liberalism itself. It reflects ten-
sions between the liberalization of individual choice through free
trade and investment, and the commitment to individual rights
and other fundamental moral obligations expressed in other as-
168 See Nichols, supra note 7, at 700-01 (reviewing factors in GATT dispute
settlement panel doctrine giving primacy to trade in conflicts with other val-
ues).
169 "Endangerment" implies that there is no harm short of dire peril that
could justify interference with economically lucrative activity, ignoring the
possibility that any harm, for example, justifies such interference. See
ousman, supra note 125, at 1376-77 (challenging Stewart).
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pects of liberalism, such as human rights and environmental pro-
tection.
The ideal solution would be consensus on the question of
what justice demands in the case of international economic law
generally, and for each linkage area in question. Absent that, one
must resort to legal techniques for managing linkages where con-
sensus is not achieved, but always with the understanding that








There are historical moments in which invisible forces take a
perfectly good idea and turn it into an ideology or even an idol.
Such seems to be the case with intellectual property. Twenty
years ago, intellectual property hardly existed as such. Its individ-
ual components-copyrights, patents, trademarks, etc.-had been
around for a long time, of course, but they had not coalesced into
anything comparable to the unified body of law we have today.
Nor were they central to legal practice or significant to law school
curriculum. Indeed, as recently as the beginning of the 1980s, de-
bate was still raging over the appropriate name to give to this
emerging field ("industrial property" or "intellectual property")
and over its precise boundaries. Almost overnight, however, in-
tellectual property has changed from a complex and generally eso-
teric body of law-the preserve of specialists in technology and
entertainment law-to the stuff of folklore and conversation at
cocktail parties, and for some, almost an object of worship. Intel-
lectual property now frequently appears in the company of such
lofty notions as freedom and democracy, and has even been hailed
as a more potent weapon than bombs and missiles for use against
dictators!**
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; LL.B. (Honors) (Makerere Uni-
versity, Kampala); LL.M.; Ph.D. (Monash University, Melbourne, Australia).
This paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law, International Economic Law Interest Group, Washington,
D.C., December 5, 1997. I am grateful for a comment by Frank Garcia and a
pointed critique by Peter Winship at this meeting; both prompted more reflec-
tion on some of the views presented there. A version of the paper was also pre-
sented at a Brooklyn Law School Center for the Study of International Business
Law's Economic Law Forum, Brooklyn Law School, April 22, 1998.
**Rebecca Mead expressed this point stating:
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As with all such things, several historical factors are responsi-
ble for this transformation, but the most significant is, I think,
evolution in the economic value behind property interests gener-
ally. The common law concept of property inaugurated by Wil-
liam the Conqueror, following his spectacular victory at the Bat-
tle of Hastings in 1066, saw the subject matter of property almost
exclusively in terms of land-real property-the foundation of
both political power and family wealth. With the Industrial
Revolution, the focus of property in the West shifted somewhat
to encompass not only land but manufactured goods as well. The
latter part of the twentieth century has seen another shift of em-
phasis from manufactured goods to ideas, information, and im-
ages-the subject matter of intellectual property-and it is this
shift that is largely responsible for the current elevation of intel-
lectual property to its present lofty status.
The impetus for globalizing intellectual property laws, how-
ever, comes from the bewilderingly global nature of intellectual
property's subject matter, nicely illustrated by the country music
singer Johnny Cash's tale of woe before a Congressional sub-
committee last fall. The source of Cash's anguish was that his hit
song, "Ring of Fire," had appeared on a website in Slovenia:
"Maybe I should be flattered that someone in Slovenia likes my
song, but when he or she makes it available to millions of people,
Saddam Hussein may have brought us back from the brink of war by
deciding to allow United Nations weapons inspectors access to his
contested presidential sites, but there are other violations that the Iraqi
premier has yet to rectify. That screening on Iraqi television of a boot-
leg copy of the movie"Wag the Dog," for a start: a few weeks ago, the
Iraqi public was treated to a grainy version of Barry Levinson's film,
presumably to illustrate that it is in the nature of an American Presi-
dent caught in a sex scandal to decide that a war overseas is exactly the
kind of distraction his country needs. Which raises the following
question: If we are not going to war with Iraq, could Saddam Hussein
nonetheless be nabbed on copyright law, just as Al Capone was caught
on tax evasion?
"This whole piracy situation is serious, because it represents a vio-
lation of property," Levinson said by telephone from Hollywood,
though he aided that he would probably not be pressuring New Line
Cinema to take action against Saddam ....
Rebecca Mead, A New Plan to Take Out Saddam Hussein, Courtesy of Hollywood,




this hardly seems fair."' Cash told attentive members of the
House Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, "[In
real life], [o]ur laws respect what we create with our heads as
much as what we create with our hands," and "[that] ought to be
true [of] cyberspace too."2 Globalization of intellectual property's
subject matter is, of course, a product of the electronic revolution
which makes it possible for one to convert every kind of informa-
tion-words, pictures, sounds-into the ones and zeros of digital
code,3 compress it, and transmit it to the ends of the earth with
only a few clicks of the mouse.
Information which has thus burst out of traditional territorial
confines can only be protected by rules which are similarly un-
constrained, whose reach does not stop at the border. It requires,
some suggest, a system of global intellectual property as distinct
from the traditional international intellectual property. Interna-
tional intellectual property is a superstructure of norms that gov-
ern the relationship between autonomous, self-contained, and es-
sentially territorial national intellectual property systems. A
global intellectual property system, by contrast, is one which
brings about deep integration 4 of the various national systems into
a single, unified, global network. In this Article, I argue that a
global intellectual property of this kind is desirable, but that it in-
volves a socio-ethical examination of near-Herculean proportions
into what would make such intellectual property laws work. I
shall suggest in Part 2 of this paper, however, that idolatry has set
in early and sabotaged that process: The result is not deep inte-
gration at all, but a hurriedly constructed system whose only
foundation is a thin bargain linkage between trade and intellectual
property. In Parts 3 and 4, 1 shall probe the competing theoretical
challenges that I have called "glib universalism" and "postmodern
culturalism" which a system of deep integration needs to con-
front. In Part 5, I suggest that the answer to the challenge of
' Rebecca Vesely, Johnny Cash Talks the Line on Coyright Law, WIRED
NEWS (visited May 5, 1998) <http://www.wired.com/newspolitcs/story/69
71.htm >.
2 Id.
3 See generally ESTHER DYSON, RELEASE 2.0, 133-34 (1997); PAUL
GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBOX 196, 196-236 (3d ed. 1994) (stating that "[o]ne of the transforming sci-
entific revolutions of the twentieth century has been to capture words, sounds,
and images in digital form").
See infra notes 5-13 and accompanying text.
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global intellectual property is neither disembodied universal
norms applied in the same way everywhere and without regard
for context or local circumstance, nor the construction of a global
culture, but lies in the more modest concept of a "justice constitu-
ency."
2. GLOBALIZING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
Is ANYTHING NEW?
As I use the term in this paper, globalization in relation to the
subject matter of intellectual property means instantaneous pro-
jection of information all over the globe. In relation to the law, it
means the deep integration necessary for a unified global norma-
tive system. In both cases, globalization is, in my view, qualita-
tively different from internationalization, a term I use here for the
occasional traversing of state borders by essentially territorial in-
formation, and the relatively modest laws designed to accommo-
date such modest border-crossings.
Internationalization is no stranger to intellectual property.
From earliest times, the kind of information protected by intel-
lectual property-for instance,, works of literature and patented
inventions-has always had an international dimension in the
sense of crossing national borders. The international intellectual
property law designed for this process is also of venerable origin,
dating back to the nineteenth century. It is found in treaties such
as the Paris Convention, created in 1883 to deal with patents,
trademarks and industrial designs, and the premier copyright
treaty, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Artistic and
Literary Works, established six years later in 1889. With a few
exceptions, however, these treaties did not create substantive uni-
versal intellectual property rules. They were content, for the
most part, to prescribe the more modest principle of "national
treatment"-the requirement that each member state accord
works of nationals of other member states the same rights as those
accorded the works of its own nationals. The substantive stan-
dards of protection and the procedures for effecting that protec-
tion were, largely, left to the autonomy of each member state.
National treatment means that an author who is a national of one
member country must not be treated any worse in another mem-
ber country than authors who are nationals of that other country;
but this does not mean that authors must receive identical treat-
ment in each member country. International intellectual property
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law is thus not incompatible with the territorial nature of tradi-
tional intellectual property laws.
It is in the context of truly global norms, however, that
Johnny Cash's complaint about the fate of his song in Slovenia
could be vindicated. What would such territory-transcending
rules look like? Although there are modest universal minimum
standards in international treaties, such as the Berne Convention,
there are really two kinds of territory-transcending intellectual
property laws, and both are of recent origin.
2.1. Super 301: The Realist Option
The first kind is the "realist" one. It involves the unilateral,
extra-territorial enforcement of one nation's laws-for instance
the laws of the United States-against countries that do not re-
spect the intellectual property of its nationals. This option is of-
ten invoked as a measure of last resort against the most egregious
offenders, such as those sometimes described as "one-copy coun-
tries"-countries where piracy is so rampant that a single legiti-
mate copy of a computer program or a musical CD is all it takes
to satisfy the needs of the entire population! An example of such
unilateral measures is the United States' "Super (or Special) 301"-
§ 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 19885-
which enables the United States to take retaliatory action against
countries with inadequate intellectual property laws. Since one
nation's laws have no normative force beyond its territory, the
external shape of "Super 301" is that of sheer economic muscle.
That is the sense in which it might be called "realist." But it
might have venerable philosophical roots in the claim of all states
to protect the interests of their nationals abroad. Unilateral
measures of this sort are built on what we might call a retaliatory
linkage: "Protect our national's intellectual property or else."
Since Johnny Cash's complaint was made to a Congressional Sub-
committee, it could indeed be perceived as an aggrieved citizen's
invocation of the realist option. Cash, however, wanted this done
through the mediation of recent WIPO treaties. He was lending
5 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. S 2901
(1998).
6 See World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20,
1996, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65; World Intellectual Property
Organization Performance and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M.
76.
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his voice not to a powerful state's unilateral commands against an
offending weaker one, but to the creation of overarching global
rules of the kind Kratochwil describes as rules in the "third party
mode."7 These global rules are the second option for a territory-
transcending intellectual property system and it is to them that I
turn.
2.2. Rules in the "Third Party Mode": TRIPS and the Road
Toward Deep Integration
Intellectual property's most dramatic step from its interna-
tional phase towards the global one came with the TRIPS Agree-
ment that was part of the GATT Uruguay Round. The TRIPS
Agreement did this, in the first instance, by "legislating" beyond
the traditional notions of national treatment (albeit with some
modest minimum standards) to strong substantive as well as pro-
cedural norms; in the second instance, by making such
"legislation" universal using a linkage to trade to ensure that eve-
ryone is either on board or soon will be; and in the third instance
by creating an institutional structure in the World Trade Organi-
zation ("WTO") to ensure compliance with these norms. The
substantive norms create a variety of universal minimum stan-
dards of protection, such as those requiring computer programs to
be protected as literary works under the Berne Convention, or
provisions relating to rental rights, performers' rights, well-
known marks or the patent term; procedural norms ensure their
enforcement through such mechanisms as injunctions, seizure,
and, in some cases, even criminal penalties; and the WTO super-
imposes upon these a transcendent institutional structure.
We have already noted that one of the causes of the shift from
international to global intellectual property is the electronic revo-
lution mentioned earlier; in addition, this shift is also attributable
both to the progressive transfer of autonomy from states to mar-
kets, as well as to the world's industrial leaders' desire to sustain
high-cost labor economies through the sales of their advanced
ideas.' What may not be so well known, however, are the pro-
7 See FRIEDRICH KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS: ON
THE CONDITIONS OF PRACTICAL AND LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS 13 (1989).
8 See W.R. Cornish, Judicial Legislation, in LAW, SOCIETY, AND
ECONOMY: CENTENARY ESSAYS FOR THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 1895-1995 359, 371 (Richard Rawlings ed., 1997).
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found implications of this shift, including for instance the spec-
tacular measures of harmonization a treaty like the TRIPS
Agreement has imposed upon its 120-odd member states,9 nor the
way this treaty may give a foreigner a second chance at litiga-
tion-in the form of international litigation-as a means of pro-
curing private rights that could not be procured through direct
negotiation. 10 As a keen observer further notes:
The particular point to be made in today's context is that
the dispute will be settled by a tribunal of three, of suita-
bly balanced composition. In the early years the panel
members are likely to be drawn from those government
9 See id
10 An interesting scenario is sketched out by Cornish:
Imagine for instance a dispute over whether a copyright computer
program can be the subject of reverse engineering by "decompilation"
in order to produce a compatible, non-infringing program. This will
first be litigated through the instances of the country where infringe-
ment is alleged. If it is an EC country there will doubtless be a cassa-
tional side-trip to the European Court of Justice in order to determine
the meaning of the ludicrously complicated Directive on the subject.
If it all goes against the plaintiff, that claimant may cause its govern-
ment to institute proceedings against the refusing State, claiming that
under TRIPS no exception is permissible because the reverse engineer-
ing prejudices the interests of the right-owner. If the outcome is in fa-
vour of the plaintiff's State, it may in its turn insist upon the with-
drawal of trade concessions under the GATT which will hurt enough
to induce a change in the copyright law.
Indeed after five years it will be possible to raise such a dispute on
the basis of prejudicial conduct which escapes violating the actual
terms of TRIPS. I have even seen it suggested that, if a country (such
as France) chooses to impose a quota on the television showing of for-
eign films (inevitably American), the copyright owners of the latter
w ll be able to argue from TRIPS that the embargo is impermissible.
Forget the fact that copyright itself is a negative right designed to pre-
vent others from using pirated or unlicensed copies for sales or per-
formances; it is not concerned with the copyright owner's or licensee's
exploitation of its own material. Forget the fct that negotiations on
quotas in the audio-visual sector broke down and nothing was included
in the new GATT on the provision of material for broadcasting. It
would be enough that some essential spirit of TRIPS had been dishon-
oured.
Whether such a claim would ever finally be sustained in a WTO dis-
pute settlement claim is wholly speculative. It is the possibility that it
can even be contemplated which should be a cause of considerable
concern in the new world of trade collaboration.
Id. at 372-73.
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negotiators who generated the TRIPs in midnight en-
claves, people steeped in the esoteric power-politics of that
process, rather than philosophers of the role and purpose
of the rights. The Dispute Settlement Panels will work at
a total remove from the political institutions of either the
State under attack or the attacking State. The settlement
could well adopt an activist approach to interpretation of
the TRIPs text. It could perhaps rely on some common
heritage of international customary law in intellectual
property matters, for which certain high-thinking groups
are even now seeking recognition. Whatever the outcome,
a settlement will have immense influence: it will establish
the essential content of the laws on the subject in well-nigh
all States."
Such are the profound implications of a global intellectual
property system, and at the formal rule-making level this edifice is
a formidable achievement.' 2  The tough terrain, however, lies
ahead, for the degree of harmonization which this formal set of
rules, along with the exigencies of their interpretation by a single
body requires, may turn out to be far more than most parties bar-
gained for. It is the kind of deep integration which rides rough-
shod over not only the strong dualism that seeks to keep treaties
and domestic law separate in countries such as Great Britain and
Scandinavia, but also in those such as the United States where the
legislature plays some role in the treaty-making process and where
many intellectual property rules may differ from those of other
countries. My principal point is that a deep integration of this
kind cannot be sustained by idolatry, or by bargain linkage. Can
such an integration be built on a firmer foundation? Possibly yes,
but only after one has dealt with the intractable problems raised
by two warring camps that inhabit the treacherous conceptual
terrain just below the surface of formal rules. I have called the
first, "glib universalism." Despite the use of the adjective "glib" to
describe this position, mine is really an attempt to put some theo-
retical flesh on the bare bones of the current system; it is an at-
" Id. at 373.12
For an overview of the implementation of the Uruguay Round see gen-
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tempt to give the most sympathetic account of the quest for uni-
versal rules that have no regard for context or circumstance.
Moreover, for the most part, these rules are simply national ones
shorn of their domestic socio-ethical roots-disembodied norms
orbiting in global space. The second camp, the exact opposite of
"glib universalism," is postmodernity's "vision of a cultural
'heterotopia' which has no edges, hierarchies or centre"13 and
which is anathema to the very possibility of universal norms. I
suggest, however, that there is a way out of the unpalatable choice
between the tyranny of disembodied norms and the intransigence
of postmodern culturalism. That way out, I suggest, lies in the
notion of a "justice-constituency" which I shall sketch in the latter
part of this Article. But first, let us elaborate on the rival visions
of glib universalism and postmodern culturalism.
3. GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GLIB UNIVERSALISM
I have attributed the factual globalization of intellectual prop-
erty to three causal factors: the electronic revolution, the tri-
umph of the market, and the perceived interests of industrialized
nations. The phenomenon I have called glib universalism is an at-
tempt to put some normative foundations underneath this proc-
ess. The glib universalist camp draws its strength from a curious
collusion of two old enemies: naturalism and legal positivism.
Let us look at the contributions of each to their joint venture of
providing a normative foundation for global intellectual property.
3.1. Naturalism
As already mentioned, intellectual property rights may ac-
quire both a canonical status and presumptive universality by
donning the garb of natural or human rights. Human rights are
universal because they are rights which all human beings every-
where have by virtue of their humanity. As Professor Henkin
reminds us:
[Such rights] do not differ with geography or history, cul-
ture or ideology, political or economic system, or stage of
societal development. To call them "human" implies that
13 STEVEN CONNOR, POSTMODERN CULTURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THEORIFS OF THE CONTEMPORARY 19 (1989).
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all human beings have them, equally and in equal measure,
by virtue of their humanity-regardless of sex, race, age;
regardless of high or low "birth," social class, national ori-
gin, ethnic or tribal affiliation; regardless of wealth or
poverty, occupation talent, merit, religion, ideology, or
other commitment.'4
The view of intellectual property rights as fundamental hu-
man rights is, of course, no idle curiosity. Although this may not
be widely known, Article 27(2) of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights-that central pillar of the International Bill of
Rights whose fiftieth anniversary we celebrate this year-affirms
the right of everyone "to the protection of the moral and material
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic produc-
tion of which he [or she] is the author."15  Moreover, while the
general right of property did not make it to the subsequent trea-
ties, intellectual property rights did find their way into the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights
which contains a similar provision.
This naturalistic elevation of intellectual property rights to the
status of universal human rights has reached new and surprising
heights in the oft-repeated description of unauthorized copying
and distribution of the protected works as "piracy," for pirates,
along with torturers and slave traders, are among the most egre-
gious violators of human rights. As Judge Kaufman of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit described them,
the torturer, the pirate, and the slave trader are each hostis humani
generis, an enemy of all humankind. 17 Yet, despite its superficial
rhetorical value which thrives on hyperbolic inflation of intellec-
tual property's universal moral claims, the naturalistic view is un-
likely to provide an enduring normative foundation for global in-
14 Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 2-3 (1990).
15 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 27(2),
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
16 Article 15(1)(c) provides that "[tlhe States Parties... recognise the right
of everyone.., to benefit from the protection of the moral and material inter-
ests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is
the author." International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966, art. 15(1)(c), 993 U.N.T.S. 3; see also American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man, art. 13, at 19, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser. L/V/ll. Doc.
6 (May 2, 1948), available in 9 I.L.M. 673.
17 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
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tellectual property. For a start, no one is likely to mistake Judge
Kaufman's characterization of the "pirate" as hostis humani generis
for a reference to purveyors of bootleg compact discs or computer
programs. But more importantly, intellectual property has an-
other handicap, not shared by tangible property, which makes its
status as the subject of fundamental human rights more tenuous:
The case for its protection is notoriously counterintuitive. This is
due, in turn, to what one may call intellectual property's "double
intangibility."
For instance, although both lawyers and lay persons habitu-
ally draw a distinction between tangible and intangible property,
and between corporeal and incorporeal hereditaments, all prop-
erty is in truth intangible. This is because by "property," we
really mean "proprietary interests." These are complex socio-legal
constructs involving relationships between "persons" (natural,
corporate, etc.) and "objects" (tangible or intangible) giving rise to
a particular kind of rights (rights in rem whose content is typi-
cally exclusive use and alienation). In this regard, the distinction
between tangible and intangible property, or the historical one
between corporeal and incorporeal hereditaments, is, in terms of
their "propertyness," conceptually erroneous; for every proprie-
tary interest-whether it be a fee simple, a lease, an easement, a
mortgage-is ex hypothesi intangible. Now within the general
category of proprietary interests, there are some that have as their
subject matter, tangible "things" such as houses, automobiles, or
furniture; their case for the protection is intuitively self-evident
because they are prototypical property in the sense that they can
be possessed. Other proprietary interests, however, are saddled
with the further intangibility of their subject matter; such is the
case with intellectual property whose subject matter consists of
literary works, music, inventions-namely, information. Intellec-
tual property is thus doubly intangible: First, by virtue of its
"propertyness," and second, because its subject matter is also in-
tangible.
This curse of double intangibility makes the case for the pro-
tection of intellectual property counterintuitive for two reasons.
The first reason is that it makes them "inappropriable." Basic
proprietary interests in tangible objects are intuitively underwrit-
ten by their amenability to appropriation: They can be removed
from the public domain for all to see, possessed-and possession
in all its many-splendoured complexity is a prototypical defining
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attribute of ownership both in the law and in the mind. As one
writer has put it:
We cannot have our fish both loose and fast, as Melville
might have said, and the common law of first possession
makes a choice. The common law gives preference to
those who convince the world that they have caught the
fish and hold it fast. This may be a reward to useful labor,
but it is more precisely the articulation of a specific vo-
cabulary within a structure of symbols approved and un-
derstood by a commercial people. It is this commonly
understood and shared set of symbols that gives signifi-
cance and form to what might seem the quintessential in-
dividualist act: the claim that one has, by "possession,"
separated for oneself property from the great commons of
unowned things.
18
Information, the subject matter of intellectual property, how-
ever, is not appropriable in this way. It is only of value in the
marketplace, but once released there, it can easily be replicated
and used by the whole world. Although this "inappropriability"
is normally worked into a utilitarian reason for legal protection of
intellectual property,' 9 it does render the naturalistic claim hope-
lessly counterintuitive. Appropriability is not just a fetish of hu-
man intuition. It also serves the valuable function of defining the
boundaries of each person's private domain. For this reason, a
distinction is often made between "choses in possession" (i.e. chat-
tels) and "choses in action" (e.g. a patent, copyright, or debt). The
general idea is that choses in possession can be possessed and en-
joyed without more ado, whereas enjoyment of choses in action
may require the assistance of some further legal action.
The second reason for the counterintuitiveness of protecting
intellectual property is what has been called "non-rivalrous" con-
sumption.20 The consumption of a tangible thing deprives others
18 Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
73, 88 (1985).
19 See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND
RELATED STATE DOCTRINES: CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 6-7 (4th ed. 1997).
20 See CRAIG JOYCE ETAL., COPYRIGHT LAW 18 n.28 (2d ed. 1991).
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of it, but the use or enjoyment of information, ideas, and works
of art does not deprive anyone else. For instance, a television sig-
nal carrying a musical work can be broadcast to the whole world
and "consumed" by everyone who has the equipment to receive
it, without anyone getting any less of it. Like inappropriability,
this unique characteristic of informational goods-that anyone
can use them without diminishing their availability to anyone
else-leads to a powerful moral intuition against intellectual prop-
erty law.2
In addition to inappropriability and non-rivalrous consump-
tion, there are also counterintuitive reasons of a more cultural
kind against intellectual property. For instance, understandings
of notions such as authorship and the construction of the public
domain provide an example. All these make it doubtful that the
naturalistic exaltation of intellectual property claims to the status
of fundamental human rights can settle any significant normative
issues between Johnny Cash and the inhabitants of Slovenia. Let
us turn then to the positivist component of glib universalism.
3.2. The Positivist Component
The positivist element of this duo consists of excessive faith in
the formal rules of law, separate and apart from law's socio-ethical
ecology. I call this one positivist because it has its roots in legal
positivism's obsession with the "separability" thesis, which insists
that law can and should be separable from its social context. The
positivist's misplaced faith in legal rules divorced from context is,
in part, a consequence of law's effectiveness in the domestic
sphere. We observe that in the domestic sphere, intellectual
property law generally works quite well, and from this observa-
tion we intuitively extrapolate that a set of formal rules would
work just as well at the global level. Most of the rules of the
emerging global system are, indeed, directly transposed from na-
tional legal systems.
But we delude ourselves. There is no easy correlation between
law's effectiveness in the domestic sphere and its chances of suc-
cess in the global arena. Whatever critical legal scholars 2 and
21 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 19, at 7.
For a liberal critique of this movement, see ANDREW ALTMAN,
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQuE (1990); a broader account of
all such movements is discussed and chronicled in GARY MINDA, POST-
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other anti-formalists might say, formal intellectual property rules
have worked pretty well in the domestic sphere. But law's success
in the domestic sphere, far from predicting its effectiveness at the
universal level, augers ill for universality since both law's domes-
tic success and its floundering at the universal level may be due to
the common feature of embeddedness at the heart of law's ontol-
ogy.
At the national level, formal rules work because they are part
of a complex web of social conventions and practices. These so-
cial conventions and practices in which law is embedded are for
the most part invisible; that may be why positivism tends to pay
scant attention to them. In everyday life, we are oblivious to
them the way we are oblivious to other aspects of our ecology,
until something disturbs them. But these social practices exist and
without them formal rules would be well nigh impossible. This
embeddedness is not unique to law; it pervades all institutional
facts of which law is only one kind. In his book which explores
the ontology of such institutional facts, John Searle uses a simple
scene to illustrate the immense complexity of the web of social
facts I talk about here.23 The scene involves a visit to a caf6 in
Paris where he utters a fragment of a French sentence by which
he orders a beer. The waiter brings him the beer, he drinks it,
leaves some money on the table, and departs. But, as Searle re-
marks, the sheer simplicity of this scene belies the fact that "its
metaphysical complexity is truly staggering"24 (Searle believes that
its "complexity would have taken Kant's breath away if he had
bothered to think about such things").25 In particular, this simple
transaction is embedded in a bewildering web of social facts.
There is hardly anything in this scene which can be adequately
described in the language of physics or chemistry--not
"restaurant," "waiter," "sentence of French," "money," nor even
"chair" and "table." Moreover, beyond these things that have
some physical existence, the scene is brimming with what Searle
MODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S
END (1995).
(9 See JOHN SEARLE, THE CONsTRucTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 3-4(1995).
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describes as "a huge, invisible ontology."26 He outlines this on-
tology as follows:
The waiter did not actually own the beer he gave me, but
he is employed by the restaurant which owned it. The
restaurant is required to post a list of the prices of all the
boissons, and even if I never see such a list, I am required to
pay only the listed price. The owner of the restaurant is
licensed by the French government to operate it. As such,
he is subject to a thousand rules and regulations I know
nothing about.27
Yet, as Searle points out, we can bear the staggering metaphysical
burden of this social reality because it is largely "weightless and
invisible."28 Once we are brought up in a particular culture, its
web of social reality seems no less natural than physical trees or
water. It is this complex web of social reality in which domestic
rules of law are embedded.
There is, however, hardly any corresponding set of social real-
ity to underwrite the proliferating rules of intellectual property
we are sending into global orbit. For the most part these are dis-
embodied domestic norms, unhinged from their socio-ethical con-
text, floating in space. It is a mistake to believe that since they
worked so well in the domestic sphere, they will work well at the
global level too, for the socio-ethical reality they have left behind
is essential to both their meaning and effectiveness.
The universalist sub-component is intertwined with both the
naturalist and the legal positivist ones just discussed, but its main
flaw is not so much the former's claim of intuitive self-evidence
nor the latter's excessive faith in formal rules severed from their
socio-ethical context. Its particular sin is that of succumbing to
the seduction of easy universality. The point here is not that uni-
versal norms are altogether unattainable.29  It is rather that out-
26 Id.
27 id
28 Id. at 4.
29 In matters of human rights generally, I am an unrepentant universalist
myself. See, e.g., Samuel K. Murumba, Cross-Cultural Dimensions of Human
Rights in the Twenty.First Century, in LEGAL VISIONS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTuRy: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF CHRISTOPHER WEERAMANTRY
(forthcoming May 1998) (manuscript on file with author); Samuel K. Mu-
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side certain contexts, universality is extremely difficult to attain,
and without satisfying some rigorous pre-conditions, a complete
impossibility.
The allure of universal intellectual property norms that do not
vary with change in place or local circumstance is, in the final
analysis, the seduction of what Sir Isaiah Berlin once referred to as
"a system of propositions so general, so clear, so comprehensive,
connected with each other with logical links so unambiguous and
direct that the result resembles as closely as possible a deductive
system."30 It is at bottom a utopian aspiration, though the world
of markets in which intellectual property rights operate is a rather
curious abode for utopian ideas. Nevertheless, the "global mar-
ket" and its accouterments, including intellectual property rights,
has been invested with some utopian characteristics by those who
see in it the panacea for all the ills of the post-cold war world.31
Indeed, it is not unusual these days to encounter discussions
linking intellectual property, especially copyright, with
"democracy,"32 and global copyright with "a vision of global de-
rumba, The Cultural and Conceptual Basis of Human Rights in International
Law (1986) (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Monash University (Melbourne, Austra-
lia) on file with the Monash University Library).
30 ISAIAH BERLIN, THIE SENSE OF REALITY 21 (Henry Hardy ed., 1996).
31 The kind of utopianism associated with the global market is sometimes
referred to as a version of "high modernism" which previously used to idolize
the state. See JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE THE STATE: How CERTAIN
SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDmON HAVE FAILED (1998); John
Gray, The Best-Laid Plans, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Apr. 19, 1998, at 36.
As I finished this book, I realized that its critique of certain forms of
state action might seem, from the post-1989 perspective of capitalist
triumphalism, like a kind of quaint archaeology. States with the ire-
tensions and power that I criticize have for the most part vanishe or
have drastically curbed their ambitions. And yet, as I make clear...
large-scale capitalism is just as much an agency of homogenization, uni-
formity, grids, and heroic simplification as the state is .... As we shall
see, the conclusions that can -be drawn from failures of modern proj-
ects of social engineering are as applicable to market-driven standardiza-
tion as they are to bureaucratic homogeneity.
SCOTT, supra, at 7-8 (emphasis added).
32 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society,
106 YALE L.J. 283, 288 (1996) (arguing that "copyright is in essence a state
measure that uses market institutions to enhance the democratic character of
civil society"); see also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright's Democratic
Principals in the Global Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217, 220 (1998) [hereinafter
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mocracy, not merely global markets,"33 or with what sounds like
an oxymoron, "freedom imperialism."
34
Whether a global intellectual property system can have such
profound socio-political implications remains to be seen. What
that lofty inquiry should not obscure, however, is the more mod-
est question of whether such a global system is capable of achiev-
ing the more traditional goal of all intellectual property systems-
the balancing of incentives and rewards to authors and inventors
against the public's right of free access to works and information.
We have seen that global intellectual property rules are gener-
ally abstracted from domestic spheres, leaving behind their sus-
taining contextual information. In place of these sustaining con-
texts, the global system of rules has relied more and more on
linkages in order to persuade countries that would otherwise be
reluctant to protect intellectual property (because such a protec-
tion is a net loss to them) to come on board. For instance, a
country may accede to the global intellectual property system be-
cause that is a condition of its obtaining access to markets for its
manufactured products. Bargain linkages of this sort may create
a system of rules, but they are unlikely to sustain it. Moreover,
such bargain linkages tell us nothing about the content of the
global rules they helped create. They do not tell us much, for in-
stance, about the meaning of "weasel" words like "fair use" and
"originality" in copyright law, "novelty" and "non-obviousness"
in patent law, or "distinctiveness" and "deceptive similarity" in
trademark law. They are, in other words, only creating what
Neil MacCormick calls "rule-texts," but hardly any "rule-
content."15 The trouble lies in the content of all these expansively
indeterminate terms. For global intellectual property, the devil
lurks in the details.
Netanel, Democratic Principals] ('Copyright law serves fundamentally to un-
derwrite a democratic culture.").
3 Netanel, Democratic Principals, supra note 32, at 221.
31 See Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPs Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated,
and Overprotective, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613, 615-20 (1996).
35 See Neil MacCormick, On "Open Texture" in Law, in CONTROVERSIES
ABOUT LAw's ONTOLOGY 72, 79-82 (Paul Amselek & Neil MacCormick eds.,
1991).
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4. GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
POSTMODERN CULTURISM
Glib universalism, as just observed, involves the use of con-
troversial naturalist or positivist-universalist foundations to un-
derwrite a global intellectual property system. Its nemesis, the
postmodern-culturalist camp, holds that the universality of norms
espoused in the global law-making enterprise is, at best, an exer-
cise in futility, and at worst, a fraud.
The basis for this rather startling claim can be found in a
complex arsenal of ontological, epistemological, and ethical tenets
of various strengths. The general target of this arsenal is a set of
related notions generally attributed to the Enlightenment, the
most important of which are: rationality, objectivity and univer-
sality. Postmodern culturalism insists that these notions are im-
plausible because there is no Archimedian perspective-no view
from above, or from the sidelines, that transcends the particulari-
ties of culture, space, and history. Rather, this camp insists that
every perspective is made from within some cultural perspective.
Instead of pretensions of rationality, universality, objectivity, (for
some even philosophy itself) this movement proposes that we
substitute the language of emotions and poetry. These claims
have profound implications for the whole project of creating a
system of global intellectual property rules. Without rationality,
we could not have any rules or principles at all,37 or at any rate,
rules and principles that are not simply "resources and instru-
ments that individuals manipulate to get what they want or think
good" or that "exert no power.., of their own over individual
thought, desire, and action"-in other words, rules that are not
"mere words," as one strand of postmodernism, the Critical Legal
Studies Movement, might regard them.3 1 Without objectivity, we
would have trouble talking about the ontology of law as a set of
social practices that do really exist in the way illustrated earlier
with the example of Searle's visit to a French caf. 39 Without
universality, we could not talk about the possibility of having a
36 See RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 373-
94 (1979).
37 See ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 40 (1993)
(discussing the role of principles in rationality and arguing that "to act and
think rationally, one must do so in accordance with principles").
38 ALTMAN, supra note 22, at 151.
39 See SEARLE, supra note 23, at 3-4.
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system of universal intellectual property at all. So if postmodern
claims about rationality, objectivity, or universality are true, then
those trying to globalize intellectual property are truly whistling
in the wind.
That seems bad enough. The postmodern project, however, is
not simply about ontology (or what exists) nor simply about epis-
temology. It is, above all, about ethics in the broadest sense. It
tells the story of what ought to be done, and much of the attack
on the rationality, objectivity, and universality that it has attrib-
uted to the Enlightenment is really strategic. The ethical claim
here is that these lofty Enlightenment notions are really the build-
ing blocks of an ideology that makes injustice invisible and thus
allows it to thrive by masking endemic inequality in the general
allocation of burdens and benefits. In the present context there is
a growing body of literature known as anti-colonial scholarship
40
which sees the global economy, and everything from global intel-
lectual property rules to global human rights principles, as a neo-
liberal attempt to adapt the traditional colonial legacy of North-
South inequality to the Information Age, a role previously per-
formed by the notion of an international division of labor in the
Industrial Age.
As a counter to this perceived deleterious import of an abso-
lute, monistic system of norms, postmodernism proposes the
competing vision of "legal polycentricity" which rejects the single
value approach to questions of law and morals.41 Legal polycen-
tricity is predicated upon an acceptance, indeed a celebration, of
cultural pluralism.
Like the universalist one, the postmodern vision contains
valuable lessons for the global law-making enterprise. Most of
these lessons can be gleaned from some of the deficiencies of the
universalist vision already observed. However, the postmodern
vision has some serious problems. One of these is that its anti-
universalist stance glosses over the reality of the increasing prox-
imity among cultures at the end of the twentieth century. With
proximity comes cross-cultural exchange, a routine feature of all
cultures and value-systems, which tends to homogenize the land-
scape. It has been suggested that, historically, this proximity be-
For an excellent review of this scholarship see James Thuo Gathii,Inter-
national Law and Eurocentricity, 9 EUR. J. INT'LL. 182-209 (1998).
41 See SURYA PRAKASH SINHA, LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY AND IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 1-14 (1996).
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tween cultures has tended to lead to the dominant culture seeking
to swallow up the minority cultures.42 In response to this threat,
the minority cultures developed, as a defensive mechanism, a de-
liberate "counter identity" that resists translation. This defensive
non-translatability is sometimes referred to as "secondary pseudo-
speciation" and results in an identity based on normative self-
definition. But today, mutual translation among cultures into
larger networks of communication is inevitable. In any event, the
cultural "heterotopia," which some versions of postmodernism
espouse, is implausible because it is predicated upon strong plural-
ism which entails the very overarching normative universe that
postmodernist culturalism had initially hoped to repudiate. Con-
sequently, postmodern culturalism does not, in the end, negate
the possibility of global intellectual property, though it does alert
us to some pitfalls we might be able to avoid along the way.
5. A JUSTICE-CONSTITUENCY FOR GLOBAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY?
We have just described two rival visions fighting for control
over the project of globalizing intellectual property: The positiv-
ist-universalist vision of disembodied, sui generis norms floating
awkwardly in global space; and the postmodern-culturalist vision
of a "heterotopia" of cultures that is anathema to the very possi-
bility of a universal law. I suggested that both are delusions: the
first because of its naturalistic intuitionism or excessive faith in le-
galism without regard to the context that makes law possible; the
second because of what we might call a kind of cultural solipsism.
Both visions are flawed for another reason. They are predi-
cated upon a world that is rapidly unraveling, a world of autono-
mous, discrete entities, whether one calls these states or cultures.
The universalist vision derives global rules from "a trade para-
digm," the language of trade being a kind of "pidgin" that makes
communication across the void between sovereign states possible.
It is this paradigm which makes excessive reliance on legal rules so
attractive. The postmodern-culturalist vision speaks the language
of cultures rather than states, but it also relies upon statism more
than it realizes: For, in practice, the constructs of states and cul-
42 See Jan Assman, Translating Gods: Religion as a Factor of Cultural
(Un)Translatability, in THE TRANSLATABILITY OF CULTURES: FIGURATIONS




tures tend to collapse into each other. Thus both universalist and
culturalist visions share a common premise of global law as inter-
national law-as law between nations-and more specifically as
public international law. In this paradigm, the only other version
of a global order would be that of a supra-national order in the
form of a world government. Although states have not withered
away, their influence has diminished considerably while the pri-
vate sphere's influence continues to expand. This is the globaliza-
tion of the market, of the private sector, for which states increas-
ingly only play the role of facilitator.
Within national jurisdictions, linkages between law and other
disciplines, such as economics or psychology or sociology, operate
upon a pre-existing sub-stratum of socio-ethical facts. Since there
is no corresponding contextual equivalent of these at the global
level, linkages here cannot play this (their usual) role. At the
global level, linkages, instead, tend to play the role of bargaining
tools as in the case of the linkage between trade and intellectual
property epitomized by the TRIPS Agreement. Or, they play the
role of surrogate "contexts" for global intellectual property, pre-
cariously inhabiting the intermediate space between the two rival
visions above.
I suggest, however, that this is not the most profitable role for
linkages. First, whatever little "context" linkages might give
global laws here occurs at the same delirious level of abstraction as
to be of little practical value. Second, they share most of the pa-
thologies of the rational choice theories in which they are
grounded.43 But in any event their role here is premised upon a
false dilemma: The view that we are doomed to choose between
the futility of disembodied norms and the intransigence of post-
modern culturalism. I suggest that the contextual problem for
global intellectual property norms, however, is really that of a
"justice-constituency." As I use it here, the phrase "justice-
constituency" signifies something more "contextual" than natural-
43 See DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL
CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
1994); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 3-8
1997).
4See JULIUS STONE, VISIONS OF WORLD ORDER: BETWEEN STATE
POWER AND HUMAN JUSTICE 95-101 (1984). On Stone's general approach to
international law, see generally James Crawford, Realism, Scepticism and the Fu-
ture World Order: Some Thoughts on Julius Stone's Contribution to International
Law, 13 SYDNEY L. REV. 475 (1991).
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ist or legalist universalism but less all-embracing than culture. It
refers to that consensus and those articulated or implicit under-
standings that make law's allocation of benefits and burdens, as
well as its designation of claimants and beneficiaries, acceptable,
or at least tolerable. Delineating and articulating a justice-
constituency for world-wide intellectual property laws is admit-
tedly no easy task: It is indisputably harder than the currently
popular game of launching into orbit de-contextualized norms
strung on thin bargain linkages; but it is also much less daunting
than a complete creation of an all-embracing global culture. A
global justice-constituency recognizes the embeddedness of law
without engaging in all-embracing models of such embeddedness.
A few short years ago, the possibility of a global justice-
constituency might have, with good reason, been described as the
craziest delusion of them all. A world of private rights and duties
stretching across state boundaries, rights, and duties not belonging
to states would have been almost inconceivable. This is because
barriers to "communication across state frontiers and the related
operations of the state entity in inhibiting, molding, and distort-
ing the formation and articulation of human claims, aspirations,
and expectations as well as the transmission and reception of
communications"45 would have made the sociological and other
inquiries necessary for articulating such a global justice constitu-
ency impossible. But the world on the threshold of the twenty-
first century looks increasingly different. It is a world where state
boundaries, though by no means non-existent, have lost much of
their effectiveness across a wide-range of human communication,
especially trade and the movement of capital. It is also a world
which is ripe for the principled construction of a justice-
constituency. This is a pre-condition for the kind of "deep inte-
gration" which notions such as a "global market" entail.
The first step in the construction of that justice-constituency is
the abandonment of "naturalistic" language now predominant in
universal intellectual property discussions. As we saw at the be-
ginning, naturalistic claims ultimately rest on the grounds of in-
tuition or self-evidence. But as already mentioned, protection of
intellectual property is notoriously counterintuitive, especially
because it involves non-rivalrous consumption. When use or
"consumption" of a novel or song by one person, or a billion
45 STONE, supra note 44, at 41; Crawford, supra note 44, at 487.
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people does not leave any less novel or song for the enjoyment of
the other four billion people on the planet, intellectual property
protection looks suspiciously like depriving people of something
to which they should have unfettered access. As Justice Brandeis
said, in his dissenting opinion, in International News Service v. As-
sociated Press, "The general rule of law is, that the noblest of hu-
man productions-knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions,
and ideas-become, after voluntary communication to others, free
as the air to common use."46 But no one could say it more elo-
quently than Thomas Jefferson:
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all
others of exclusive property, it is the action of the think-
ing power called an idea, which an individual may exclu-
sively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the
moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of
every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it.
Its peculiar character, too, I that no one possess the less,
because every other possess the whole of it. He who re-
ceives an idea from me, receives instructions himself with-
out lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, re-
ceives light without darkening me. That ideas should
freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the
moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of
his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevo-
lently designed by nature, when she made them, like fire,
expansible over all space, without lessening their density in
any point, and like the air in which we breathe, move and
have our physical being, incapable of confinement or ex-
clusive appropriation.
47
Yet, as already mentioned, it is equally true that the subject
matter of intellectual property is plagued by "inappropriability"
by its author: The author needs to disseminate her work in order
to profit from it, but once released, she cannot control its exploi-
46 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918).
47 THIRTEEN WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 333-34 (Lipscomb ed.,
1904) (Letter to I. McPherson, Aug. 13, 1813), quoted in RAUPH BROWN &
ROBERT DENICOLA, COPYRiGHT 9 (6th ed. 1995).
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tation. Moreover, with the advent of modern technology, dupli-
cation produces copies of perfect quality at almost no cost; there
now exists the means to distribute them to the whole world at the
click of a mouse. There is thus little economic incentive for
authors to take the trouble to create works, and every incentive to
wait and duplicate those created by others. An intellectual prop-
erty system is needed to strike a careful balance between the pub-
lic's rights of access to works and the intellectual property
owner's incentive and reward for giving society something of
value. This is the utilitarian or economic basis for our intellectual
property law mentioned earlier. The utilitarian basis is memora-
bly enshrined in the United States Constitution which gives Con-
gress the power "[to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
48
This provision provides the back-drop for our elaborate system of
copyright and patent concepts-such as originality, idea-
expression dichotomy, and "fair use" in copyright laws, and
"novelty" and "non-obviousness" in patent law, as well as an array
of limitations on the scope of rights and compulsory licenses.
The same balance between private rights and public benefits is
struck in a different way for trademarks using such notions as de-
ception and distinctiveness-which reflect the nature of the
trademark as an information device-but that also rests princi-
pally on a utilitarian premise, not a natural rights one. The eco-
nomic or utilitarian rationale has often been reiterated by the
courts at the highest level as in Sony Corp. ofAmerica v. Universal
Studios, Inc.:
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are
neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a spe-
cial private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means
by which an important public purpose may be achieved.
It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors
and inventors by the provision of a special reward ....
" U.S. CONST. art. I, 9 8, ci. 8.
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The first challenge for a global justice-constituency is to
clearly articulate what that public purpose is at the global level,
instead of simply transposing ready-made purposes and rules from
national jurisdictions; the second is to formulate rules, norms, and
concepts that are carefully calibrated to achieve that public pur-
pose.
It is quite conceivable that both the goals and the rules may,
with appropriate modification, be closer to the traditional ones of
increasing production of valued works. For developing intellec-
tual property importing countries, however, it is equally plausible
that the public purpose may also embrace encouragement of im-
portation of appropriate technology.50 This, for instance, was the
principal role of the English patent system at its inception. It was
designed to encourage importation of crafts from overseas, and
the teaching of these to the locals; under both early English and
Venetian patents, validity of the patent was premised on the con-
dition that the patented invention be worked in the country and
taught to local workmen. Indeed, the original patent term con-
sisted of the normal period of apprenticeship-seven years-or
multiples of that period.5'
6. CONCLUSION
The formulation of global intellectual property goals sug-
gested here-namely, the articulation of a justice-constituency-
should be a top priority for rule makers. It is a project uniquely
amenable to multiple linkages. Once the basic structure is in
place, invisible hand effects may well step-in and configure the
deep integration, founded upon the concept of a justice constitu-
ency, into the greater complexity required of a modern global
market in products and information.
I do not remember all the stories from my Sunday school
class, but one that left an indelible impression on my mind is the
parable of the two builders: one wise, the other foolish. The wise
50 See, e.g., UN TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND MANAGEMENT
DIVISION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (New
York: United Nations, 1993) (documenting an apparent positive link between
effective intellectual property laws and the flow ot foreign investment).
51 See STANIFORTH RICKETSON, THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
861 1984).
As to the invisible hand effects, see the interesting account in ROBERT
NOZICK, SOCRATIC PUZZLES 191 (1997).
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builder labored long and hard to build a foundation for his house
on a rock. Not so the foolish one: Wanting to build quickly and
with minimum effort, he built his house on the sand, and for a
moment seemed the wiser of the two. But then the rain came
down, the streams rose and the winds blew and beat against the
houses. The wise man's house remained standing, but the foolish
man's fell and great was the fall of it. In building a global system
of intellectual property law, we might want to heed the parable of
the builders. We should not be afraid to engage in a little map-
making, to stand back from the breathtaking manufacture of
global intellectual property rules in order to get a sense of per-
spective of the landscape upon which these rules are being
planted. A preliminary map-making of this kind is the only as-
surance that the global legal structure, now going up at such a




INSTITUTIONALISM AND ANALYSIS OF THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION
PHILIP M. NICHOLS*
Institutionalism has become firmly entrenched in legal schol-
arship.' In particular, institutionalism has become a Vowerful and
alluring theoretic for international law scholarship. Given the
use of institutionalism in international law scholarship, and the
importance of international economic organizations to theory and
practice, it is natural that institutionalism has been prominently
used to scrutinize international economic organizations, including
the World Trade Organization.
When international law scholars utilize the tools of institu-
tionalism, however, they tend to draw only from two sources.
International relation's regime theory3 has entered the main-
stream of international law discourse, and has been applied di-
rectly to the World Trade Organization. Institutional econom-
ics, particularly transaction cost analysis, has also appeared in
international law discourse, and has been directly applied to or-
ganizations that include the World Trade Organization.
Regime theory and institutional economics, however, do not
exhaust the universe of sources of institutional analysis. Virtually
* Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, The Wharton School of the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania. A.B. Harvard; J.D., LL.M. Duke. Research for this Arti-
cle was generously supported by a grant from the Department of Legal Studies.
See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis ofDiscourse, and
the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1393 (1996)
(predicting that institutionalism may bring a rapprochement between law and
economics and "outsider" schools such as feminist legal theory, which will cre-
ate a unified theory for legal scholarship).
2 See William J. Aceves, Institutionalist Theory and International Legal
Scholarship, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 227, 229 (noting the increasing use
of institutionalism in international law scholarship); see also infra notes 9-60
and accompanying text (discussing the use of institutionalism in international
law scholarship).l See discussion infra notes 9-36 and accompanying text.
4 See discussion infra notes 36-60 and accompanying text.
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all of the social sciences are experiencing a revival in institutional-
ism.5 In particular, this Article examines two schools of institu-
tionalism: historical institutionalism,6 which is a ?roduct of po-
litical science; and sociological institutionalism, which is a
product of sociology. Each of these iterations of institutionalism
differs in critical ways from regime theory or institutional eco-
nomics. Each also provides a rigorous framework for analyzing
international law and for scrutinizing the World Trade Organiza-
tion. To date, however, neither international law scholars nor
trade scholars have availed themselves of these two means of in-
quiry.
This lack of use raises an interesting question, which is ana-
lyzed in this Article: why have international law scholars and
trade scholars not utilized historical institutionalism or sociologi-
cal institutionalism? Ironically, historical and sociological institu-
tionalism themselves provide insights. Historical institutionalism
emphasizes path dependency: a brief review of the unfolding of
institutional thought in international law scholarship reveals how
regime theory and institutional economics obtained an advantage
over rival schools. Similarly, sociological institutionalism empha-
sizes cultural factors in the creation or alteration of institutions:
the culture of legal scholarship may not be conducive to these ver-
sions of institutionalism.
The implications for both trade scholarship and the World
Trade Organization as institutions are significant. Understanding
why trade scholarship has not incorporated historical and socio-
logical institutionalism may explain why trade scholarship has not
established linkages with other potentially instructive schools of
thought, such as business ethics. Moreover, understanding the
World Trade Organization as an institution' with a history and
embedded in culture may explain why practical linkages, such as
See Vivien Lowndes, Varieties of New Institutionalism: A Critical Ap-
praisal, 74 PUB. ADMIN. 181, 181-82 (1996) (noting the revival in and plethora
of institutionalisms).
6 See discussion infra notes 62-90 and accompanying text.
7 See discussion infra notes 91-120 and accompanying text.
8 An institution not in the sense of an institute but rather as a bundle of
rules and procedures. See Douglass C. North, Institutional Change: A Frame-
work for Analysis, in SOCIAL RULES: ORIGIN; CHARACTER; LOGIC; CHANGE
189, 190 (David Braybrooke ed., 1996) (distinguishing institutions-"the rules




the linkage between trade and human rights, are difficult to ac-
complish.
Before discussing the possibilities that accrue from understand-
ing the relationship between trade scholarship and historical and
sociological institutionalism, the current -inkage between trade
scholarship and institutionalism must be explained. This article
begins with a discussion of institutionalisms that have been used
to analyze the World Trade Organization.
1. INSTITUTIONALISM AND ANALYSIS OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION
Two iterations of institutionalism predominate in interna-
tional law scholarship, and these two have resulted in the only
significant institutional analysis of international economic organi-
zations such as the World Trade Organization. These two are re-
gime theory and institutional economics. Each is distinct from
the other, and each shall be discussed in turn.
1.1. Regime Theory
Kenneth Abbott introduced the international relations school
of regime theory9 to international law scholarship in an article
published in the YaleJournal of International Law in 1989.10 Ab-
bott noted the schism between international relations theory and
international law theory, and attributed this schism to differences
in the theoretical approaches dominating each discipline." Inter-
national relations theory was, at that time, dominated by the
school of realism, which "see[s] a world of states obsessed with
9 Regime theory sometimes also uses the appellation "institutionalism."
John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International
Relations Theory and International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 139, 140 (1997).
Given the number of different types of institutionalism that are discussed in
this Article, this Article will use the older appellation "regime theory" when
discussing international relations theory, so as to avoid confusion with other
types of institutionalism.
10 Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus
for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989); see Anne-Marie
Slaughter [Burley], Book Review, 89 AM J. INT'L L. 454, 454 (1995) (reviewing
VOLKES rITTBERGER, REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
(1993)) (stating that Kenneth Abbott "first broached the connection between
regime theory and international law").
1 See Abbott, supra note 10, at 337-38; see also FRANCIS ANTHONY BOYLE,
WORLD POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 58-60 (1985) (discussing the
schism and criticizing international law scholarship).
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their power vis-a-vis other states," and in which international law
is mere "window dressing." 12  International law, on the other
hand, was dominated by a rather moribund positivism, with a
goal to describe international law as it is rather than as a theoreti-
cal construct.
13
Abbott perceived the possibility of rapprochement between
international relations theory and international legal scholarship
in a new school of thought within the discipline of international
12 Abbott, supra note 10, at 337-38; see HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLmCS
AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 4-5 (4th ed. 1967)
(arguing that the only relevant law is the "law of politics"); Richard A. Falk,
The Reevance of Political Context to the Nature and Functioning of International
Law: An Intermediate View, in THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
133, 138 (Karl W. Deutsch & Stanley Hoffman eds., 1968) (criticizing interna-
tional law as a "repository of legal rationalizations"); see also Ann-Marie Slaugh-
ter [Burley], Liberal International Relations Theory and International Economic
Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'LL. & POL'Y 717, 721-22 (1995) (noting that the realist
school dominated international relations theory for "virtually the past two mil-
lennia, from Thucydides to Machiavelli to Morgenthau").
Slaughter [Burley] summarizes realism in three principles: states are the
pertinent actors in international relations, states are rational actors who seek
power, and the organizing principle of international relations is anarchy. Id at
722. She cautions, however, that this simple summary does not fully capture
the complexities or varieties of the school of realism. Id. at 727. More fulsome
discussions can be found in classic realist texts such as GEORGE KENNAN,
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1900-1950 (1951) or MORGENTHAU, supra.
13 Positivism in international law posits three principles: all sovereign
states are equal and independent, international law consists only of those rules
that states have consented to follow, and states are the only actors in the inter-
national arena. See L. OPPENHEIMER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 20-21 (4th ed.
1928) (setting out the principles of positivism in international legal scholarship);
H. Lauterpacht, Spinoza and International Law, 8 BRiT. Y.B. INT'L L. 89, 106-
07 (1927) (same); see also Sol Picciotto, Networks in International Economic Inte-
gration: Fragmented States and the Dilemma of Neo-Liberalism, 17J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 1014, 1018 (1996) (noting that both legal positivism and international rela-
tions theory realism are state centered). Positivism has long been castigated for
its detrimental effect on international legal theory. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound,
Philosophical Theoy and International Law, IBIBLIOTECA VISSERIANA 73, 87-88
(1923) (launching a blistering attack on positivism in international legal scholar-
ship); Philip R. Trimble, International Law, Worl Order and Crztical LegalStudies, 42 STAN. L. REV. 811, 819 (1990) (decrying"sterile positivism in inter-national law scholarship). Nonetheless, positivism "still dominates the profes-
sion." BOYLE, supra note 11, at 18. David Kennedy notes the predominance of
positivism, but also calls attention to "new streams" of international law schol-arship. David Kennedy & Chris Tennant, New At poaches to International
Law: A Bibliography, 35 HARV. INT'L L~j. 417, 418 (1994) (noting "a dramaticincrease during the past two decades in the volume of scholarly work that aims
to rethink the foundations of international law and to respondo recent trends




relations theory. That school of thought is regime theory. Re-
gime theory originated as a reaction to an explanatory failure of
realism. Realism posits a chaotic and competitive world.14 The
realist explanation for the existence of international organizations
in such a hostile environment is that such organizations are im-
posed on other states by the most powerful states." Under such a
construct, however, the decline of U.S. hegemony in the 1970s
and 1980s should have meant the end of international organiza-
tions. However, it did not.' 6 This explanatory gap was filled by a
subgroup of international relations theorists who study interna-
tional organizations.' These subspecialists recognized that it is
not simply states that determine international outcomes; states
operate and interact through the rules and procedures of regimes.
These regimes are maintained by the states because they are valu-
able to the states. They reduce the costs of making transactions
among states, increase the quality and availability of information,
legitimize and delegitimize behaviors of states, and facilitate reci-
procity among states.'8 In short, regimes matter, and offer an ana-
lytic through which international behavior can be studied.
Abbott saw in regime theory "a long-overdue opportunity to
re-integrate [international legal scholarship] and [international re-
lations theory]." 19 International legal scholarship brings to the re-
lationship its experience in rules and institutions. International
relations theory, on the other hand, offers international legal
scholarship an analytic by which it can escape the "narrow posi-
14 See MORGENTHAU, supra note 12, at 25-26 (describing international
politics as "a struggle for power").
15 ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND
DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 8-10 (1984) ("[F]or Realists...
the early postwar regimes rested on the political hegemony of the United
States."); see also Duncan Snidal, The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory, 39
INT'L ORG. 579 (1985) (setting out and refuting the realist hegemony explana-
t6 See G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory:
An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DuKE L.J. 829, 859 (1995)
(pointing out that the GATT and IMF continued to exert great influence after
the decline of U.S. hegemony).
17 See Friedrich Kratochwil & John Gerard Ruggie, International Organiza-
tion: A State of the Art on an Art of the State, 40 INT'L ORG. 753 (1986)
(recounting a history of the study of international organizations).
is KEOHANE, supra note 15, at 244 (attributing accord to "complementary
interests, which make certain forms of cooperation potentially beneficial").
19 Abbott, supra note 10, at 338.
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tivism" in which it is trapped.20 Each school obviously has poten-
tial benefits for the other.
Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley amplified Abbott's ideas in an
article published in 1993. Burley's approach is much different
than Abbott's. Abbott explains, in extreme detail, the concept
and mechanics of regime theory.2 2  Burley, on the other hand,
concentrates on a detailed intellectual history of the relationship
between international relations theory and international law
scholarship. 23 Burley reaches two conclusions. First, she notes
that the convergence of regime theory and international law
scholarship creates opportunities for interdisciplinary collabora-
tion.24 Second, Burley concludes that regime theory "remains
theoretically inadequate in many ways."25 Specifically, she faults
regime theory for its inability to explain the creation of regimes,
and for its failure to account for the relationship between the in-
dividual and the state. 26 She offers the "Liberal Theory" as a doc-
trinal alternative to both realism/positivism and regime theory.
2 7
20 Id. at 339-40.
21 See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International
Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993). Burley's article
evokes a reaction similar to that elicited by Abbott's article. See, e.g., Setear,
supra note 9, at 139 n.1 (1997) (noting that Burley's article represents "the best
summary of the trends and counter-trends in the relationshi between interna-
tional relations theory and international legal scholarshipJ; Richard L. Wil-
liamson, Jr., Law and the H-Bomb: Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime to
Impede Advanced Prolifeation, 28 CORNELL INT'L .J. 71, 76 n.8 (1995)
(discussing Burley's article as "an excellent analysis of contemporary interna-
tional relations theory").
22 See Abbott, supra note 10, at 342-404.
23 See Burley, supra note 21, at 207-20 (describing the 'postwar trajectory' of
international relations theory).
24 See id. at 222. Specifically, Burley suggests collaboration on distinguish-
ing legal regimes from nonlegal regimes, studying organizational design, study-
ing the phenomenon of compliance with international rules, and undertaking a
normative inquiry into international ethics. See id. at 222-24.
' Id. at 225.
26 See id. at 225-26. Burley also specifically faults regime theory for its fail-
ure to explain peace among democratic nations; this, however, is more an ex-
ample of regime theory's weakness than a general criticism. See id.; see also
Bruce Russett, Politics and Alternative Security: Toward a More Democratic,
Therefore More Peaceful, World, in ALTERNATIVE SECURITY: LIVING WITHOUT
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 107, 111 (Burns H. Weston ed., 1990) (discussing a
number of studies that show that democratic nations rarely go to war with one
another).
27 Burley, supra note 21, at 227. Burley recognizes that the school of liber-




Notwithstanding Burley's criticism, Abbott's suggestion that
international legal scholarship borrow from regime theory has
created a cottage industry in institutionalism. Scholars such as
Abbott, Burley, Jutta Brunnee and Stephen Toope, Frank Garcia,
John Setear, and Edwin Smith have used institutionalism to ex-
plain and analyze a variety of public international law issues.
28
Indeed, Michael Reisman has characterized institutionalism as
"the current rage in the United States."29 It is important to note,
however, that although many legal scholars use the broad term in-
stitutionalism, the roots of their analyses lie in the regime theory
of international relations.
30
Regime theory has also been used to analyze the World Trade
Organization. In an article published in 1995, Richard Shell ex-
tensively utilizes realism, regime theory and liberalism to scruti-
nize the World Trade Organization.3 1 In particular, Shell uses re-
tions are common to the school: the fundamental actors in politics are mem-
bers of society (whether individuals are privately constituted groups), all gov-
ernments represent some segment of domestic society, and the behavior of
states depends not on power relationships or institutional constraints but in-
stead on what the state wants. See id. at 227-28. Burley relies heavily on an un-
published manuscript by Andrew Moravcsik. For accessible versions of
oravcsik's writing, see Andrew Moravcsik, Preferences and Power in the Euro-
pean Community: A Liberal Intergovernmenta Approach, 31 J. COMMON
MKT. STUD. 473 (1993), in which Moravcsik particularly applies the concept
that a state's actions are determined more by its goals and preferences than by
relative power distributions among states or by institutional constraints upon
them, and Andrew Moravcsik, Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Integration: A
Rejoinder, 33 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 611 (1995), in which Moravcsik defends
liberalism as .a theory, and posits that it is necessary for understanding Euro-
pean integration.
28 See Kenneth W. Abbott, "Trust But Verifyt. The Production of informa-
tion in Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agreements, 26 CORNELL
INT'L LJ. 1 (1993); Jutta Brunn~e & Stephen J. Toope, Environmental Security
and Freshwater Resources: Ecosystem Regime Building, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 26
(1997); Frank J. Garcia, Decisionmaking and Dispute Resolution in the Free Trade
Area of the Americas: An Essay in Trade Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 357
(1997); Setear, supra note 9; Edwin M. Smith, Understanding Dynamic Obliga-
tions: Arms Control Agreements, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1549 (1991). The writings
of Abbott, Burley ancSmith are summarized in Setear, supra note 9, at 14247.
29 W. Michael Reisman, Book Review, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 205, 206 (1991).
30 Each of the scholars discussed in footnote 28 mention Abbott's 1989 ar-
ticle as a starting point for institutional analysis. See Brunn'e & Toope, supra
note 28, at 33 n.43; Garcia, supra note 28, at 361 n.15, Setear, supra note 9, at
140 n.1; Smith, supra note 28, at 1584 n.156.
31 G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An
Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE LJ. 829 (1995). Shell makes
explicit the lineage of his analysis by acknowledging his article's "particular
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gime theory to explain one of the most intriguing aspects of the
World Trade Organization: the potential legalism of its dispute
settlement process. 32 In an interesting comparison and application
of both realism and regime theory, Shell explains the transforma-
tion of dispute settlement in the global body as a paradigm shift
from realism to regime theory. He convincingly demonstrates
how this paradigm shift reflected real world changes that caused
states to transform the dispute settlement process into a more le-
galistic institution.33 Shell is not, however, completely satisfied
with regime theory as an explanation for the World Trade Or-
ganization, because he finds regime theory lacking in its ability to
explain the relationship between institutions and the preferences
of individuals.3 4 Therefore, he accepts regime theory as an expla-
nation of the World Trade Organization as it is but turns to liber-
alism for an explanation of the World Trade Organization as he
predicts, and hopes, that it will become. 35 Shell's facile use of the
debt to the work of Kenneth Abbott and Ann-Marie Slaughter [Burley]." Id. at
834 n.21.
32 The dis pute settlement process of the World Trade Organization has
evoked a significant amount of scholarly attention. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Ab-
bott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution: Building a Private.Interests Sys-
tern of Justice, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 111; Claudio Cocuzza & Andrea
Forabosco, Are States Relinquishing Their Sovereign Rights? The GA TT Dispute
Settlement Process in a Globalized Economy, 4 TuL. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 161
(1996); Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, W'TO Dispute Procedures, Standard
of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193
(199§); Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Or-
der for World Trade?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 349 (1995); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Insti-
tutional Misfits: The GA 77, the IC, & Trade-Environment Disputes, 15 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 1043 (1994); David A. Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction to
International Trade Law in the United States, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 7,
129 (1995); David W. Leebron,An Overview of the Uruguay Round Results, 34
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 11, 14-16 (1995); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies
Along With Rights: Institutional Reform in the New GA YT, 88 AM. J. INT'L L.
477, 479 (1994; Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 Nw. U. L. REV.
658 (1996); Curtis Reitz, Enforcement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 555 (1996); Matthew Schaefer, National Re-
view of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: In the Name of Sovereignty or Enhanced
WTO Rule Compliance?, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 307 (1996); C.
O'Neal Taylor, The Limits of Economic Power: Section 301 and the World Trade
Organization Dispute Settlement System, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 209
(1997).
See Shell, supra note 31, at 895-98. Shell also discusses an efficient market
model, which he discards in favor of regime theory. See id. at 897.
31 Id. at 901-903; cf. supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text (relating to




three schools is an excellent example of theoretical international
law scholarship, and also demonstrates the value of a regime the-
ory based analysis of the World Trade Organization.
In short, the essence of regime theory is that in international
or transnational 6 relations, regimes matter. Institutions facilitate
the prediction, planning and execution of international actions
and form the basis on which states or other international actors
may cooperate. They constrain the actions of international ac-
tors, who voluntarily adhere to institutions because it is easier or
more effective to do so than not to do so. Institutions persist in a
self-interested world because they have value to international ac-
tors. As a theoretic framework, international law scholars have
borrowed from the regime theory. The use of regime theory has
included analysis of the World Trade Organization, where regime
theory has been used productively and plausibly, but not to the
complete satisfaction of the scholar who first applied it as an ana-
lytical tool.
1.2. Institutional Economics
The second form of institutionalism that has worked its way
into legal scholarship is institutional economics. Given the pre-
dominance of law and economics and the nominal fealty paid by
most legal scholars to efficiency,37 it may not seem surprising that
economic institutionalism has found a niche in legal scholarship.
However, in the realm of international law, this development is
actually noteworthy. Unlike other branches of legal scholarship,
35 Shell, supra note 31, at 911-15 (explaining an international law developed
by "citizen-sponsored, nongovernmental organizations").
36 A small number of regime theorists argue that the theory is applicable to
non-state as well as state actors. See, e.g., SUSAN STRANGE, STATES AND
MARKETS 200 (1988); Virginia Haufler, Crossing the Boundary Between Public
and Private International Regimes and Non-State Actors, in REGIME THEORY
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 94 (Volker Rittberger ed., 1993); see also
Philip M. Nichols, Realism, Liberalism, Values, and the World Trade Organiza-
tion, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 851, 876-77 (1996) (suggesting that interna-
tional legal scholarship does not need to limit itself in the application of regime
theory to state actors).
17 See Richard A. Westin, Wen One.Eyed Accountants are Kings: A Primer
on Microeconomics, Income Taxes and the Shibboleth of Efficiency, 69 MINN. L.
REV. 1099 (1985) (noting the use and overuse of economic concepts in legal
scholarship).
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international law scholarship has not been the subject of large
amounts of economic analysis.
38
Institutional economics9 is a response to a perceived flaw in
neo-classical economics. Neo-classical economics bases its theo-
retical models on the actions of rational individuals who act to
maximize their own well-being (often spoken of as wealth).40 In
reality, however, consumption decisions are usually made bT
households and production decisions are usually made by firms.
38 See Abbott, supra note 10, at 337. Abbott attributes this to the predomi-
nance of positivism in international legal analysis and the corresponding lack of
interest in explanatory models. Id. Of course, the analytical landscape is not as
bleak as Abbott depicts. In addition to the use of institutional economic analy-
sis, others have explored the usefulness of economic analysis of international
law. See, for example, the essays collected in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Alan 0. Sykes eds., 1997).
39 Institutional economics is sometimes referred to as "neo-institutional
economics" in order to distinguish it from the earlier works of Thorstein Ve-
blen and John R. Commons. See Douglass C. North, The New Institutional
Economics, 142 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 230 (1986). Ironi-
cally, the earlier institutional economics also had a powerful influence on con-
temporary legal theory. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-
1960 19 (1986) (discussing the influence of institutional economics, and of Ve-
blen in particular, on legal realism).
40 See Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and the Law and Economics
Movement, 84 GEo. L.J. 2071, 2115 (1996). These assumptions, of course, have
been criticized as inaccurate, unverified, or unverifiable. See, e.g., id. at 2117-18
(stating that the assumptions made by the law and economic movement are un-
verifiable and unfalsifiable); John J. Donahue III & Ian Ayres,Posner's Sym-
phony No. 3: Thinking About the Unthinkable, 39 STAN. L. REV. 791, 812 (1987)
(criticizing law and economic's "clean assumptions"); John J. Flyn, The "Is" and
ihe "Ought" of the Vertical Restraints After Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service
Corp., 71 CORNELL L. REv. 1095, 1128-29 (1986) (stating that law and econom-
ics "patterns its methodology after an outmoded notion of 'scientific analysis'"
and is based "upon a series of unrealistic notions"); Judith Schenck Koffler,
Forged Alliances: Law and Literature, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1374, 1382 (1989)
(book review) ("law and economics rests on assumptions about human nature
that many, especially trained humanists, find disturbing"); Nancy Levit, Listen-
ing to Tribal Legends: An Essay on Law and the Scientific Method, 58 FORDHAM
L. REV. 263, 285 (1989) ("Many assumptions of normative law and economics
are either untested or called into doubt -by empirical testing."). But see Herbert
Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law and Economics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 293,
293 (1992) (responding to some of the criticisms of law and economics' assump-
tions . Radical individualism has also been the target of criticism by legal
ethicists. See, e.g., Thomas Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65
TEX. L. REV. 963 (1987) (arguing that the organic community has priority over
individuality).
41 See Robert B. Bates, Social Dilemmas and Rational Individuals, in
ANTHROPOLOGY AND INSTrUTIONAL ECONOMICS 43, 44 (fames M. Acheson




Neo-classical economics is forced to treat these collectives as if
they were individuals and to ignore the process that occurs within
the collective.42 Ultimately, such "black box" treatment is theo-
retically unsatisfying. Institutional economics is one aspect of the
resulting interest in how individual choices are made.
43
The school of institutional economics has not yet sorted out
its principles.44 Nonetheless, its basic assumptions and theory can
be described. Institutional economics begins with the individual,
whose behavior is opportunistically rational-"rational" meaning
that the individual seeks to maximize his or her wealth and to
minimize costs. Rationality, however, is bounded by the infor-
mation that is available.4 5 Obtaining information imposes trans-
action costs on actors. 46 Institutions facilitate the gathering and
communication of information, thereby reducing transaction
costs.47  Indeed, "[t]he discriminating alignment hypothesis to
which transaction cost economics owes much of its predictive
content holds that transactions, which differ in their attributes,
are aligned with governance structures, which differ in their costs
and competencies, in a discriminating (mainly, transaction cost
economizing) way."
48
foundly embarrassing to modern economics that in its models market forces did
not rest on the choice of individuals.").
42 See Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS
IN POSrVE ECONOMICS 3, 15 (1953) (defeniing "as if" arguments).
43 Bates, supra note 41, at 45.
44 See James M. Acheson, Introduction, in ANTHROPOLOGY AND IN-
STITUTIONAL ECONOMICS, supra note 41, at 1, 6 ("Institutional economics is
moving so rapidly that no commonly agreed set of principles has emerged.").
45 See MARY DOUGLAS, RISK AND BLAME: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL THEORY
198 (1992) (stating that institutional economics "characterizes individuals in the
marketplace as wiakly rational and weakly moral").
4 See OLIVER E. WLLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS
AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 31-32 (1975) (stating that obtaining informa-
tion is one of the most important transaction costs). Carl Dahlman identifies
the time, effort and expense of obtaining the "information necessary to make an
exchange, negotiate the exchange and enforce the exchange" as transaction
costs. See Carl Dahlman, The Problems of Externality, 22 J. L. & ECON. 141, 149(1979.
4 Anthony Obershall & Eric M. Leifer, Effuciency and Social Institutions:
Uses and Misuses of Economic Reasoning in Sociology, 12 ANN. REV. SOc. 233,
237 41986).
Oliver E. Williamson, Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis
of Discrete StructuralAlternatives, 36 ADMIN. SI. Q. 269, 277 (1991).
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Thus, an understanding of the relationship between transac-
tion costs and institutions is thought to be critical to an under-
standing of economic exchange, the existence of institutions, and
the existence of international institutions. 4  Moreover, institu-
tional economics predicts that individuals will seek out and utilize
institutions that minimize transaction costs, and may endeavor to
create alternative institutions if suitable institutions do not exist.50
Institutional economics has been criticized in a number of51
ways. One criticism deals with the assumption that rational be-
havior is self-centered. In his writing, Am artya Sen has noted that
"[t]he economic man is a social moron."5 2 Other social scientists
also criticize institutional economics' humans as "under social-
ized" and point out that economic relations are shaped by a multi-
tude of cultural interests that have nothing to do with self-
interest.53 Indeed, some institutional economists feel that their
49 See THRAIN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUnONS:
PRINCIPALS OF NEO-INsTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (1990); NEIL KOMESAR,
IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994); Bruno Frey, The Economic Approach to Institutions:
Institutions Matter: The Comparative Analysis of Institutions, 34 EUR. ECON.
REV. 443 (1990); Werner Pommerehne, The EmpiricalRelevance of Comparative
Institutional Analysis, 34 EuR. ECON. REV. 458 (1990); Beth V. Yarbrough &
Robert M. Yarbrough, International Organizations and the New Economics of
Organizations, 44 INT'L ORG. 235 (1990) (book review).
'o See Douglass C. North, Institutional Change: A Framework ofAnalysis, in
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 35, 35-46
(Sven-Erik Sj6strand ed., 1993) (discussing theory of institutional change); An-
ew Stone et al., Public Institutions and Private Transactions: A Comparative
Analysis of the Legal and Regulatory Environment for Business Transactions in
Brazil and Chile, in EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 95, 98-
100 (Lee Alston et al. eds., 1996) (discussing and applying theory of institutional
change).
5 An emotional response to the general criticism is found inWLLIAM M.
DUGGER, UNDERGROUND ECONOMICS: A DECADE OF INSTITUTIONALIST
DISSENT xviii (1992) ("So our realism will continue to be a threat to academic
complacency as long as the real world exists, for the real world is insistent and
can push its surprises into the most cloistered of academic sanctuaries."). The
responses of Ronald Coase (1991), Gary Becker (1992) and Douglass C. North
(1993) to general critics of institutional economics were less emotional but
probably more effective: each of these institutional economists won the Nobel
prize.
52 Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations
of-Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 336, 336 (1977).
53 Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: A Theory of
Embededness, 91 AM. J. Soc. 481, 502-05 (1985).
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discipline can only overcome these barriers by borrowing from
other social sciences.
5 4
Despite these criticisms, many social sciences have found the
transaction cost analysis contained in institutional economics to
be valuable. The law and economics movement has an obvious
interest in this school of thought.5 Indeed, Ronald Coase's trans-
action cost explanation for the existence of firms has become the
dominant paradigm in corporate legal theory.
5 6
54 See Bates, supra note 41, at 54-59 (calling for a "new anthropology"); see
also Christian Knudsen, Equilibrium, Perfect Rationality and the Problemi of Setf
Reference in Economics, in RATIONALITY, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC
METHODOLOGY 133, 134 (Uskali Miki et al. eds., 1993) (arguing that solving
basic problems in institutional economics "seems to require a broadening of the
behavioural foundation of economics insofar as one has to emphasize not only
the substantive, but also the procedural and the epistemic aspects of rational-
ity"). But see Thrfin Eggerston, A Note on the Economics of Institutions, in
EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, supra note 50, at 6, 17-20
(defending the assumption of self-interested, rational behavior).
See generally Steven G. Medema, Discourse and the Institutional Approach
to Law and Economics: Factors that Separate the Institutional Approach to Law
and Economics from Alternative Approaches, 23 J. ECON. ISSUES 417 (1989);
Richard Posner, The New Institutional Economics Meets Law and Economics, 149
J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 73 (1993).
56 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management within a Theory of
the Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657, 659 (1996) (stating that economic theories are"now the dominant paradigm in corporate law"); Ronald H. Coase, The Nature
of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937), reprinted in RONALD H. COASE, THE
FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 33 (1988); Aleta G. Estreicher, Beyond
Agency Costs: Managing the Corporation or the Long Term, 45 RUTGERS L. REV.
513, 515 (1993) (stating that offspring of Coase's analysis"still reigns supreme in
the academic literature"); Jason S. Johnston, The Influence of the Nature of the
Firm on the Theory of Corporate Law, 18J. CORP. L. 213, 213 (1993) (stating that
Coase's theory dominates theoretical work in corporate law). Oliver William-
son has expanded Coase's original theory in a manner that has particular appli-
cation to institutional economics. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION: FIRMS, MARKETS AND POLICY CONTROL (1986); Oliver E.
Williamson, Economics and Organizations: A Primer, 38 CAL. MGMT. REV. 131
(1996).
It should be noted that the dominance of Coase's theory of firms does not
mean that there is only one economic model of firms. Michael Jensen and Wil-
liam Meckling, for example, define a firm not in terms of agency costs but in-
stead as a "nexus for contracting relationships." Michael C. Jensen & William
H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Owner-
ship Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976). But see William W. Bratton, Jr.,
The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation:A CriticalAppraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV.
407, 415 (1989) (criticizing Jensen and Meckling's and related theories). Oliver
Hart, on the other hand, emphasizes not contracts but instead the ownership of
property by the firm. See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FI-
NANCIAL STRUCTURE 57 (1995). Other economists proffer an employment
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Joel Trachtman has used institutional economics as the foun-
dation for comparison of international economic organizations,
including the World Trade Organization. Trachtman hypothe-
sizes that "states use and design international institutions to
maximize the members' net gains," which are the gains from a
transaction minus the losses from and costs of that transaction.
s5
Trachtman makes the important distinction between the markets
to which institutional economics is usually applied5" and the in-
ternational arena: the commodities exchanged in the interna-
tional arena are "agreements regarding the allocation of power."
59
After thoroughly working through the details of institutional
economic theory and applying them to international economic
organizations, Trachtman concludes that, although additional
theoretical and empirical work needs to be done, institutional
economics provides a useful means of scrutinizing and comparing
international economic organizations. The metric for scrutiny
and comparison, in Trachtman's theory, is how efficient an inter-
national economic organization is in maximizing states' prefer-
ences."' Trachtman's excellent analysis illustrates the potential of
an institutional economic analysis of the World Trade Organiza-
tion.
In short, institutional economics uses institutions to explain
the actions of rational, self-interested actors. These actors create
or modify institutions on the basis of the extent to which the in-
stitutions enhance efficiency in obtaining the actors' preferences.
Institutional economics has influenced legal scholarship, and will
probably make inroads in international law scholarship. Indeed,
it has been used as an analytic for the comparison of international
economic organizations such as the World Trade Organization.
theory of the firm. See, e.g., Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Contested Ex-
change: New Microfoundationsfor the Political Economy of Capitalism, 18 POL. &
Soc. 165 (1990); Bengt Hoistrom & Paul Milgrom, The Firm as an Incentive Sys-
tem, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 972 (1994); Louis Putterman, Ownership and the Na-
ture othe Firm, 17 J. COMP. ECON. 243 (1993).
Joel P. Trachtman, The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the Interna-
tional Economic Organization: Toward Comparative Institutional Analysis, 17NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 470, 473-74 (1997). The statement obviously resonates
with aspects of regime theory in that institutions are designed by their users
and serve rational, means-end utilities.
'8 That is, the market for goods or services.
'9 Trachtman, supra note 57, at 487. Trachtman notes that in legal analysis
power is called jurisdiction. See id. at 498.




2. ALTERNATIVE JNSTITUTIONALISMS: HISTORICAL
INSTITUTIONALISM AND SOCIOLOGICAL INSTITUTIONALISM
To label historical institutionalism and sociological institu-
tionalism as "alternative" forms of institutionalism may be some-
what misleading. Both are firmly established schools of thought
in other disciplines: historical institutionalism has been a part of
political science since the 1960s and sociological institutionalism
has been a growing part of sociology for almost as long.61 The
term "alternative" is used in this Article only to emphasize that
these schools of thought have not yet been mined by international
legal scholarship.
Because some legal scholars may be unfamiliar with either his-
torical or sociological institutionalism, each is briefly discussed in
the following subsections.
2.1. Historical Institutionalism and Sociological
Institutionalism
2.1.1. Historical Institutionalism
Historical institutionalism 62 is a reaction to and extension of
the group theory and structural functionalist approaches to po-
litical science that dominated the 1960s and 1970s. Group theory
emphasizes power and conflict, arguing that politics is a balancing
"of various forces contending for power and the making of deci-
sions." 63 Structural functionalism compares social entities to or-
61 An especially informative discussion of historical and sociological insti-
tutionalism from which this Article benefits substantially is Peter A. Hall &
Rosemary C. R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, 49
POL. STUD. 936 (1996).
62 Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo use the appellation "historical insti-
tutionalism." See Kathleen Thelen & Sven Steinmo, Historical Institutionalism
in Comparative Politics, in STRUCTURING POLITICS: HISTORICAL INSTI-
TUTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 1, 2 (Kathleen Thelen & Sven Ste-
inmo eds., 1992). They, in turn, attribute the phrase to Theda Skopcol. See id.
at 28 n.4. It is not always identified as such by members of the school.
63 RONALD H. CHILCOTE, THEORIES OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS: THE
SEARCH FOR A PARADIGM 35 (1981). Obviously, group theory cannot be
summarized in one sentence. A chapter length explanation of group theory can
be found in JAMES A. BILL & ROBERT L. HARDGRAVE, JR., COMPARATIVE
POLITICS: THE QUEST FOR THEORY 117-141 (1973). In particular, "[g]roup
scholars view the political system as a gigantic network of groups in a constant
state of interaction with one another. This interaction takes the form of pres-
sures and counterpressures, the outcome of which defines the state of the politi-
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ganic entities,64 and by studying how structures work together,
tries "to provide a consistent and integrated theory from which
can be derived explanatory hypotheses relevant to all aspects" of a
given system.65  From group theory, historical institutionalism
cal system at any given time." Id. at 120. Moreover, "[i]n an attempt to un-
cover the 'real' or 'basic' forces of political life, group scholars rutdessly cut
through the formal and institutionaf-trappings of government and focus[] their
attention upon structures of competition." Id. at 134. Bill and Hardgrave at-
tribute the introduction of concepts such as"power," "interest," and "conflict"
into mainstream political science to group theorists. Id. at 134-35; see John G.
Gunnell, The Genealogy ofAmerican Pluralism: From Madison to Behavioralism,
13 INT'L POL. SCI. REv. 253 (1997) (discussing the influence of group theory on
political science); cf CHILCOTE, supra, at 350 (giving John Locke, Jeremy Ben-tham, and James Madison credit or roviding the intellectual basis for group
theory). Group theory continues to dominate American political science. SeePaul H. Brietzke, Administrative Law and Development: The merican Model"
Evaluated , 26 HOw. L. J. 645, 659 (1983); see, e.g., Marie Hojnacki, Interest
Groups Decisions to Join Alliances or Work Alone, 41AM. J. POL. SI. 61(1997)
(usini group theory concepts).
Cf A.R. RADCLIFFE-BROWN, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PRIM-
rrlv SOCIETY 178 (1952) (stating that the understanding of social function is
based on "an analogy between social life and organic life").
65 William Flanigan & Edwin Fogelman, Functional Analysis, in
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ANALYSIS 72, 76 Games C. Charlesworth ed.,
1967). Again, this school of thought cannot be fully explicated in one sentence.
For a longer treatment, see BILL & HARDGRAVE, supra note 63, at 201-17; see
also CHILCOTE, supra note 63, at 162-82 (analyzing the work of Gabriel Al-
mond, an important early figure in structural functionalism). In particular,
structural functionalists perceive society as "a tightly inte rated system of inter-
related elements or structures. These structures exist because they perform
functions: one can explain various structures... by discovering their func-
tion." David M. Trube-k, Back to the Future: The Short, Happy Life of the Law
and Society Movement, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 4, 32 (1990). Analytically,"[t]he
principal objective of functional analysis is to determine the contribution
which a social item (a structure or process) makes to the persistence of the sys-
tem in which it occurs, that is, the role it plays in maintaining the system
within specified limits." BILL & HARDGRAVE, supra note 63, at 203. The most
glaring weakness of structural functionalism is its requirement that all systems
perform functions: in reality there are many dysfunctional systems. See John
H. Schlegel, The Ten Thousand Dollar Question, 41 STAN. L. REV. 435, 445
(1989) (book review) (attributing the demise of structural functionalism to the
cove of dysfunctional systems). Given these and other explanatory weak-
nesses, the predominance of structural functionalism has waned. SeeNICHOLASC. MULLINS, THEORIEs AND THEORY GROUPS IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY 66-67 (1973) (stating that structural functionalismstopped being the majority view in 1968). Nonethele s, s ructural functional-
ism continues to exert influence on political science. See Ruth Lane, Structural-
Functionalism Reconsidered- A Proposed Research Model, 26 CoMP. POL. 461
(1994) (advocating use of the structural functionalist model for theoretical re-
search), Susan A. Mann et al., Paradigm Shifts in Family Sociology? Evidence




draws the concept of rivalry; from structural functionalism, his-
torical institutionalism draws an image of the polity as an inte-
grated system. The primary difference between historical institu-
tionalism and its intellectual forebears is that while structural
functionalists often argued that external factors drive the func-
tioning of a system, historical institutionalists hold that the sys-
tem structures collective behavior and thus shapes external
events.
66
Historical institutionalists perceive institutions as the formal
or informal rules or procedures embedded in a formal organiza-
tion. Peter Hall defines institutions as
the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard op-
erating practices that structure the relationship between
individuals in various units of the polity and economy. As
such, they have a more formal status than cultural norms
but one that does not necessarily derive from legal, as op-
posed to conventional, standing .... [T]he term "organ-
ization" will be used here as a virtual synonym for
"institution."
Because historical institutionalism has not yet coalesced as a
doctrinal school, it is difficult to summarize in a few short para-
graphs; nonetheless, some of the basic characteristics of historical
institutionalism can be highlighted. The most striking, and per-
haps definitive, characteristic of this school of thought is its em-
phasis on the historical "path" taken by an institution in its crea-
tion and development. 68  These pathways are marked by critical
that structural functionalism is so deeply embedded in political science dis-
course that it continues to govern significant issues and debates).
66 Hall & Taylor, supra note 61, at 937.
67 PETER A. HALL, GOVERNING THE ECONOMY: THE POLITICS OF STATE
INTERVENTION IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE 19 (1986).
68 See Seymour M. Lipset & Stein Rokkan, Cleavage Structures, Party Sys-
tems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction, in PARTY SYSTEMS AND VOTER
ALIGNMENTS: CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTVES 1, 37 (Seymour M. Lipset &
Stein Rokkan eds., 1967). Paul David refers to this as"path dependent" change.
Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWER7Y, 75 AM. ECON. REV.
PAPERS & PROC. 332, 332 (1985). Path dependency, of course, has become an
analytical tool used by other social sciences, albeit in slightly different forms.
Path dependency has even been used in purely legal analysis. See Maxwell L.
Steams, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 309
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junctures, or cleavages, which present new paths or opportunities
for change. "A critical juncture may be defined as a period of sig-
nificant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in differ-
ent countries and which is hypothesized to produce distinct lega-
cies." 69  A critical juncture is measured against a baseline of
antecedent conditions. Ruth Collier and David Collier explain
that there are three claims made of a purported critical juncture:
that significant change took place, that the change took place in a
distinct way, and that the change produced a legacy.70 The legacy
is critical to historical institutionalism because it becomes the new
antecedent condition, conditions what choices can be made at fu-
ture critical junctures, and determines the range of choices that
can be made on a day to day basis.71 Stephen Krasner makes ex-
plicit this core assumption of historical institutionalists:
Historical developments are path dependent; once certain
choices are made, they constrain future possibilities. The
range of options available to policymakers at any given
point in time is a function of institutional capabilities that
were put in place at some earlier period, possibly in re-
sponse to very different environmental pressures.72
Historical institutionalists emphasize the role of power, com-
petition, and coalitions in analyzing how an institution operates.
This, of course, is a legacy of historical institutionalism's group
theory roots. Margaret Weir's discussion of U.S. economic policy
(1995) (using path dependency to analyze standing); Maxwell L. Stearns, Stand-
ing Back From the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309
(1995) (using path dependency to analyze justiciability).
69 RuTH BERINS COLLIER & DAVID COLLIER, SHAPING THE POLITICAL
ARENA: CRITICAL JUNCTURES, THE LABOR MOVEMENT, AND REGIME
DYNAMICS IN LATIN AMERICA 29 (1991) (footnote omitted).
7 See id. at 30. Collier and Collier also break the legacy down into three
components: "mechanisms of production of the legacy," "[m]echanisms of repro-
duction of the legacy," and "stability of the core attributes of the legacy." Id. at 30-
31. Each of these attributes bears directly on whether the purported legacy is in
fact a legacy, that is, whether the critic juncture effectuated-a real and lasting
change in extant conditions. See id.
7 Cf. JAMES GLICK, CHAOS 8 (1987) (emphasizing the "sensitive depend-
ence on initial conditions").
72 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective, 21 COMP.




is a striking example of this preoccupation. She demonstrates that
the structure of the political system leads to certain types of coali-
tions and precludes others.
7 3
Historical institutionalism exhibits a nonparochial approach
to the causal forces in politics. Although the role of institutions is
emphasized and thoroughly explored, it is not given an exclusive
role. "They typically seek to locate institutions in a causal chain
that accommodates a role for other factors, notably socioeco-
nomic development and the diffusion of ideas. In this respect,
they posit a world that is more complex than the world of tastes
and institutions often postulated by" self-interest based theories.
7 4
An example that is of particular pertinence to this Article is an
analysis by Judith Goldstein, in which she demonstrates that the
structure for formulating trade policy in the United States rein-
forces the influence of certain types of ideas and diminishes the
influence of others; the ideas themselves are significant factors in
producing the outcome.
75
Similarly, historical institutionalism does not posit one exclu-
sive means by which institutions affect individual behavior.
7 6
Hall and Taylor set out two competing theories of how institu-
tions affect behavior: the calculus approach and the cultural ap-
proach]7 The calculus approach assumes that behavior is strate-
gic. According to the calculus approach, institutions "provide
information relevant to the behavior of others, enforcement
mechanisms for agreements, penalties for defection, and the
73 See Margaret Weir, Ideas and the Politics of Bounded Innovation, in
STRUCTURING POLITICS: HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS, supra note 62, at 188; see also SVEN STEINMO, TAXATION AND
DEMOCRACY: SWEDISH, BRITISH AND AMERICAN APPROACHES TO FI-
NANCING THE MODERN STATE (1993) (explaining cross-country differences in
tax systems by examining the way that political structure affects access to-and
therefore power over-the political decisionmaking system).
74 Hall & Taylor, supra note 61, at 942.
75 See Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Institutions and American Trade Policy, 42
INT'L ORG. (1988).
76 Hall and Taylor state: "Central to any institutional analysis is the ques-
tion: how do institutions affect the behaviour of individuals? After all, it is
through the action of individuals that institutions have an effect on political
questions." Hall & Taylor, supra note 61, at 939. It should be recalled that
both Burley and Shell criticize regime theory for its inability to explain how
institutions relate to individuals. See supra notes 26 & 33 and accompanying
text.
77 See Hall & Taylor, supra note 61, at 939.
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like.",7  Institutions, therefore, allow individuals to calculate ra-
tionally and persist because they are useful to individual actors.
79
The cultural approach recognizes that behavior is purposeful,
but emphasizes the fact that it is bounded by established routines,
existing patterns, and worldviews8 0 According to the cultural
approach, institutions "provide moral or cognitive templates for
interpretation and action."81 Institutions thus allow an individual
to filter and make meaningful the morass of information not only
concerning the situation, but also concerning the individual him-
self or herself.82 Institutions persist because they are deeply in-
grained and because they shape the choices that an individual
makes about reforming institutions.
8 3
78 Id.
79 See Randall L. Calvert, The Rational Choice Theory of Socia institutions,
in MODERN PoLmTcALECONOMY 216, 216 (Jeffrey S. Banks & Eric A. Ha-
nushek eds., 1995); see also Kenneth A. Shepsie, Institutional Equilibrium and
Equilibrium Institutions, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE SCIENCE OF POLITICS 51,
74-75 (Herbert F. Weisberg ed., 1986) (arguing that individuals are hesitant to
alter institutions even for short term gain because change creates a great deal of
future uncertainty). This analysis is similar to that of the institutional econo-
mist Douglass C. North. See North, supra note 8, at 189.
80 See, e.g., John L. Campbell, The State and Fiscal Sociology, 19 ANN. REV.
SOC. 163, 164 (1993) (acknowledging that rational incentives are important but
stating that cultural restraints are equally important).
"' Hall & Taylor, supra note 61, at 939.
82 See James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New Institutionalism: Organ-
izational Factors in Political Life, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734, 738 (1984). A
study conducted in Hungary provides interesting, and unintentional, empirical
verification of this construct. The study found that a change in institutions,
specifically, the advent of advertising, changed the manner in which individual
Hungarians expressed their cultural identity. See Beverly James, Learning to
Consume: An Ethnographic Study of Cultural Change in Hungary, 12 CRITICAL
STUD. MASS COMM. 287 (1995).
83 See ROBERT GRAFSTEIN, INSTITUTIONAL REALiSM: SOCIAL AND
PO=iTICAL CONSTRAINTS ON RATIONAL ACTORS (1992). Interestingly, some
legal scholars have made the same observation about the relationship between
law and society: that law is defined by, but at the same time defines, society.
Mary Ann Glendon, in particular, has explored this aspect of law. See MARY
ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 311 (1989) ("A
country's law.., both affects and is affected by the culture in which it
arises .... "); see also Kristian Miccio, In the Name of Mothers and Children: De-
constructing the Myth of the Passive Battered Mother and the "Protected Child" in
Child Neglect Proceedings, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1087, 1087 (1995) ("Law shapes and
defines who we are as a culture while reinforcing the belief system that under-
girds it."); Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE
L. 56, 83 (1993) ("The law is a powerful conceptual-rhetorical, discursive-
force. It expresses conventional understandings of value, and at the same time




Regime theory and institutional economics both clearly postu-
late a calculus approach to explore the relationship between indi-
viduals and institutions. Historical institutionalists, on the other
hand, have used both of these approaches.14 A striking example is
Victoria Hattam's analysis of labor movements. In discussing the
U.S. labor movement, she speaks of the movement analyzing and
adopting or avoiding certain strategies-in particular, moving
away from strategies that were susceptible to review by the en-
trenched judiciary. On the other hand, when comparing the
U.S. labor movement to the British labor movement, she con-
trasts the different institutions available to each movement, and
discusses how these institutions created different worldviews that
led to different actions.8
6
Historical institutionalism qua historical institutionalism87 has
made virtually no inroads into legal scholarship. Ronald Kahn,
who is educated as a political scientist rather than as a lawyer, re-
cently published an article on presidential appointment power
that explicitly suggests historical institutionalism as a valuable
model for legal scholarship. 8 Kahn particularly emphasizes his-
torical institutionalism's ability to describe and interpret the roles
of power, conflict, and cooperation.89 Kahn's admonition, how-
ever, has not been heeded by legal scholarship. In fact, Kahn
chided his fellow panelists in the symposium from which his arti-
cle was published for not taking advantage of historical institu-
tionalism.
90
sumer's Guide to Law and the Social Sciences, 100 YALE L.J. 531, 542 (1990)
(book review) ("[L]aw is preeminently an artifact of culture: it is influenced byand constitutive of the way in which the members of a society comprehend
their actions towards one another and infuse those actions with an air of im-
manent and superordinate worth.").
84 See Hall & Taylor, supra note 61, at 940.
85 See VICTORIA C. HATTAM, LABOR VISIONS AND STATE POWER: THE
ORIGINS OF BuSINESS UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES (1993).
86 See id. at 180-203.
8 That is, historical institutionalism as a school of thought rather than the
simple concept of path dependency.
-s8 See Ronald C. Kahn, Presidential Power and the Appointments Process:
Structuralism, Legal Scholarship, and the New Historical Institutionalism, 47 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 1419, 1449-50 (1997).
'9 See id. at 1446. Kahn relies heavily on Stephen Skowronek, Order and
Change, 28 POLrrY 91 (1995).
90 See Kahn, supra note 88, at 1445.
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In short, historical institutionalism is a vibrant school of
thought within the realm of political science. The definitive char-
acteristic of historical institutionalism-an attenuated path de-
pendency-has been used in other social sciences, including legal
scholarship. Historical institutionalism as a whole, however, has
not been imported into legal scholarship or international law
scholarship in the manner of regime theory or institutional eco-
nomics. In particular, no legal scholar has used historical institu-
tionalism as a model for critically analyzing the World Trade Or-
ganization.
2.1.2. Sociological Institutionalism
Just as in international relations theory, economics, political
science, and so many other of the social sciences, a new institu-
tional school has appeared in sociology. Hall and Taylor label
this school "sociological institutionalism."9 The school of socio-
logical institutionalism first appeared within the subspecialty of
organization theory.92 The impetus for the creation of this school
was discomfort with a distinction-drawn since the time of Max
Weber-between rational, formal, modern organizations (such as
bureaucracy) and the parts of social life associated with culture.
93
Some sociologists found this distinction to be artificial, and ar-
gued against the notion that a certain class of institutions are cho-
sen or created simply because they are the most effective at ac-
complishing a desired end. Rather, they argued, institutions are
chosen, created and transmitted in the same manner as any other
cultural artifact, such as ritual or myth.94 Thus, the underlying
9 Sociologists themselves seem to refer to this school of thought s Iply as
institutionalism." See, e.g., Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, Introduc-
tion, in THE NEW INSTITUTIoNALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 1, 1
(Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991). This is similar to legal
scholars who refer to their theory simply as institutionalism.
92 This resulted in important works such as THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM
IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 91, and JOHN W. MEYER & W.
RICHARD SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS: RITUAL AND
RATIONALITY (1983); INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS
(W. Richard Scott & John W. Meyer eds., 1994).
93 This distinction is drawn and emphasized in Frank R. Dobbin, Cultural
Models of Organization: The Social Construction of Rational Organizing Princi-
ples, in TE SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE 117 (Diana Crane ed., 1994).
94 See John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations:
Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340 (1977); see also




question for sociological institutionalists asks not what utilities
caused an institution to be created, but instead what cultural fac-
tors led to its creation.95 Indeed, Neil Fligstein and Robert Free-
land argue that theories that take into account political, institu-
tional and cultural factors as causal elements explain empirical
data better than do economic theories.
9 6
Sociological institutionalists may have the broadest definition
of institutions of any of the social sciences. Institutions, to a so-
ciological institutionalist, include not only formal and informal
rules and procedures, but also symbols, cognitions, norms, and
any other templates that organize or give meaning to the human
condition. 97 This definition explicitly blurs the distinction be-
tween culture and institutions; in fact, under such a definition,
culture itself may be an institution.98 The definition is broad,
however, only in terms of what types of structures it will include;
it is quite rigorous in terms of what qualities are required of these
structures. A rule or pattern is only considered an institution by
sociological institutionalists if there is an unspoken sense that the
rule or pattern must be followed or adhered to.99 In this sense,
and culture are inseparable. See Niel Fligstein, Markets as Politics: A Political-
CulturalApproach to Market Institutions, 61 AM. Soc. REv. 656 (1996).
9' See Hall & Taylor, supra note 61, at 947. Thus, John Campbell differen-
tiates sociological institutionalism from other approaches by focusin explicitly
on "the complex social interactions and institutional and historical contexts
that link state and society in ways that shape fiscal policy and their effects."
Campbell, supra note 80, at 164;see also Paul J. DiMaggio & Helmut K. Anheir,
The Sociology of Nonprofit Organizations and Sectors, 16 ANN. REv. Soc. 137
(1990) (statng that the emergence of nonprofit organizations is caused by insti-
tutional factors as well as the individual utility functions emphasized by
economists, and that to understand nonprofit organizations one must use an
industry level ecological perspective).
96 See Neil Fligstein & Robert Freeland, Theoretical and Comparative Per.spectives on Corporate Organization, 21 ANN. REV. Son. 21, 40 (1995).
9z See W. Richard Scott, Institutions and Organization: Toward a Theoretical
Synthesis, in INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS, supra
note 92, at 55, 56.
98 See Ronald L. Jepperson, Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institution-
alism, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supranote 91, at 86, 143, 150-51; John Meyer et al., Ontology and Rationalization in
the Western Cultural Account, in INSTI'TUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND THEORGANIZATION, supra note 92 at 9; Lynne Zucker, The Role of Institutionaliza-tion in Cultural Persistence, in THE NEW INSTITOTIONALISM IN ORGAN-
IZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 91, at 83.
See Jepperson, supra note 98, at 143, 145 (notin that "institutions repre-
sent a social order or pattern that has attained a certain state or property" andproviding an explanation of that state or property); Lynne G. Zucker, Organi
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Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell argue that the definition used
by sociological institutionalists is actually more restrictive than
that used by institutional economists, who consider mere rules of
convenience to be institutions.
100
Sociological institutionalism is no more unified than historical
institutionalism.' 01 Nonetheless, broad themes can be discerned.
Sociological institutionalism emphatically embraces a cultural ap-
proach to the relationship between institutions and individual be-
havior.10 2 Sociological institutionalism "emphasize[s] the way in
which institutions influence behavior by providing the cognitive
scripts, categories and models that are indispensable for action,
not least because without them the world and the behaviour of
others cannot be interpreted." 0 3 Institutions and individual be-
zations as Institutions, in RESEARCH IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS
1, 2 (S.B. Bacharach ed., 1983) (stating that"institutionalism is fundamentally a
cognitive process"). Public international lawyers will note the similarity to cus-
tom, which is considered a source of international law that is binding, in part,
because there is a sense that it is binding. See Statute of the International Court
of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1153, 1187
(stating that to constitute custom, a country's behavior must not only consist of
a gener-al practice but must also be accepted by that country as obligatory); see
also IAN BROWNLE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (4th ed.
1990) (discussing custom).
100 See DiMaggio & Powell, sup-a note 91, at 9; see also MARY DOUGLAS,
How INSTITUTIONS THINK 46-48 (1986). Whether one definition actually is
more restrictive than another is not a question with an objective answer, and
has much to do with the underlying perspective of each school of thought. The
instrumentalist orientation of institutional economics requires a definition that
includes rules of convenience, whereas the cultural orientation of sociological
institutionalists requires a definition that includes constructs that often are not
scrutinized by other schools.
101 DiMaggio and Powell begin their introduction to sociological institu-
tionalism by noting that "it is ot en easier to gain agreement about what it is
not than about what it is." DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 91, at 1.
102 See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (discussing the cultural ap-
proach).
103 Hall & Taylor, supra note 61, at 948; see also DiMaggio & Powell, sup-a
note 91, at 3 ("[Tlhouglit of self, social action, the state, and citizenship are
shaped by institutional forces."). Hall and Taylor note that"[i]nstitutions in-
fluence behaviour not simply by specifying what one should do but also by
specifing what one can imagine oneself doing in a specific context." Hall &
Taylor, supa note 61, at 948; see also Neil Fligstein, Social Skill and Institutional
Theoy, 40 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCINTIST 397, 397 (1997) (noting that sociologi-
cal institutionalism treats shared meanings as constraints on action that limit
and determine what is meaningful behavior"); Zucker, sup-a note 98, at 2






havior, therefore, are mutually constitutive and mutually rein-
forcing.'0 Moreover, even though an individual may be acting
rationally or out of self interest, perceptions of rationality or self
interest are framed through-and thus shaped by--institutions
l05
Sociological institutionalism also propounds a cultural account
for the origination and alteration of institutions. This is most eas-
ily understood when contrasted with institutional economics. In-
stitutional economics places the creation or alteration of institu-
tions in the hands of entrepreneurs who act when the benefits of
creation or alteration will outweigh the costs.' 6 In other words,
institutional economics proffers a voluntaristic, means-end ori-
ented explanation. Sociological institutionalism, on the other
hand, does not proffer a utilitarian explanation; instead, it argues
that institutions are created or changed because the new institu-
tion will confer greater social legitimacy on the organization or its
individuals. "In other words, organizations embrace specific insti-
tutional forms or practices because the latter are widely valued
within a broader cultural environment." 10 7  Legitimate institu-
tions should not be confused with laudable institutions, the adjec-
tive that is more accurate is "plausible" 1°S-institutions are ac-
cepted if they are considered "appropriate." 10 9 Once created or
lo4 See supra note 83 (discussin the mutually reinforcing roles of actions
and institutions and similarities with law); see also Jepperson, supra note 98, at
146 (.institutions simultaneously empower and control").
See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 91, at 10 ('[T]he very notion of ra-
tional choice reflects modern secular rituals and myths that constitute and con-
strain legitimate actions."); see also Ann Swidler & Jorge Arditi, The New Sociol-
ogy of Knowledge, 20 ANN. REV. SOC. 305 (1994) (arguing that patterns of
knowledge in organizations shape both the content and structure of knowl-
edge). Interestingly, the prominent regime theorist Robert Keohane agrees:
institutions do not merely reflect the preferences and power of the units con-
stituting them; the institutions themselves shape those preferences and that
power." Robert 0. Keohane, International Institutions: Two Research Programs,
32 INT'L STUD. Q. 379, 382 (1988).
106 See North, supra note 8, at 191-92.
107 Hall & Taylor, supra note 61, at 949.
log See ROBERT WUTHNOW ET AL., CULTURAL ANALYSIS 49-50 (1984)
(stating that legitimation means "explaining or justifying the social order in
such a way as to make institutional arrangements subjectively plausible"); see
also W. Richard Scott, Unpacking Institutional Arguments, in THE NEW
INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 91, at 164,
169-70 (discussing legitimacy).
109 See March & Olsen, supra note 82, at 741 (stating that "actors connote
certain actions with certain situations by rules of appropriateness-). In Limits of
Citizenship, Yasemin Soysal concludes that states adopted certain policies to-
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altered, institutions persist not because they are useful but instead
because institutions constrain the manner in which individuals are
able to consider changing institutions.
110
Sociological institutionalism has not been completely voiceless
in mainstream legal scholarship. Edward Rubin, who advocates a
"new institutionalism" as a unifying theoretic for law,"' incorpo-
rates the work of James March and Johan Olsen as well as those
of Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell in his explanation of institu-
tionalism.12 Rubin's is a very limited use of sociological institu-
tionalism-he suggests a microanalysis of courts as institutions."1 3
Nonetheless, his approach-in which he examines societal motiva-
tions of judges in an institutional context-resonates with the gen-
eral tenets of sociological institutionalism.114 Rubin's use of so-
ciological institutionalism stands virtually alone in legal
scholarship, and has not been replicated in international legal
scholarship.
In short, although sociological institutionalism is an emerging
school of thought, its concept of how institutions inform individ-
ual behavior and how institutions are created and altered can be
wards immigrants not because those policies were functional or beneficial to
the state but instead because those policies conformed to evolving concepts of
human rights. YASEMIN NUHOGLU SOYSAL, LIMrrS OF CITIZENSHIP 164
(1994). The concept of appropriateness may be vaguely reflected in Richard
Posner's concept of intuition. For example, Posner has defended slavery con-
tracts as a matter of economic theory and of legal theory. See RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 86 (1981) (economic theory); Richard
A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103,
134 (1979) (legal theory). He does not countenance slavery contracts, however,
because they fail "the ultimate test" of a moral theory, which he describes as
conformity to intuition. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JU.
RISPRUDENCE 376-77 (1990). Similarly, even if some utility argument in favor
of slavery could be fabricated, sociological institutionalism predicts that slavery
would not be instituted because it is not considered appropriate and certainly
does not enhance the legitimacy on an organization.
110 See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 91, at 10-11, 14-15. With an inter-
esting turn of a phrase, DiMaggio and Powell state "[i]n other words, some of
the most important sunk costs are cognitive." Id. at 11.
111 See Rubin, supra note 1.
112 See Edward L. Rubin, Legal Reasoning, Legal Process and the Judiciary as
an Institution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 265, 280 n.41 (1997) (reviewing CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996)). Rubin also
refers to institutional economists such as Douglass North and Oliver William-
son. See id.
113 See id. at 281.
114 A particularly excellent example is Edward Rubin & Malcom Feeley,




sketched out. Nonetheless, even though these analytical princi-
ples are available, they have barely entered the realm of legal
scholarship and have not been imported into international legal
scholarship. 115 In particular, sociological institutionalism has not
been used as a model for analysis of the World Trade Organiza-
tion.
2.1.3. Historical Institutionalism and Sociological
Institutionalism Differ
Historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism
differ from one another. At the level of first principles, which is
the level at which this Article scrutinizes the various theoretical
schools, they differ on at least two points: the creation and altera-
tion of institutions, and the role of institutions in affecting indi-
vidual behavior.
With respect to the creation and alteration of institutions, the
difference might be summarized as one of perspective; historical
institutionalism looks inward while sociological institutionalism
looks outward. In other words, historical institutionalism exam-
ines factors pertinent to the institution under scrutiny-its past
and the decision constraints that flow from the past-when asking
how an institution came into existence. Sociological institutional-
ists, on the other hand, examine factors that are exogenous to the
institution under scrutiny-institutions already existing in the
cultural milieu act as the constraints on the creation and alteration
of institutions.
With respect to the role of institutions in affecting individual
behavior, the difference is one of scope. Both historical and socio-
logical institutionalism accept the cultural approach to this rela-
tionship. Historical institutionalism, however, also accepts the
115 It should be noted that the Yale School of international law did borrow
concepts from the sociology of the time. The Yale School portrayed interna-
tional law as process, and emphasized the interrelatedness of legal and other so-
cial processes. Unlike current sociological theory, however, the Yale School
displayed a distinctly realist posture. For example, the test of international de-
cisions was whether they conformed with certain values critical to a world or-
der among nations. Similarly, the Yale School posits that enforcement of deci-
sions is shaped by social, moral and political relations among nations. See
MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PuBLIc ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
COERCION (1961); Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, The Prescribing
Order: How International Law is Made, 6 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORDER 249
(1980).
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calculus approach, thus evidencing a wider or perhaps more eclec-
tic perspective on the relationship between institutions and indi-
vidual behavior. An equally meaningful difference with respect
to the role of institutions in affecting individual behavior is in the
quality of the treatment of the relationship between individual
behavior and institutions. Taylor and Hall chide historical insti-
tutionalism for its lack of detailed attention to the relationship.
1 1 6
A great amount of sociological institutionalism, in contrast, fo-
cuses on the relationship between institutions and individual be-
havior, particularly on the cognitive role of institutions; this at-
tention shapes a version of the cultural approach that is both
detailed and unique to sociological institutionalism.
2.2. Alternative Institutionalisms can be Distinguished from
Other Institutionalisms
Just as differences can be found between historical institution-
alism and sociological institutionalism, critical differences can be
discerned between the "alternative" institutionalisms and the two
types of institutionalism that have entered the mainstream of in-
ternational law scholarship. Again on the level of first principles,
differences exist in the explanation each theoretical school offers
for the creation and alteration of institutions, and for the role of
institutions in affecting individual behavior.
Perhaps the greatest contrast is with respect to the creation or
alteration of institutions. Regime theory and institutional eco-
nomics offer little theoretical substance on this subject. 17  Indi-
viduals or states choose an institution from a wide menu of possi-
bilities based on how well (or efficiently) that institution will
effectuate the individuals' or states' preferences. Neither regime
theory nor institutional economics explain how the menu is cre-
ated, and the only constraint placed on the behavior of self-
interested actors is informational. In contrast, historical institu-
tionalism and sociological institutionalism, as discussed above, of-
116 See Hall & Taylor, supra note 61, at 950. Their criticism is all the more
credible given that Peter Hall is a leading historical institutionalist.
117 Robert Keohane admits that regime theory, the school of which he is a
prominent member, "leave[s] open the issue of what kinds of institutions will
develop, to whose benefit, and how effective they will be." Keohane, supra




fer elaborate explanations of how that menu is created, and sug-
gest a great number of constraints on actors' behavior."1
Regime theory and institutional economics do have elaborate
explanations for the role institutions play in ordering behavior,
although in the case of regime theory the analysis often deals with
the behavior of states rather than individuals or voluntary associa-
tions.n 9 Institutions are used as tools to accomplish ends, and are
used in a voluntary and rational manner. Institutional economics
in particular offers the most detailed explanation of individual be-
havior, although it is an explanation that rests uncomfortably on
stark assumptions about state and individual behavior.12 0 In con-
trast, historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism
offer a far less detailed explanation for individual behavior. In the
case of historical institutionalism, the lack of detail may be attrib-
utable to a preoccupation with other aspects of institutionalism;
nonetheless, historical institutionalism offers the insight that the
calculus approach and the cultural approach may both be plausi-
ble in different times and situations. In the case of sociological in-
stitutionalism, the lack of detail is probably attributable to the
enormous task that the theory takes on, which is to fit behavior
into the context of entire cultures.
Each of the four iterations of institutionalism discussed in this
Article have analytical strengths and weaknesses, and each has as-
pects that the others could profitably borrow. The insights of re-
gime theory and institutional economics, as well as instances of
their application to the World Trade Organization, are discussed
above. What is equally interesting is that historical institutional-
18 In a similar vein, DiMaggio and Powell suggest that a dividing line
among the various forms of institutionalism is whether a particular form of in-
stitutionalism's definition of institutions reflects the preferences of individuals
or collective outcomes that are not the simple sum of individual interests. See
DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 91, at 9. In this context it is interesting to con-
trast the common economic meaning of entrepreneur-to whom North attrib-
utes the changing of institutions, with the definition proffered by Fligstein-an
actor with well developed social skills, particularly the ability to motivate co-
operation among other actors. See Fligstein, supra note 103 passim.
119 But see supra note 36 (noting that a small number of regime theorists ar-
gue for the application of regime theory to non-state actors).
120 See Donohue & Ayres, supra note 40, at 812 (noting the limitations
caused by the "clean assumptions" of law and economics); Thelen & Steinmo,
supra note 62, at 12 (describing the "ruthless elegance" of economic explana-
tions).
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ism and sociological institutionalism also offer insights into the
World Trade Organization.
2.3. Historical Institutionalism and Sociological
Institutionalism are Instructive to the Legal Analysis of the
World Trade Organization
These differences between regime theory and institutional
economics on the one hand, and historical institutionalism and
sociological institutionalism on the other, suggest that the alterna-
tive institutionalisms offer new perspectives to the legal scholar,
and as a corollary offer trade scholars a means of sharpening their
analysis of the World Trade Organization. Three short examples
indicate that this is in fact the case.
121
The first example is the dispute settlement process of the
World Trade Organization. Several scholars have intuited that
the dispute settlement process cannot be understood without un-
derstanding the process under the GATT. Their intuition is evi-
denced by the fact that prior to discussing dispute settlement
within the World Trade Organization, these scholars often pro-
vide lengthy discussions of the process under the GATT.'" As a
purely technical matter, such discussion is not required because
the World Trade Organization is distinct from and is not the
technical successor to the GATT.lz3 Institutional economics does
not require such a discussion, because institutions are created by
rational actors free from the burden of prior institutions. Simi-
larly, regime theory has no place for such a discussion. In the ab-
121 These examples, of course, are not exhaustive. The question asked by
this Article is not how alternative institutionalisms may be applied to analysis
of the World Trade Organization, but instead why these iterations of institu-
tionalism have not to date been used in such analysis.
122 See, e.g., Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The Juridicization of Inter-
national Trade Relations, 17 J. INT'LL. & BUS. 775 (1996-97).
123 See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. 2, cl. 4,
33 I.L.M. 1144, 1145 (1994) [hereinafter the "Charter"] ("The General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade 1994 as specified in Annex 1A (hereinafter referred
to as 'GATT 1994') is legally distinct from the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, dated 30 October 1947... as subsequently rectified, amended or
modified (hereinafter referred to as 'GATT 1947'). ); Amelia Porges, Introduc-
tory Note to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade
Negotiations (The Uruguay Round): Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, 33 I.L.M. 1, 4 (1994) (quoting then Di-
rector-General Peter Sutherland as emphasizing that the Worlc Trade Organi-





sence of a theoretical framework, the intuitions of scholars ana-
lyzing dispute settlement become nothing more than interesting
background information.
Historical institutionalism provides a theoretical perspective
in which understanding dispute settlement under the GATT is of
critical importance to understanding dispute settlement within
the World Trade Organization. Dispute settlement under the
GATT constituted the antecedent conditions from which dispute
settlement within the World Trade Organization arose. John
Croome's insightful history of the Uruguay Round of multilateral
trade negotiations reveals several points during the seven years of
negotiation that might be considered critical junctures; 124 alterna-
tively, the entire negotiations could be considered a cleavage in
the governance of international trade.i25 In either case, historical
institutionalism posits that the antecedent conditions impose con-
straints on the choices that are available now-constraints that
must be understood in order to truly effect analysis of the dispute
settlement process.126 Examples of aspects of dispute settlement
under the World Trade Organization that are best understood in
historical context include the allowance of multiple complainants
in one proceeding,'127 which is an extension of several proceedings
in the 1980s and a 1989 decision by the parties to the General
124 See JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: A
HISTORY OF THE URUGUAY RoUND (1995). The four years of preparation for
and seven years of negotiation of the Uruguay Round cannot be summarized in
one footnote-even a law review footnote. Croome, who participated in the
entire span of the Uruguay Round, recalls "the days and nights of efforts, the
clashes of policies and personalities, the national pressures on negotiators, the
repeated solemn declarations of heads of state and government, the frustrations
and breakthroughs." Id. at 4. Examples of critical junctures might include the
1985 clash between developed and developing countries over the need for a new
round of negotiations (which fundamentally changed perceptions of the Multi
fibre Arrangement), id. at 24-25; the circulation by Artur Dunkel of his Draft
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Negotiations in
1991 (which jelled negotiators' opinions and became the new point of reference
for negotiators), id. at 291-94; and the collapse of the Blair House accords on
agriculture (which very nearly resulted in the failure of the Uruguay Round),
id. at 341.
125 See COLLIER & COLLIER, supra note 69, at 29-30 & n.14 (discussing such
cleavage).
126 See Thelen & Steinmo, supra note 62, at 3 (arguing that historical con-
straints must be understood).
W See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes art. 9, Charter, supra note 123, Annex 2 [hereinafter Understand-
ing].
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Agreement; 128 rules governing the participation of third parties,' 2
9
which expand, in interesting ways, the rights given to third par-
ties in two Decisions by parties to the General Agreement; 3 0 and
even the much condemned secrecy of dispute settlement panels,'3
which was the emphatic practice of panels convened by the
GATT. 32  The trade scholars' intuitions are correct, and are
given a theoretical niche in historical institutionalism.
Historical institutionalism gives voice to questions that are
outside the theoretical constructs of regime theory or institutional
economics. For example, regime theory and institutional eco-
nomics posit a world of autonomous, roughly equal actors. In the
World Trade Organization, however, there are marked gradations
of power. The "quad countries," consisting of Canada, the Euro-
pean Union, Japan and the United States, are the most powerful
members. 133 Emerging economies and developing countries, on
121 See United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Sub-
stances, GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 136, 136-37 (1987); United States-
Customs Users Fees, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 245, 245-46 (1988); Con-
ciliation on Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Proce-
dures, Apr. 12, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 61, 64 (1989) [hereinafter
1989 Decision].
129 See Understanding, supra note 127, art. 10.
130 See Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Set-
tlement and Surveillance, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 210,
213 (1979); 1989 Decision, supra note 128, at 65. The rules of the World Trade
Organization give third parties access to the submissions'of the primary parties,
a right that they did not enjoy under the rules for dispute settlement under the
GATT.
131 See Understanding, su a note 127, art. 13(1) & art. 14(1); see also Jeffrey
L. Dunoff, Institutiona l Misfits: The GA 77, the ICJ & Trade-Environment Dis-
putes, 15 MIcH. J. INT'LL. 1043, 1066 (1994) (castigating closed decisionmaking
process as "inimical" to sound decisionmaking); Robert F. Housman,Democra-
tizing International Trade Decision-Making, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 699, 711
(1994 ("The application of these ironclad rules of secrecy is perhaps most trou-
bling in the area of GATT dispute resolution."); John H. Jackson, World Trade
Rulis and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1227, 1255 (1992) ("For purposes of gaining a broader constituency among
the various policy interested communities in the world ... the GATT could go
much further in providing 'transparency' of its processes.").
132 See, e.g., Panel on Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather, May 15-16,
1984, GATT B.I.S.D. (31st Supp.) at 94, 95 (1984) (recording a decision made by
a GATT panel). For a more ful discussion of these and many other aspects of
the dispute settlement process under the World Trade Organization that stem
from practices that evolved under the General Agreement, see Philip M.
Nichols, GA TTDoctrine, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 379, 399418 (1996).
133 See Uruguay Round: Quad Countries Deliver Ratification of Uruguay




the other hand, have entered into a series of shifting alliances.13 4
Historical institutionalism, with its roots in the political scientific
analysis of power, is well situated to provide a theoretical frame-
work for analysis of this aspect of the World Trade Organiza-
tion.
135
Similarly, sociological institutionalism allows scholars to
frame questions that do not arise under regime theory or institu-
tional economics. Of these, one of the more interesting has to do
with sociological institutionalism's observation that institutions
are a product of and are affected by the culture in which they are
embedded. 136 The World Trade Organization is a global institu-
tion.137 Sociological institutionalism would suggest that it is the
product of a global culture. The existence of a global culture,
however is an issue that is greatly contended but little ex-
plored. 1H The insight that culture informs institutions raises sev-
eral questions with respect to the World Trade Organization,
such as whether, if there is no global culture, the World Trade
Organization or the rules that it promulgates can truly persist;
whether the rules issued by the World Trade Organization and
134 See ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT
LEGAL SYSTEM (1987); Robert E. Hudec, GA 7T and the Developing Countries,
1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 67.
135 See Hall & Taylor, supra note 61, at 954 (extolling the ability of histori-
cal institutionalism to analyze power).
136 See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
137 See Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade Organiza-
tion Disputes to Nongovernment Parties, 17 U. PA. . INT'LECON. L. 295, 322-23
(1996) (distingishing the European Union as a federation of culturally related
nations from the World Trade Organization as a global organization). As of
October, 1997, the World Trade Organization had 132 members and 32 ob-
servers from all parts of the world.
138 See, e.g., ANTHONY D. KING, THE BUNGALOW: THE PRODUCTION OF
A GLOBAL CULTURE (2d ed. 1995) (using similarities of architectural style in
India, Britain, North America, Africa, Australia and continental Europe to ar-
gue in favor of the inter-relatedness of worldwide social phenomena); William
Alonso, Citizenshi, Nationality and Other Identities, 48J. INT'L APP. 585, 588-
592 (1995) (descri ing a study that finds some identification with a global cul-ture, but los r ide tfication with local factors); Jason Clay, Glob l Culture is
Globaloney, UTNE READER, Jan./Feb. 1996, 36 at 37 (arguing that the putativeglobal culture is really a froit-oriented manipulation by those with an interest
9 marketing the concept); Mel van Elteren, Conceptualizing the Irpact of U.S.
Popular Culture Global y, 30 J. POPULAR CULTURE 47 (1996) (stating that the
spread of U.S. culture is due to an increasetin capitalistic consumerism rather
than a global culture, but noting that the spread has the effect of homogenizing
culture worldwide).
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other international economic organizations will engender a global
culture; and how a thin global culture would constrain the func-
tioning and enforcement of the World Trade Organization's rules
and policies. Unfortunately, sociologists have only begun to
scratch the surface of international institutions, and offer little
guidance.1 39 Nonetheless, the questions raised by sociological in-
stitutionalism are of obvious interest to trade law scholars.
3. THE QUESTION OF SCHOLARLY LINKAGE
3.1. Institutional Explanations ofHistorical Institutionalism's
and Sociological Institutionalism-s Lack of Influence on the
Analysis of the World Trade Organization
It is apparent that regime theory and economic institutional-
ism do not exhaust the universe of institutionalisms. It is also ap-
parent that other forms of institutionalism can provide a useful
prism for the scrutiny of international law in general, and for
analysis of the World Trade Organization in particular. The ob-
vious question, therefore, is why these alternative forms of insti-
tutionalism are not widely used. Interestingly, the alternative in-
stitutionalisms themselves provide possible answers to this
question. In order to embark upon this analysis, it is necessary to
accept that legal scholarship is itself an institution, replete with
formal and informal rules, motivated actors, and shared cogni-
tions.
140
The first means by which to examine the scholarly linkages
that have already occurred is through historical institutionalism.
Historical institutionalism emphasizes path dependency. Future
direction is conditioned by the past; significant change occurs at
critical junctions or points of cleavage. Against this background,
it is interesting to turn to a story related by the comparative legal
scholar Alan Watson. Watson is not a historical institutionalist,
139 But see, e.g., David Strang & John W. Meyer, Institutional Conditionsfor
Diffusion, in INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS, 100 (W.
Richard Scott & John W. Meyer eds., 1994) (analyzing how institutions affect
cultural diffusion).
140 See Nancy L. Cook, Outside the Tradition: Literature as Legal Scholarship,
63 U. CiNN. L. REV. 95, 148 (1994) (stating that the development of legal schol-
arship is like that of "any institution"); see also Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems
Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 479, 479-81 (1997) (discussing the func-




but he too is interested in how laws develop and change. 141 Wat-
son attributes one factor in the development and change in legal
systems to accident and "chance." 42 He relates a story concerning
the development of law in South Africa. A South African physi-
cian happened upon one of Watson's books, Legal Transplants, in
a bookstore shortly before a return flight to South Africa. The
physician, who assumed that the book dealt with the law of medi-
cal transplants, purchased the book. Although the book actually
deals with the transplant and reception of laws, the physician en-
joyed the book and, after a series of letters with Watson, provided
Watson with funds to edit a translation of Justinian's Digest. The
translation was made available in South Africa, where it resulted
in a measurable increase in the use of Roman law in South Afri-
can legal decisions. 43 In relating this story, Watson revels in dis-
cussing the chance or accidental nature of this line of legal devel-
opment.' 44 What is most interesting for the purposes of the
present analysis, however, is Watson's observation that the intro-
duction of a single text into South African jurisprudence had tre-
mendous impact on the formulation of South African law.
45
Abbott's article on regime theory was not accidentally pur-
chased on the way to an airport. The lesson of Watson's story,
however, is apparent. Abbott's article shaped the direction of in-
ternational legal scholarship, and conditioned its path toward ac-
ceptance and use of regime theory."4 Burley's synthesis further
constrained international law scholarship.'47 Had Abbott written
141 See, e.g., ALAN WATSON, THE EVOLuTION OF LAW (1985).
142 Alan Watson, Aspects of Reception of Law, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 335, 341
(1996). Altogether, Watson suggests four factors: utility of the transplanted
law, accident and chance, difficulties of clear sight, and the authority enhancing
effect of the transplanted law. See id. at 335-45.
143 See id. at 340.
144 It should be noted that neither economic institutionalism nor repime
theory are equipped to interpret this story. Indeed, Watson himself is reuced
to labeling this factor "chance." Id. at 339. He also notes that "[p]urists will ob-
ject and say that I am relying on anecdotal evidence. Yes, I am. But that in no
way impairs my argument.... [c]hance cannot systematically be factored into
any development." Id. at 341. Historical institutionalism provides a theoretical
means of categorizing this critical junction in the development of South African
law.
145 See id. at 340-41.
146 See supra note 30 (noting that scholars who used regime theory analysis
acknowledged Abbott).
147 See supra note 21 (relating plaudits for Burley).
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an article expounding the application of historical institutionalism
to legal theory, or had Burley explicated a detailed history of so-
ciology rather than international relations theory, it is probable
that the landscape of international law scholarship in general and
of analysis of the international trade regime in particular would
be quite different today.
Such a story may seem incomplete-it begins abruptly with
the publication of Abbott's article. A lingering question remains:
from where did this article arise? While only Abbott can fully
answer that question, he does provide a clue in the article itself.
That clue, in turn, can be placed within the structure of sociologi-
cal institutionalism. Abbott opines that international relations
theory, from which regime theory is taken, is the closest of the
social sciences to international law scholarship. 148 In sociological
institutionalism terms, Abbott is culturally predisposed, perhaps
even constrained, to borrow from international relations theory.
This is true both cognitively and with respect to legitimization.
Cognitively, Abbott's writings indicate that he is steeped in
knowledge of institutionalism and that he is a profound re-
searcher. As a scholar trained in international law and interna-
tional relations, however, he simply may not have "seen" histori-
cal or sociological institutionalism. With respect to
legitimization, Abbott may, consciously or unconsciously, have
considered borrowing from a related social science to be more ap-
propriate than* borrowing from political science or sociology.
149
148 Abts
Abbott, supra note 10, at 342;see also Burley, supra note 21, at 205 ("Just
as constitutional lawyers study political theory, and political theorists inquire
into the nature and. substance of constitutions, so too should two disciplines
that study the laws of state behavior seek to learn from one another.").
149 f Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal
Scholarship, 80 CAL. L. REV. 889, 900 (1992) (noting that methodological com-
mitment tends to bind legal scholars and diminish acceptance of alternatives).
Indeed, some aspects of historical institutionalism and sociological institutional-
ism may seem to some legal scholars to resonate with the deconstructionist al-
lies of the school of critical legal studies, which is anathema to many U.S.
scholars and thus would not be considered institutionally appropriate. In addi-
tion to criticism of its logic, deconstructionism is criticized as contributing to
excessive cynicism and nihilism while contributing nothing positive to legal
theory. See, e.g., DAvID C. HoY & THOMAS MCCARTHY, CRITICAL THEORY
(1994) (criticizing deconstructionism); Martha C. Nussbaum, Skepticism About
Practical Reason in Literature and the Law, 107 HARv. L. REv. 714, 743 (1994)
(criticizing deconstructionism); Girardeau A. Spann, Deconstructing the Legisla-
tive Veto, 68 MINN. L. REV. 473, 540-41 (1984) (questioning whether decon-
struction adds anything to legal analysis);see also Vivian Grosswald Curran, De-




A similar story can be told with respect to economic institu-
tionalism, although not quite as directly. The modern law and
economics movement probably began when Aaron Director, an
economist at the University of Chicago, introduced several mem-
bers of that university's law faculty to economic theory. 50 From
that beginning, law and economics has gone through several intel-
lectual generations, becoming more broadly distributed through-
out legal scholarship."5 Thus, it is not possible to draw a straight
line from Director to Trachtman, as it is from Abbott to Shell.
5 2
Nonetheless, a historical institutionalist might argue that at a
critical juncture, when legal scholarship was receptive to a new
paradigm, Director's protegees sent legal scholarship along the
path of law and economics, and that the choices available to legal
scholarship are now constrained by that choice.'53 Under this
line of reasoning, it would be considered institutionally likely that
a scholar would apply institutional economics to the World Trade
(outlining criticisms of deconstructionism, from a perspective sympathetic to
econstructionism). The difference, of course, is that while deconstructionism
simply posits that words have no objective meaning, historical institutionalism
and sociological institutionalism posit that the meaning attributable to various
c.nitions may be attributable to several sets of rules, including self-referential
150 See NEIL DuxBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 316-30
(1995) (discussing the beginning and early history of law and economics).
Among the firstaw faculty that Director worked on were Robert Bork and
Richard Posner. See id. An interesting history, albeit recounted very subjec-
tively by actual participants, of the nascence of the modern law and economics
movement is Edmund W. Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and
Economics at Chicago, 1932-1970, 26 J.L. & ECON. 163 (1983) (reproducing a
transcript of a discussion among a number of members of the law and econom-
ics school). Intellectually, moaern law and economics may have its roots in
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960), and
Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L.J. 499 (1961). See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMICANALYSIS OF THE
LAW 19-20 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing the influence of the two articles).
151 See POSNER, supra note 150, at 19-20 (outlining a history of the law and
economics school); Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s, 50
OHIO ST. .. 599, 604-13 (1989) (same); Susan Rose-Ackerman,Law and Eco-
nomics: Paradigm, Politics or Philosophy, in LAW AND ECONOMICS 233
(Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1989) (explaining the basic ideas of the 'Chicago' and
'Reformist' schools of law and economics).
152 Shell himself draws that line. See supra note 31.
. Robert Ellickson reports that the percentage of law faculty with Ph.D.'s
in economics grew considerably from 1960 to 1970. See Robert C. Ellickson,
Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical
Law an Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 26-27 (1989).
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Organization,154 and unlikely that institutionalism from another
school of thought would be applied.
Again, this story seems incomplete-its conclusion of inevita-
bility seems rather self-fulfilling. And again, sociological institu-
tionalism may offer a more satisfying explanation. Sociological
institutionalism argues that institutions will be created or changed
in ways that are considered appropriate.5 5 Law and economics is
wildly controversial as a theoretic for legal scholarship, 6 but it
nonetheless has earned a position as a legitimate heuristic. 57 Just
as importantly, law and economics analysis has become a proven
route for ensuring publication and obtaining tenure and promo-
tion.15 It is difficult to make the same claim for political science
or sociology, particularly in recent years.159 Thus, culturally, it is
more legitimate and appropriate to borrow from institutional
154 Recounting this line of reasoning is not meant to imply that Tracht-
man's analysis is neither original nor welfexecuted. It is both, m abundance.
155 See Scott, supra note 97, at 169-70.
156 See Avery Wiener Katz, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Eco-
nomics, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2260 (1996) ("The tension among efficiency,
equity, and other aspects of justice remains as controversial as ever in public
discourse."); see also Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CoRNELL L. REV.
1, 8 (1986) (noting that law and economics is controversial because it makes
radical assumptions and because it reduces values to preferences).
157 See Linz Audain, Critical Legal Studies, Feminism, Law and Economics,
and the Veil of Intellectual Tolerance: A Tentative Case for Cross-Juris dential
Dialogue, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1017, 1045 (1992) (noting that while the as-
sumptions of law and economics are controversial, the methodology is not, be-
cause it is simply the methodology of economics);see also Gregory S. Crespi,
The Mid-Lifi Crisis of the Law and Economics Movement: Confronting the Prob-
lems of Non alsifibility and Normative Bias, 67NoTRE DAME L. REv. 231, 231-
32 (1991) (discussing the influence of law and economics).
15 See Donald N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Law and Economics, 86
MICH. L. REV. 752, 765 (1988) ("In his Maccabean lecture on jurisprudence in
1981, Guido Calebresi reported the current opinion that law and economics
was the only sure route to promotion and tenure."); Mark Tushnet,Critical Le-
gal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515, 1519 n.18 (1991) ("I am hard-
pressed to identify a leading law faculty that has denied tenure to someone
prominently identified as a ... law and economics person, and find it absurdly
easy to identify law faculties that have denied tenure to [critical legal studies]
people.").
159 An exception might be the Yale School of International Law, which
professed to borrow from sociology (although now a dated sociology), and
wvhich occasionally is itself explicitly borrowed from. See, e.g., David J. Gerber,
International Discovery After Aerospatiale: 7he Quest for an Analytical Frame-
work, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 521, 543 n.125 (1988) (borrowing from the Yale





economics than from historical institutionalism or sociological in-
stitutionalism.
Regime theory and institutional economics are singularly un-
helpful in explaining why they are the dominant institutionalisms
used to analyze the World Trade Organization. Regime theory is
inapplicable to a question of the institution of scholarship, but its
principles would suggest that a number of autonomous scholars
with relatively equal power selected regime theory and institu-
tional economics as the most effective means of obtaining their
preferences (which, hopefully, would be a clearer theoretical and
practical understanding of the World Trade Organization). Insti-
tutional economics would make a similar argument, substituting
efficient for effective. These self-congratulatory arguments, how-
ever, are wrong; it has already been demonstrated that historical
institutionalism and sociological institutionalism offer unique and
valuable insights into the World Trade Organization.160 Clearly,
the explanations suggested by historical institutionalism and so-
ciological institutionalism are the more persuasive.
3.2. Why Other Analytical Linkages May Not Exist
The inquiry into why historical institutionalism and socio-
logical institutionalism have not been used in the analysis of the
World Trade Organization sheds light on another area of interest
to trade scholars. Why have certain analytical linkages not been
drawn? This question is of particular interest, because trade
scholars should not assume that their repertoire for analysis, sim-
ply because it is bulky, is complete.
An example of a linkage that has not been drawn, for exam-
ple, is that between the World Trade Organization and ethics.
What is particularly puzzling is the fact that trade scholars have
not drawn from the rapidly growing body of literature concern-
ing business ethics, 161 particularly that branch of business ethics
that concerns international business.
162
160 See supra notes 121-139 and accompanying text.
161 The field of business ethics is rapidly becoming big business.
Among other developments, the last fifteen years have-seen the prolif-
eration of a great number of books and articles on ethical problems in
business; the emergence of several centers and institutes at least partly
devoted to the subject or to related problems like the role of values in
scientific, technological or public policy work; the spread of business
ethics courses in both college and business school curricula; and even,
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Integrated social contract theory, as explicated by Thomas
Dunfee and Thomas Donaldson, for example, has become a
widely explored analytical tool in the field of business ethics.' 63 It
has also found expression in general management literature. In
legal literature on trade, however, there are no references to this
school of thought.!"
Integrated social contract theory is based on, but radically ex-
tends, the tradition of social contract theorists such as Locke and
Rousseau.165 Integrated social contract theory adopts the appella-
tion "integrated" because it unites two distinct types of social con-
in some corporations, the development of seminars in ethics for execu-
tives.
Robert Jackall, Business as Social and Moral Terrain, in PERSPECTIVES IN
BUSINESS ETHICS 77, 77 (Laura Pincus Hartman ed., 1998).
162 See, e.g., BUSINESS ETHICS: JAPAN AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
(Thomas W. Dunfee & Yukimasa Nagayasu eds., 1993); THOMAS DON-
ALDSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS (1989).
163 See Jeffrey Nesteruk, The Moral Dynamics of Law in Business, 34 AM.
Bus. L.J. 133, 133 (1996) (stating that "virtue ethics and social contract the-
ory ... are increasingly influencing our understanding of ethical issues in busi-
ness"); Robert Phillips, Stakeholder Theory, Social Contracts, and a Principle
of Fairness 1 (1997) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author)("Prominent among the myriad proposed models of business ethics are stake-
holder theory and social contract theory. The latter has, in fact, been suggested
as a normative grounding for the former."). A very clear explanation of inte-
grated social contract theory can be found in DAVID J. FRJTZCHE, BUSINESS
ETHICS: A GLOBAL AND MANAGERIAL PERSPECTIVE 43-47 (1997).
164 In legal literature as a whole there are virtually no references to inte-
grated social contract theory. Moreover, the only two references found by the
author of this Article are brief, and do not attempt to borrow from or integrate
the theory into legal theory. In corporate law, Timothy Fort borrows Dunfee
and Donaldson's criticism of stakeholder theory. See Timothy L. Fort, The
Corporation as Mediating Institution: An Efficacious Synthesis of Stakeholder The-
ory and Corporate Constituency Statutes, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 173, 188-89
(1997). Steve Salbu refers to the concept of moral free space, but does notpres-
ent integrated social contract theory as a model. See Steven R. Salbu, 4rue
Codes Versus Voluntary Codes of Ethics in International Markets: Towards the
Preservation of Colloquy in Emerging Global Communities, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L
BUS. L. 327, 348 n.73 (1994). It should be noted that Professor Fort teaches at
the University of Michigan's business school, and that Professor Salbu received
his Ph.D. partially under the supervision of Dunfee. Both facts reinforce the
path dependency of legal scholarship.
165 See Michael Keeley, Continuing the Social Contract Condition, 5 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 241 (1995) (stating that Donaldson and Dunfee's work extends the




tracts.1 66  The first type is a hypothetical macrosocial contract
among all of the members of a given society, the contents of
which are all of the economic rules to which all of the members
would agree. 16  Obviously, this will not be a great number of
rules. The result is moral free space within that hypothetical
macrosocial contract. Inside that moral free space, communities
are free to enter into the second type of social contract: explicit
contracts that provide more detailed rules concerning ethical be-
havior in economic life. 16  These microsocial contracts are
bounded only by hypernorms, which are "principles so funda-
mental to human existence that they serve as a guide in evaluating
lower level moral norms,"169 and by a requirement that individual
members have consented to the contract. Because membership
in different economic communities may overlap, thus creating
overlapping systems of rules within the moral free space of the
macrosocial contract, Dunfee and Donaldson have devised a set of
priority rules to determine which set should apply in a given
situation.1
7 '
Dunfee defines communities as "all coherent groupings of
people capable of generating ethical norms... includ[ing] a cor-
poration, a department or other subgroup within a corporation, a
social club, an industry association, a faculty senate, a church or
synagogue, a city government, an association of trial lawyers and
166 See Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Toward a Unified Con-
tion of Business Ethics: Integrative Social Contracts Theory, 19 ACAD. MGMT.
R 252, 254 (1994) (explaining the appellation).
167 See Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Integative Social Con-
tracts Theory: A Communitarian Conception of Economic Ethics, 11 ECON. &
PHIL. 85, 93 (1995) (explaining the hypothetical macrosocial contract).
168 See Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 166, at 260-62 (discussing moral
free space); Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 167, at 93-95 (discussing nicroso-
cial contracts that fill in the moral free space).
169 Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 166, at 265; see also Thomas W. Dun-
fee, The Role of Ethics in International Business, in BUSINESS ETHICS: JAPAN
AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 162, at 63, 69 ("Hypernorms are de-
fined as norms so fundamental to human existence that they will be reflected in
a convergence of religious, political, and philosophical thought. HypernorrIs
thus represent core or fundamental values common to many cultures.).
170 Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 167, at 98. Consent can be indicated
by, among other means, not taking advantage of an opportunity to exit. See id.
at 99.
171 See Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 166, at 268-71 (outlining priority
rules for determining which community's rules apply).
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so on."1 72 Clearly, the World Trade Organization constitutes a
community under this definition. Just as clearly, legal scholarship
on the World Trade Organization could benefit from the disci-
pline that integrated social contract theory brings to consideration
of the issue of ethics in an economic setting, and from a theory
that "allows for moral diversity among various cultures while
maintaining certain universal norms."173 And yet, it does not.
That legal scholarship has not availed itself of this or other
analytics from the discipline of business ethics may be explained
by the insights of historical institutionalism and sociological insti-
tutionalism. Historically and culturally, there has been little in-
tellectual exchange between legal scholarship and business schol-
arship.7 4  An example is illustrative. The concept of "core
competencies" is a staple in management sciences and other sci-
ences related to the study of businesses. 75 Out of the estimated
five thousand law review articles published each year,'7 6 however,
a search of the LEXIS electronic database reveals only sixteen ref-
erences to core competencies. Of these, five could in no way be
construed as a reference to business theory,' 7  four were made by
172 Dunfee, supra note 169, at 68. "Thus defined, communities are groups
that determine their own membership and apply their own preferred forms of
rationality." Id.
173 FRITZScHE, supra note 163, at 43.
174 See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and
Asset Pricing, 94 YALE U. 239, 303-05 (1984) (castigating legal scholarship and
education for its lack of integration with business theory).
175 For an early and often-cited discussion of core competencies, see C.K.
Prahalad & Gary Hamel, The Core Competence of the Corporation, HARX'. Bus.
REV., May-June 1990, at 79.
176 Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and
Tenure, 103 HARV. L. REV. 926, 928 (1990).
177 See Frank S. Bloch, Framing the Clinical Experience: Lessons on Turning
Points and the Dynamics of Lawyering, 64 TENN. L. REV. 989, 1000 (1997)
(discussing clinical experience at the University of Tennessee); Teresa V. Carey,
Credentialing for Mediators-To Be or Not To Be?, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 635, 640
(1996) (discussing the attributes necessary for a mediator); Rob Frieden,Privati-
zation of Satellite Cooperatives: Smothering a Golden Goose?, 36 VA. J. INT'L L.
1001, 1007 (1996) (discussing the language of the INMARSAT Convention);
Emmanuel P. Mastromanolis, Insights from US. Antitrust Law on Exclusive andRestricted Territorial Distribution: The Creation of a New Legal Standard for
European Union Competition Law, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 559, 591 (1995)(discussi g attributes of traders); Donald T. Weckstein, Mediator Certification:Sand How, 30 U.S.F.. REV. 757, 767 (1996) (discussing training in the ba-




attorneys who were employed in business settings, 178 one was
made by a businessperson who authored a very short comment,1
79
and two were made by students. 8° Out of all sixteen, only one
actually used the concept at length.' 81 By contrast, a search in the
same database of the term "efficiency" yields 17,792 references; of
the term "efficient allocation," 1,056 references; of "Coase Theo-
rem," 707 references; of "elasticity of demand," 684 references.
Even the term "David Ricardo" yields ninety references. Clearly,
management theory is not part of the culture of legal scholarship
in any meaningful way, whereas economic theory appears in
abundance.
The insights of historical institutionalism and sociological in-
stitutionalism-that legal scholarship's past and present culture
lead it to certain linkages and away from others-reflects neither
well nor poorly on legal scholarship, it is simply an observable
phenomenon. Awareness of possible institutional limitations on
178 See Craig Becker, Labor Law Outside the Employment Relation, 74 TEX.
L. REV. 1527, 1530 n.8 (1996) (Becker was Associate General Counsel of the
Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO); Ward Bower, Law Firm
Economics and Professionalism, 100 DICK. L. REV. 515, 529 (1996) (Ward was a
principal of a management consultant group); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr.,Reconcil-
ing Competition and Cooperation: A New Antitrust Standard for Joint Ventures,
35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 871, 887 (1994) (Piraino was a Vice-President of
Parker-Hannifan Corporation); Paul R. Verkuil,Reverse Yardstick Competition:
A New Deal for the Nineties, 45 FLA. L. REv. 1, 17 (1993) (Verkuil was President
and CEO of the American Automobile Association).
179 See Ronald Mitsch, Innovation as Part of the U.S. Corporate Culture: In-
novation Working for You, 21 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 171, 174 (1995) (Mitsch was Ex-
ecutive Vice President of the 3M Company).
"0 See William Kummel, Note,A Market Approach to Law Firm Economics:
A New Model for Pricing, Billing, Compensation and Ownership in Corporate Le-
gal Services, 1996 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 379, 399 n.65 (discussing raw firms'
competitive strategies); Nicholas A. Widnell, Comment, The Crystal Ball of In-
novation Market Analysis in Merger Review: An At.opriate Means of Predicting
the Future?, 4 GEo. MASON L. REV. 369, 393 (1996) (suggesting an approach for
measuring market concentration for innovation).
181 See Jeffery Atik, Complex Enterprises and Quasi-Public Goods, 16 U. PA.
J. INT'L Bus. L. 1, 30 (1995). Mark Lemley also briefly explains the term, and
Ann E. Conaway Stilson mentions it in a way that implies part of the underly-
ing concept. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual
Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1049 n.279 (1997); Ann E. Conaway Stil-
son, The Agile Virtual Corporation, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 497, 527 (1997). The
remaining reference is male by the former Vice Chairman of the Zambia Priva-
tization Agency. See Benjamin Lubinda Ngenda, Comparative Models of Priva-
tization: A Commentary on the A/rican Experience, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 179,
182 (1995). This survey of legal literature is, of course, subject to the limitations
of any electronic database search.
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scholarly linkages creates the opportunity to transcend those bar-
riers in innovative ways. 82 Awareness of the institutional diffi-
culties inherent in scholarly linkage also sheds light on problems
of practical linkage between societal issues and the World Trade
Organization.
4. Tii TRIALS OF SCHOLARLY LINKAGE SHED LIGHT ON ISSUES
oF PRACTICAL LINKAGE
The importance of theory and of scholarly analysis of the
World Trade Organization cannot be gainsaid. Arguably, the
World Trade Organization owes its very existence to scholarly•• 183 N t ti
analysis of the international trade regime. Nonetheless, it is
important to consider the implications of the preceding section,
discussing scholarly linkages, on practical linkages that are asked
of the World Trade Organization in the real world. Those link-
ages are considerable, and growing. The World Trade Organiza-
tion is not yet five years old, but it has already been suggested as
the appropriate forum for the promulgation of rules concerning
labor, investment, transnational bribery, human rights, antitrust,
the environment, gender and racial discrimination, taxation, and
the development of democracy. 184 While it is clear that not all of
112 See Rubin, supra note 149, at 901 (discussing the benefits that accrut
from shifts in mainstream scholarship).
183 At the outset of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations,
of course, the creation of an international organization was not contemplated.
While, however, the Uruguay Round was proceeding, the Royal Institute of
International Affairs commissioned Professor John Jacson to conduct a study
of the international trade regime. Jackson suggested that only the creation of
an international organization would bring coherency to the management of in-
ternational trade regulation. His study was embraced by the European Com-
munity, which formally proposed the creation of such an organization. See
Gardner Patterson & Eliza Patterson, The Road from GA 77 to MTO, 3 MINN.
J. GLOBAL TRADE 35, 41-42 (1994); see also JOHN H. JACKSON, RE-
STRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 91-103 (1990) (Chapter 8 entitled
"Reforming the GATT System"). It is interesting to note that at the time he
wrote his study, Jackson considered the creation of an actual international or-
ganization "improbable" and suggested that analyzing it as a hypothetical
"might further stimulate thought about some of the difficult institutional prob-
lems of the GATT system." Id. at 93.
184 See, e.g., William Diebold, Some Second Thoughts, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 1251, 1257 (1995) (suggesting that the World Trade Organization issue
rules for international investment); Claus Dieter-Ehlermann, The International
Dimension of Competition Poliy, 17 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 833, 840 (1994)
(suggesting that the World Trade Organization promulgate rules on competi-




these linkages are desirable, 185 it is equally clear that some are. 86
The alternative institutionalisms may shed light on two questions
concerning practical linkages: how to discern which linkages are
desirable, and how to effectuate those desirable linkages.
The author of this Article has published an article on deter-
mining what issues are proper subjects for consideration by the
World Trade Organization. 87 That article suggests four criteria
that must be satisfied for an issue to fall within the World Trade
Organization's mandate: that the issue be within the legal compe-
tency of the World Trade Organization, that the issue signifi-
cantly involve trade, that the World Trade Organization be capa-
ble of enforcing any guidelines related to the issue, and that the
issue require international coordination. 8 8 These criteria are ex-
plicitly drawn from the nature of the World Trade Organization
as an international institution and from the purposes of its crea-
tors.1 89 In that sense, these criteria reflect the rational and utilitar-
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 17, 23-24 (1996) (suggesting that the World Trade Or-
ganization will be called upon to issue rules concerning the environment, anti-
trust and competition, labor standards, human rights, distributional issues, gen-
der and other discrimination, and democratic structure); Philip M. Nichols,
Outlawing Transnational Bribery Througb the World Trade Organization, 28 L.
& POL'Y INT'L BUS. 305 (1996); Asif H. Qureshi, Trade Related Aspects of Inter-
national Taxation-A New WTO Code of Conduct?, J. WORLD TRADE, Apr.
,1996, at 161 (suggesting the World Trade Organization as a forum for the
romulgation of uniform trade-related tax regulations); Thomas J. Schoen-
baum, The International Trade Laws and the New Protectionism: The Need for a
Synthesis with Antitrust, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 393, 394 (1994)
(suggesting that the World Trade Organization take up the issue of antitrust
regul)ation; James F. Smith, NAFTA and Human Rights: A Necessary Linkage, 27
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 793, 836 (1994) (Over time it may be possible to explicitly
link membership in the WTO to adherence to [human rights conditions].").
185 See Philip M. Nichols, Corruption in the World Trade Organization: Dis-
cerning the Limits of the World Trade Organization's Authority, 28 N.Y.U. J.
INT LL. & POL. 711, 714-18 (1996) (arguing that excessive linkage would dilute
the clarity of the World Trade Organization's mandate, undermine its credibil-
ity, and place issues in its hands that would best be considered elsewhere).
186 The author of this Article has argued, for example, that the World
Trade Organization should deal with the issue of transnational bribery. See
Nichols, supra note 184.
187 See Nichols, supra note 185.
188 See id. at 72240.
189 See id. at 719 ("Specifically, the question requires an understanding of
what type of internation-al organization the World Trade Organization is, and
what it is intended by its creators and members to accomplish."). The analysis
relies on the taxonomy of international organizations created by Paul Taylor in
its effort to define and characterize the World Trade Organization. See Paul
Taylor, A Conceptual Typology of International Organization, in FRAMEWORKS
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ian orientation of regime theory (as well as institutional econom-
ics,190 although that iteration of institutionalism is not explicitly
referred to in the article). In other words, these criteria examine
intrinsic characteristics of the World Trade Organization as a re-
gime and apply them outward. They do not reflect the historical
or cultural orientation of historical institutionalism or sociologi-
cal institutionalism. They do not examine constraints imposed
upon the World Trade Organization through past decisions at
critical junctures. They do not examine the culture in which the
World Trade Organization is embedded to determine if linkage
with some issues would be more appropriate than linkage with
other issues. These types of analysis are not typical to mainstream
trade scholarship, but nonetheless would provide interesting in-
sights into the question of the scope of the World Trade Organi-
zation's authority.
An example of a practical linkage that might be excluded un-
der regime theory is a linkage between trade and human rights. 9
Trade and human rights have not been linked in the status quo.
192
Particularly given regime theories' assumptions that actors in the
international arena are autonomous and equal, regime theory
might lead to a conclusion that such a linkage would render the
international trade regime inadequate in effectuating members'
preferences.1 93  Because regime theory predicates institutional
FOR INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 12 (AJ.R. Groom & Paul Taylor eds.,1 990).19 See Geoffrey R. Watson, The Death of Treaty, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 781, 807
(1994) (stating that regime theory can be compared to economics because it
treats states as unitary, rational, maximizing actois).
191 Patricia Stirling, for example, advocates the creation of a human rights
body within the World Trade Organization that will oversee the administra-
tion of multilateral enforcement of human rights though trade sanctions. See
Patricia Stirling, The Use of Trade Sanctions as an Enforcement Mechanism for Ba-
sic Human Rights: A Proposal for Addition to the World Trade Organization, 11
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 4 (1996).
192 See Smith, supra note 184, at 819 n.95 (noting that in the real world,
human rights regimes and commercial regimes are wholly independent of one
another, and using the separation of the World Trade Organization and the
United Nations as an example).
193 The criteria for determining which issues are proper for consideration
by the World Trade Organization that are discussed supra notes 187-189 and
accompanying text almost certainly would exclude this proposal. This proposal
would not be considered within the scope of the World Trade Organization's
authority because it would fail tests number two (that is, resolution of this issue
would not significantly increase trade) and number three (that is, it would be




change on how effective the change in the institution would be,
194
upon receiving a negative answer it would resist the change.
Sociological institutionalism asks a different question. Rather
than concerning itself with the utilitarian effectiveness of the in-
stitution, sociological institutionalism asks whether the contem-
plated change would render the institution more legitimate, that
is, whether it would be considered more appropriate for the
World Trade Organization to establish linkage with human rights
than it would be for the Organization not to do so. While this
Article does not delve into the myriad debates over human rights,
there is a body of international law scholarship that concludes
that human rights principals have achieved almost universal ac-
ceptance. 195 Interestingly, some of that scholarship suggests that
the increased acceptance of human rights principles has proceeded
hand in hand with increased acceptance of the globalization of
commerce.19 6 If indeed it can be demonstrated that a demand for
core human rights forms part of the cultural context in which the
World Trade Organization is embedded, and if it can be shown
that a connection between those core rights and international
commercial regulation is considered appropriate, then sociological
institutionalism, unlike reg9me theory, might provide a theoreti-
cal justification for linkage.
The alternative institutionalisms might also provide instruc-
tion in how to effectuate linkage. Regime theory and institu-
any rules that it promulgated on the subject). These criteria, it should be re-
called, reflect a regime theory orientation toward institutions.
194 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
195 See, e.g., Jost Delbriick, A More Effective International Law or a New
"World Law'?-Some Aspects of the Development of International Law in a
Changing International System, 68 IND. L.j. 705, 713 (1993) ("Human dignity, as
the anchor point for the normative validity of internationa human rights law
and as a basic guiding principle for their interpretation and application, has be-
come more firmly established within the international community than ever
before."); Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities,
89 AM J. INT'L L. 554, 554 (1995) (noting the general acceptance of human
rights as a subject for international regulation); Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and
the Convergence of Values, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.. 429, 447 (1997) (noting that
"the rhetoric of human rights has gained universal acceptance").
'96 See Delbriick, supra note 195, at 713 (stating that "individual rights and
fundamental freedoms are accepted, in principle, along with economic...
rights"); Seita, supra note 195, at 447 (arguing that the acceptance of human
rights goes hand in hand with economic globalization).
197 This hypothetical is provided only as an example, and should not be
construed as a Fully developed argument for, or against, such a linkage.
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tional economics rely on the self-interest of actors to effectuate a
change in institutions; clearly, however, this theoretical device is
not perfectly applicable in the real world.'98 An actor cannot
simply demonstrate that a particular linkage is more effective or
efficient in satisfying World Trade Organization members' pref-
erences and expect the members to fall in line. On an intuitive
level, it is understood that historical and cultural barriers must be
overcome; such barriers are the lifeblood of historical and socio-
logical institutionalism.
An example of linkage that might be instructed by historical
institutionalism and sociological institutionalism is a linkage be-
tween trade and the environment.199 Parsing the mass of litera-
ture on trade and the environment would overwhelm this Arti-
cle;2°° therefore, a single, discrete example is used. Steve
Charnovitz, who has written prodigiously and insightfully about
198 An obvious criticism is that the ineffective or inefficient institutions
that are created, often persist, or are resistant to change, while more suitable
alternatives do not come into effect.
199 Reconciliation of trade policy with environmental policy is probably of
some relevance to the survival of the international trade regime. See Robert
Howse & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Fair Trade-Free Trade Debate: Trade, La-
bour and the Environment, in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 38, at 2 (suggesting that popular support for the international
trade regime will evaporate if the trade regime does not address concerns);
Nichols, supra note 32, at 702 ("Placing primacy on trade thus imperils popular
and sovereign support for a trade regime, and endangers all of free trade."). The
infamous Tuna/Dolphin decisions, which were not even adopted by the
GATT, is indicative of the tensions. The mere release of these decisions, which
exalted trade concerns over environmental concerns, led to calls for the United
States to withdraw from the trade regime. See Belina Anderson, Unilateral
Trade Measures and Environmental Protection Polic, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 751, 751-
52 (1993) (describing reactions to the Tuna/Dolphin decisions). For descrip-
tions of the Tuna/Dolphin proceedings and decisions, see Joel P. Trachtman,
GA7TDipute Settlement Panel, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 142 (1992). For a respected
discussion of the many issues concerning trade and the environment (the men-
tion of which is not intended to slight the many other excellent discussions), see
the essays contained in THE GREENING OF WORLD TRADE ISSUES (Kym An-
derson & Richard Blackhurst eds., 1992).
200 Cf Nichols, supra note 32, at 673 ("To bundle all of the many values re-
garding environment into one cohesive scheme would be a monumental, and
probably impossible, task."); Eric W. Orts,Reflexive Environmental Law, 89
Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1230 (1995) ("Just listing some of the many pressing envi-
ronmental issues can lead to despondency: species extinction, deforestation, de-
sertification, toxic waste, acid rain, global climate change, and severe air and




the relationship between law and trade,20 ' has advocated a funda-
mental change in the rules of the World Trade Organization-a
change that would lead to greater participation by nongovern-
mental organizations 02 in the Organization's rulemaking proc-ess. Charnovitz and others forcefully argue that nongovern-
mental organizations have demonstrably aided other international
organizations in the creation of effective trade policy and link-
ages.204  In other words, Charnovitz offers a utilitarian argu-
ment.20 Despite this argument, the institutional alteration that
Charnovitz calls for has not been effected.0 6
Regime theory and institutional economics have little to say
about the failure of a proposed alteration other than that if the de-
201 See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defog.
ging the Debate, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 459 (1994); Steve Charnovitz, Green
Roots, Bad Pruning: GA TT Rules and Their Application to Environmental Trade
Measures, 7 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 299 (1994); Steve Charnovitz, The NAFTA Envi-
ronmental Side Agreement: Implications for Environmental Cooperation, Trade
Policy, andAmerican Treatymaking, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. LJ. 257 (1994).
22 Charnovitz uses the term nongovernmental organizations" in a man-
ner that does not include businesses. See Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of
Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 183,
187 (1997).
2 3 See Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in
the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 331, 331 (1996).
204 See id. at 341 (citing NGO participation in GATT Uruguay Round); A.
Dan Tarlock, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Development
of International Environmental Law, 68 Cm1. KENT L. REV. 61 (1992). But see
Philip M. Nichols, Realism, Liberalism, Values, and the World Trade Organiza-
tion, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 851, 856-60 (1996) (cautioning against relying
on the results of nongovernmental participation in other international organi-
zations unless it is demonstrated that that organization is comparable to the
World Trade Organization).
205 See Charnovitz, supra note 203, at 341 (arguing that nongovernmental
organization participation would facilitate negotiations). Of course, to those
who are ideologically predisposed to discount environmental concerns, ignor-
ing any attempts to reconcile the two issues might seem to have the greatest
utiity; given the plasticity of economic assumptions it is even possible that they
could construct mathematical proofs for their position. See Cotter, supra note
40, at 2114, 2117-18 (discussing the falsifiability problem with economics). The
point, however, is not that the World Trade Organization must embrace envi-
ronmental issues, but instead, that failure to consider environmental concerns
endangers the continued viability of the trade regime. Cf Howse & Trebil-
cock, supra note 199, at 3 ("If international trade law simply rules out of court
any trade response to the policies of other countries, however abhorrent, then
there will be an understandable, and dangerous, temptation to declare that the
international trade law is an ass [sic].").
206 See Steve Charnovitz, A Critical Guide to The WTO's Report on Trade
and Environment, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 341, 34142 (1997).
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sired institutional alteration did not occur, it must not have been
perceived as effective or efficient by international actors.20 7 His-
torical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism, on the
other hand, speak to historical constraints that must be overcome,
cognitions that must be expanded or changed, and cultural legiti-
mations that must be elicited and made explicit. While this Arti-
cle does not purport to engage in the laborious task of applying
the alternative institutionalisms to a specific linkage, the useful-
ness of these theoretical schools to those who advocate practical
linkages should be clear.
Charnovitz does point out that the proposed International
Trade Organization, which would have joined the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund as the third Bretton Woods
institution if its charter had been ratified by the United States in
1948,208 had provisions for the participation of nongovernmental
organizations. He suggests that this means the World Trade Or-
ganization should do the same.20 9  As a purely legal matter, of
course, the actions of one international organization have little
bearing on the requirements to be made of another. 210 Historical
institutionalism, on the other hand, does provide a theoretical jus-
tification for exploration of the history of nongovernmental or-
ganization participation. This theoretical construct, however, re-
quires more rigor than simple iteration of the history of the
International Trade Organization. Rather, it suggests examina-
tion of at least two critical junctures: the point at which the In-
ternational Trade Organization was not created, and the point at
which the drafters of the World Trade Organization's charter dis-
carded any plans to deeply involve nongovernmental organiza-
tions. Scrutinizing these critical junctures for the purpose of de-
207 See North, supra note 8 (noting that entrepreneurs change or do not
chanme institutions based on their perceptions of the benefits).
8 See ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD
TRADE DIPLOMACY 11-12 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing the history of the Interna-
tional Trade Organization); Nichols, supra note 132, at 389-91 same).
209 See Charnovitz, supra note 203, at 338-39. Charnovitz has also written
the definitive article on the history of nongovernmental organization participa-
tion in international organizations. See Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Par-
ticipation: NGOs and International Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 183 (1997).
210 In general, the authority and requirements of an international organiza-
tion are bounded by its organic documents, or by a limited number of powers
that are implied to international organizations. See Edward Gordon, The World
Court and the Interpretation of Constitutive Treaties, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 794, 816-




termining how the choices made at those cleavage points possibly
constrain future institutional choices could provide guidance for
those who wish to effect institutional alteration.
5. CONCLUSION
Institutionalism is an increasingly useful tool in the repertoire
of international law scholarship. Among other uses, institutional-
ism has been used to scrutinize the World Trade Organization.
Institutionalism, as it is used in international law scholarship,
however, reflects only two sources: regime theory from interna-
tional relations theory, and institutional economics from the so-
cial science of economics. Regime theory and institutional eco-
nomics, however, do not exhaust the universe of possible sources
for models of institutional analysis. This Article offers two ex-
amples of other models for institutional analysis: historical insti-
tutionalism from political science, and sociological institutional-
ism from sociology. Neither school of institutionalism has been
used to analyze the World Trade Organization.
Historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism
differ from regime theory and institutional economics in funda-
mental ways. To the international trade law scholar who is seek-
ing models for analysis, these differences should not be looked
upon as reasons to discredit one school or another, but instead as
opportunities to examine international law from a variety of per-
spectives, or even to hybridize in legal analysis the strengths of
several other disciplines while pruning their weaker analytical
principles. As this Article briefly demonstrates, historical institu-
tionalism and sociological institutionalism can lead to new in-
sights concerning the World Trade Organization.
While trade scholars should appreciate the possibility of new
tools of analysis, the existence of these tools raises an interesting
question concerning why some forms of institutionalism have
been used in trade scholarship and others have not. In order to
answer that question, scholars must recognize that trade scholar-
ship itself is an institution, and is subject to the same scrutiny as
the World Trade Organization. By examining how analytical
linkages occur or do not occur in trade scholarship, lessons can be
learned that have applicability to the broader questions of theo-
retical and practical linkage to the World Trade Organization.
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DOMESTIC POLICY OBJECTIVES AND THE
MULTILATERAL TRADE ORDER:
LESSONS FROM THE PAST*
FRIEDER ROESSLER **
1. INTRODUCTION
Trade issues are rarely discussed in isolation from other policy
issues. The conference that led to the Havana charter for an In-
ternational Trade Organization (ITO) was the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Employment. Chapter II of the charter
assigned to the ITO the task of resolving the most pressing eco-
nomic problems of the late 1940s, including attaining full em-
ployment, eliminating balance-ofpayments disequilibria, action
against inflationary or deflationary pressures, and promoting fair
labor standards. Chapter II1 committed the ITO's members to
cooperation on economic development and reconstruction, and
chapters IH and V established the ITO as a forum for negotiating
agreements on technology transfer, foreign investment, double
taxation, and restrictive business practices, as well as commodity
agreements (ICITO 1948).
While the Havana charter was never adopted, its chapter on
commercial policy survived in the form of the GATT. Linkages
taken over into the original GATT concerned balance-of-payments
disequilibria and competition, to which a linkage between trade
and development was subsequently added. Under the WTO,
commitments on trade in goods have now been linked with
* Copyright © 1998 The National Bureau of Economic Research. This arti-
cle is reprinted with permission from the publisher, the University of Chicago
Press; it first appears in THE WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
213-29 (Anne 0. Krueger, ed. 1998). Only minor stylistic changes have been
made.
** Frieder Roessler, formerly director of the Legal Affairs Division of the
WTO Secretariat, is now visiting professor at the Georgetown University Law
Center, Washington, DC.
Thanks are due to Robert Hudec and Richard Snape, as well as Alice End-
ers, for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss2/7
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commitments on intellectual property rights through an integrated
dispute settlement mechanism.
When the Uruguay Round was brought to a close in April
1994 at the Marrakesh ministerial, the list of linkages with trade
proposed by various speakers included environmental policies, in.
ternationally recognized labor standards, competition policy, com-
pany law, foreign investment, immigration policies, development, po-
litical stability, and alleviation of poverty (GATT Document
MTN, TNC/45 [MIN], 12). Only one of these proposals was ac-
cepted: the Decision on Trade and Environment provides for the
WTO to continue the work of the GATT on environment
(GATT 1994, 469). Efforts to link trade with labor standards did
not succeed at the WTO ministerial meeting in Singapore in De-
cember 1996, but two working groups were established to study
the relationship between trade and investment and the intersec-
tion between trade and competition, respectively.
As the preceding paragraphs demonstrate, linkages between
trade and other policy areas have long been a feature of the multi-
lateral trade order, and recent events suggest an intensification of
the trend. The pursuit of domestic policy objectives through the
multilateral trade order raises fundamental issues for the newly
established WTO. Will such linkages be beneficial or harmful to
the young institution? Will the attainment of domestic policy ob-
jectives be furthered or frustrated by their integration into the
world trade order? Will regimes established in disparate policy
areas mutually reinforce or weaken each other when interacting
in a single treaty with an integrated enforcement mechanism?
This paper attempts to shed light on these questions by exam-
ining the experience of the GATT with the linkages made be-
tween trade and balance-of-payments matters, development poli-
cies, and objectives of antitrust policies. This paper argues that
the integration of these subject matters into the multilateral trade
order undermined both the trade order and the attainment of the
objectives in those nontrade policy areas. At least two important
lessons can be drawn from this experience: first, the pursuit of
domestic policy objectives through trade policy instruments is not
judicable and therefore leads to a de-legalization of international
trade relations; and second, exemptions from trade policy disci-
plines designed to permit the pursuit of domestic policy objectives
attract protectionist forces that eventually subject that objective to
their ends. The application of these lessons to the trade and envi-
ronment linkage is considered in detail.
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2. THE PuRsuIT OF DOMESTIC POLICY OBJECTIVES THROUGH
THE GATT
2.1. Trade and Monetary Policies
Within nations, trade policy and monetary policy are con-
ducted in isolation. Trade policies are basically structural policies
determined by legislators for long periods of time, while mone-
tary policies are conducted on a daily basis by central banks, often
politically independent of the executive and legislative branches.
Trade and monetary policies are generally implemented with dif-
ferent instruments: trade policies with tariffs, quotas, and similar
measures; monetary policies with interventions in the exchange
and money markets.
The architects of the postwar economic system nevertheless
considered that it was necessary to link these two policy areas.
GATT contracting parties were permitted to impose import re-
strictions for the purpose of correcting a balance-of-payments
deficit; in other words, to use trade policy instruments to achieve
monetary objectives. According to article XII of the GATT,
which applies to all WTO members, and section B of article
XVII, which applies only to developing countries (GATT 1994,
501, 512), a WTO member may impose import restrictions to
safeguard its external financial position provided the restrictions
do not exceed those necessary to prevent a serious decline, or
achieve a reasonable increase, in its monetary reserves. The re-
strictions need not be withdrawn even if a change in monetary
policies would make them unnecessary.
The 1979 Declaration on Trade Measures Taken for Balance-
of-Payments Purposes of the GATT contracting parties recog-
nized that "trade measures are in general an inefficient means to
maintain or restore balance-of-payments equilibrium" (GATT
1978-79, 205). This statement is regarded by most economists as a
truism. Since the fundamental cause for a balance-of-payments
deficit is normally an excess of domestic consumption over do-
mestic production, the solution lies in most cases in restrictive fis-
cal and monetary policies that help reduce the overall level of
consumption. Imposing import controls on particular products
will influence the pattern of domestic consumption but cannot
have any predictable and durable impact on the overall level of
domestic consumption. Like devaluations, import controls
change the prices of internationally traded products, but only for
1998]
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imports and not exports, and therefore constitute at best "half a
devaluation" (GATT 1983, 16).
In practice, the trade measures imposes under articles XII and
XVII:B of the GATT have not been applied across the board to
all imports and have thus distorted the price relationships not
only between imports and exports but between different catego-
ries of imports. Such distortions inevitably entail additional inef-
ficiencies, widening the gap between domestic production and
consumption. For these reasons, the only predictable conse-
quence of an import restriction imposed under the GATT's bal-
ance-of-payments provisions is a worsening of the balance-of-
payments deficit.
What practical use did the GATT contracting parties make of
the balance-of-payments provision? In the immediate postwar pe-
riod, they were mainly invoked by European countries struggling
to achieve the convertibility of their currencies. In the 1960s,
when convertibility had been achieved, many European coun-
tries, eschewing devaluations, used the provision to justify import
restrictions designed to maintain the exchange value of their cur-
rencies. In 1971, the United States invoked article XII to justify
an import surcharge imposed to force its trading partners to ac-
cept a revaluation of their currencies in relation to the dollar.
Since the replacement of the International Monetary Fund's
([MF) par value system by a system of flexible exchange rates in
the early 1970s, industrialized countries ceased almost completely
to invoke the GATT's balance-of-payments provisions (Roessler
1975).
These provisions then became the almost exclusive preserve of
the developing counties, which invoked them, often for decades
or longer, as a legal justification for their import substitution
policies. By doing so, developing countries avoided the proce-
dural strictures of GATT article XVII:A and C, which were
meant to be the legal basis for restrictive import measures im-
posed for development purposes. As import substitution policies
became less popular and the pressure on the more advanced de-
veloping countries to liberalize grew, they began to disinvoke
voluntarily the balance-of-payments provisions. In 1995 and
1996, seven WTO members ceased to apply article XVI:B or gave
undertakings to disinvoke it. In early 1997 the IMF found that
India did not have a balance-of-payments problem justifying an
invocation of article XVII:B. The only members still consulting
in the WTO Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions
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(BOP Committee) are Bangladesh, Hungary, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Sri Lanka, and Tunisia. Of these countries, all except Hungary
have invoked article XVIII:B since their accession to the GATT.,
The determination as to what constitutes a serious decline or a
reasonable increase in reserves is made by the BOP Committee on
the basis of a determination by the IMF. According to article
XV:2 of the GATT, the IMEF's views on this matter must be ac-
cepted by the WTO (GATT 1994, 507). Under the current
monetary system, however, the IMF faces an impossible task.
The level of import controls necessary to resolve the reserve prob-
lem depends on the level of the exchange rate: the greater the de-
valuation, the less protection will be required to safeguard the ex-
ternal financial position. In the past, the IMF's par value system
dictated the choice of the exchange rate, namely the exchange rate
agreed with the IMF, but under the current monetary system, the
choice of any exchange rate by the IMF would be arbitrary. If it
chooses the exchange rate that prevails after the introduction of
the import restrictions, its determination would only reflect what
the market has already decided and automatically sanction the
level of import controls actually applied. If it chooses the ex-
change rate that would be required to eliminate the need for the
restrictions, it would effectively eliminate the right under articles
XII and XVIII:B to impose restrictions. In short, the criteria that
determine the level of restrictions have not been capable of ra-
tional application for more than two decades-except for the de-
termination that a country has no balance-of-payments problems
and therefore the level of restrictions should be zero-but the
GATT, and now the WTO, have nevertheless not adopted any
other criteria.
The linkage between trade and monetary matters has helped
neither the GATT nor the IMF in the pursuit of their basic objec-
tives. The right of all WTO members to impose import restric-
tions in the event of a balance-of-payments deficit creates signifi-
cant legal uncertainty in international trade relations, and
nourishes the illusion that import controls can reduce a deficit. It
is disquieting that the United States could now, consistent with its
WTO obligations and section 122 of its Trade Act of 1974, im-
pose a surcharge on a wide range on its imports, or that China
could, once it becomes a WTO member, withdraw all the market-
1 Information supplied by the WTO Secretariat.
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access commitments now painfully being negotiated in the process
of its accession to the WTO simply by writing a letter to the di-
rector general of the WTO. In practice, the use of balance-of-
payments provision by developing countries deprived them of the
possibility to invoke GATT disciplines to ward off domestic pro-
tectionist pressures. The restrictions originally imposed in a
payments crisis often created their own pressure groups, making
their subsequent removal politically difficult or impossible. As a
result, the countries disinvoking the balance-of-payments provi-
sions generally required long transition periods to phase out the
restrictions.
From the perspective of the monetary order, the balance-of-
payments provisions of the GATT have also not had a favorable
effect. Article IV: 1 of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF states
that "the essential purpose of the international monetary system is
to provide a framework that facilitates the exchange of goods,
services, and capital among countries" (IMF 1978, 6). However,
the GATT balance-of-payments provisions allowed governments
to postpone devaluations and therefore to mask the most visible
sign of fiscal or monetary mismanagement. By helping govern-
ments postpone the political consequences of mismanagement,
these provisions created a permanent moral hazard for govern-
ments, undermining the smooth operation of the international
monetary system.
The right of GATT contracting parties to impose TMF-
sanctioned trade controls in payments crises originally served to
promote the goals of convertibility and of exchange rate stability,
considered by the architects of the postwar international eco-
nomic order to be of a higher priority than trade liberalization.
Now the convertibility of the major currencies has been achieved
and exchange rate stability as such has ceased to be a goal of the
IMF. Nevertheless the IMF insisted throughout the Uruguay
Round on the maintenance of GATT's balance-of-payments pro-
visions and even on their extension to the General Agreement of
Trade in Services (GATS).2 One explanation is that the balance-
of-payments provisions give the IMF the possibility to approve
trade measures that permit its members in payments crises to use
their scarce financial resources to reimburse their debts rather
2 See the Declaration on the Relationship of the World Trade Organiza-
tion with the International Monetary Fund (GATT 1994, 447), and artides XI
and XII of the GATS (GATT 1994, 337).
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than to pay for additional imports. The provisions sought by the
IMF thus give it the competence to approve measures designed to
protect its own financial interests and those of its members.
The response to the above observations might be that the link
between trade and monetary matters is a fact of political life,
without which the world trade order would not be politically re-
alistic. In reply, it could be pointed out that the world trade or-
der should not pave the way to disaster but react appropriately
when it occurs. Debt crises are also a political fact of life, but the
creation of a formal legal framework for the rescheduling of debts
has been wisely avoided. Rather than granting WTO members an
almost unconditional right to impose trade controls for decades
merely because of a payments deficit, the WTO should grant ad
hoc time-bound waivers when grave crises arise, on conditions tai-
lored to the circumstances of the case. The explicit and perma-
nent linkage between trade and monetary matters incorporated in
1947 into the GATT has neither an economic rationale nor a po-
litical rationale and serves neither the purpose of the world trade
order nor that of the international monetary system.
2.2. Trade and Development Policies
The central theme of international economic diplomacy in the
1960s and 1970s was third world development. The Charter on
the Economic Rights and Duties of States, adopted by the United
Nations in 1974, made all aspects of international economic coop-
eration subservient to the goal of development (General Assembly
resolution 3281 [XXIX] of 12 December 1974). In the GATT de-
cision on "Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reci-
procity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries"
(GATT 1978-79, 203), the principle of nonreciprocity in trade ne-
gotiations between developed and developing countries was rec-
ognized, developed countries were permitted to accord tariff pref-
erences to developing countries under the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP), and developing countries were accorded the
right to exchange preferences among themselves in the name of
collective autonomy.
Today, the new international economic order is long forgot-
ten, and the charter lies in the wastepaper basket of history. De-
clining tariffs eroded the commercial attraction of the GSP, and it
never achieved its ethical mission-to create greater equality
among nations-because the benefits were concentrated on a small
19981
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group of highly advanced developing countries. The principle of
nonreciprocity had on balance a negative impact on trade liberali-
zation: rather than inducing developed countries to liberalize uni-
laterally imports in sectors of export interest to the developing
countries, such as textiles and agriculture, the principle provided
developing countries with a justification for refusing to make
market-access commitments and to sign the agreements on non-
tariff measures concluded in the Tokyo Round. As a result of the
principle of nonreciprocity, developing countries were deprived
of the main benefit of GATT membership, namely the exposure
to a system of rules and procedures that help correct the protec-
tionist bias in trade policymaking, and of the benefits of adher-
ence to codes of good government practice incorporated in the
Tokyo Round agreements (Hudec 1987). The cause of develop-
ment was manifestly not served by releasing developing countries
from their GATT obligations.
The trade and development linkage eliminated the rule of law
in north-south trade relations. The most-favored-nation rule was
removed, but no other rule of conduct was put in its place. The
beneficiaries of the principle of differential treatment were never
defined. The GSP permits the donor countries to unilaterally de-
termine the beneficiaries and to withdraw the preferences at any
time, which led developed countries to impose numerous condi-
tions on the grant of the preferences. Thus, the main preference
donors, the United States and the European Community, each
make GSP benefits conditional on the adoption of certain labor
standards, cooperation in drug control, and many other policy
conditions.3  The nonreciprocal nature of the preferences thus
3 Under Title V of the United States Trade Act of 1974, a developing coun-
try cannot receive preferences if inter alia the country expropriates or otherwise
seizes control of property owned by a U.S. citizen, including patents, trade-
marks, and copyrights; repudiates an agreement with a U.S. citizen; imposes
taxes or other excations with respect to property of a U.S. citizen; refuses to
cooperate with the United States to prevent narcotic drugs from entering the
United States unlawfully; aids or abets any individual or group that has com-
mitted an act of international terrorism; denies its workers internationally rec-
ognized rights, including acceptable minimum wages; refrains from enforcing
arbitral awards; is a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries.
Under article 3:2, 7, 8, and 9 of Council Regulation (EC) 3281/94 of 19 De-
cember 1994 (Official Journal of the European Communities, 31 December
1994, no. L 348/1), the European Community makes GSP benefits available to
countries that conduct a campaign to combat drugs; apply the conventions of
the International Labor Organization on the freedom of association, on the
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turned out to be an illusion: rather than reciprocating in the field
of trade, the developing countries were forced to make conces-
sions in other policy areas without receiving legally guaranteed
benefits in return. The new law of north-south relations con-
sisted essentially of clauses enabling, but not obliging, developed
countries to accord trade advantages under unilaterally deter-
mined conditions. What was hailed by some authors as "a new
law of development" (Hubbard 1979, 92) consisted essentially of
rules delegalizing trade relations between developed and develop-
ing countries.
The historical failure of the GATT in this area was the ab-
sence of an appropriate response to the genuine problems that
low-income states may have had in applying GATT principles.
For instance, certain countries with a fiscal infrastructure insuffi-
cient to raise revenue through domestic taxes could have been
given the right to levy import duties for revenue purposes. In-
stead, the GATT responded to the broad political demands of the
Group of 77, a coalition spanning the richest and poorest develop-
ing countries with no common trade interests. This group was
able to formulate only the demand to exempt all of its member-
ship form the rules of the GATT, and make them all eligible for
GSP. None of the instruments the GATT adopted in response to
the demands of the developing countries was therefore targeted to
the real and definable problems of these states and to those of the
poorest among them.
2.3. Trade and Competition Policies
At present, the only provision in the WTO agreements that
links trade with competition is article VI of the GATT, which
declares that dumping "is to be condemned if it causes or threat-
ens material injury to an established industry" (GATT 1994, 493)
and permits the levying of duties to offset such dumping.
Dumping and antidumping have been extensively analyzed in
the literature on imperfect competition. At their origin, anti-
protection of the right to organize and bargain collectively, and on the mini-
mum age for admission to employment; apply standards relating to the sustain-
able management of forests; do not practice any form of forced labor; do not
manifest shortcomings in customs controls on export or transit of drugs; com-
ply with international conventions on money laundering; do not engage in un-
far trading practices, such as discrimination agais the European Community,
comply with market-access obligations under the WTO agreements.
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dumping provisions in the international trade agreements were
intended to protect competition against anticompetitive practices,
and in particular to combat predatory pricing (Hindley and
Messerlin 1996). The general conclusion is that predatory pricing
is only in exceptional situations a rational strategy of companies
locked in battle for control of a market and that, in most cases,
the antidumping provisions have been used in circumstances in
which predatory pricing cannot occur. Thus, it was found that
"most antidumping cases involve products with a considerable
number of producers at the global level, none of whom has a
dominant share of global output" (Hinkley and Messerlin 1996,
21). As a result, there is no economic rationale for the vast major-
ity of antidumping cases.
Even on the assumption that predatory pricing may occur and
will need to be suppressed by governments to safeguard competi-
tion, there would still not be any justification for special rules that
differentiate between domestic and imported products. Article
III, the GATT's national treatment provision, and article XX:d of
the GATT's general exceptions allow WTO members to apply
their competition policies equally to all sources of predatory pric-
ing and to take in respect of imported products all measures nec-
essary to secure compliance with those policies. The only func-
tion of the WTO antidumping provisions is therefore to permit
WTO members to apply to imported products competition rules
that are more onerous than those applied domestically.
Article VI of the GATT is supplemented by the WTO
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994
(Antidumping Agreement), which regulates the application of an-
tidumping measures at the national level in great detail. Such an
agreement fosters the illusion that the rule of law applies in this
area. In fact, however, the agreement leaves WTO members with
an extremely wide range of discretion in determining whether in-
jurious dumping has occurred, and its article XVII:6 explicitly ex-
empts the exercise of this discretion from a full review by WTO
panels and the WTO Appellate Body (GATT 1994, 193). The ex-
ercise of the right to take antidumping measures is consequently
not submitted to judicable criteria and effective multilateral con-
trol, notwithstanding the plethora of WTO rules on their applica-
tion.
The origin of antidumping provisions in the GATT was in-
nocuous, and such measures were rarely applied in the first two
decades of the GATT's existence. As other authors have amply
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documented, however, the provisions became a safe harbor for
projectionist domestic interests (Hindley and Messerlin 1996).
Once GATT contracting parties were permitted to deviate from
the basic trade policy principles, ostensibly to pursue competition
policy objectives, the political forces that these principles are to
control overwhelmed the competition policy objectives. There is
nearly unanimity in the academic world now that the WTO's
rules on antidumping operate to protect competitors rather than
competition and consequently have acquired a rational that is the
complete opposite of the one they were originally meant to serve.
3. THE TRADE AND ENViRONMENT LINK: WnL HISTORY
REPEAT ITSELF?
The trade and environment debate raises issues and submits
the principles of the world trade order to scrutiny from a new
perspective. However, there are elements in the proposals to in-
tegrate environmental concerns into the multilateral trade order
that so strongly resemble aspects of the unsuccessful linkages
made between trade and other policy matters that a repetition of
past mistakes is to be feared.
Technically, there is no conflict between environmental poli-
cies and trade policies. The rules of the WTO do not prescribe or
prevent the attainment of any domestic policy goal in the field of
the environment. They are merely "negative" rules prohibiting
policies that distinguish, openly or in disguise, between products
and services or service suppliers as to their origin or destination.
Such distinctions are, however, normally not necessary to attain
domestic environmental policy goals (Roessler 1996b). Why then
do so many environmental organizations consider WTO law as a
threat to domestic environmental legislation?
Their opposition is based on the fear that many laws further-
ing environmental and other public interests may only be adopted
with elements that are contrary to WTO law. The legal con-
straints imposed by WTO membership create in their view obsta-
cles to the formation of domestic political coalitions between sec-
toral interests pursuing protectionist aims and public-interest
groups pursuing environmental goals, and the rulings of the
WTO panels put into jeopardy existing domestic laws furthering
legitimate domestic policy objectives for which there is, politi-
cally, no prospect of a WTO-consistent solution. As Ralph
Nader stated in his testimony before the U.S. Senate Finance
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Committee on the results of the Uruguay Round (16 March 1994,
photocopy): "Raw log export bans are one of the most trade re-
strictive means to attain the goal of conserving our nation's for-
ests. Yet, after years of debate, raw log bans were the only politi-
cally feasible approach because they accommodated the interest of
providing alternative lumber processing jobs to those who would
no longer be cutting down forests. Laws with such mixed eco-
nomic and social purposes, of which there are many, would likely
fall before challenge under the World Trade Organization's
rules."
Ralph Nader is no doubt right. And many other illustrations
can be provided to substantiate his point. Take the case, for in-
stance, of the introduction of a new clean-air standard for gaso-
line. Such a standard, by itself, can of course be introduced for all
gasoline without any legal constraints under WTO law. A prob-
lem of WTO consistency would arise, however, if the domestic
political constraints are such that a new standard would secure a
parliamentary majority only if domestic gasoline is exempted
from the standard for five years or, to put the issue in political-
economy terms, if the cost of reducing pollution is initially borne
only by nonvoting producers abroad. That discrimination would
be inconsistent with the GATT's national treatment provisions of
article II and would most likely not be justifiable under the
GATT's public policy exceptions of article XX. The five-year ex-
emption violating the GATT 1994 would thus not be technically
necessary to implement a higher environmental standard (it would
in fact reduce the new standard's environmental impact during
the transition period), but would be politically necessary to adopt
the higher standard.
Another example illustrating Nader's point is the phase-out
mechanism for chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) included in the 1987
Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer.
In theory, the phase-out of CFCs could have been achieved
through internal measures consistent with the national treatment
principle, for instance, a system of sales licenses. However, such a
system would have imposed only burdens on the producers of the
chemicals and would probably not have won their support. The
mechanism that was instead adopted provides for quantitative
limits on the production of CFCs in the members, combined
with a ban on imports from nonmembers, with the result that the
consumption of CFCs is reduced. Under this mechanism, the de-




controls generated rents for the domestic producers during the
phase-out period, and the scheme therefore won their support.
The import controls were thus not technically required to protect
the ozone layer, but were politically necessary to win the support
of the producers of ozone-depleting chemicals (Enders and Porges
1992).
How can the dilemma of groups pursuing environmental goals
be accommodated in the WTO law? One approach would be to
add a provision to the GATT 1994 permitting discriminatory
trade measures if a legitimate domestic policy goal would not be
politically attainable without that measure. However, such a
"political necessity" clause would establish a license for unprinci-
pled policymaking, and the market-access rights under the WTO
agreements would therefore be submitted to the vagaries of the
domestic political process of the WTO members. A provision
with these functions, however drafted, would not mark a line be-
tween international trade interests and domestic policy con-
straints, and would therefore be incompatible with the rule of law
in international trade relations (Roessler 1996a).
Environmental groups have also been concerned that a WTO
member is, under the principle of unconditional most-favored-
nation treatment, unable to offset through trade measures the
economic consequences of the differences between its environ-
mental policies and those of other WTO members. This concern
is reflected in the following statement by Ralph Nader (16 March
1994):
U.S. corporations long ago learned how to pit states
against each other in a "race to the bottom"-to provide
the most permissive corporate charters, lower wages, pol-
lution standards, and taxes. Often it is the federal gov-
ernment's role to require states to meet higher federal
standards.... There is no overarching "lift up" jurisdic-
tion on the world stage.... The Uruguay Round is crafted
to enable corporations to play this game at the global level,
to pit country against country in a race to see who can set
the lowest wage levels, the lowest environmental stan-
dards, the lowest consumer safety standards. Notice this
downward bias-nations do not violate the GATT rules
by pursuing too weak consumer, labor.., and environ-
mental standards.... Any... demand that corporations
1998]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
pay their fair share of taxes, provide a decent standard of
living to their employees or limit their pollution of the air,
water and land will be met with the refrain, "You can't
burden us like that. If you do, we won't be able to com-
pete. We'll have to close down and move to a country
that offers us a more hospitable business climate."
The theoretical literature on interjurisdictional competition
indicates that the problem described by Ralph Nader is largely a
reflection of a desirable competition among jurisdictions and not
a race to the bottom (Wilson 1996). Given that jurisdictions can
be assumed to choose environmental quality to maximize the wel-
fare of residents, they have no incentive to offer firms exemptions
from taxes required to cover costs to the environment even when
competing for scarce capital. However, second-best situations-
unavailability of policy instruments or distortions in market
structure or both-may give rise to the adoption of inefficiently
low or too high standards; again, a case-by-case analysis is neces-
sary.
Furthermore, if the race-to-the-bottom argument is accepted,
it would apply not only to environmental policies but to all poli-
cies that affect the location of industries, including tax and sub-
sidy policies, the provision of infrastructure, and production regu-
lation of all kinds. Eliminating a race to the bottom only in the
area of environmental policies would merely displace the race into
other policy areas, for example in workers' safety. At the end of
this process, there would no longer be local jurisdictions within
federal states, and states would have to cede their policy auton-
omy to international authorities (Revesz 1992).
What would be the consequence of a new general rule in the
WTO legal system that would permit WTO members to apply
import taxes and restrictions designed to offset the competitive
advantages that differences in environmental and other regula-
tions accord to producers abroad?4 With such a rule, the law of
4 There is no provision in the WTO agreement that permits trade restric-
tions specifically designed to offset differences in domestic policies. WTO
members may impose countervailing duties on products that benefit from a
domestic production subsidy. However, a countervailing duty may be imposed
even if the importing contracting party also accords a subsidy. Two WTO
members grantimg the same fiscalavantages to their steel industries may im-
pose (and frequently impose in practice) countervailing duties on the steel




the WTO would provide legal security only for the products and
services traded between pairs of countries with identical domestic
production regulations. This would be contrary to the principle
of comparative advantage according to which nations are to ex-
ploit their differences, which are often reflected in their regula-
tions (Bhagwati 1996). Moreover, the unconditional most-
favored-nation principle would be lost, and with it the peace-
engendering impact of that principle. With a general rule that
permits WTO members to eliminate the external effects of the
differences between them, the WTO legal system could therefore
no longer fulfill its functions.
One legal method to take into account the domestic political
constraints of WTO members and the fear of a race-to-the-bottom
effect of trade liberalization would be to permit them to individu-
ally vary their market-access commitments in accordance with
those constraints. That method is already available. The market-
access commitments under the WTO agreements are made by
product (GATT), by sector (GATS), or by entity (Agreement on
Government Procurement). The schedules of commitments of
WTO members therefore vary significantly. Moreover, WTO
members are entitled to renegotiate their commitments. Both
during the process of negotiating the commitments and after their
acceptance, WTO members thus have the possibility to adjust
their trade obligations in accordance with their domestic political
constraints and the external impact of their policies. However,
this adjustment takes place at the time when market-opening
commitments are negotiated or after a renegotiation based on
reciprocity, and therefore maintains the balance of rights and ob-
ligations among members.
From the perspective of WTO law, the issue is thus not
whether domestic policy constraints should be taken into account
or whether trade liberalization entails a healthy competition
WTO are therefore not provisions permitting measures designed to offset pol-
icy divergences, but are provisions permitting the protection of import-
competing industries contingent upon the protection o an exporting industry
in another country. This observation can also be made in respect of the provi-
sion of the GATT that exempts measures related to the products of prison la-
bor from the obligations under the GATT (article XX:e. It is true that the
domestic policies of another WTO member trigger in this case the right to im-
pose import controls, but that right may be exercised independently of the
prison-labor regulations of the contracting party imposing the import control.
A WTO member could consequently permit the sale of products produced in
domestic prisons while restricting the sile of those made in foreign prisons.
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among jurisdictions or a destructive race to the bottom. Given
the right of each member to adjust its market-access commitments
to its perception of these issues, the real issue is whether WTO
members should be able to react to the external repercussions of
their own domestic policy choices by unilaterally withdrawing
their market-access commitments or whether they should be able
to do so only by renegotiating their commitments. A multilateral
trade order based on the rule of law cannot but be based on the
principle of renegotiation.
There are many proposals to use the market-access opportuni-
ties created by the obligations assumed under the WTO agree-
ments as bargaining chips to induce other countries to change
their environmental policies, and the withdrawal of these oppor-
tunities as sanctions against countries that do not cooperate in the
protection of the environment. Thus, Steve Charnovitz (1993,
282) wrote:
How can an agreement on minimum standards be
achieved among a hundred countries with different values
and resources? One approach is to devise a clever mix of
carrots and sticks from a diverse enough issue garden to al-
low a cross-fertilization of concerns. The goal is not only
to obtain an agreement, but also to maintain its stability.
The carrots are the basic tool. Because countries face dif-
ferent economic trade-offs... an assistance mechanism can
be developed to enable gainers to compensate losers and
rich nations to "bribe" poor ones. This assistance could be
in the form of financial aid or technology transfer..., or
it could be trade concessions.
The proposal to use the world trade order as a source of car-
rots and sticks for the pursuit of environmental objectives is based
on three illusions. The first is generated by the image of "carrots
and sticks." "Carrot" suggests that you give something of value to
you; "stick" suggests that you inflict pain without hurting your-
self. However, such sticks do not exist in international economic
relations. Here, nations can hurt others only by hurting them-
selves at the same time; a trade sanction inflicts costs both on the
imposing nation and on the target nation, and the cost for the
former can sometimes exceed that of the latter. The choice is thus




trade sanctions, but between subsidies that transfer resources from
one nation to another and trade sanctions that destroy the re-
sources of both (GATT 1991).
If the image of carrots and sticks has such currency in the
trade and environment debate, it is probably because the costs of
trade sanctions are generally so thinly spread across populations
that they arouse little political opposition and are therefore not
taken into account in the public debate. This is probably also the
reason that a trade sanction seems to be the only stick seriously
considered in the trade and environment literature even though
the arsenal of economic sanctions contains many more sticks,
such as the interruption of financial relations, telecommunica-
tions, transport services, and so forth. These other types of eco-
nomic sanctions may be just as effective in obtaining commit-
ments from other nations to cooperate in the protection of the
environment as trade sanctions; however, they will cause concen-
trated and easily visible effects for a small group of producers and
will therefore engender greater political opposition. If one has
concluded that sanctions are required to achieve a negotiating
goal, one still needs to decide that among the sanctions available
the trade sanction is the most efficient one. The public choice on
that issue, however, is likely to be distorted by the bias that dis-
torts the public choice on trade policies generally. The focus of
the trade and environment debate on trade sanctions, rather than
economic sanctions generally, is an indirect reflection of this bias.
The second illusion is that the goals of trade liberalization and
environmental protection can be obtained simultaneously in a
single negotiation. In a reciprocity-based negotiation in the
WTO, a nation will not obtain in return for its market-access
commitment an equivalent market-access commitment and com-
mitments in another policy area; it will obtain only one or the
other and will therefore have to decide which of the two objec-
tives to pursue. To propose that a multilateral negotiation cover
market access issues and a raising of environmental standards is
therefore to propose that nations with high environmental stan-
dards pursue their trade interests or their environmental interests.
The third illusion is that the trade and environment link is a
one-way street toward better environmental protection. In any
system in which the results of reciprocity negotiations are en-
forced through a right to retaliation, an issue linkage becomes a
two-way street: if market access and the protection of endangered
species were to be successfully linked in WTO negotiations, trade
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concessions could be withdrawn in response to the failure to pro-
tect an endangered species and vice versa. If environmentalists
seek in the WTO the "trade weapon" to further environmental
goals, they must therefore accept that other nations obtain the
"environmental weapon" to defend their trade interests. How-
ever, it is totally inappropriate to make commitments on such es-
sential matters as the protection of endangered species, where the
withdrawal from obligations may have irreversible effects, de-
pendent on the ups and downs of commercial policies. The main
purpose of international bargaining is to create regimes, systems
of rules and procedures making governmental actions more pre-
dictable. Each of these regimes cannot furnish predictability if it
is constantly exposed to the need to adjust to a breakdown in
other regimes. That is true for both the international trade order
and international environmental law.
The inherent limitations of the cross-retaliation principle were
recognized by the negotiators of the WTO agreements. Initially,
the United States, mainly with its interest in protecting world-
wide intellectual property rights in mind, proposed that there be
an unbridled right of cross-retaliation under the WTO dispute set-
tlement procedures. However, it subsequently revised its position
to the effect that retaliation across sectors should be resorted to
only if retaliation within the sector was not practical or effective.
This change reflected the fear of the United States' banking sector
that cross-retaliation resulting from failures to observe obligations
in the field of trade in goods might upset the delicate balances of
interest between nations in the field of financial services. Article
22:3 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSL) therefore
now contains eight subparagraphs which, while maintaining the
principle of cross-retaliation, define meticulously the circum-
stances under which a WTO member may retaliate across sectors
and the elements of the Uruguay Round package that constitute
individual sectors, segregating-of course-financial services as a
separate sector (GATT 1994, 423). If environmental groups did
not have the illusion of the one-way street, they would, just like
the U.S. banking community, make every effort to ensure that






What do the linkages between trade and domestic policy ob-
jectives reviewed in this paper have in common? In each case, the
linkage led to the creation of new rules permitting governments
to depart from basic principles of the world trade order without,
however, establishing effective new disciplines constraining the
exercise of the resulting discretion. The reason was that the new
rules enabled governments to pursue monetary, development, and
competition policies with second-best policy instruments, and, as
economic theory has amply demonstrated, one cannot define in
the abstract ad in advance under what circumstances the choice of
the wrong instrument for the right policy raises welfare. Only a
case-by-case analysis is appropriate in this situation. No generally
applicable, abstract rule is therefore conceivable that would dis-
tinguish between permissible and forbidden second-best policies
on economic efficiency grounds.
The choice of the second-best policy instrument was permit-
ted essentially for political reasons, that is, to exempt from GATT
disciplines the trade policy measures of governments politically
unable to pursue their monetary, development, or competition
policies with more direct and efficient policy instruments. How-
ever, a GATT rule that defines the domestic political circum-
stances that would justify the resort to a second-best policy in-
strument is impossible to craft. For instance, in the case of
balance-of-payments policies implemented through trade measure,
such a rule would have to provide for something like the follow-
ing: "A WTO member incurring a serious balance-of-payments
deficit may, instead of devaluing its currency, impose an import
surcharge if it demonstrates that its government would, if it were
to devalue, lose the next election/be toppled by riots/encounter
serious problems in containing wage demands." It is obvious that
such a rule would not be seriously considered even though it
would precisely reflect the political purpose of the GATT's bal-
ance-of-payments exception. A fundamental lesson that can be
drawn from the GATT's links with monetary, development, and
competition policies is that, upon entering the realm of the sec-
ond-best, the realm of the rule of law is left, and any such link
therefore entails a delegalization of international trade relations.
Each of the linkages reviewed above was made to harness the
instruments of trade policy for domestic policy objectives. In all
three cases, however, the protectionist forces freed by the elimina-
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tion of the trade policy disciplines seized the occasion and over-
whelmed the domestic policy objective. Thus, the antidumping
provisions, originally designed to protect competition, now oper-
ate exclusively to protect competitors., Another conclusion that
can therefore be drawn from the experience under the GATT is
that, if domestic policy objectives are not pursued in a trade-
neutral manner, they attract protectionist interests that will tend
to undermine the attainment of these objectives. As a result nei-
ther the world trade order nor the causes such linkages were
meant to serve benefited from the link.
Many of the proposals to pursue environmental objectives
through the multi-lateral trade order have features that resemble
those of past failed linkages between trade policy instruments and
domestic policy objectives. Again proposals are made that would
permit the use of trade measures in the pursuit of policy objec-
tives that cannot be attained efficiently with trade policy instru-
ments. And, again, the hoped-for cross-fertilization is likely to
turn into cross-contamination. The fundamental illusion that
prompts these proposals is that the link between environmental
policies and trade policies is a one-way street and that it is there-
fore possible to use the political pressures behind trade policy in-
struments for one's policy objectives without in turn being sub-
jected to these pressures., In fact, however, that linkage, as the
previous linkages of its kind, is likely to turn into a disservice to
the important cause it is meant to advance.
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THE FUNCTION-SPECIFIC AND LINKAGE-BARGAIN




As the twenty-first century draws near, one of the most com-
pelling problems in international economic law and relations is
how to achieve the "deep integration" among national political
economies which will promote economic efficiency and growth.'
States share interests in overcoming political segmentation
through the harmonization of economic policies and regulationsI
but domestic opponents successfully resist change frequently.
The globalization of private production in the post-war era has
led to ever-growing demand from industrialized country-based
business enterprises for free trade,3 and ever-increasing economic
interdependence has promoted international trade cooperation
through regional and multilateral institutions.4  Yet, opposition
within developing countries, despite that they have become
* This paper draws from the author's Knowledge Diplomacy: Global Compe-
tition and the Politics of Intellectual Property, which will be published by the
Brookings Institution Press in 1998. He gratefully acknowledges conversations
with some 100 practitioners and policymatkers in Geneva and Washington. He
received a Ph.D. in political science with concentration in international politi-
cal economy and law from the University of Michigan in 1990. Michael P.
Ryan teaches in the Schools of Business and Foreign Service at Georgetown
University.
' See generally MILES KAHLER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTEGRATION (1995) (analyzing the role of interna-
tional institutions in promoting policy cooperation and harmonization).
2 See generally RONALD ROGOWSKI, COMMERCE AND COALITIONS: How
TRADE AFFECTS DOMESTIC POLICAL ALIGNMENTS (1989) (argu'mg that pat-
terns of trade influence the structure and behavior of domestic political groups
and coalitions).
3 See HELEN V. MILNER, RESISTING PROTECTIONISM: GLOBAL IN-
DUSTRIES AND THE POITICS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 18 (1988) (arguing
that "firms with more extensive exports and multinationality should be less
likely to demand protection").
See generally ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE, REGIONALISM, MULTILATERALISM,
AND DEEPER INTEGRATION (1996) (discussing the regional and multinational
institutions that have resulted from economic iberalization).
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
"emerging markets" in the 1990s because of the shift in their eco-
nomic development strategies from closed, import-substituting
strategies5 toward open, investment and trade-promoting strate-
gies, is entrenched politically.6 Domestic coalition support in de-
veloping countries for the "shallow integration," nondiscrimina-
tion and border measure reduction program of the second half of
the twentieth century remains unconsolidated while support for
the "deep integration," regulatory and policy harmonization pro-
gram of the twenty-first century is shallow. Thus, under condi-
tions of universal state participation, it has never been more im-
portant to understand how international economic law is made,
and intellectual property lawmaking represents a challenging and
instructive issue area.
The international law of patents, trade secrets, copyrights, in-
dustrial designs, and trademarks has been more than a century in
the making, owing to a series of treaties promulgated late in the
nineteenth century and amended during the twentieth century to
adapt to changing technologies and competition patterns in intel-
lectual property-intensive business sectors. Over most of its his-
tory, the international law of intellectual property existed a world
apart from the international law of real property trade. The for-
mer institutionalized government intervention into markets,
while the latter institutionalized government withdrawal from
markets. The diplomacy of the former was conducted by obscure
intellectual property administrators at the World Intellectual
Property Organization ("WIPO") forum (or its predecessors),
while the diplomacy of the latter was conducted by high-profile
trade and economic ministers at the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade ("GATT") forum, and never-the-twain-shall-meet.
Met they finally did, nevertheless, in the Uruguay Round of
GATT multilateral trade negotiations in the late 1980s and early
1990s for the purpose of establishing minimum national standards
of protection of intellectual property rights under authority of re-
5 See ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 263-305 (1987).
6 See ECONOMIC CRISIS AND POLICY CHOICE: THE POLITICS OF AD-
JUSTMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD (oan M. Nelson ed., 1990); JEFFREY A.
FRIEDEN, DEBT, DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY (1991); THE POLITICS OF
ECONOMIC ADjUSTMENT (Stephan Haggard & Robert R. Kaufman eds., 1992).
7 See generally STEPHAN HAGGARD, DEVELOPING NATIONS AND THE
POLITICS OF GLOBAL INTEGRATION (1995) (arguing that political group sup-
port within developing countries for trade liberalization is weak).
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formed treaties regarding intellectual property. One hundred
years of function-specific international lawmaking under WIPO
auspices gave way to linkage-bargain international lawmaking un-
der GATT auspices in order to offer developing countries com-
pelling rationales for a commitment to "deep integration" policy
change. Yet, though many observers opined that the Trade-
Related Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") agreement at
GATT indicated that function-specific intellectual property di-
plomacy at WIPO was dead, within two years two new treaties
were signed at WIPO, offering excellent contemporary opportu-
nity to assess the function-specific and linkage-bargain diplomacy
of international intellectual property lawmaking.
2. EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING
International law scholars have contributed little explanation
to international lawmaking. Ian Brownlie's seminal treatise ar-
ticulates the sources of international law, including custom,
treaty, and international adjudicatory decision, and defines key
concepts in international law, including subject, comity, equity,
sovereignty and the rest, but offers no explanation of how treaties
are obtained. Neither Joseph Brierly's Law of Nations nor Percy
Corbett's Growth of World Law attempts systematic explanation
of how international law is made as a matter of state practice.
9
The Myres McDougal World Public Order research program,
conducted with the collaboration of political scientist Harold
Lasswell, drew from conceptual advances in political science in
the 1950s' ° which articulated an empirical, policy process method
of analysis for law and policy: study the relevant policy actors;
analyze the structure of influence and power; and examine the
symbols, practices, and functions of politics. But, McDougal
8 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-31
(1990) (examining the sources of international law).
9 J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE (5th ed. 1963); PERCY E. CORBETT, THE
GROWTH OF WORLD LAW (1971).
10 See generally DAVID EASTON, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM: AN INQUIRY
INTO THE STATE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (1966) (arguing that political science
ought study the process of policymaking in order to understand political out-
come); HAROLD D. LASSwELL, POLITICS: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, HOW
(1936) (arguing that politics redistributes social values);HAROLD D. LASSWELL
& ABRAHAM IAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL
INQUIRY (1950) (arguing that the central concept of politics is social power).
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conducted in the main a scholarship of international law descrip-
tion and prescription n as did his students;12 thus, his research
program did not fulfill its explanatory promise nor did it become
the conceptual link between the fields of international law and in-
ternational politics.13 Louis Henkin provided an insightful, if la-
conic, explanation of the politics and diplomacy of international
lawmaking:
The character, shape, and content of international law-as
of national law-are determined by prevailing political
forces within the political system, as refracted through the
way law is made.... Emerging law will depend on the in-
terest of influential states to espouse it, a common interest
in developing it, and the inability, or lack of interest, of
others to resist it.
14
But, he concluded his analysis was not very helpful:
1 See MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., HuMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
HUMAN DIGNITY (1980) (describing values regarding human dignity and pre-
scribing universal norms regarding human rights); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL &
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER:
THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION (1961) describing
national security and peace values and prescribing universal norms of state secu-
rity behavior); MYRES S. McDoUGAL ET AL., LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN
SPACE (1963) (describing communication values and prescribing universal
norms for international communication policy); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL &
WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS: A CONTEM-
PORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (1962) (describing social values
with respect to ocean resources and prescribing universal norms of ocean re-
source utilization); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER (1987) (describing social values and prescribing universal norms
of social justice).
12 See RICHARD A. FALK, A STUDY OF FUTURE WORLDS (1975)
(recommending an alternative world system which maximizes social values of
human rights and social justice); INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVE (Richard A. Falk et al. eds., 1985) (providing a basic textbook re-
garding shortcomings of extant international law regarding human rights and
social justice).
13 See FRANCIS ANTHONY BOYLE, WORLD POLITICS AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 61-66 (1985).
14 Louis HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY
32, 33-34 (2d ed. 1979).
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Negotiated at a particular time, with virtually all states
participating, any emerging treaty will reflect what the
participants perceived as their interests as regards the mat-
ter at issue, in the context of the system at large. But with
ever more governments participating, with their interests
often varied and complex, the process is confused and the
result often not only impossible to predict but even diffi-
cult to explain when it appears.'
5
International politics scholars have contributed to explana-
tions of international lawmaking, though Hans Morgenthau, an
international lawyer by education but student of international
power by practice, offered nothing more than that "[i]n the inter-
national sphere there are but two forces creating law: necessity
and mutual consent,", 6 and scholars working in his tradition ig-
nored international law under the presumption of its irrelevance
under "conditions of international anarchy."' 7 International poli-
tics scholars known as "functionalists" explained the growth of in-
ternational law and the proliferation of international governmen-
tal organizations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries as the result of technological advances in transportation
and communication, which had increased the need for transna-
tional policy cooperation." Technical, knowledge-rich specialists
in a functional area influence the drafting of international law,
19
but the international governmental organization is the negotia-
tion-facilitating forum for rule-creation decisions made by states.
Robert Cox, Harold Jacobson and their colleagues provided an
analytic framework composed of a taxonomy of actors and factors
and a method of weighting the power and influence of states and
15 Id. at 35-36.
16 HANS J. MORGENTHAU, PoLncs AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE
FOR POWER AND PEACE 283 (5th ed. 1978).
17 KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 102-16
(1979) (arguing that the world political system is characterized by a structure of
anarchy and lack of universal state authority).
18 See the description of functionalism in HAROLD K. JACOBSON,
NETWORKS OF INTERDEPENDENCE: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND
THE GLOBAL POLITICAL SYSTEM 62-66 (1984).
19 See HAROLD KARAN JACOBSON & ERIC STEIN, DIPLOMATS, SCI-
ENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS: THE UNITED STATES AND THE NUCLEAR TEST
BAN NEGOTIATIONS (1966) (arguing that scientists and technical specialists in-
fluenced the drafting of international law).
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intergovernmental organizations ("IGOs"). 20 Robert Keohane
and Joseph Nye articulated the "complex interdependence" re-
search program in the late 1970s, and international laws were ex-
plained as the product of a diplomacy of state power, interests,
and goals conducted with the active participation of sub- and tran-
snational actors, including multinational corporations, non-
governmental organizations, secretariats at international govern-
mental organizations, and epistemic communities (transnational,
knowledge-common professional networks), and mediated by the
rules, 2procedures, principles, and norms of international re-
gimes. "[I]ncentives to form international regimes depend most
fundamentally on the existence of shared interests.... Interna-
tional regimes reduce transaction costs of legitimate bargains and
increase them for illegitimate ones."22 Thus, international politics
scholarship offered a good "why" explanation and a general
"how" explanation of international lawmaking.
But, the general "how" explanation, which seemed adequate
for the "shallow integration" of the GATT treaty and its early tar-
iff-cutting agreements, could not explain why the "deep integra-
tion" agenda GATT Tokyo Round multilateral trade negotiations
had been achieved with great difficulty and without the consent
of the many states which refused to sign some of the agreements.
The general "how" explanation also seemed an inadequate descrip-
tion and prescription for the seemingly intractable conflict be-
tween industrialized and developing countries over international
intellectual property law. When U.S. business people and gov-
ernment representatives called for new international intellectual
property law creation, because many developing countries pos-
sessed weak institutions of intellectual property protection or
none at all, developing-country governments signaled at the
WIPO forum that they wanted no part of reformed international
20 See ROBERT W. COX ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF INFLUENCE: DECISION
MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 1-58 (1974) (providing an ana-
lytic framework carried out in the study of a number of international organiza-
tlon_$).
2 See INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983);
ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN
THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 92 (1984) [hereinafter KEOHANE, AFTER
HEGEMONY]; ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND IN-
TERDEPENDENCE: WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION 55 (1977); Peter M. Haas,
Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control,
43 INT'L ORG. 377 (1989).
22 KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 21, at 79, 90.
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intellectual property institutions. What was needed was a better
understanding of the strategic interaction of states in multilateral
bargaining settings. The diplomacy of international law writing is
really a two-level game in which states bargain with their own
domestic groups even as they bargain with each other.23 The do-
mestic level of the game may require the inclusion of new domes-
tic groups and issues, the payment of side concessions, and even
re-definition of issues from low- to high-national interest politics
in the minds of opinion-leading policymakers, legislators, and"
domestic groups in order to change domestic political and eco-
nomic calculations.24 Thus, explain bargaining-approach students
of trade negotiations, the key to getting agreement is getting the
right mix of issue linkages onto the table. Linkage-bargain di-
plomacy can be fruitfully exploited to achieve treaties in diplo-
matically and politically difficult policy areas in which agreement
would otherwise be elusive. Thus, since the international regime
establishes the IGO forum and the decision-making rules which
govern multilateral negotiations to write new public international
law,26 international intellectual property law creation would need
to be moved from the function-specific WIPO forum with its one-
nation, one-vote decision making to the linkage-bargain capable
GATT forum with its economic power-based decision making.
All previous diplomatic conferences to write public international
23 See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of
Two-Level Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427 (1988).
24 See H. Richard Friman, Side-Payments Versus Security Cards: Domestic
Bargaining Tactics in International Economic Negotiations, 47 INT'L ORG. 387
(1993) (showing that side payments topreviously uninvolved interest groups
change state payoffs structures); LeonardJ. Schoppa, Two-Level Games and Bar-
gaining Outcomes: Why Gaiatsu Succeeds in Japan in Some Cases but Not Others,
47 INT'L ORG. 353 (1993) (showing that trade issues may be linked with na-
tional security issues in order to change state interest calcu ations).
25 See Bernard M. Hoekman, Determining the Need for Issue Linkages in
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 43 INT'L ORG. 693 (1989) (aguing that GATT
possesses the bargaining capability to link issues which can change domestic po-
litical calculations toward international agreement); James K. Sebenius,Negotia-
tion Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Issues and Parties, 37 INT'L ORG. 281
(1983) (providing a logic for the inclusion/exclusion of issues and associated
domestic interest groups in order to achieve international agreement); Robert
Tollison & Thomas Willett, An Economic Theory of Mutually Advantageous Issue
Linkages in International Negotiations, 43 INT'L ORG. 425 (1989) (arguing that
issue linkages can change domestic political calculations toward international
agreement).
26 See JACOBSON, supra note 18, at 83; KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, su-
pra note 21, at 90.
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law regarding intellectual property took place within the WIPO
forum or its predecessors. Nevertheless, U.S. trade diplomats hy-
pothesized that a linkage-bargain conducted within the GATT fo-
rum could achieve an unprecedented multilateral intellectual
property agreement. The "South" would get apparel and agricul-
ture liberalization; the "North" would get globally universal,
minimum-standard intellectual property protections as well as
foreign direct investment policy liberalization. 27  When the
TRIPS Agreement was finally achieved as part of the Uruguay
Round package, it appeared that linkage-bargain diplomacy ex-
plained the outcome. It also recommended the conclusion that
international intellectual property lawmaking was henceforth
linkage-bargain, trade-related intellectual property diplomacy.
Linkage bargaining within the GATT regime worked because
U.S. negotiators held fast to their position that the Uruguay
Round agreements had to be accepted in their totality. There
would be no a la carte shopping among agreements as had hap-
pened at the Tokyo Round, a circumstance with force because the
final Uruguay Round package included the agreements establish-
ing the World Trade Organization and the Dispute Settlement
Understanding. The Dispute Settlement Understanding, within
the context of the TRIPS Agreement, offered some respite from
the threat of Special 30128 and trade sanctions carried out by the
U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR") bilaterally. The Special 301
threat loomed large in the minds of developing-country policy-
makers, who had little to fear from the European Community
which was lukewarm from the beginning with respect to TRIPS,
but who had much to fear from a USTR which had "self-
initiated" Special 301 actions over intellectual property against
Korea and Brazil in 1986 to get them to the table. USTR pursued
an aggressive Special 301 diplomacy throughout the eight years of
the Uruguay Round to keep countries at the table.
27 See generally GARY C. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTr, TRADING FOR
GROWTH: THE NEXT ROUND OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 73-75 (1985)
(contending that industrialized countries and developing countries could each
benefit from international trade agreements achieved through linkage bargains
involving apparel, agriculture, intellectual property, and foreign direct invest-
ment); MANAGING TRADE RELATIONS IN THE 1980s: ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE
GATT MINISTERIAL MEETING OF 1982 (Seymour J. Rubin & Thomas R. Gra-
ham eds., 1983) (proposing an agenda for new multilateral trade negotiations
which included non-traditional trade issues).
28 See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. S 2901
(1998) [hereinafter Special 301].
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However, closer examination of TRIPS diplomacy reveals
why function-specific intellectual property diplomacy within
WIPO was dead neither in logic nor in practice. Linkage-
bargaining within the Uruguay Round only worked because there
was a draft TRIPS Agreement text on the table as the final linkage
bargains were being struck. Functionalism proposes that expert,
functional specialists crucially help international regime coopera-
tion happen through their ability to deploy their technical
knowledge.2 9  Under the leadership of the TRIPS negotiation
chair, the GATT secretariat culled ideas from the negotiators and
offered compromise text to the combatants, providing a Draft
Composite Text which was incorporated into the Dunkel Draft
offered by the director-general as compromise final agreements.
When the end-game concluded, the Draft Composite Text became
the final TRIPS Agreement. By contrast, there was no Trade-
Related Investment Measures Agreement in the Uruguay Round
because there had been no specialist-drafted text to incorporate
into the Dunkel Draft.
International intellectual property law writing did not remain
linkage-bargain, trade-related diplomacy in practice. Two copy-
right treaties, aimed at adapting to Internet-based electronic
commerce, were negotiated and signed under WIPO auspices a
mere two years after TRIPS, contradicting the proposition that
trade-related intellectual property diplomacy would be a diplo-
matic way of life toward the year 2000 and beyond. The Decem-
ber 1996 agreements were the product of classic function-specific
international law-writing diplomacy. WIPO sponsored a number
of international conferences attended by expert specialists in
communication technology, copyright business strategy, and
copyright law over a period of five years leading up to the 1996
Diplomatic Conference. The five-year educational initiative and
drafting help from the WIPO Secretariat created a consensus suf-
ficient for a copyright treaty to supplement the Berne Convention
and a performances and phonograms treaty to supplement the
Rome Convention, recommending that function-specific diplo-
macy rests upon the IGO's capacity to promote learning.
"Learning is largely an information-processing activity in which
information about the structure of behavior and about environ-
mental events is transformed into symbolic representations that
29 SeeJACOBSON, supra note 18, at 62-66.
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serve as guides for action."3° Learning is the result of compara-
tively simpler processes of replacement whereas "problem-
solving" requires greater leaps of mental replacement (such as
analogy), and "innovation" requires the greatest leaps of mental
replacement, but both problem-solving and innovation are never-
theless forms of learning. Learning may be "observational," i.e.,
the outcome of noting someone else's experience, or may be
"experiential," i.e., the outcome of the trial-and-error of one's
own experience. According to educational psychology, learning
is dependent upon cognition and motivation. "Cognition"
means the learner's ability to process information-selection, ac-
quisition, construction, integration. "Motivation" means the
learner's goals, sense of efficacy (control), and expectancy for suc-
cess. Cognition and motivation are interdependent and dynamic.
Cognition depends upon the existence of appropriate cognitive
structures and learning strategies; cognitive structures and learn-
ing strategies relate to personality and motivation characteristics.
Individual learning relates to, but is not identical to, organiza-
tional learning. Organizations are more than collected individu-
als, and organizational learning is more than collective individual
learning.3 2  An organization is "learning" when "encoding...
procedures... beliefs..., paradigms, [and] codes." 33 Organiza-
tional learning depends upon the existence of "shared mental
models" or "consensual knowledge" (akin to the "cognitive struc-
tures" of individual learning), which encouraes the integration of
new knowledge into organizational routines.
This Article explains the international lawmaking of intellec-
tual property through investigation of the evolution of the re-
gime, first proceeding by reviewing the key treaties of the interna-
30 ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THOUGHT AND
ACTION: A SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY 51 (1986).
31 See Lyn Corno & Richard E. Snow,Adapting Teaching to Individual Dif
ferences Among Learners, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON TEACHING 605
(Merlin C. Wittrock ed., 3d ed. 1986) (arguing that teaching strategies are most
effective when adapted to differences in students' patterns of cognition and mo-
tivation); Paul Pintrich et al.,Instructional Psychology, 47 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL.
611 (1986) (arguing that student learning is dependent upon patterns of cogni-
tion and motivatioh).
32 See Daniel H. Kim, The Link Between Individual and Organizational
Learning, SLOAN MGMT. REV., Fall 1993, at 37.
33 Barbara Levitt & James G. March, Organizational Learning, 14 ANN.
REV. Soc. 319, 320 (1988).
34 See Kim, supra note 32, at 43.
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tional intellectual property regime constructed through function-
specific diplomacy. The function-specific and linkage-bargain di-
plomacy of TRIPS is then discussed, followed by assessment of
the important reforms which the agreement brings to the interna-
tional law of intellectual property. The Article assesses the 1996
Diplomatic Conference which produced two new copyright trea-
ties and the return of WIPO-forum, function-specific interna-
tional lawmaking diplomacy.
3. FUNCTION-SPECIFIC, WIPO FORUM-MADE INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
The nineteenth century Industrial Age emergence of transna-
tional competition in intellectual property-intensive goods led to
the first institutionalization of intellectual property into public
international law through the negotiation of conventions, regard-
ing industrial property in 1883, trademark in 1891, and copyright
in 1896.35 The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property,3 6 periodically amended during this century, establishes
a "Paris Union" of signatories which offer national treatment to
each other with respect to their policies regarding industrial prop-
erty. An important provision of the convention is that a right of
priority is established throughout the membership once an appli-
cation for a patent, utility model, industrial design or trademark
is filed in any one member state. However, this provision ought
not be misinterpreted to mean that a patent application filed in
one member state is a patent application filed in all member states,
for it does not.37 It simply means that a date has been established
throughout the membership should any "first-to-file" dispute
arise.
The Treaty provides that states have the right to legislate re-
garding compulsory licenses with a view "to prevent the abuses
which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights con-
ferred by the patent, for example, failure to work."38 The mem-
bers are bound to assure effective protection against unfair compe-
35 In this s.ection, I discuss the key treaties of the international intellectual
property regime. However, several other treaties regarding intellectual prop-
erty exist and are administered by WIPO.
36 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, op ened for
signature Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
17 See id. art. 4.
31 Id. art. 5.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
tition and particular attempts to "create confusion" in the mar-
ketplace by attempting to pass off goods through unauthorized
use of trademarks or trade names. Each member is obligated to
establish a special industrial property service office for the pur-
pose of administering policy regarding patents, utility models, in-
dustrial designs, and trademarks, including publishino a public re-
cord of intellectual property grants and registrations. Regarding
enforcement, the Treaty provides that "[a]ll goods unlawfully
bearing a trademark or trade name shall be seized on importation
into those countries of the Union where such mark or trade name
is entitled to legal protection." 41 The Paris Convention created a
forum for the members to consult with each other, an executive
committee of member representatives to meet more often, and a
secretariat known as the "International Bureau."
42
The Paris Convention bears the marks of its articulation as a
modest agreement among generally like-minded industrialized
countries. Patent policies aim to provide incentives to innovate
inventions and new devices under circumstances where the costs
of new product development are high while the costs of product
imitation (or outright theft) are low, a circumstance which
economists call the "appropriability problem." 43 Without market
intervention, the research investment is without justification be-
cause there is no market reward. A system of patent is an inter-
vention by government into the marketplace to correct deficien-
cies of unregulated markets, which if left to themselves tend to
underproduce innovation, when inventions bring value to the
public in themselves and propel economic growth at large. How-
ever, since a patent confers an exclusive right in the marketplace
over a product or process, patent law demands full disclosure of
the product or process when the patent is granted. The policy is
that the inventor enters into a contract with the public. The in-
3 See id. art. 10.
4 See id. art. 12.
41 Id. art. 9.
42 See id. art. 13.
43 See generally PETER MEINHARDT, INVENTIONS, PATENTS AND
MONOPOLY (1946) (arguingthat patent systems solve the a propriability prob-
lem); Kenneth W. Dam, e Economic Underpinnings 
o fPatent Law, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 247 (1994); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the
Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977); Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Inno-
vation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCIENCE 173 (1986) (showing that cer-
tain industries are the most patent-dependent).
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ventor receives limited exclusivity as a reward for skill, and in re-
turn the inventor teaches others skilled in the art how to do it.
Thus, technology diffusion is institutionalized into a patent sys-
tem by way of the publication of the patent search reports and the
patent claim itself. Students of innovation assert that the inter-
esting and challenging policy dilemmas regarding patents include:
How long ought the patent term be? How ought "market" be de-
fined if a patent has possibly become anti-competitive? What is
the appropriate "scope" or coverage of the patent?
45
The Paris Union agreed that the patent institution was impor-
tant for industrial innovation even if it disagreed on particulars,
acknowledging that Europeans decide patentability based upon
the concept of "inventive step" and maintain a "first-to-file" prior-
ity system, while Americans decide patentability based upon the
concepts of "nonobviousness" and "novelty" and maintain a "first-
to-invent" priority system. Though a few developing countries
had joined early in the convention's history, for example, Brazil
in 1884, the Dominican Republic in 1890, Mexico in 1903, and
Cuba in 1904, sixty-two developing countries joined the Paris Un-
ion after 1962, and many former socialist republics and states have
joined in the 1990s, bringing the total membership of the Paris
Union to a substantial 136 members.
46
The Patent Cooperation Treaty ('PCT"), 47 articulated by the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 8 signed in Washington in
See Janusz A. Ordover, A Patent System for Both Diffusion and Exclusion,
5 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 (1991) (arguing that the central features of apatent system
diffuse technology even as they exclude competitors from specific uses of the
technology).
45 See Nancy T. Gallini, Patent Policy and Costly Imitation, 23 RAND J.
EcON. 52 (1992); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On Limiting or En-
couraging Rivalry in Technical Progress: The Effect of Patent Scope Decisions, 25J.
EcoN. BEHAV. & ORG. 1 (1994).
46 See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, STATES PARTY
TO THE CONVENTION ESTABLISHING THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION (WIPO), Pub No. 423(E), at 4-6 (Oct. 15, 1995) [hereinafter
STATES PARTY]. I chose 1962 as a beginning year to tabulate accessions because
it was in that year that WIPO's predecessor organization began preparations for
a major diplomatic conference regarding industrial property, which was held in
Stockholm in 1967. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION,
TiE FIRST TWENTY-FIvE YEARS OF THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION, FROM 1967 TO 1992, at 5 (1992).
Patent Cooperation Treaty, opened for signature June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T.
7645 [hereinafter PCT].
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1970 and subsequently amended, makes it possible to seek patent
protection for an invention simultaneously in each of a large
number of countries by filing an international patent application.
The PCT provides detailed provisions regarding the process
within the International Patent Cooperation Union. The interna-
tional application for patent contains the name of the applicant,
the title of the invention, a description of the invention which
"shall disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and
complete for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in
the art"49 including an abstract, the claim or claims for patent, and
the member states or region in which the patent is sought. The
applicant indicates in which contracting parties of the union the
international application should have effect, an effect which is the
same as if the application had been independently filed in the
state's patent office. The international application is then sub-
jected to an "international search" of the prior art.5 ° One of the
major patent offices (Australia, Austria, China, Japan, the Russian
Federation, Spain, Sweden, the United States, or the European
Patent Office) carries out the search. The search report is com-
municated to the inventor, who may withdraw the application if
the result of the search indicates that patentability is modest. If
the applicant decides to continue with the international applica-
tion, the application and search report are sent to all designated
national and reional patent offices, in proper form and, if neces-
sary, translated. 1 The WIPO International Bureau publishes for
public notice the international application (after eighteen months)
and the international search report.12 The PCT provides innova-
tors an efficient application submission procedure to multiple na-
tional authorities but does not provide a mechanism for an
"international patent." Indeed, Article 27 makes clear that
"[n]othing in this Treaty and the Regulations is intended to be
construed as prescribing anything that would limit the freedom of
each Contracting State to prescribe such substantive conditions of
48 See ARPAD BOGSCH, THE FIRST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE PATENT
COOPERATION TREATY (PCT) 1970-1995, at 10 (1995).
49 PCT, supra note 47, art. 5.
'o See id. art. 15.
5' See id. art. 20.
52 See id. art. 21.
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patentability as it desires." 3 Definitions of "prior art" and stan-
dards for patentability are reserved to the member states.
The PCT does, however, establish an "international prelimi-
nary examination" option for applicants.5 4 For an additional fee,
the PCT administrators will request that one of the national or
regional patent offices do a preliminary examination and offer a
"non-binding" opinion regarding "whether the claimed invention
appears to be novel, to involve an inventive step..., and to be
industrially applicable." 55 It offers the applicant better informa-
tion regarding patentability than the international search. The
PCT establishment of the International Patent Cooperation Un-
ion includes the creation of an assembly composed of the con-
tracting parties, an executive committee of representatives drawn
from the membership, and administering authority vested in the
WIPO's International Bureau. 56  The International Bureau, fi-
nanced by fees paid for its services, also offers technical services to
national patent office authorities, providing training, administra-
tive reform counsel, and record-keeping and processing advice.
57
A total of eighty-three states have acceded to the PCT, including
twenty-four developing countries-Brazil (1978), Vietnam (1993),
and China (1994) among them.
58
The International Convention for the Protection of New Va-
rieties of Plants ("UPOV"), 59 signed in 1961 and amended in 1991,
establishes a union of contracting parties which agree to confer
"breeder's rights" on those who discover or develop new varieties
of plants. A "variety" is defined as "a plant grouping within a sin-
gle botanical taxon of the lowest known rank."' The Union for
the Protection of New Varieties of Plants is headquartered at the
WIPO and administered under authority of the Director-General
of WIPO, who also serves as Secretary General of the Plant Vari-
ety Union. Article 4 provides that contracting parties confer na-
tional treatment upon each other while Articles 5 through 9 estab-
s Id. art. 27.
4 See id. art. 31.
Id. art. 33.
s See id. ch. 5.
s See id. art. 56.
58 See STATES PARTY, supra note 46, at 17.
59 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants,
Dec. 2, 1961, 33 U.S.T. 2703 [hereinafter UPOV].
60 Id. art. 1.
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lish the conditions under which breeder's rights are granted.61
The breeder's right "shall be granted where the variety is new,
distinct, uniform, and stable." The Treaty goes on to provide
that the breeder's right "shall not be subject to any further or dif-
ferent conditions," contingent upon compliance with application
procedures and fee payment. 63 "Newness" means "novelty," and
in the area of plant varieties that means that the variety has never
been sold or otherwise exploited earlier than one year before the
application date in territories outside of application (six years in
the cases of trees and vines). 6 Hence, the plant breeder's novelty
standard is lower than the patent novelty standard, yet more de-
manding than the "originality" notion of copyright law. The va-
riety must be "distinct" and that means that it is "distinguishable
from any other variety whose existence is a matter of common
knowledge at the time of the application. " 65 It must be "stable"
and that means its "relevant characteristics remain unchanged af-
ter repeated propagation."
66
Regarding the application, the breeder has the right to select
the country of priority application, but need not wait until the
process is complete before applying for secondary rights in other
contracting party national jurisdictions.67 The applicant has a
twelve-month right of priority beginning with the application
date,68 and the applicant has "provisional protection" against in-
fringement during the pendency period.69 The breeder maintains
exclusive rights regarding "production or reproduction
(multiplication), conditioning for the purposes of propagation, of-
fering for sale, selling or other marketing, exportinF importing,
stocking for any of the purposes mentioned" above. However,
exceptions to these rights include "acts done privately and for
non-commercial purposes, acts done for experimental purposes,






6 See id. art. 10.
68 See id. art. 11.
69 See id. art. 13.
70 Id. art. 14.
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and acts done for the purpose of breeding other varieties...."71
The UPOV also provides an "optional" exception:
Each contracting Party may, within reasonable limits and
subject to the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of the
breeder, restrict the breeder's right in relation to any vari-
ety in order to permit farmers to use for propagating pur-
poses, on their own holdings, the product of the harvest
which they have obtained by planting, on their own hold-
ings, the protected variety ....
Article 16 further provides for the exhaustion of breeder's
rights by stating that they "shall not extend to acts concerning
any material of the protected variety," when "material" means
"propagating," "harvesting," and "any product made directly from
the harvested material."7  The breeder's right "shall be granted
for a fixed period" and "shall not be shorter than 20 years from
the date of the grant of the breeder's right" (twenty-five years in
the case of trees and vines).74 Article 20 provides terms by which
the new variety is "designated by a denomination which will be
its generic designation," which may be trademarked.75 Twenty-
nine states belong to the UPOV, including only a few developing
countries: Argentina, South Africa, and Uruguay.
7 6
The Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the
Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Proce-
dure,7 signed in 1977 and amended in 1980, establishes a union of
contracting parties which either allows or requires the deposit of
microorganisms for the purposes of patent procedure and which
agrees to recognize the legitimacy of the deposit with any interna-
tional depository authority. Article 6 provides that for a state to
become an international depository authority, it must become
71 Id. art. 15.
n Id. art. 15.
A3Id. art. 16.
+ Id. art. 19.
"5 See id. art. 20.
76 See STATES PARTY, supra note 46, at 24.
77 Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Mi-
croorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure, Apr. 28, 1977, 32 U.S.T.
1241 [hereinafter Budapest Treaty].
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signatory to the treaty and comply with certain procedures speci-
fied in the treaty.78 Article 7 provides that the International Bu-
reau of WIPO, as administrator of the treaty, determines whether
a national depositor is in compliance and designates international
depository status.7 9  Thirty-five states, including China, Korea
Singapore, and the Philippines, have joined the Budapest Treaty.86
The Hague Agreement Concerning the International Deposit
of Industrial Designs,81 signed in 1925 and amended through the
years, allows nationals of any of the contracting parties to secure
protection for industrial designs in all the contracting countries
by depositing their design with the International Bureau of
WIPO. In order to register the industrial design, the designer
submits an application along with a graphic of the design. Ac-
cording to Article 7, the duration of protection for international
industrial designs is fifteen years, divided into a first five-year
phase when the design may be accepted under sealed cover and a
second ten-year phase when the design must be accepted only un-
der open cover. The International Bureau publishes notice of in-
dustrial design registrations monthly in the Bulletin. Only
twenty-five states have acceded to the Hague Agreement, includ-
ing, surprisingly, North Korea in 1992.82
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Ar-
tistic Works, 3 amended many times over more than 100 years,
defines "literary and artistic works" as:
[E]very production in the literary, scientific and artistic
domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expres-
sion, such as books, pamphlets and other writings; lec-
tures, addresses, sermons and other works of the same na-
ture; dramatic or dramatico-musical works; choreographic
works and entertainments in dumb show; musical compo-
sitions with or without words; cinematographic works to
78 See id. art. 6.
7' See id. art. 7.
80 See STATES PARTY, supra note 46, at 21.81 ..
Hague Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Indus-
trial Designs and Models, Nov. 6, 1925, 74 L.N.T.S. 343 [hereinafter Hague
Agreement].
82 See STATES PARTY, supra note 46, at 12.83
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
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which are assimilated works expressed by a process analo-
gous to cinematography; works of drawing, painting, ar-
chitecture, sculpture, engraving and lithography; photo-
graphic works to which are assimilated works expressed
by a process analogous to photography; works of applied
art; illustrations, maps, plans, sketches and three-
dimensional works relative to geography, topography, ar-
chitecture, or science.
84
Furthermore, the Berne Convention covers translations, adap-
tations, musical arrangements, encyclopedias, anthologies, and
other collections and arrangements of expression. 5 All these ex-
pressions "enjoy protection in all countries of the Union."
86
However, the Berne Convention states that:
"[P]ublished works" means works.., whatever may be
the means of manufacture of the copies, provided that the
availability of such copies has been such as to satisfy the
reasonable requirements of the public, having regard to the
nature of the work, [and thus does not include] [tihe per-
formance of a dramatic, dramatico-musical, cinema-
tographic or musical work, the public recitation of a liter-
ary work, the communication by wire or the broadcasting
of literary or artistic works, the exhibition of a work of art
and the construction of a work of architecture .... 87
The law of copyright protects these works in order to stimu-
late expression to the benefit of the public interest, because costs
of product development (such as, writing a novel or composing a
musical piece or writing business application software) are high,
yet costs of unauthorized appropriation are low.88 In theory, the
contract institution could achieve the same results, but in practice
'4 Id. art. 2.
" See id. art. 2(3).
16 Id. art. 2(6).
17 id. art 3.
88 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989) (arguing that the purpose of
copyright is to solve the appropriability problem and thereby encourage the
expression of ideas).
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the transaction costs of negotiation and enforcement would be too
high, so copyright is the necessary institutional innovation. The
limited period of copyright exclusivity is defined to cover only
the expression, not the underlying ideas, so that copyright en-
courages expression rather than monopoly of ideas. Thus, one
may obtain a copyright for a work of fiction or of nonfiction, for
example, and the copyright is obtained for how the ideas are ex-
pressed, not for the story plot or the thesis. The copyright insti-
tution provides the chance of commercial success for risky busi-
nesses. Without the intervention by government, the
marketplace would tend to underproduce expression when ex-
pression products bring cultural and political benefits as well as
economic benefits to the public.
The Berne Convention offers national treatment, stating that
"when the author is not a national of the country of origin of the
work for which he is protected under this Convention, he shall
enjoy in that country the same rights as national authors." 9
However, the Berne Convention clearly states that "the extent of
protection, as well as the means of redress afforded to the author
to protect his rights, shall be governed exclusively by the laws of
the country where protection is claimed."90 The Convention con-
fers moral rights by stating that "the author shall have the right
to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory action
in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his
honor or reputation."91 These rights pass to the author's heirs.
92
The term of protection is established as the life of the author plus
fifty years, 93 fifty years after the work has been made available to
the public in the case of cinematographic works,94 and a mini-
mum of twenty-five years from their making in the case of photo-
graphic works.
95
The authors maintain the exclusive right to authorize repro-
duction of their works "in any manner or form."96 Authors of
89 Berne Convention, supra note 83, art. 5(3).
90 Id. art. 5(2).
9' Id. art. 6 [bis] (1).
92 See id. 6 [bis] (2).
9' See id. art. 7(1).
9' See id. art. 7(2).
95 See id. art. 7(4).
96 Id. art. 9(1).
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literary and artistic works enjoy the exclusive right to authorize
broadcasting, publishing, or other public communication, per-
formance, and distribution of their works.97 Authors also have an
exclusive right to authorize adaptations, arrangements, and other
alterations of their works,9 8 including adaptation into cinema-
tographic work and "the distribution of the works thus adapted
or reproduced."99 This right includes importantly "the inalien-
able right to an interest" in resales of the work.'0°
These exclusive rights, however, are constrained by the caveat
that national governments may "determine the conditions" under
which the rights are exercised, though governments may not "be
prejudicial to the moral rights of the author, nor to his right to
obtain equitable remuneration."0 1 The author's exclusive right
does not take away from the public the right to "make quotations
from a work which has already been lawfully made available to
the public, provided that their making is compatible with fair
practice, and their extent does not exceed that justified by the
purpose."102 This provision is augmented by the caveat that press
or broadcast transmissions of current events are a matter for the
national legislation to determine, with respect to "the extent justi-
fied by the informatory purpose," 1 3 whether they may "be re-
produced and made available to the public." '°4 The exclusive
rights of authors are further limited by the sweeping language of
Article 17: "The provisions of this Convention cannot in any way
affect the right of the Government of each country of the Union
to permit, to control, or to prohibit, by legislation or regulation,
the circulation, presentation, or exhibition of any work or pro-
duction in regard to which the competent authority may find it
necessary to exercise that right."' Infringing copies of a pro-
tected work are subject to seizure, and this "seizure shall take
place in accordance with the legislation of each country."'0 6 The
9 See id. art. 11 [bis] (1).
98 See id. art. 12.
99Id. art. 14 (1) ().
100 Id. art. 14 [ter] (1).
101 Id. art. 11 [bis] (2).
102 Id. art. 10(1).
103 Id. art. 10 [bis] (2).
104 Id.
"'s Id. art. 17.
'06 Id. art. 16(1),(3).
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Berne Convention is administered by the International Bureau of
WIPO, which receives financial assessments from the member
states of the Berne Union and charges fees for the services which
it provides. In stark contrast to the Paris Convention on patents,
the Berne Convention on copyrights demands that minimum
standards be maintained with respect to literary and artistic
works. The Berne Union membership totals 117 governments,
including countries such as Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Malaysia,
and South Africa.'07 The utility of the copyright for the promo-
tion of expression product creation has long been recognized in
developing countries which have rich traditions in literature and
the arts.
The Rome Convention of 1961, formally the International
Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Pho-
nograms and Broadcasting Organizations, 08 grants national
treatment to performers, phonogram producers, and broadcasters.
The protection provided for performers includes prevention of
any non-consensual broadcast or public communication, fixation,
and reproduction of their works.' 9 Producers of phonograms en-
joy the right to authorize or prohibit the direct or indirect repro-
duction of their phonograms." 0 Broadcasters of phonograms en-
joy the right to authorize or prohibit the rebroadcast, fixation,
and reproduction of their broadcasts."' The Rome Convention
provides that the term of these rights is twenty years from the end
of the year in which fixation of the phonogram, performance, or
broadcast took place. The member states, however, may limit
these rights through domestic laws and regulations regarding pri-
vate use, the use of short excerpts in connection with the report-
ing of current events, broadcast by its own facilities, education,
and scientific research. Forty-nine states have joined the Rome
Convention, including Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and some other
Latin American and African countries.
12
107 See STATES PARTY, supra note 46, at 7-9.
108 International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers
of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S.
43 [hereinafter Rome Convention].
109 See id. art. 7.
110 See id. art. 10.
1' See id. art. 13.
1 See STATES PARTY, supra note 46, at 15.
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The Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of
Phono~rams Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phono-3
grams, signed in 1971, states in the preamble that the motiva-
tion for the agreement is that the contracting states are
"concerned at the widespread and increasing unauthorized dupli-
cation of phonograms and the damage this is occasioning to the
interests of authors, performers, and producers of phono-
grams."114 Member states "shall protect producers of phonograms
who are nationals of other Contracting States against the making
of duplicates without the consent of the producer and against the
importation of such duplicates..., and against the distribution of
such duplicates to the public." 15 The Geneva Convention estab-
lishes a minimum twenty-year period for the protection of pho-
nogram rights against infringement, and provides that the mem-
ber states will implement their obligations through "one or more
of the following: protection by means of the grant of copyright or
other specific right; protection by means of the law relatingto un-
fair competition; protection by means of penal sanctions."1 6 The
Convention further provides that compulsory licenses must fulfill
all the following conditions: (1) duplication is for use solely for
the purpose of teaching and scientific research; (2) the license is
valid only within the territory of the state which granted the li-
cense; (3) "equitable remuneration" is provided. The member-
ship, amounting to fifty-three states, includes developing coun-
tries such as Brazil (1975), China (1993), Egypt (1978), India
(1975), Mexico (1973), and Korea (1987)."7
The Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Regis-
tration of Marks," as amended during its more than 100-year life,
establishes the Madrid Union regarding trademarks and provides
that nationals of any of the contracting countries may secure
mark protections applicable to their goods and services registered
in their country of origin in all member countries by filing their
113 Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against
Unauthorized Duplication of their Phonograms, Oct. 29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309
[hereinafter Geneva Convention].
114 Id. pmbl.
115 Id. art. 2.
116 Id. art. 3.
117 See STATES PARTY, supra note 46, at 19.
11 Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks,
Apr. 14, 1891, 828 U.N.T.S. 389 [hereinafter Madrid Agreement].
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marks with the International Bureau of WIPO. When filing the
application for Union registration, the mark holder must comply
with rules articulated in the Madrid Convention and additional
regulations specified by WIPO, including indication of the goods
and services for which protection is claimed. These goods and
services are classified according to terms specified by the Nice
Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods
and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks,"
9
which was signed in 1957 and amended through the years. The
Trademark Law Treaty, 120 signed in Geneva in 1994, further de-
tails rules regarding the international registration of marks for
goods and services. Forty-eight states have acceded to the Madrid
Agreement; forty-five states have acceded to the Nice Agreement;
forty-seven states have acceded to the Trademark Law Treaty.'
21
4. LINKAGE-BARGAIN, GATT TRIPS DIPLOMACY
The Paris Convention, in particular, offered weak standards;
it obligated members to little more than national treatment.
American patent interests determined that minimum standards
needed to be added to the Paris Convention because the era of
treaty membership among generally like-minded industrialized
countries was over. Developing countries had become important
sources of intellectual property product production, and a good
deal of it was pirated. Even in countries which belonged to the
patent treaty, local laws offered little chance of remedy for in-
fringement. Beginning in the late 1970s, a couple of the more re-
search-oriented pharmaceutical companies and U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office representatives took their case for new negotia-
tions to WIPO with the goal of a diplomatic conference of the
Paris Union which would fundamentally reform the patent
treaty. They were rebuffed at WIPO, where they were told that
the developing countries vehemently opposed changes to the Paris
Convention. To press forward despite developing country oppo-
sition, they were told, would yield nothing for the United States
119 Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods
and Services to Which Trademarks Are Applied, June 15, 1957, 23 U.S.T. 1336
[hereinafter Nice Agreement].
120 Trademark Law Treaty, in WIPO, Industrial Property and Copyright,
Industrial Property Laws and Treaties, Multilateral Treaties, Jan. 1995, at 1-12,
reprinted in 49 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) at 22 (Nov. 10, 1994).
121 See STATES PARTY, supra note 46, at 11, 13, 23.
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or its patent-oriented industries, and WIPO itself might well be
fatally damaged in the process; developing countries would reject
any reformed treaty and might even leave WIPO to reinforce
their displeasure.
The Advisory Committee on Trade Policy Negotiation
("ACTPN") provided the forum for U.S. intellectual property in-
terests to advocate a "trade-related" strategy to reform the intellec-
tual property policy milieu in which they were operating. The
ACTPN, led by the chief executive officers of Pfizer and IBM,
persuaded the U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR") that the next
round of multilateral trade negotiations should be used to adapt
the international institutions of intellectual property to a world
economy where developing countries were major producers of in-
tellectual property goods. Patent protection should be harmo-
nized at a high standard, and computer software, increasingly im-
portant to the U.S. economy, should be explicitly protected by
the Berne Convention. Business interests and USTR articulated a
"GATT strategy" to overcome developing-country opposition
within WIPO to intellectual property institution change. GATT
had a record of success regarding new rule creation in politically
thorny trade policy matters, and it was its institutional design
which offered the prospect of successfully reforming international
intellectual property laws.
The early GATT rounds of negotiations in the 1950s had been
primarily for the purpose of tariff reduction, and an "offer-
concession" negotiation scheme was carried out whereby the ma-
jor trading states bargained in essentially bilateral fashion, request-
ing and offering concessions, trading off one product area for an-
other.12  The GATT most-favored-nation ("MFN") rule
institutionalized tariff cuts throughout the membership. Trade
negotiators established a "linear-cut" negotiation scheme for the
1960s Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations, whereby a general
across-the-board cut was the starting point for exceptions-oriented
bargaining.'2 Linear tariff cutting produced another one-third
122 See KENNETH DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 61 (1970) (describing the patterns of trade negotia-
tion during the first six rounds of international trade negotiations).
123 See ERNEST H. PREEG, TRADERS AND DIPLOMATS: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE KENNEDY ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS UNDER THE GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 58-80 (1970) (describing the negotiation
preparations for the Kennedy Round); see also GERARD CURZON, MULTI-
LATERAL COMMERcIAL DIPLOMACY: THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
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cut in world tariff levels in the 1973-79 Tokyo Round of negotia-
tions, but of greater import to world trade was that the multilat-
eral trade negotiation ("MTN") forum had proven itself capable of
winning international agreements to reduce nontariff barriers to
trade. Nontariff barriers posed special challenges to trade negotia-
tors because they were difficult to measure and, hence, tricky to
value and weight. Yet, Tokyo Round negotiators had been able
to create "linkage" opportunities provided by the round's broad
agenda during a final end-game to get important new agreements
regarding issues such as antidumping, government procurement,
and safeguards. 24 Further supporting the GATT forum was the
fact that the GATT secretariat had earned a reputation for provid-
ing objective technical support, either through the leadership of a
more active director-general during the Kennedy Round who
hosted in his office the final, late-night bargaining, or of a more
modest director-general during the Tokyo Round who kept to the
background. 125
USTR and American business leaders assessed that the GATT
round, to begin in the early 1980s with a proposed agenda of trade
barrier reduction regarding agriculture and textiles issues known
to be important to many developing countries, 126 could achieve
what could not be achieved at the World Intellectual Property
Organization forum. The GATT MTN, which had been hailed
at the conclusion of the Tokyo Round as the birth of the most
TARIFFS AND TRADE AND ITS IMPACT ON NATIONAL COMMERCIAL POLIcIES
AND TECHNIQUES 77-78 (1965) (explaining the dynamics of linear tariff reduc-
tions in the GATT negotiations).
124 See GILBERT R. WINHAM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE TOKYO
ROUND NEGOTIATION 256-305 (1983). See generally Jock A. Finlayson &
Mark W. Zacher, The GA 7T and the Regulation of Trade Barriers: Regime Dy-
namics and Functions, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 273 (Stephen D. Krasner
ed., 1983) (describing the nontariff barriers and how negotiators addressed them
in the Tokyo Round).
125 Eric Wyndham White had been director-general of the GATT secretar-
iat since its inception in 1948, and Preeg explains that he had played a key bro-
kering role in the Kennedy Round. See PREEG, supra note 123, at 184-89.
White's successor, Olivier Long, receives only one mention by Winham in the
history of the Tokyo Round. See WINHAM, supra note 124, at 96. Analyti-
cally, however, I note that Winham makes almost no reference in the entire
book to the GATT Secretariat.
126 See C. FRED BERGSTEN & WILLIAM R. CLINE, TRADE POLICY IN THE
1980s, at 38-41 (1982); see also COMPLETING THE URUGUAY ROUND: A
RESULTS-ORIENTED APPROACH TO THE GATT TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 1-50
Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 1990).
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important institutional innovation in world trade since the crea-
tion of the GATT itself,127 could provide the forum for trade ne-
gotiators to link "concessions" on intellectual property protection
on the part of the South, to concessions on agriculture and textiles
on the part of the North. However, for the strategy to work, the
round negotiation scheme would need a crucial change from the
Tokyo Round scheme: there could be no a la carte shopping
among agreements as had been permitted in the Tokyo Round, no
selective, code-by-code signatures, and no "code conditionality"
regarding benefits. All agreements would have to be accepted by
all contracting parties, or developing countries would simply opt
out of an intellectual property agreement.
U.S. policymakers, however, faced an unexpected problem in
their own camp, even before their GATT strategy could be set in
motion. The "countable indicators" of piracy losses provided by
the International Intellectual Property Alliance (a specialized coa-
lition organization representing filmmakers, music producers,
book publishers, and software makers) in 1985128 demonstrated to
USTR that they had extensive film, music, book, and software pi-
racy problems in developing countries and thus that the copyright
issue should be on the agenda as well. However, to the surprise of
USTR policymakers, the copyright interests did not share the be-
lief of the patent interests that the multilateral, GATT-based ne-
gotiation strategy was in their interest. Film, music, and book in-
terests adamantly opposed the idea of reforms of the Berne
Convention within the next round of trade negotiations. The
copyright interests knew that GATT rounds were wild and
woolly affairs: President Carter recruited Robert Strauss, a mas-
ter negotiator, to become Trade Representative for the purpose of
bringing the difficult Tokyo Round to a close, and the deals he
struck to get agreements in 1979 were legendary-admired by
some, loathed by others.12 9 The Berne Convention did not cover
computer software, but its rules were in general acceptable to
127 See John H. Jackson, The Birth of the GA TT-MN System: A Constitu.
tionalAppraisal, 12 LAw & POLY INT'L Bus. 21 (1980) (arguing that the Tokyo
Round initiated a wholly-new international trade law-creation institution).
128 See INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE, TRADE
LossEs DUE TO PIRACY AND OTHER MARKET AccEss BARRIERS AECTING
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES (1985) (report on file with Office of U.S.
Trade Representative).
121 See Gilbert R. Winham, Robert Strauss, MTN, and the Control of Faction,
14 J. WORLD TRADE L. 377 (1980).
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copyright-oriented U.S. companies. The problem for them was
lack of enforcement in developing countries, and the film, music,
and book interests were placing their stock in the bilateral, Sec-
tion 301 strategy to get enforcement levels up. To the copyright
interests, the GATT strategy offered risks without apparent re-
wards. USTR hosted several meetings, described by participants
all-around with words such as "testy" and "acrimonious," to get
the copyright interests on-board with the multilateral GATT
strategy.
Getting intellectual property onto the MTN agenda was itself
no easy task. Believing that European support would be neces-
sary and Japanese support helpful in making it happen, the U.S.
Trade Representative recommended to the chairmen of Pfizer and
IBM that they encourage their European and Japanese counter-
parts to pressure their governments and EC secretariat leadership
to support the idea.3 Though competitors in global markets,
these companies shared the common interest in improved intellec-
tual property protection around the world, especially in develop-
ing-country markets, and various European and Japanese trade as-
sociations were talked into supporting the initiative. Yet, neither
they, nor their governments, were as committed to the issue as
were some people in the United States. The round had many is-
sues which they perceived to be of greater salience, and develop-
ing-country opposition was well-known.
Many of the developing countries maintained that WIPO, not
GATT, was the appropriate forum for intellectual property dis-
cussions and that patent policies especially ought to vary by level
of development and not be harmonized. Extensive piracy of pat-
ented pharmaceuticals and chemicals, copyrighted film, music,
book, and software products meant that local interests opposed
policy change. Inside and outside the governments, health care
interests claimed that pharmaceutical piracy benefited the people;
agricultural interests claimed that agri-product piracy promoted
local food production; and, book and software interests claimed
that piracy contributed to local learning and technology transfer.
The so-called Group of Ten ("G-10") developing countries, Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru,
Tanzania, and Yugoslavia, opposed placing intellectual property
on to the Uruguay Round agenda, just as they opposed placing
10 See Michael A. Santoro & Lynn Sharp Paine,1izer: Global Protection of
Intellectual Property, HARv. Bus. SCH. CASES 7 (1995).
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services and investment on the agenda. During several years of
pre-round agenda negotiation, they did not budge from their op-
position to the notion of "trade-related intellectual property"
talks, so USTR decided to take the unprecedented "self-initiated"
Section 301 action against Korea and Brazil in order to bully the
developing countries to the GATT negotiating table. By playing
the 301 card, they aimed to signal that negotiations could go on
one-by-one under threat of bilateral trade sanction or could take
place within the GATT MTN round, but that they would take
place nevertheless.
The 301 bullying gambit worked, aided by some draftsman-
ship maneuvering, since a group of twenty developing countries
and twenty industrialized countries agreed to include intellectual
property on the agenda. In July 1986 a final draft text for the
Punta del Este Ministerial Declarationi 3i was submitted to all the
trade ministers under the authorship of the Swiss and Colombian
ambassadors, and it was this text which was adopted as the agenda
for the Uruguay Round. 3 2 The Punta del Este Declaration gave
the following mandate to the negotiators:
In order to reduce the distortions and impediments to in-
ternational trade, and taking into account the need to
promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual
property rights, and to ensure that measures and proce-
dures to enforce intellectual property rights do not them-
selves become barriers to legitimate trade, the negotiations
shall aim to clarify GATT provisions and elaborate, as ap-
propriate, new rules and disciplines. Negotiations shall
aim to develop a multilateral framework of principles,
rules and disciplines dealing with international trade in
counterfeit goods taking into account work already under-
taken in the GATT.'33
131 Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration, Sept. 20, 1986, GATT B.I.S.D.
(33d Supp.) at 19 (1987).
132 See Gail Evans, Intellectual Property as a Trade Issue-The Making of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1 WORLD
COMPETITION 160, 173 (1994).
133 Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration, supra note 131, at 25-26.
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Through U.S. leadership and the cooperation of the govern-
ments of Europe, Japan, and some of the developing countries,
the GATT Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations, with
their opportunities for linkage bargaining, became in the late
1980s and early 1990s the forum for international intellectual
property negotiations. However, the Trade-Related Intellectual
Property Rights declaration text was deliberately loosely-worded.
Thus, the first issue for the TRIPS negotiating committee with
the Uruguay Round was an agenda. The United States insisted
that TRIPS should comprehensively cover patents, trade secrets,
industrial designs, integrated circuit designs, copyrights, and
trademarks; it should articulate as goals agreements which
achieved MFN, national treatment, transparency, and minimum
standards; and it should be geographically universal. The Organi-
zation for Economic Development and Cooperation ("OECD")
and newly industrializing countries had converged toward a con-
sensus that the TRIPS Agreement ought to incorporate the Paris
Convention and the Berne Convention, apply Berne rules to
computer programs by defining them as "literary works," and go
beyond Paris and Berne to establish minimum standards. India,
on behalf of the G-10, contended that a counterfeiting code with
respect to trademark and copyright ought to be the only issue un-
der discussion and bitterly opposed any agreement regarding pat-
ents and trade secrets.' The Indian government argued that pat-
ents were trade restrictive by allowing certain firms to exploit
monopolies over pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals and
products.
Negotiations proceeded, though wide gaps in policy prefer-
ences persisted for several years, and months would pass between
formal meetings among negotiators. American governmental
trade negotiators in Geneva frequently contacted the primary
Washington-based intellectual property interest groups, including
the Intellectual Property Committee, the International Intellec-
tual Property Alliance, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manu-
facturers of America, and various company and trade association
representatives. European business was represented in Geneva by
the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederation of Europe,
which is composed of thirty-three member federations from
twenty-two countries. Japanese business was represented by the
... See Evans, supra note 132, at 162.
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keidanren, the Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations.
These groups jointly announced in June 1988 a draft agreement,
the Basic Framework of GATT Provisions on Intellectual Prop-
erty, Statement of Views of the European, Japanese, and United
States Business Communities.135  European business groups rec-
ommended that developing countries be offered preferential
treatment on an MFN basis, pledges of increased technical assis-
tance, and transitional provisions to sweeten the deal, the last
term of which was at the time and until the end opposed by the
U.S. pharmaceutical makers. India and Brazil, for their part, de-
nounced the Basic Agreement proposed by multinational corpora-
tions, especially the patent rules. India argued that developing
countries should be free to exclude pharmaceuticals, food, and
chemicals from patent protection, shorten patent protection peri-
ods for other sectors, and license foreign patents under preferen-
tial terms. A patent conferred in a host country, contended the
Indian negotiators, was an obligation upon the multinational
company, and compulsory licensing should be recognized as a le-
gitimate government policy tool to prevent multinational enter-
prises from misusing their rights within the host country. 136 At a
1989 international conference held at Vanderbilt Law School, one
industrial design scholar contended that the TRIPS negotiators
ought to adapt the "fair use" doctrine of copyright law to patent
law,137 a proposal rejected by both patent specialists and copyright
specialists as a perversion of policy purposes in both their houses,
but which underscored that the negotiation gap remained so wide
that unconventional thinking could be aired. At the same confer-
ence, two senior Congressional staff members insisted that the
minimum which the U.S. delegation should obtain in a TRIPS
Agreement was "(1) substantive standards for intellectual property
protection; (2) effective enforcement measures at the border and
internally; (3) a multilateral consultation and dispute settlement
mechanism; and (4) traditional GATT provisions, including
transparency and national treatment applied to intellectual prop-
135 See id. at 165.
136 See id. at 167.
137 See J. H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade: Oppor-
tunities and Risks of a GATT Connection, 22VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 809
(1989).
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erty."138 A GATT secretariat official pointed out to the develop-
ing country policymakers that they were acting as though the
choice of forum was GATT or WIPO when the reality was a
choice between GATT and USTR. They were failing to recog-
nize that their bargaining leverage was greater within the multi-
lateral Uruguay Round than within the bilateral Section 301 pro-
cedure with the United States. 139
The turning point in the negotiations came in April 1989
when a compromise between the industrialized and developing
countries was achieved to draft a "framework agreement" which
would outline minimum standards for intellectual property rights
and enforcement, but leave the GATT versus WIPO competence
question off the table.' 40 In September, 1989, India announced
that it accepted the principle of international enforcement of in-
tellectual property within the context of the Uruguay Round, an
act which allowed the negotiations to become about substantive
provisions of an agreement. Proposals were tabled by industrial-
ized and developing countries alike, with countries such as Can-
ada and Mexico sharing India's concerns about patent-based mo-
nopolies turning into international anti-competitive situations. In
January 1990, this phase of the negotiations resulted in the crea-
tion of the Checklist of Issues, which listed some 500 points of
disagreement.
Led by the American, European, Japanese, Swiss, and Indian
negotiating teams, draft texts were circulated to bridge the check-
listed differences. Brokered by the chairman of the TRIPS nego-
tiating group, the GATT secretariat staff culled these ideas and
proposals so that in June the TRIPS chairman and the ambassador
from Sweden, Lars Anell, presented a Draft Composite Text at
the Brussels Ministerial Meeting in December 1990. The TRIPS
Draft Text indicated that much disagreement persisted on impor-
tant issues of intellectual property policy, including (1) first-to-file
versus first-to-invent systems for patents, (2) compulsory licens-
ing, (3) patents regarding plant and animal varieties, (4) copyright
versus neighboring rights for performers, (5) moral rights under
138 Robert W. Kastenmeier & David Beier, International Trade and Intellec-
tualProperty: Promise, Risks, and Reality, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 285, 291
(1989).
139 See Arvind Subramanian, TRIPS and the Paradigm of GA 77 A Tropical,
Temperate View, 13 WORLD ECON. 509 (1990).
See Evans, supra note 132, at 169.
[Vol 19:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss2/7
1998] INTERNA TIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPER TY 567
copyright, and (6) rental rights under copyright. The Chairman
of the TRIPS committee established a "ten-on-ten" structure-ten
industrializing countries, ten developing countries-to move the
negotiations toward consensus.
Because the whole Uruguay Round was foundering, GATT
Director-General Arthur Dunkel and the secretariat compiled the
results achieved to that point and presented them with the Draft
TRIPS in December 1991 as a formal draft for final negotia-
tion.14 1 Agreement had been reached in principle to phase-out the
Multifiber Arrangement, thus offering the developing countries
something of great economic worth. The overriding problem of
the Uruguay Round had by then become the agricultural policy
dispute between the European Union on one side and the United
States and the so-called "Cairns Group" of agricultural exporting
countries on the other. When compromise was finally reached,
the whole Urugauy Round was brought to conclusion and the
Draft Composite Text became the final TRIPS Agreement essen-
tially without change.14 Interviewees, looking back on the nego-
tiations, acknowledged that without the secretariat-drafted Draft
Composite Text there would have been no TRIPS Agreement.
They were effusive in their praise of the negotiation committee
chair, whom several called the "hero" of the story, and of the sec-
retariat. Indeed, the investment agreement contained modest
provisions, and services yielded only a framework agreement,
while sector-specific commitments were put off for further nego-
tiation after the Round.
5. GATT FORUM-MADE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW
In the end, the TRIPS Agreement produced agreement regard-
ing patents, copyrights, trademarks, semiconductor masks, indus-
trial designs, and trade secrets. The TRIPS Agreement builds
upon the substantial legal base provided by previous international
treaties regarding intellectual property. Regarding patents, the
141 See id. at 174.
142 See Carlos A. Primo Braga, Trade.Related Intellectual Property Issues: The
Uruguay Round Agreement and Its Economic Implications, in THE URUGUAY
ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING EcoNOMIES 387 (Will Martin & L. Alan Win-
ters eds., 1995).
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agreement 43 offers product and process patents to nearly all types
of inventions "in all fields of technology, provided that they are
new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial appli-
cation" when the terms "non-obviousness" and "useful" are
"synonymous." 144 Article 27 further explains that patent rights
are "enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of inven-
tion, the field of technology and whether products are imported
or locally produced." 145  This Article is thus an important
achievement from the perspective of U.S. negotiators, for it le-
gitimizes the patentability of pharmaceuticals, transgenic plants
and animals, and computer software. However, it also qualifies
that states may exclude from patentability inventions for reasons
of "public order" or "morality."146 This clause is ambiguous be-
cause it confers upon the state the right to prohibit patents to pro-
tect "human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious
prejudice to the environment," including but not limited to (1)
"diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of
humans or animals," and (2) "plants and animals other than mi-
cro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the produc-
tion of plants and animals other than non-biological and microbi-
ological processes." 147 The passage explicitly permits plant variety
patents and provides that the language should be revisited "four
years after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agree-
ment."'48  The precise meaning of the passage can only become
known through interpretation over time and when issues are re-
addressed beginning in 1999.
TRIPS provides patent holders with exclusive rights to make,
use, sell, import, assign or transfer the patent through license.
However, these rights may be limited in certain ways and com-
pulsory licensing, though not prohibited, is constrained by Arti-
cle 31 such that it must be (1) a non-exclusive license; (2)
"predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the
143 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights. Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Or-
ganization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
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Member authoring such use;" (3) with "adequate remuneration;"
(4) Usubject to judicial review" as well as other terms. 149 A patent
term runs for at least twenty years from the date of the filing of
the application, 1 and an opportunity exists for judicial review of
any decision to revoke or forfeit a patent.15' Regarding process
patents, the alleged infringer has the burden to prove that he pro-
duced an identical product by a different process under circum-
stances where the "product obtained by the patented process is
new," or where "there is substantial likelihood that the identical
product was made by the process and the owner of the patent has
been unable through reasonable efforts to determine the process
actually used."
152
TRIPS requires that members offer MFN terms to each other,
stating that "any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted
by a Member to the nationals of any other country shall be ac-
corded immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all
other Members."' Members must offer signatories national
treatment: "Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other
Members treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its
own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual prop-
erty... ." 14 The twin requirements of MFN and national treat-
ment, which have been hallmarks of the GATT/WTO-based
trade regime since its founding, aim to generalize the rights and
responsibilities among weak states and powerful states alike. The
TRIPS, like the GATT/WTO, permits exceptions to the MFN
requirement through free trade agreements or customs unions.
However, because of the limitations of the terms of the TRIPS,
they do not establish a harmonized, global, level playing field of
harmonized policies and practices. Furthermore, Article 8 pro-
vides a caveat which appears to offer some latitude for members
regarding their commitments in the TRIPS by stating:
1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws
and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect pub-
149 Id. art. 31.
150 See id. art. 33.
151 See id. art. 32.
152 Id. art. 34.
153 Id. art. 4.
154 Id. art. 3.
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lic health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest
in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and
technological development, provided that such measures
are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement. 2.
Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent
with the provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to
prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights holders or
the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade
or adversely affect the international transfer of technol-
155ogy.
The precise meaning of Article 8 will only become known
over time through the inevitable litigation of international dispute
settlement.
TRIPS aims to prevent disputes by demanding transparency
with respect to intellectual property laws, regulations, administra-
tive practices, and court decisions (though permitting the with-
holding of information due to public interest or proprietary in-
terest concerns) through publication and reporting to the TRIPS
Council of certain aspects of the policy and practices. 156 When
disputes between members do arise, the disputants use
GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures. 157 These procedures
call for bilateral negotiation with or without the good offices of
the WTO secretariat first, then formal dispute settlement if
needed. The dispute settlement mechanism is the establishment
of a three-member panel which assesses the arguments of the dis-
putants and issues a decision which typically offers interpretation
of relevant international law and an opinion regarding a state's
policy compliance with relevant international law. 5 ' The dispute
settlement provision is, from the standpoint of developing coun-
tries (as well as some industrialized countries), the great achieve-
ment of the Round, for it constrains U.S. unilateralism. The
agreement establishes a Council for TRIPS, a body composed of
155 Id. art. 8.
156 See id. art. 63.
157 See id. art. 64.
1s8 See ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:
THE EvOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (1993) (providing
analysis of GATT dispute settlement procedures and cases); PIERRE PESCATORE
ET AL., HANDBOOK OF WTO/GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (1997) (providing
analysis of WTO dispute settlement reforms).
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representatives from member states who monitor the operation of
the agreement.' 59 The Council offers an on-going forum for con-
sultation regarding intellectual property policy issues, a mecha-
nism which may resolve disputes without the need for formal
dispute settlement.
Regarding copyright, TRIPS establishes that members comply
with the 1971 terms of the Berne Convention. 60 Article 10 ex-
plicitly provides that computer programs and databases are to be
protected as literary works under the Berne Convention.' 6 ' Arti-
cle 12 establishes a generally applicable fifty-year term minimum,
dating from the year of publication or making, while not dimin-
ishing longer terms which many states offer to their copyright
holders. 6 2 Article 11 grants "at least" owners of computer soft-
ware and cinemaworks the right to authorize or prohibit rental of
their products. 163 With respect to the rights related to sound re-
cordings, performers control fixation, reproduction, and broad-
casting of their performances. Producers of sound recordings
have the right to authorize or prohibit the reproduction of their'65
phonograms. Broadcasters have the right to authorize or pro-
hibit the fixation, reproduction of fixations, and rebroadcasting of
their broadcasts. 16 6 These rights and obligations are further speci-
fied in the Rome Convention, which Article 14 embodies in
TRIPS, although moral rights are not specified in TRIPS.' 67
With respect to trademarks, owners are granted, by Article 16
and through application of the Paris Convention, an exclusive
right of use "in the course of trade identical or similar signs for
goods and services... where such use would result in a likelihood
of confusion." 16' TRIPS further enhances protection for interna-
tionally well-known marks, though not with absolute clarity: "In
determining whether a trademark is well known, Members shall
take account of the knowledge of the trademark in the relevant
159 See TRIPS art. 68.
16 See id. art. 9.
161 See id. art. 10.
161 See id. art 12.
163 See id. art 11.




168 Id. art. 16.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
sector of the public, including in the Member concerned which
has been obtained as a result of the promotion of the trade-
mark."169 Sustained use of the mark combined with registration
of the mark with trademark authorities appears to be the best
means to maintain and extend trademark rights globally, for Arti-
cle 19 requires that registration may be canceled "only after an un-
interru ted period of at least three years of non-use" by the
holder. TRIPS also provides that a trademark registration term
minimum is seven years, but that a trademark may be renewed
indefinitely. 17 ' Article 21 declares the prohibition of compulsory
licensing of marks, instead conferring to the owner the exclusive
right to assign the trademark. 72
TRIPS requires that member states protect industrial designs
"that are new or original"' 73 and that the owner of a protected in-
dustrial design has the right to prevent third parties from making,
selling, or importing articles "bearing or embodying a design
which is a copy or substantially a copy."'74 The agreement pro-
vides that the term of protection be at least ten years. With re-
gard to lay-out design (topography) protection for integrated cir-
cuits, TRIPS refers to the Treaty on Intellectual Property in
Respect of Integrated Circuits ("IPIC Treaty"), 175 signed in Wash-
ington when it states that members should consider it unlawful to
import, sell, or distribute a product which is or which contains an
unauthorized, protected integrated circuit lay-out design
(sometimes called a "semiconductor mask"). 76 Article 38 pro-
vides that this protection ought to last for at least ten years begin-
ning with registration filing or first commercial exploitation
"wherever in the world it occurs." l77
Trade secret protection, though the term "trade secret" is not
used, is provided for in Article 39.178 "This was an area of heated
169 Id.
170 Id art. 19.
171 See id. art. 18.
172 See id. art. 21.
173 See id arts. 16, 25.
174 Id. art. 25.
175 See The Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Cir-
cuits, May 26, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1484.
176 See a arts. 35-36.
1"7 Id art. 38.
171 Id art. 39.
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North-South debate, with developing countries opposing the
treatment of trade secrets as an intellectual property right."M In
accordance with the Article 10 unfair competition section of the
Paris Convention, members are to protect "undisclosed informa-
tion."i ° Persons should be able to protect their information so
long as it is secret, has commercial value because it is secret, and
has "been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances...
to keep it secret." 181 However, neither the TRIPS nor the Paris
Convention establishes rules regarding judicial remedies for theft
of trade secrets.
The TRIPS Agreement also concerns competition-
specifically the licensing of intellectual property rights.1 & Article
40 states that certain types of licensing agreements can restrain
trade or impede the transfer and dissemination of technology;
thus it explicitly reserves to the members the right to write legis-
lation which controls these types of licensing agreements.
183
Considerable text is devoted to issues of enforcement, an out-
come important to U.S. copyright interests, in the short term and
also to patent interests over the long term. The general obligation
is presented in Article 41 that members "shall ensure that en-
forcement procedures.., are available under their law so as to
permit effective action against any act of infringement of intellec-
tual property rights..., including expeditious remedies to pre-
vent infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to
further infringements."1 4  The requirements also included en-
forcement procedures which are "fair and equitable" but which
are not "unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail unreason-
able time-limits or unwarranted delays." 85 Procedures are to be
transparent; decisions are to be delivered "without undue delay"
and "based only on evidence in respect of which parties were of-
fered the opportunity to be heard." 86  The Article further obli-
gates states to offer the "opportunity to be heard."187  These en-
179 Braga, supra note 142, at 393.
"so See TRIPS art. 39.
181 Id-L
182 See id. art. 40.
183 See id.
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forcement provisions also require states to offer the opportunity
for judicial review of administrative decisions, though it makes no
demand that states create a special, separate judicial review proce-
dure regarding intellectual property law.
Civil judicial procedures are demanded in Article 42, includ-
ing the right to timely, written notice, the right to independent
legal counsel, and the right to present relevant evidence. 89 The
judicial authorities are given the authority to order that evidence
be produced by the opposing party when the complainant has
"presented reasonably available evidence sufficient to support its
claims and has specified evidence relevant to substantiation of its
claims which lies in the control of the opposing party."190 Judicial
authorities have "the authority to order a party to desist from an
infringement, inter alia to prevent the entry into the channels of
commerce in their jurisdiction of imported goods that involve the
infringement of an intellectual property right, immediately after
customs clearance of such goods."' These authorities, also must
be able to pay damages "adequate to compensate for the injury the
right holder has suffered because of an infringement of that per-
son's intellectual property right by an infringer who knowingly,
or with reasonable grounds to know, engaged in infringing activ-
ity."192 Judicial authorities may also "order prompt and effective
provisional measures" to prevent infringement from occurring by
preventing the distribution for sale or importation of infringing
goods and by preserving evidence."1 93 The article further lays out
guidelines regarding procedures for provisional measures.194
Members are obligated by TRIPS provisonal measures to
adopt administrative or judicial procedures which afford rights-
holders the opportunity to stop the importation of infringing
goods at the border through customs action.195 The rights-holder
must provide "adequate evidence," 196 however, before the customs
action need be taken, and the goods may only be held up at the
188 See id
189 See id = 42.
'90 I1 art. 43.
191 Id art. 44.
192 Id art. 45.
193 Id art. 50.
194 See id
195 See id. art. 51.
196 Id art. 52.
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border for ten working days without the initiation of full judicial
procedures or revocation of the suspension order.
197
In addition to civil actions, members are required, at mini-
mum, to provide criminal procedures in cases of "willful trade-
mark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale,"
and the remedies "shall include imprisonment and/or monetary
fines sufficient to provide a deterrent, consistently with the level
of penalties applied for crimes of corresponding gravity."198 Sei-
zure, forfeiture, and destruction of the infringing goods may also
be available remedies.
199
Since the WTO Agreement requires member states to accept
all WTO agreements, most developing countries will be party to
TRIPS. However, the TRIPS agreement includes the important
caveat that no member is bound to comply until one year after
the January 1, 1995, effective date of the WTO, and middle-level
developing countries are given an additional five-year implemen-
tation grace period, while least-developed countries receive ten-
year phase-in periods for implementation of all the terms of the
agreement.200 Perhaps as importantly, de jure implementation of
TRIPS obligations in some emerging-market countries may not
indicate de facto implementation by local governmental and judi-
cial authorities. The implementation of TRIPS into national legal
systems among industrializing countries will gradually occur dur-
ing the decade to come, but at a pace and vigor which may vary
considerably across emerging-market, developing countries.
These transition periods were strenuously opposed by the phar-
maceutical interests, yet they, the copyright interests, U.S. gov-
ernment negotiators, and many other business and government
participants, were generally pleased with the final TRIPS product,
for developing countries were finally obligated under interna-
tional public law to meet basic standards of intellectual property
protection, thereby achieving "deep integration" in an important
policy area. The points of continued disagreement which had
been specified in the Draft Composite Text, in the minds of the
participants, could be re-addressed at another date. Some conten-
tious points were taken-up almost immediately after the conclu-
197 See id art. 55.
198 IAd art. 61.
199 See id
200 See id art. 65.
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sion of the GATT Uruguay Round, and they were taken up in
the WIPO forum.
6. FUNCTION-SPECIFIC, WIPO FORUM-MADE INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT LAW
Even as the TRIPS negotiations were proceeding, a communi-
cation revolution was underway, born of the spectacular rise in:
the use of the Internet; telephony deregulation, which increased
the number of providers and the need for high-capacity fiber optic
cable; and an important breakthrough in digital compression
technologies, which increased channel-capacity and may foment a
digital convergence of communication media. The digital com-
munication revolution challenges conventional institutions of in-
tellectual property, such as copyright to adapt to new technologi-
cal capabilities and new commercial behaviors. The future of
global electronic communication and commerce was at issue as
representatives of national governments, companies, and nongov-
ernmental organizations convened at the World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization Conference in December 1996 for the purpose
of amending the Berne and Rome Conventions regarding copy-
right and performers' rights for the era of digital communication.
Digital convergence and networked, interactive communication
offers the prospect of new services and conveniences, including a
powerful new medium by which to distribute copyrighted mate-
rials. It also, however, offers the prospect of unauthorized piracy
of digitized music, films, and software, repeatedly down-loaded
with no quality loss. The prospect of Internet-based electronic
commerce posed challenges to information technology
(encryption, e-cash, etc.) and the copyright institution even as it
offered a paradigm-shift in product distribution. The key ques-
tion was: did "going digital" require a complete rethinking of in-
ternational copyright law?
WIPO sponsored a number of international conferences at-
tended by expert specialists in communication technology and in-
tellectual property law over a five-year period leading up to the
December 1996 Diplomatic Conference. Conferences were con-
vened under the auspices of WIPO in Palo Alto, California, in
March 1991; Cambridge, Massachusetts, in April 1993; Paris, in
June 1994; Mexico City, in May 1995; and Naples, in October
1995. At the Cambridge Conference, Digital Media magazine edi-
tor articulated, for the 300 participants, the special characteristics
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of the digital information and expression revolution: (1) intangi-
ble until processed and projected through a microprocessor-
controlled device; (2) copied indefinitely with no loss of quality;
(3) information is malleable, i.e., can be combined, altered, mixed,
manipulated with relative ease; (4) infinite life (unlike old movie
film and 78 rpm recordings which decay).01
Two American copyright attorneys reminded the participants
that governments have a long, embarrassing history of retarded
copyright policy response to technological innovations in expres-
sion media.20 2 Two music industry representatives emphasized
the revolutionary change imminent in their business: "Everything
capable of being reduced to zeros and ones, whether literary text,
audio or audio-visual signals, or other information, can be deliv-
ered to the home without manufacturing costs or environmental
waste.... Industries that have produced and manufactured cul-
tural goods will become service, rather than goods, providers." 203
They opined that electronic delivery will one day replace existing
retail marketing systems for phonograms but only if appropriate
technical and legal means of anti-piracy are established. At the
Paris conference, a professor from the University of Paris, noting
the emerging "multimedia" works, opined that the acquisition of
a right to copy text, music, and images already was limiting and
would increasingly constrain the creativity of these new kinds of
expressions unless appropriate provisions were provided in the
law.
2 4
A Finnish copyright authority explained that the copy ma-
chine had introduced a tremendous technological challenge in the
area of scientific, technical, and medical ("STM") journal publish-
0 See David Baron, Digital Technology and the Implications for Intellectual
Property, in WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WIPO
WORLDWIDE SYMPOSIUM ON THE IMPACT OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY ON
COPYRIGHTS AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS 31 (1993) [hereinafter WIPO,
DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY].
202 See Morton David Goldberg & Jesse M. Feder, Copyright and Technol-
ogy: The Analog, the Digita, and the Analogy, in WIPO, DIGITAL TECH-
NOLOGY, supra note 201, at 43.
203 See Jason S. Berman, The Music Industry and Technological Development:
Are We Winning the War?, in WIPO, DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY, supra note 201,
at 93, 107-10.
204 See Pierre Sirinelli, The Adaptation of Copyright in the Face of New Tech-
nology, in WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WIPO
WORLDWIDE SYMPOSIUM ON THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT AND NEIGH-
BORING RIGHTS 37 (1994) [hereinafter WIPO, COPYRIGHT].
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ing, which assumed greater economic consequences in the 1980s as
libraries faced tighter budgets, along with growing demand for ar-
ticles regarding science, engineering, and medicine.20 5  Inter-
library loan proliferated within the library community to the
consternation of the main STM publishers, Reed Elsivier and
Springer-Verlag, so a solution was found through (1) levies on
copyright equipment, (2) paybacks to copyright associations, (3)
increased journal prices, (4) less expensive distribution through
CD-ROM, and (5) acceptance of the inter-library loan practice.
This authority speculated that the principles could be applied to
electronic distribution for "[t]here is rather general agreement that
displaying or viewing of protected material on a screen ought to
be subject to copyright. The protection can be constituted... by
considering a display to be a copy and the act consequently sub-
ject to the right of reproduction." 07 The conflict between U.S.
copyright law's emphasis upon the economic rights of the risk-
taking producer/distributor and Europe's emphasis upon the ex-
pressive rights of the author/director was proclaimed by a Belgian
screenwriter: "It is... ridiculous to claim that the creator of Citi-
zen Kane was RKO, Inc., in 1943, and the Turner Corporation in
1994. " 208 "Europe," he concluded, "is the only place in the world
where men have been able to combine economic progress with
social and cultural progress," a situation it owes to its
moral/author's rights institution.209  A Stanford law professor,
however, offered the counterpoint:
I know of no artist who starves in his garret because he de-
sires to do so. Every serious creator wants to communi-
cate his work to as large an audience as his vision can
command. Copyright and author's right create the shelter
of privacy that authors need, and give publishers and other
risk-taking intermediaries the economic protection they
205 See Tarja Koskinen, Reprography, Electrocopying, Electronic Delivery, and
the Exercise of Copyright, in WIPO, COPYRIGHT, supra note 204, at 180-87.
206 See id
207 Id. at 182.
208 Joao Correa, Protection of the Rights of the Creators ofAudiovisual Works,
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need, to make this hoped-for communication between
author and audience a reality.
210
The assistant director of WIPO for copyright norm creation
presented a paper in Paris aiming to define controversies and
summarize the issues.211 First, multimedia was clearly already
covered by the Berne Convention. Second, the lines between
rights of reproduction, distribution, and communication to the
public are becoming more blurry and may simply be stated in fact
if not in law as "digital delivery."212 Finally, the technical means,
of copy protection and management systems, "smart cards," di i-
tal codes, and so forth may become more frequently applied.F13
In Mexico City, he offered the judgment that treaty language
which could find broad support among Berne Convention mem-
bers would confer the right of distribution on digital transmis-
sions; treaty language which would likely be difficult to garner
broad support among Berne Convention members would be to
confer the right to authorize digital transmissions. 214 He noted
his sense that there was a consensus that application of these tech-
nical means, such as copy protection, copy management devices,
enc2yption, and identification, should be left with the rights own-
ers. However, "efficient sanctions may have to be prescribed
against those who manufacture, import or distribute unauthor-
ized devices the only or main purpose of which is to defeat or cir-
cumvent copy-protection, copy-management or encryption sys-
tems and the like... . 216  At the October, 1995 Naples
Conference, he opined that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
position as explicated in the so-called Lehman Report offered "a
very innovative solution" to the problem of defining reproduc-
tion: "The economic impact of such 'distribution by transmission'
210 Paul Goldstein, Copyright and Author's Right in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, in WIPO, COPYRIGHT, supra note 204, at 261.
21 Mihpy Ficsor, New Technologies and Copyright: Need for Change, Need
for Continuity, in WIPO, COPYRIGHT, supra note 204, at 209-20.
212 See i at 218..
213 See id
214 See id
215 See id at 219-20.
216 Mih~ly Ficsor, Speech, in WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION, WIPO WORLDWIDE SYMPOSIUM ON COPYRIGHT IN THE
GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTuRE 369 (1995).
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is really the same as that of distribution of tangible copies."217 He
went on to say that "at the international level, this solution may
not be acceptable for many countries.... It cannot be the only
approach because, in the national laws of many countries, the no-
tion of distribution is closely linked to the distribution of tangible
copies ... .218 The "Committee of Experts," the representatives
of the national governments which were parties to the Berne
Convention, met in May 1996 at WIPO headquarters in Geneva
for the purpose of moving toward a consensus so that treaties
could be concluded by the end of the year. A wide range of non-
governmental organizations were represented at the meetings.
Most governments expressed their optimism that two treaties
would be concluded in December.
The negotiators completed a Copyright Treaty219 at the De-
cember 1996 Diplomatic Conference, which supplements the
Berne Convention, and a Performances and Phonograms Treaty,
which supplements the Rome Convention. The copyright agree-
ment which emerged begins with the preamble that the contract-
ing parties desire to "develop and maintain the protection of the
rights of authors in their literary and artistic works" because they
recognize the "profound impact of the development and conver-
gence of information and communication technologies on the
creation and use of literary and artistic works," yet emphasizing
the "outstanding significance of copyright protection as an incen-
tive for literary and artistic creation" and recognizing the "need to
maintain a balance between the rights of authors and the larger
public interest, particularly education, research, and access to in-
formation, as reflected in the Berne Convention." 220 The Con-
vention reinforces continuity with the traditional scope of the
copyright institution that "copyright protection extends to ex-
pressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation, or
mathematical concepts as such."2' However, further articles ex-
plicitly extend Berne Convention protections to computer pro-
grams and compilations of data (databases). Regarding databases,
217 See id at 369-70.
218 Id
219 WIPO Copyright Treaty and Agreed Statemets Concerning the WIPO
Copyn'ght Treaty, INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT, Feb. 1997, Text No. 5-01, at
002 [hereinafter WIPO Copyright Treaty].
220 id
221 Id art. 2.
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the agreement qualifies that the "protection does not extend to the
data or the material itself" for databases protectable by "reason of
the selection or arranjyient of their contents" which "constitute
intellectual creations." Articles 6, 7, and 8 extend to authors'
exclusive rights regarding distribution, rental, and communication
to the public.
t2
The Convention's language is of considerable consequence for
the future development of electronic communication and com-
merce. The Obligations Concerning Rights Management Infor-
mation states that contracting parties:
shall provide adequate and effective legal remedies against
any person knowingly performing any of the following
acts knowing, or with respect to civil remedies having rea-
sonable grounds to know, that it will induce, enable, facili-
tate or conceal an infringement of any right covered by
this Treaty or the Berne Convention: (1) to remove or al-
ter any electronic rights management information without
authority; (2) to distribute, import for distribution, broad-
cast or communicate to the public, without authority,
works or copies of works knowing that electronic rights
management information has been removed or altered
without authority.224
The article defines "rights management information" as:
[I]nformation which identifies the work, the author of the
work, the owner of any right in the work, or information
about the terms and conditions of use of the work, and
any numbers or codes that represent such information,
when any of these items of information is attached to a
copy of a work or appears in connection with the com-
munication of a work to the public. m
Id arts. 4-5.
See id arts. 6-8.
2 Id. art. 12.
n Id.
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Thus, the treaty does not ban any consumer electronics hardware,
such as digital audio, video machines, or Internet connection de-
vices, which may now or might in the future be used for the pur-
pose of piracy. The treaty does not define transitory copies of
copyrighted works in computer memory as "copyright-significant
acts," which was an alternative proposed by the U.S. govern-
ment.226 The proposed language apparently would have meant
that a copyrighted work would have to be paid for using e-cash
systems at the time of calling up a copyrighted expression on-line
lest infringement occur. The adopted language apparently means
that identification codes and encryption will be used to permit
on-line access to copyrighted works but will prevent copying of
expressions, and e-cash systems will be designed to demand pay-
ment for down-loading or other use of the information.
The state representatives to WIPO also adopted a WIPO Per-
formances and Phonograms Treaty,227 on December 20, 1996, an
agreement which aims to amend the International Convention for
the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and
Broadcasting Organizations (the Rome Convention). The pream-
ble to the treaty states that the contracting parties desire to
"develop and maintain the protection of the rights of performers
and producers of phonograms" because they recognize the
"profound impact of the development and convergence of infor-
mation and communication technologies on the production and
use of performances and phonograms," yet recognize the "need to
maintain a balance between.the rights of performers and produc-
ers of phonograms and the larger public interest, particularly edu-
cation, research, and access to information.
" "8
After defining "performer," "phonogram," "fixation,"
"producer of a phonogram," and "publication," the Rome Con-
vention goes on to define broadcasting as the "transmission by
wireless means for public reception of sounds or of images and
sounds or of the representations thereof" and includes
"transmission by satellite" and "transmission of encrypted signals"
226 See id.
227 WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty and Agreed Statements Con-
cerning the WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty, INDUS. PROP. &
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as broadcasts. 229 It defines "communication to the public" as the
"transmission to the public by any medium, otherwise than by
broadcasting, of sounds of a performance or the sounds or the
representations of sound fixed in a phonogram."23 This language
thereby explicitly captures digital transmission within the mean-
ing of the rights of performers as it relates to broadcasting and
phonogram production. Article 4 provides that each contracting
party shall provide national treatment to the nationals of other
contracting parties.231 The Convention goes on to provide that
performers have moral rights independent of economic rights
"even after the transfer of those rights.., as regards live aural per-
formances or performances fixed in phonograms," 232 including the
"right to claim to be identified as the performer of his perform-
ances" and to "object to any distortion, mutilation or modifica-
tion of his performances that would be prejudicial to his reputa-
tion."233  It is noteworthy that the second right is qualified
through the language "object" to any distortion rather than
stronger language such as "prevent" any distortion. Regarding
economic rights, Article 6 provides that performers "enjoy the
exclusive right of authorizing, as regards their performances: (1)
the broadcasting and communication to the public of their un-
fixed performances except where the performance is already a
broadcast performance; and (2) the fixation of their unfixed per-
formances."2 4 Articles 7 provides performers with the exclusive
right to authorize reproduction of their performances; Article 8
provides to performers exclusive distribution rights; Article 9
provides to performers exclusive rental rights.
235
Producers of phonograms enjoy the "exclusive right of author-
izing the direct or indirect reproduction of their phonograms"
23 6
and "exclusive right of authorizing the making available to the
public of the original and copies of their phonograms through sale
or other transfer of ownership," but this right may be limited by
22 Id. art 2.
230 Id.
231 See id. art4.
232 IL art. 5.
" Id. arts. 11-12.
214 Id. art. 6.
231 See id arts. 7-9.
236 Id. art. 11.
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contracting parties to first sales.237 Producers enjoy rights regard-
ing commercial rental of the original and copies of their hono-
grams (which means that they can prevent it if they wish). 8 Ar-
ticle 13 also provides a grandfather clause regarding existing
phonogram rental systems, provided that "equitable remunera-
tion" is available for producers and that commercial rental is "not
giving rise to the material impairment of the exclusive rights of
reproduction," these rental systems may be maintained. 23 9 There
is broad language aimed at dealing with distribution through such
communication means as the Internet: "Producers of phono-
grams shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing the making
available to the public of their phonograms, by wire or wireless
means, in such a way that members of the public may access them
from a place and at a time individually chosen by them."
240
The outcome, thus, was just as predicted by the WIPO secre-
tariat assistant director general more than a year before at the
Naples conference. The agreements aim to preserve the intent of
the intellectual property policy of expression by conferring exclu-
sive rights of authorship and distribution in order to provide in-
centives for risky investment in expression products while main-
taining the public's interest in access to the information and
expression. Though new communication technologies make it a
tricky balance to achieve, the copyright agreements were achieved
through function-specific diplomacy built upon five years of
WIPO educational initiative and despite the absence of the linkage
bargaining opportunities. One electronic magazine described the
interest group advocacy and diplomacy at the Diplomatic Confer-
ence, but, by ignoring the institutional history of the interna-
tional copyright law reform process undertaken through the lead-
ership of the WIPO secretariat over the previous five years,
mischaracterized how the new international copyright law was
achieved there.24' However, the final text omitted crucial issues,
so the 1996 Diplomatic Conference only begins the process of
7 Id. art. 12.
3 See id. art. 13.
239 rd.
240 Id. art. 14.
241 See John Browning, Africa 1 Hollywood 0, WIRED, Mar. 1997, at 61-64,
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new rule creation regarding communication technology change
and copyright.
7. CONCLUSION
Function-specific diplomacy contributes learning capacity to
international lawmaking: Expert knowledge-rich specialists at the
IGO form the organizational core of a subnational and transna-
tional epistemic community which shares the consensual knowl-
edge needed for learning to adapt economic law to changing tech-
nologies and market conditions. Linkage-bargain diplomacy
contributes multiple policy issues to international lawmaking.
Trade negotiators have at their disposal a panoply of policy issues
with which to offer concessions which permit side-payments to
affected domestic groups in order to bargain new economic law.
Function-specific diplomacy is the grist of the law-creation mill;
linkage-bargain diplomacy fixes the break-downs. International
intellectual property lawmaking is both function-specific and
linkage-bargain diplomacy, and policymakers will exploit the ca-
pabilities of both the WIPO and WTO forums in order to achieve
new international intellectual property law. They will consider
both their bargaining rules and their technical, functional exper-
tise when planning future multilateral negotiations. Given the
importance of learning and technical knowledge to successful
lawmaking, policymakers ought put as much consideration into
secretariat knowledge-support capabilities as into forum decision-
making procedures when planning multilateral negotiations for
international rule creation.
The international intellectual property diplomacy conducted
in TRIPS and in the 1996 Berne and Rome convention amend-
ments has barely addressed the Information Revolution, for
TRIPS negotiators were preoccupied with the diplomacy of de-
veloping country opposition to intellectual property protection,
especially to the patent institution, and the Copyright Diplomatic
Conference negotiators were limited to the incrementalism of the
achievable under circumstances of technological turbulence and
market uncertainty. Looking toward the year 2000 and beyond,
the primary catalyst for international intellectual property institu-
tional change will be digital communication convergence, net-
work computing, and biotechnology. Areas of special focus will
likely include: (1) patenting of biotechnology products, (2) plant
breeder's rights, (3) trade secrets in pharmaceutical, chemical, and
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agri-product production, (4) copyrights in electronic commerce,
including moral/author's rights versus producer/distributor's
rights, (5) trade secrets of networked business enterprises, and (6)
expression and "sweat-of-the-brow" database protection. New
rule creation will be informed by ideas generated at WIPO-
sponsored international conferences, from national experiences
with legislation-drafting, and from dispute settlement within state
judiciaries, between private parties at WIPO's Arbitration Center,
and between states at WTO's dispute settlement mechanism.
Intellectual property offers some generalizations for the di-
plomacy of other policy areas of international economic rule crea-
tion. Deep integration with respect to environmental, labor,
communication, health, and other regulatory issues will demand
full exploitation of function-specific as well as linkage-bargain in-
ternational lawmaking diplomacy. Thus, scholars and policy-
makers alike ought not to singly focus on the trade-related diplo-
macy of these issues within the World Trade Organization, for
the function-specific learning forum provided within the United
Nations Environment Program, International Labor Organiza-
tion, International Telecommunications Union, International
Standards Organization, World Health Organization, and other
IGOs will importantly contribute to international law creation.
Linkage bargaining aided by a small WTO secretariat will be
overwhelmed by the knowledge demands and ought to be re-
served for the politically and diplomatically unresolvable issues.
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The question of dispute resolution systems for international
organizations is of growing importance. Not only has there been
a plethora of new international and regional organizations created
in the last few years, but this trend is likely to continue. There
are numerous proposals for multilateral free trade areas and
agreements across Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as in
Asia.' At the same time, existing international trade organiza-
tions have come under increasing scrutiny for their inability to
reflect accurately the needs and concerns of the citizens of the
member states.
For example, the debate about fast track authority for the
Clinton Administration reflects concerns about the benefits of
free trade agreements to the U.S. economy and fears that in-
creased free trade with less developed states will lead to an elimi-
nation of jobs in certain manufacturing sectors. 2 This debate fo-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. J.D.,
Harvard Law School; A.B., Princeton University. I would like to thank Jeffery
Atik, Steve Charnovitz and Frank Garcia for their insightful comments and
questions. John McDonald and Sara Cobb also provided helpful feedback. An
early draft of this Article was presented at the conference Linkage as Phenome-
non: An Interdisciplinary Approach, sponsored by the International Economic
Law Interest Group of the American Society of International Law. I appreciate
the valuable comments from the conference participants. Many thanks also go
to Maria Cheryan and Emily Canedo for their superior research assistance.
SSee, e.g., Frank J. Garcia, "Americas Agreements"'--An Interim Stage in
Building the Free Trade Area of the Americas, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 63
(1997) (discussing implementation of the Free Trade Area); Paul A. O'Hop, Jr.,
Hemzspheric Integration and the Elimination of Legal Obstacles Under a NAFTA-
Based System, 36 HARV. INT'L LJ. 127 (1995) (discussing importance of
NAFTA to the establishment of the free trade zone in the Western Hemi-
%here); Merit Janow, Assessing APEC's Role in Economic Integration in the Asia-
acic Region, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUs. 947 (1997).
Fast track allows the President to negotiate trade pacts and submit them
to Congress for up-or-down votes, with no amendments allowed. See Peter
Baker & Paul Bluestein, Clinton Searches for Middle on 'Fast Track', WASH.
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cuses on whether it is even in our citizens' interests for the United
States to join international trade organizations. Meanwhile,
across the Atlantic Ocean, the ongoing debate about the
"democracy deficit" in the European Union ("EU") demonstrates
the concern with the decreased ability of citizens to have a say in
what the laws are under the EU.3 This debate focuses on the abil-
ity of citizens to influence lawmakers in the substantive laws that
directly affect their lives. In both of these debates, people have
examined the legitimacy of international trade organizations and
debated ways of structuring these organizations to be more demo-
cratic and more legitimate.
POST, Sept. 11, 1997, at A8. Fast track supporters argue that without fast track,
it would be impossible for the United States to conclude deals with other na-
tions because tle agreements are subject to Congressional approval. Many na-
tions are hesitant to negotiate agreements when they know that Congress can
reopen them in the approval process and force further negotiations. See, e.g.,
Bob Dole & Lloyd Bentsen, Editorial, 'Fast Track' Issue Deserves Fast Action,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1997, at A31. Supporters of fast track generally favor in-
creased free trade. Those opposed to fast track are those more doubtful of the
benefits of free trade and harmonization of standards, including labor and envi-
ronmental groups. See Linda Clerkin, Shut Up and Take Your Medicine: Will
International Laws Force Vitamins Off U.S. Shelves? CiTY EDITION: THE WKLY
NEWSPAPER OF MILWAUKEE, Nov. 20, 1997 ("We believe that each nation's
needs are unique, and it shouldn't be up to an international group to decide
what laws best govern that nation. It should be up to those nations them-
selves.") (quoting Susan Haeger, Executive Director of Citizens for Health pro-
testing harmonized guidelines for vitamins and minerals under CODEX). For
a discussion that links current trends in international trade and the economy
towards strengthening the argument for fast track, see the viewpoint by the
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for international economic policy from 1989
to 1993, in Thomas J. Duesterberg, Selling the Free-Trade Story, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 1997, at BU9. For a view of whether fast track is necessary to accom-
plish trade pacts, see David Sanger, The Trade Bill: The Impact, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 11, 1997, at A6, and also see Lori Wallach, Fast Track Trade Authority:
Who Needs Fast Track?, J. CoM., Sept. 19, 1997, at 9A. Although fast track
authority was not granted last year, it is clear that the debate over free trade in
general and fast track in particular will recur.
3 See, e.g., J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J.
2403, 2466-74 (1991). Weiler's article describes "democracy deficit" as the abil-
ity of the unelected branches of the EU, the Council and the Commission to
pass legislation overriding laws passed by the national parliaments. In other
words, it is possible for citizens of a certain member state to be required to fol-
low a law f6r which neither they nor their duly elected representatives voted.
Democracy deficit also refers to the comparative lack of political power in the
only elected EU body, the Parliament. See generally Anne-Marie Burley, De-
mocracy and Judicial Review in the European Community, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 81 (1992) (examining the roles of legislative and judicial bodies in the EU).
4 For example, the Environmental Side Agreement of the North American




This article takes a different approach to understanding ques-
tions of legitimacy and democracy in international organizationss
by examining the dispute resolution mechanisms used in these or-
ganizations. An alternative method of assessing legitimacy and
democracy in international organizations would be to look at the
ability of private actors to enforce rules once they are enacted.
Ultimately, I shall argue that increasing individual involvement in
dispute resolution-by granting private actors rights and standing
under these organizations-is an appropriate way to increase the
legitimacy of international trade organizations.
Section 2 of this Article reviews the general arguments sur-
rounding democracy in international organizations. I will exam-
ine the increased role of private actors in international law as ad-
vocated by liberal international relations theory, the arguments
surrounding the democracy deficit in the EU, and the issue of
capture by narrow political interests reflected in the debate over
fast track authority.
In order to understand different levels of individual involve-
ment in dispute resolution, Section 3 of this Article examines
some factors in determining different types of dispute resolution
mechanisms. These factors--direct effect, standing, supremacy,
transparency and enforcement-all reflect different levels of in-
volvement between the trade organization and the citizens under
it.
The Section 4 of this Article makes the argument that in-
creased individual involvement will increase democracy in these
trade organizations. This involvement will increase the role of
private actors in lawmaking, make enforcement of the original
trade agreement more likely, reduce the danger of capture by nar-
adequate enforcement of environmental laws in Mexico and the resulting con-
cern about a "race-to-the-bottom"--the fear that companies would relocate
there in order to take advantage of the lax enforcement. See North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1994).
s In an attempt to give some definition to ambiguous and critical terms, I
use the term "legitunacy" to refer to the lawfulness and appropriateness of these
international organizations, as well as the perceived fairness and justice resulting
from these agreements. "Democracy" refers to the representative and participa-
tory aspects of international organizations.
6 See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, opened for
signature Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958)
[hereinafter the EEC TREATY].
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row interests, increase the transparency of these trade organiza-
tions and, in the end, make organizations themselves more effec-
tive. Finally, Section 5 concludes the Article.
2. DEMOCRACY iN INnTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
There are three critiques of international organizations that
can shed light on the involvement of private actors.
2.1. Liberal International Relations Theory
The first argument comes from the liberal international rela-
tions theory ("liberal IR") of political science, which has now
been more regularly applied to international law.7 Liberal IR ar-
gues that previous international relations theories, such as realism
8
and regime theory,9 are too state-based in their assessment of in-
ternational relations. Liberal IR focuses on the actors behind the
veil of the state, looking at how the state is organized and who
has power, in order to understand the motivations and interac-
tions of states in the international realm. In examining dispute
resolution, several proponents of liberal IR have looked at the
European system and the role of private actors for explaining its
success. Furthermore, scholars have focused on how interna-
7 See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Re-
lations Theory: A DualAgenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993) (proposing applica-
tion of "liberal" international relations theory to internationa law; Anne-
Marie Slaughter, The Liberal Agenda for Peace: International Relations Theory
and the Future of the United Nations, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
377 (1994) (discussing liberal conception of the United Nations); David P.
Fidler, LIBERTAD v. Liberalism: An Analysis of the Helms-Burton Act From
Within Liberal International Relations Theory, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
297 (1997) (using liberal IR to examine U.S. legislation).
8 See Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Pro-
spectusfor International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335, 336-38 (1989); see also
furley, supra note 7, at 214-18 (discussing realism theory). For more on apply-
ing realism to international trade see generally ROBERT GILPIN, U.S. POWER
AND THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (1975), and HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS
AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (5th ed. 1973).
9 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (1983) (Stephen D. Krasner ed.);
Friedrich Kratochwil & John G. Ruggie, International Organization: A State of
the Art on an Art of the State, 40 INT'L ORG. 753 (1986); Burley, supra note 7, at
218-20.
10 For a Kantian explanation of liberal governance and the relation to in-
ternational trade, see ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 23-24 (1997); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie




tional relations theories might reflect themselves in different dis-
pute resolution models in a variety of international trade organi-
zations.1
This article attempts to build on this body of work by using
the major beliefs of liberal IR to evaluate different models of in-
ternational dispute resolution. Liberal IR argues that (1) private
actors are the fundamental actors in society; (2) governments re-
flect some segment of society; and, (3) states behave according to
their preferences.12 This article examines the extent to which pri-
vate actors are given roles in international dispute resolution and
the impact this has on the international organization as well as
their domestic government. I will examine how different dispute
resolution models result in different segments of society being
represented by their governments and how different models re-
flect and change state actions and preferences.
2.2. Democracy Deficit
A more direct line of attack on the legitimacy of international
organizations comes from many of the scholars focusing on the
EU. The argument here is that, as power has been centralized in
the EU and as laws are increasingly passed at the EU level, citi-
zens of member states actually have less ability to influence legis-
lation. 3 What started as a union of democratic states actually re-
L.J. 273 (1997); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International
Organizations, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 398, 424-27 (1997); Walter Mattli &
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Constructing the European Community Legal System from
the Ground Up: The Role of Individual Litigants and National Courts (Harvard
Law School, Harvard Jean Monnet Chair Working Papers, No. 1/95), available
at Jonathan Katchen, The Jean Monnet Chair (visited Apr. 4, 1998)
< http://www.law.harvard.edu/Programs/JeanMonnet/>.
Kenneth W. Abbott, The Trading Nation's Dilemma: The Functions of the
Law of International Trade, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 501 (1985) (applying realist
theory to international trade); Frank J. Garcia, Decisionmaking and Dispute
Resolution in the Free Trade Area of the Americas: An Essay in Trade Governance,
18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 357 (1997) (applying mesoinstitutiLon theory to the Free
Trade Area of the Americas); G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and Interna-
tional Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DuKE
L.J. 829 (1995) (setting forth three models of dispute resolution based on three
theoretical premises).
12 See Burley, supra note 7, at 227-28.
13 See Weiler, supra note 3; Weiler, et al., European Democracy and Its Cri-
tique-Five Uneasy Pieces (Harvard Law School, Harvard Jean Monnet Chair
Working Papers, No. 1/95), available at Jonathan Katchen, The Jean Monnet
Chair (visited Apr. 4, 1998) <http://www.law.harvard.edu/Programs/
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suits in less democracy for their citizens. In order to remedy this
deficit of democracy, some argue that citizens must be given more
direct representation at the EU level through the Parliament.
Some of the reforms of the European Parliament in the Single
European Act and the Treaty of Maastricht are explained by the
desire to give citizens more direct voice in EU legislation.'4 Oth-
ers argue that the EU has tried (unsuccessfully) to ease concerns of
democracy by greater transparency and legislative review.,, Citi-
zen participation in trade policy has also become a focus of envi-
ronmental and public interest groups looking at U.S. trade pol-
icy1 6 in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ("GATT")1
7
and the World Trade Organization ("WTO")."8
JeanMonnet/>.
14 To partially remedy the democracy deficit, the Maastricht Treaty cre-
ated a co-decision procedure, which essentially gives the European Parliament a
legislative veto on some matters. See TREATY ESTABLISHNG THE EUROPEAN
COMmUNry, Feb. 7 1992, art. 189b, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992), [1992] C.M.L.R. 573
(1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY]; see also Alan Dashwood, Community Legisla.
tive Procedures in the Era of the Treaty on European Union, 19 EUR. L. REV. 343
(1994) (discussing changes to legislative procedures resulting from Treaty on
EU); Trevor Hartley, Constitutional and Institutional Aspects of the Maastricht
Agreement, 42 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 213, 224-26 (1993); Dieter Kugelmann, The
Maastricht Treaty and the Design of a European Federal State, 8 TEMP. INT'L &
CoMP. L.J. 335, 346-48 (1994) (discussing relationship between the Treaty and
democracy).
15 See, e.g., Juliet Lodge, Transparency and Democratic Legitimacy, 32 J.
COMM. MKT. STUD. 343 (1994); Imelda Maher, Legislative Review by the EC
Commission, in NEW LEGAL DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN UNION 235, 238-240 Go
Shaw and Gillian More eds., 1995).
16 See, e.g., DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT (1994); Daniel C.
Esty, NGO's at the World Trade Organization: Cooperation, Competition, or Ex-
cluiion, (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript on file with author); Patti Goldman,
The Democratization of the Development of United States Trade Policy, 27
CORNELL NT'L L J. 631 (1994) (arguing that the secrecy and lack of public in-
put in U.S. trade policy results in a policy that is biased toward trade liberaliza-
tion at the expense of other values); Robert F. Housman,Democratizing Inter-
national Trade Decision-making, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 699 (1994) (discussing
undemocratic nature of international trade decision-making); Paul B. Stephan,
Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17
NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 681 (1997). Furthermore, in response to complaints
about lack of transparency, a U.S. District Court ordered the United States
Trade Representative to grant public access to submissions to GATT dispute
resolution panels. See Public Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Rep-
resentative, 804 F. Supp. 385 (D.D.C. 1992).
17 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55
U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
18 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Mulitlateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
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However, a focus on the democracy deficit alone is too nar-
row. In this view, the level of representation of private actors is
solely measured in the legislative process. Yet the legislative
prowess is only part of the equation. Lawmaking also occurs in
the judicial branch of the EU, through the European Court of
Justice. Additionally, the greatest changes in breadth, scope, and
power of the EU have come from the Court, not from legisla-
tion.' 9 Therefore, it is also appropriate-and indeed necessary-to
examine who has the power to compel judicial change. In the
EU, ironically, its citizens have the greatest ability to participate
in the dispute resolution process. Instead of a democracy deficit,
the EU comes closest to achieving democracy in its dispute reso-
lution mechanism compared to other international trade organi-
zations.
2.3. Trade Liberalism Versus Political Capture by Narrow
Interests
A final critique of international trade examines the relation-
ship between the state and its constituents. It is widely believed
that trade liberalism, while making economic sense to most states
is difficult to implement in the face of nationalist interests.2
8
First, at the U.S. political level, it has been argued that the execu-
tive branch is the logical protector of free trade, while Congress is
more likely to want to protect narrow, industrial, protectionist
interests.21 Therefore, it is important that the President be given
power over trade policy so that the broader economic interests of
the state, and consumers and exporters in particular, will be pro-
tected from the well-funded, well-organized importer lobby. Sec-
ond, on the international level, it has been argued that less trans-
URUGUAY Round vol. 1. (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter WTO
Agreement].
19 Weiler, supra note 3, at 2411-20.20 See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776); see also Frederick M. Abbott, Trade and
Democratic Values, 1 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 9, 17-18 (1992) (explaining
Adam Smith's and David Ricardo's economic theories in favor of a liberal tra?-
ing system).
2 See DANIEL VERDIER, DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 275
(1994); BETH V. YARBROUGH & ROBERT M. YARBROUGH, COOPERATION
AND GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 11 (1992); C. O'Neal Taylor,
Fast Track, Trade Policy, and Free Trade Agreements: Wy the NAFTA Turned
Into a Battle, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 18-21 (1994).
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parency for trade deals is useful in shielding trade agreements
from scrutiny of these national interests.22
Again, I suggest that this analysis of international trade rela-
tions overlooks the important dimension of dispute resolution.
The concerns of capture are not only prevalent at the deal making
stage. Whether or not a trade agreement is enforced clearly brings
all of the same elements to the table.23 Enforcement can separate
interests along the importer-exporter divide, along the manufac-
turer-consumer divide, between industries, or between companies.
Different methods of dispute resolution can either recognize or
ignore the issue of capture.
24
The involvement of private actors in the dispute resolution
mechanisms of trade organizations has the ability to reduce the
linkage between trade and domestic political interests.25  While
theoretically this link allows governments to be more responsive
to their citizens, in reality, the link between trade and politics
keeps governments tethered to special and well-organized interest
22 See Philip M. Nichols, Participation of Nongovernmental Parties in the
World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 295, 319 (1996) ("It can
be argued that the low public profile of international trade policy has been one
of the largest contributors to trade liberalization over the past fifty years.").
23 See Horacio A. Grigera Naon, Sovereignty and Regionalism, 27 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1073, 1075 (1996) (arguing that supranational dispute settle-
ment can "transcend the day-to-day political maneuvering of member states, lo-
cal bureaucracies, and interest groups").
24 "The nature of these [GATT] proceedings is not over conflicts of inter-
ests among countries but between the general interest of consumers in liberal
trade and the general interests of the taxpayers in an efficient government and
the interests in trade protectionism. They are about redistribution of income at
home." ASIL BULLETIN, No. 9, IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROLIFERATION OF
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATORY BODIES FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 44
(1995) (statement of Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann); see also John H. Barton & Barry
E. Carter, International Law and Institutions for a New Age, 81 GEO. L.J. 535,
550, 560 (1993) (arguing that individuals ought to be able to enforce and invoke
international law).
25 By using the term "political interest," I am denoting those negative con-
notations of narrow, specidal or otherwise inappropriate interests that can cap-
ture the polity. For more general information on public choice theory, see
DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991);
CHARLES K. ROWLEY & WILLEM THORBECKE, THE ROLE OF CONGRESS AND
THE EXECUTIVE IN U.S. TRADE POLICY DETERMINATION: A PUBLIC CHOICE
ANALYSIS IN NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW (Meinhard Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1993);KAY SCHLOZMAN
& JOHN TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICA DEMOCRACY, 339-
46 (1986); Paul B. Stephan, I, Barbarians Inside the Gate: Public Choice Theory
and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 745 (1995);




26groups. Once a state has determined that it is in its national in-
terest to join a trade organization and once rules are adopted un-
der that organization, the link to domestic political interests can
be reduced by giving private actors standing to enforce the agree-
ment. In that way governments will be responsible for following
the rules across the board rather than selectively.
27
3. FACTORS IN DETERMINING MODELS OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
Now that I have set forth some of the critiques of the interna-
tional trade system, this Article can turn to better understanding
the dispute resolution options. In order to determine the level of
individual involvement there are several factors to examine.
3.1. Direct Effect ofRights
3.1.1. Definition
The first factor is whether private actors are directly granted
rights under the international treaty establishing the trade organi-
zation. The term "self-executing" comes from the idea that the
treaty executes itself without further legislative action. For those
who study EU law, the rights under the Treaty of Rome and
26 See Jeffery Atik, Identifying Antidemocratic Outcomes: Authenticity, Self-
Sac ifice and International Trde, in Symposium, Linkage as Phenomenon: A
Multidisciplinary Approach, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 201 (1998).
27 For more on how private actors can enhance government compliance,
see Matt Schaefer, Are Private Remedies in Domestic Courts Essential for Interna-
tional Trade Agreements to Perform Constitutional Functions with Respect to Sub-
Federal Governments?, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 609 (1996-97).
28 The factors listed in this section are no doubt incomplete. Other factors of
inquiry could include the precedential value of decisions, hether the decision is
subject to review or appea , and whether the panel is rotating or standing. See, e.g.
Louis F. Del Duca, Teachings of the European Community Experience for Dove.
oping Regional Organizations, 11 DICK. J. INT'L L. 485 1993); Philip M.
Nichols, GA 7TT Doctrine, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 379 (1996); Miquel Montafia I
Mora, A GA 7T with Teeth: Law Wins over Politics in the Resolution of Interna-
tional Trade Disputes, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103 (1993). I have chosen
not to discuss those factors because they focus on those dispute resolution systems
that already have some sort of decision-makingbody. This study takes a broader
approach and does not assume the existence of any such tribunal.
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other legislation have been called "directly applicable" 29 and are
said to have "direct effect." 30 For the purposes of this Article, the
differences among the three phrases will be overlooked,3' and I
will use the term "direct effect" to mean those treaties that give
private actors immediate rights and under which no further do-
mestic legislative action is necessary.
3.1.2. WhTy Directly Effective Rights Are Important
Directly effective rights are an important issue in treaty law
because the scope and depth of the treaty will vary depending on
whether private actors will also be involved in the implementa-
tion of the treaty. Those treaties under which private actors get
rights give these private actors another legal basis for protecting
their rights under the law.
The issue of direct effect globally has most commonly arisen
under human rights treaties, which are clearly drafted in order to
protect and benefit individuals.32 In the United States, the con-
tinual debate over self-executing treaties re-emerges every time a
new human rights treaty comes up for ratification in the U.S.
Senate. The Senate is traditionally reluctant to grant direct effect
to these treaties because these treaties may provide additional
29 See Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming
Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1
[hereinafter Van Gend en Loos].
30 See Case 106/77, Amministrazione Delle Finanze Dello Stato v. Sim-
menthal SpA (1I), 1978 E.C.R. 629; see also, Ronald A. Brand, Direct Effects of
International Economic Law in the United States and the EU, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& Bus. 556 (1996-97); Pierre Pescatore, The Doctrine of "Direct Effect"An Infant
Disease of Community Law, 8 EUR. L. REV. 155 (1983). For discussion of
direct effect" see T. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW 183-218 (1988).
31 This is not to say that the difference between direct applicability and di-
rect effect is not important or has not occupied many pages of academic discus-
sion. See, e.g., J.A. Winter, Direct Applicability and Direct Effect" Two Distinct
and Different Concepts in Community Law, 9 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 425
(1972).
32 See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishr-ent, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOc. No. 100-20;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, openedfor signature Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter
ICCPR]; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, ado pted Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; see also David Weissbrodt,
United States Ratification of the Human Rights Covenants, 63 MINN. L. REV. 35





rights not provided under the Constitution.3 3 In keeping with the
Senate's traditional isolationist approach to foreign relations, the
idea that international law may differ or go further than U.S. do-
mestic law remains anathema to many members of Congress and
other citizens.14 Thus, when the United States recently ratified
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR"), the United States made a specific reservation stating
that the ICCPR would not be self-executing.35 This has been the
typical practice with most recently ratified human rights treaties.
International trade treaties in the United States are also tradition-
ally not self-executing.3 6 They usually need additional implement-
33 For example, the ICCPR calls for the elimination of the death penalty
for juveniles under 18. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, has held that
the death penalty is permitted against juveniles to the age of 16. See Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
While many countries around the world have eliminated the death penalty, the
United States has expanded its use. See International Comm'n of Jurists, Ad-
ministration of the Death Penalty in the United States, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 165
(1997).
34 See, e.g., U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: WIH
OR WIOUT RESERVATIONS, (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1981); M. Cherif Bas-
siouni, Reflections on the Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights by the United States Senate, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1169 (1993)
(discussing the U.S. concerns in ratification of the ICCPR); Kerri Ann Law,
Hope for the Future. Overcoming Jurisdictional Concerns to Achieve United States
Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 62 FORDHAM L. REV.
1851 (1994) (discussing the reasons the United States should ratify the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child); Ann Elizabeth Mayer,Reflec-
tions on the Proposed United States Reservations to CEDA W Should the Constitu-
tion Be an Obstacle to Human Rights?, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 727 (1996)
(discussing the U.S. reaction to Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women); Jordan J. Paust,Avoiding Fraudulent' Execu-
tive Policy: Analysis of Non-Self-Execution of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1257 (1993) (discussing the U.S. decision to make
ICCPR non-self-executing).
35 The ICCPR was adopted by the United States on September 8, 1992.
The U.S. Senate gave the requisite advice and consent to the treaty, together
with the declaration "[tihat the United States declares that the provisions of Ar-
ticles 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing.... ." 138CONG. REC
S4,784; see also 18 U.S.C. SS 1091-93 (1994) (setting forth the implementing lan-
gua e of the Genocide Convention).
6 See JOHN H JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND
POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 79-105 (1997) (discussing
broadly U.S. law and the application of international trade treaties); John H.
Jackson, U.S. Constitutional Law Principles and Foreign Trade Law and Policy, in
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 65
(Meinhard Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1993) (reviewing the history
of the application of trade treaties in U.S. law).
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ing legislation or rule-making in order to have any force in do-
mestic U.S. law.
On the other hand, when we discuss trade organizations, the
private actor involvement is particularly appropriate. After all,
states intend to design trade treaties to encourage private actors to
import and export from other private actors. In order to encour-
age this trade, treaties require that states do not take actions that
would adversely affect these private actors. Historically, the very
basis of friendship, commerce and navigation treaties was to pro-
vide protection for private actors from unfair governmental
treatment. Even at the lowest level of economic interaction, bi-
lateral investment treaties today require that governments treat
citizens and noncitizens equally. States grant private actors these
rights as national treatmentV or a minimum standard of treat-
ment38 in the host state. Once states choose to join international
37 The notion that individuals granted rights under national treatment will
receive the same treatment as the state's nationals is referred to as the "Equality
of Treatment Doctrine." Though gaining popular support world wide, it has
been the doctrine historically preferred by communist and Third World na-
tions. "Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation" between the U.S.
and other nations used the national treatment standard. See, e.g., Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, U.S.-Japan, art. IV, para.
1, 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2067. ("Nationals and companies of either Party shall be ac-
corded national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment with respect to
access to the courts of justice and to administrative tribunals and agencies
within the territories of the other Party... both in pursuit and in defense of
their rights.").
38 Accordin to the Minimum Standard of International Justice, a state
must accord an lien with at least a minimum standard of treatment, even if this
means an alien would receive better treatment than the state's own nationals.
This doctrine was traditionally favored by Western nations, particularly with
regard to states with a poor record on human rights. However, third world na-
tions have feared that the use of a minimum standard will be used as a cover for
privileged status with regards to investments, inheritance and ownership of
property. See Greta Gainer, Nationalization: The Dichotomy Between Western
and Third World Perspectives in International Law, 26 How. L.J. 1547 (1983).
Interestingly, more recent U.S. treaties combine both the national treatment
and the minimum standard. For example, in the one Treaty of Friendship with
Belgium it is written that
Each Contracting Party shall at all times accord equitable
treatment and effective protection to the persons, property,
enterprises, rights and interests of nationals and companies of
the other Party.... Nationals of either Contracting Party
within the territories of the other Party shall be accorded full
legal and judicial protection for their persons, rights, and in-
terests. Such nationals shall be free from molestation and
shall receive constant protection in no case less than required
by international law. To this end they shall in particular have
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trade organizations, the requirement of fair treatment for nonciti-
zens includes freedom from unfair taxation, unfair government
regulation, unequal tariffs and unequal nontariff barriers. Basi-
cally, trade treaties provide a set of rights for private actors against
governments.
Yet, trade treaties are currently structured so as to provide
states these rights on behalf of their citizens rather than granting
these rights directly to the citizens. Because trade treaties most
affect private actors it only makes sense that these rights have ap-
propriate remedies. As Stefan Riesenfeld argued almost twenty-
right of access, on the same basis and on the same conditions
as nationals of such other Party, to the courts of justice and
administrative tribunals and agencies in all degrees of jurisdic-
tion and shall have right to the services of competent persons
of their choice.
Treaty of Friendship, Establishment, and Navigation, Feb. 21, 1961, U.S.-Belg.,
arts. 1, 3(1),.(2), 14 U.S.T. 1284, 1286, 1288-89; While in an investment treaty
with Argentina, it is written:
Each Party shall permit and treat investment, and activities as-
sociated therewith, on a basis no less favorable than that ac-
corded in like situations to investment or associated activities
of its own nationals or companies, or of nationals or comp a-
nies of any third country, whichever is the more favorable,
subject to the right of each Party to make or maintain excep-
tions falling within one of the sectors or matters listed in the
Protocol to this Treaty... Investment shall at all times be ac-
corded fair and equitable treatment, shall enjoy full protection
and security and shall in no case be accorded treatment less
than that required by international law.
Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Invest-
ment, Nov., 14 1991, Arg-U.S., 31 I.L.M. 124.
39 As Andreas Lowenfeld stated,
I have never believed that a right without a remedy is no right
at all. But there can be no doubt that the closer a legal system
comes to affording remedies for breaches of rules, the stronger
are the rights it confers, and the more reliance can be placed
on the rues.
Andreas Lowenfeld, Remedies Along with Rights: Institutional Reform in the New
GA T, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 471, 488 (1994). For more on rights without reme-
dies in the domestic context, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,Individual Rights and
the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L. REV. 343 (1993) (giving context to indi-
vidual's rights in a structured society); Richard H. Flon, Jr. & Daniel J. Melt-
zer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 1731 (1991) (examining the concept of "new" law in criminal cases from
h ive of the law of remedies in the constitutional context); Donald H.
Zeig er, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of Rights
in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665 (1987) (arguing that courts must
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five years ago, direct effect of rights and proper judicial remedies
are necessary to the continued development of free trade.4 Fur-
thermore, without appropriate remedies, these rights often are left
unprotected and unenforced. Increased legitimacy and effective-
ness of international trade organizations require individual in-
volvement, not only at the staie of lawmaking, but also at the
stage of remedying lawbreaking. 1
3.1.3. How Rights Become Directly Effective
In many states other than the United States, international
treaties are automatically self-executing and, at ratification, grant
individual citizens the rights outlined in the treaty on the same
basis as the state itself. Language granting individual ri hts under
international treaties can be outlined in the constitution or legis-
lation.43 Still other states grant individual rights under treaties
through the evolution of judicial decisions that have held the
rights to be self-executing or directly effective.44 In the United
States, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a Japanese
individual was granted rights directly under the Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation signed between Japan and the
United States. 45 Similarly, although direct effect was not clearly
presume enforcement of a law absent a showing that greater harm will occur to
a plaintiff from enforcing these rights).
40 See Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Legal Systems of Regional Economic Integration,
22 AM. J. CoMP. L. 415, 443 (1974).41 In fact, the American Bar Association ("ABA") supported expanding the
right of private parties to bring cases under NAFTA. See Int'l Law and Practice
Section, American Bar Ass'n, Reports to the House of Delegates, 26 INT'L LAW.
855, 859 (1992). See also, Joint Working Group on the Settlement of Int'l Dis-
putes, Canadian and American Bar Ass'ns, Settlement ofDisputes Under the Pro-
posed Free Trade Area Agreement, 22 INT'L LAW 879 (1988) proposing a refer-
ence procedure from national courts in which individuals could bring cases to a
Joint Canada-United States Free Trade Tribunal).
42 See STATUUT NED. [Constitution] art. 91 (Neth.).
43 For example, under the law of the United Kingdom, "although the ex-
ecutive has a largely unfettered power to enter into treaty obligations, such ob-
ligations normay need to be transformed into domestic law by legislation be-
fore they can be enforced by British courts." Nicholas Grief, Constitutional
Law and International Law, in UNITED KINGDOM LAW IN THE MID-1990s
76,88 (ohn W. Bridge et al. eds., 1994).
4 See Etat Beige, Ministre des Affaires Economiques c. Societe Anoyme
Fromagerie Franco-Suisse Le Ski', Cour des Cass., 158 Pasic. 1971-I (1971)
(Belf.) (ruling on the supremacy of the self-executing treaties over national law).
5 See Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924) (detailing suit of a
Japanese national by the City of Seattle for the ability to open a pawn shop).
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written into the Treaty of Rome, the European Court of Justice
("ECJ") found that the rights in the treaty did have direct effect.46
Under case law from the ECJ, citizens of member states of the
EU are also granted rights directly from EU legislation.47 This
direct effect under the Treaty of Rome is already quite revolu-
tionary in comparison to most international treaties.48  Because
the practice of granting direct effect varies by state, it is necessary
The Court quoting language from the treaty, "[t]he citizens ... of each of the
High Contracting Parties shall have the liberty to ... reside in the territories of
the other to carry on trade. . ." held in favor of the Japanese national. See id. at
340. For more on self-executing treaties, see Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing
Treaties, 82 AM J. INT'L L. 760 (1988); Carlos Manuel Vasques, The Four Doc-
trines of SelfExecuting Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695 (1995). See also Charles
D. Siegel, individual Rights Under Se-fExecuting Extradition Treaties-Dr. Al-
varez Machains Case, 13 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP L. J. 765 (1991) (detailing
case ruling that a Mexican fugitive wanted for a U.S. murder who was kid-
napped had to be released because Mexico had protested under its rights under a
treaty).
46 See Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. 1. This decision was controversial at
the time and, it was argued, beyond the scope of the ECJ. See id., at 19
(Opinion of the Advocate General Karl Roeme) (protesting the decision); P.P.
Craig, Once upon a Time in the West: Direct Effect and the Federalization of EEC
Law, 12 OxFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 453, 458-63 (recounting criticisms of the
case).
4 The ECJ has interpreted the language of Article 189 as conferring rights
u ?on the nationals of Member States in certain circumstances. The direct effect
ofthe legislation, treaty article, or decision is, in essence, what constitutes the
right. The Court has distinguished vertical direct effect, the rights of an indi-
vidual to sue a governmental entity, from horizontal direct effect, the right of
an individual to sue another individual. The Court has acknowledged vertical
direct effect involving disputes arising from treaty articles, regulations, and di-
rectives. See Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. 1; Case 6/64, Costa v. Ente Nazi-
onale per L'Energia Elettrica, 1964 E.C.R. 585; Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home
Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337; Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southampton & S.-W.
Hampshire Area Health Auth., 1986 E.C.R. 723. However, the Court has not
been so lenient on the rights of individuals established by horizontal direct ef-
fect. Although the Courts have recognized horizontal direct effect in disputes
arising from treaty articles and regulations, Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Societe
Anonyme Beige De Navigation Aerienne Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455, the Court re-
fuses to acknowledge horizontal direct effect in disputes arising from directives.
See Case 106/89, Marleasing SA v. La Commercial Internacional De Ali-
mentacion SA, 1990 E.C.R. 14135.
48 See Brand, supra note 30; David O'KeefeJudicial Protection of the Indi-
vidual by the European Court of Justice, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 901 (1996);
Louis F. Del Duca, Teaching of the European Community Experience for Develop-
ing Regional Organizations, 11 DICK. J. INT'L L. 485 (1993). In fact, the E
does not provide direct effect for other international treaties including the
GATT. See Brand, supra note 30, at 575-93 (1997).
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to examine the language of the treaty, the member states' prac-
tices, and any judicial interpretations of the treaty.
3.2. Standing Before the Dispute Resolution Body
3.2.1. No Standing
Under some treaties, all disputes are resolved between states
through diplomacy. Alternatively, the dispute resolution system
is a court or tribunal that is only open to states, as is the case with
the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"). Evolving from the
Permanent Court of Arbitration,49 the ICJ is the most recognized
international court.5 0 In the trade arena, the WTO Dispute Set-
tlement Understanding is closest to this type of international ad-
judication. In either instance, private actors have no official role
in dispute resolution.
Historically under international law, only a state could sue
another state and demand reparation for the injuries inflicted on
its citizens. The injured private actor did not have a directly en-
forceable claim against a state that violated his rights.5 1  There-
fore, it was up to each state to determine if, when, and how to
press claims for injury to its own citizens.52 A state could clearly
choose not to pursue this remedy.
53
49 On July 29, 1899, at the first Hague Peace Conference, the Permanent
Court of Arbitration ("PCA") was established. The Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes detailed the PCA, which was to become
the first dispute settlement mechanism between sovereign states. See Bette E.
Shifman, The Revitalization of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 23 INT'L J.
LEGAL INFo. 284 (1995).
50 The Permanent Court of International Justice ("PCIJ") was established
in 1921 by the League of Nations. The Court, heard 32 cases and issued 27 ad-
visory opinions to international organizations. At the end of World War H,
the establishment of the United Nations (UN) sparked the need for a new
world court in consideration of concerns by the parties who were not signato-
ries to the League of Nations. The new world court, the International Court of
Justice was, thus, formed in 1945. See Statute of the International Court of Jus-
tice, Iune 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055.
' See Factory at Chorz6w (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 6, at
28 (July 27) (Merits). ("The rules of law governing the reparation are the rules
of international law in force between the two States concerned, and not the law
governing relations between the State which has committed a wrongful act and
the individual who has suffered damage.").
52 The Permanent Court of International Justice recognized that:
It is an elementary principle of international law that a State is
entitled to protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary
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Private suits in domestic courts were also not an option.
Many states had laws that limited grounds on which they could
be sued in their own courts which meant that foreign investors
had little recourse to that domestic legal system.14 Even if a pri-
vate actor wanted to bring a suit in his own home court against
the foreign state, most developed states had laws that provided
foreign sovereign immunity. 5 Moreover, private actors had no
international recourse in the case of a violation by their own gov-
ernment.
Today, under a treaty with no standing for private actors, pri-
vate actors are involved only to the extent that they lobby their
governments to represent their interests and to protect their in-
dustries. Examples of this would be the United States negotiating
to international law committed by another State, from whom
they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the or-dinary channels. By taking up the case of one of its subjects
and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial
proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own
rights-its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect
for the rules of international law.
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 13 (Aug.
30) VJurisdiction).
3 See, e.g., Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993) (involving U.S. gov-
ernment reftsal to espouse the claims of the plaintiff against the government of
Saudi Arabia). Individuals have traditionally been able to request that their
government espouse their claims before the ICJ or other international court.
See Lotus, (Fr. v. Tur.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7);see also David M.
Reilly & Sarita Ordonez, Effect of the Jurisprudence of the International Court
of Justice on National Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 435 (1996)
(analyzing U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan and the denial of indi-
viduals to bring a case in front of the ICJ).
54 In most countries the government had full sovereign immunity both in
law and in practice. See Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Government and Officers:
Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1963); see also United States v. Lee,
106 U.S. 196 (1882) (stating that the United States may only be sued by its own
consent).
55 See, e.g., Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. S 1604
(1994) ("Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States
is a party at the time of the enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be im-
mune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States except as provided
[in the exceptions]."); State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33 (Eng.) (granting immu-
nity in the United Kingdom to the sovereign).
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with Japan to open its automobile market56 or negotiating with
Russia regarding regional investment 5 7
3.2.2. Petition Domestically for Government to Represent
A second option is that private actors have the right to peti-
tion their governments to bring a dispute to the system. While
private actors do not have the opportunity to directly bring their
cases, the government may be persuaded through formal mecha-
nisms that a dispute is sufficiently serious to warrant their atten-
tion. The closest example of this in the United States is the so-
called "301 procedure" for the United States Trade Representative
("USTR"). 5p While the state still makes the final decision about
whether or not to bring such a case, there are formal mechanisms
for private actors to become involved at the domestic level in this
dispute resolution system.5 9 Because the USTR's decisions have
5' See High Level Talks Slated with Japan on Auto Agreement, 14 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1714 (Oct. 8, 1997).
5 See U.S., Russia Sign Cooperation Accords, Focus on Investment in Russia's
Regions, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1633 (Sept. 24, 1997).
58 Section 301 allows an individual to petition the United States govern-
ment to initiate trade dispute resolutions. Under Section 302 a party can peti-
tion the U.S. Trade Representative to investigate a foreign government's poli-
cies or practices that are suspected to be hindering trade. See 19 U.S.C. SS 2412-
14 (1994). The USTR, under section 304, must investigate and determine if the
foreign government has violated a trade agreement, benefits of any trade agree-
ment are unreasonably being denied to the individual, or the foreign govern-
ment is unjustifiably burdening or restricting U.S. commerce. See id S 2414. If
the dispute involves a trade agreement the USTR is obligated under section
303(a)(2) to first use the dispute settlement procedures provided under that
agreement. See idL 5 2413. For example, if a dispute involves infringements
based on one of the Uruguay Round Agreements, the USTR must utilize the
dispute resolution system of the World Trade Organization. If the USTR finds
that a trade infringement is occurring and is convinced that the dispute should
involve action by the United States it will pursue resolution of the dispute.
The EU also has a procedure whereby private actors can request the EU take
action against those governments violating free trade agreements. See Council
Regulation 3286/94, 1994 O.J. (L 349) 71 [the Trade Barriers Regulation]
(laying down EU procedures in the field of common commercial policy).
Out of the 23 section 301 cases initiated by an individual between 1985
and 1996, 11 GATT panels were established. See C. O'Neal Taylor, The Limits
of Economic Power: Section 301 and the World Trade Organizations Dispute Set-
tlement System, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 209 (1997). See also A. Lynne
Puckett & William L. Reynolds, Current Development, Rules, Sanctions and
Enforcement under Section 301; At Odds with the W/TO?, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 675
(1996) (detailing conflicts between Section 301 and WTO policy); Jared R. Sil-
verman, Multilateral Resolution over Unilateral Retaliation: Adjdicating the Use
of Section 301 before the WTO, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 233 (1996).
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not been reviewed by the judiciary,60 a private actor seeking dis-
pute resolution of his claim in this manner will likely have no re-
course if the USTR decides to take no action.
3.2.3. Individual Arbitration
Private actors can also be granted standing before an interna-
tional arbitration board. Such a dispute resolution mechanism
permits standing for private actors directly affected by laws in the
state in which they are investing. The move toward investment
arbitration began with the creation of the International Centre for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") under the aegis
of the World Bank.61 In the model of investment arbitration un-
der ICSID, private actors can bring cases against states. ICSID has
jurisdiction over any legal dispute arising out of an investment be-
tween a member state and a national of another member state. 62
To initiate proceedings under ICSID, a party must submit a writ-
ten request to the Secretary-General of ICSID detailing the issues
in dispute, the parties, and consent to arbitration. Once certified
by the Secretary-General of ICSID, a private actor can have the
case heard by an arbitral panel established by ICSID.63 This
model of permitting private actors to bring cases against states has
60 The USTR has discretion in determining whether to initiate investiga-
tions from the petitions filed by interested indiiiduals. See 19 U.S.C. S 2412(a)
(2). If the USTR decides not to investigate, notice of such a determination with
an explanation of reasons must be published in the Federal Register. See id. S
2412() (3). But see Erwin Eichman & Gary Horlick, Political Questions in In.
ternational Trade: Judicial Review of Section 301, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 735 (1989)
(arguing that a denial by the USTR to pursue investigations of an individual's
petition should be reviewed by the judiciary).
61 ICSID was established by the Convention on the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, opened for signa-
ture Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Con-
vention]. See also Thomas L. Brewer, International Investment Dispute
Settlement Procedures: The Regime for Foreign Direct Investment, 26 LAw &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 633, 655-56 (1995).
62 See ICSID Convention, supra note 61, art. 25. The parties must, how-
ever, consent to the use of the arbitration facility. Id. The use of ICSID has
not been initiated by a Contracting State in complaint of an individual of an-
other Contracting State even though the potential exists under the Convention
provisions. See David A. Solely, ICSID Implementation:An Effective Alternative
to International Conflict, 19 INT'L L. 521 (1985).
63 See ICSID Convention, supra note 61, art. 36. Unless the SecretarM-
General finds that the dispute falls outside the jurisdiction of ISCID, he will
register the request and notify the parties. See id. art. 36(3).
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since been copied in bilateral investment treaties in order to en-
courage foreign direct investment6 and outlined in the North
American Free Trade A'greement ("NAFTA") for investor dis-
putes under Chapter 11. These treaties outline limited standing
provisions and permit only those private actors with investments
in the state to bring such a dispute against a state.
3.2.4. Private Actors Before a Court
The furthest evolution of individual standing is when private
actors have the ability to bring a case themselves to an interna-
tional tribunal.66 In the EU, private actors have the right to bring
6 See, e.g., Investment Treaty with the Republic of Armenia, Sept. 23,
1992, S. TREATY DOc. No. 103-11, art. VI (1992).
65 See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289, ch. 20. [hereinafter NAFTA]. NAFTA provides the opportunity under its
investment arbitration chapter to have arbitration under ICSID or Arbitration
Rules of the United Nations Conference on International Trade Law
("UNCITRAL") rules. Arbitration under ICSID rules is available to member
countries and nationals of member countries. Disputes where only one of the
countries concerned is a member of ICSID are carried out under the Additional
Facility Rules of ICSID. Because Canada and Mexico are not yet members of
ICSID, arbitration is only available under the Additional Facility Rules when
one of the countries involved is the United States. The first two NAFTA cases
using the ICSID Additional Facility Rules were registered in January and
March, 1997, and involve U.S. nationals versus the Mexican government. See
Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1); Robert Azinian
v. Mexico qCSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/2). See generally First ICSID Addi-
tional Facility Proceedings Under the NAFTA, 14 NEWS FROM ICSID, 1, 6, 10
(1997) (No. 1). Arbitrations involving only Canada and Mexico must be re-
solved using the UNCITRAL rules as the ICSID facility is not available where
neither country is a member. UNCITRAL rules are reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 701
(1976). A model similar to investor arbitration is also established in the Envi-
ronmental Side Accord to NAFTA, the North American Agreement on Envi-
ronmental Cooperation, entered into force Jan. 1, 1994, art. 14(1), 32 I.L.M.
1480. For further information on the implementation of the Environmental
Accord see David Lopez, Dispute Resolution under NAFTA: Lessons from the
Early Experience 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 163, 184-191 (1997); Kal Raustiala, Interna-
tional "Enforcement of Enforcement" Under the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 721 (1996); Rex J. Zedalis,
Claims by Individuals in International Economic Law: NAFTA Developments, 7
AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 115 (1996).
66 The first court to provide standing for individuals was the Central
American Court of Justice created in 1907 by Costa Rica, Guatemala, Hondu-
ras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. Although the court's existence was short lived,
it was the first court to allow individual claims to be brought against the con-
tracting states. Individuals were barred from bringing suit against their own
nation and were required to demonstrate an exhaustion of local remedies before
bringing an action before the court. All of the five cases brought by individuals
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a case directly to the ECJ in certain circumstances.67 Cases
brought before the ECJ based on a reference made by a domestic
court are more common. 68 The private actor brings a case to his
or her national court. That court then can refer the question of
EU law to the ECJ. In either case, the result is the opportunity
for private actors to argue and defend their rights in front of an
international tribunal.6 9  El Mercado Comuin del Sur
against a contracting state within the ten year existence of the Central Ameri-
can Court resulted in favor of the contracting states. See P.K. Menon, The In-
ternational Personality of Individuals in International Law: A Broadening of the
Traditional Doctrine, 1J. TR.ANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 151, 159 (1992) (citing Con-
vention for the Establishment of Central American Court of Justice, Dec. 20,
1907, 2 AM. J. INT'LL. 231 (Supp. 1908)).
67 Article 173 of the EC Treaty provides an individual with the opportu-
nity to institute proceedings not only involving decisions explicitly against that
person, but also involvin an directive or regilation that is of direct and indi-
vidual concern to that individual. The courts, however, have been reluctant to
allow all directives and regulations to be challenged. CompareJoined Cases 16
& 17/62, Confederation Nationale des Productents de Fruits et Legumes v.
Council 1962 E.C.R. 47 (denying standing to fruit and vegetable producers peti-
tioning to annul a Council regulation advancing a common market in the in-
dustry) with Case 730/79, Philip Morris Holland v. Commission, 1980 E.C.R.
2671 (permitting standing for a cigarette manufacturer seeking to annul the
Commission's denial of permission to Holland for the granting of state aid for
the expansion of cigarette production). For more information on the applica-
tion of Article 173, see Anthony Arnull, Private Applicants and the Action for
Annulment under Article 173 of the EC Treaty, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 7
(1995).
68 Article 177 of the EC Treaty provides guidance to the domestic courts in
referring issues to the ECJ. The ECris limited to providing preliminary rulings
only on issues regarding the interpretation of the Treat, the validity and inter-
pretation of acts of the Community's institutions, and the interpretations of
any statutes that provide for such a means of clarification. See H.P. Bulmer Ltd.
v. J. Bollin er S.A., [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 91 (1974) (U.K.) (holding that English
judges are tte final court to apply community law, but the ultimate authority
on interpreting community law goes to the ECJ); Case 283/81, Srl CILFIT v.
Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415 (ruling that a national court is required to
refer cases where there is no judicial remedy in the member state but there is a
question of Community law raised). The use of Article 177 mitigates the strin-
ent standing requirement set forth by Article 173. Thus, an individual who
toes not have a direct and individual concern to introduce a case directly to the
ECJ can commence the action in a domestic court and request a preliminary
ruling from the ECJ. See Arnull, supra, note 67, at 40-9 (describing the com-
bined effect of Article 173 and 177); see also Schaefer, supra, note 27 (discussing
rights and remedies to bring claims under international dispute settlement sys-
tems and in domestic courts .
69 Case law in the EU has also determined that an individual may sue other
individuals in order to protect his rights under Community law. The concept is
referred to as horizontal direct effect (distinct from vertical direct effect, the
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("MERCOSUR", or the "Common Market of the South") also
modeled its system of dispute resolution upon the EU where pri-
vate actors can go to either the MERCOSUR court or their na-
tional court.70
We cannot underestimate the impact of individual involve-
ment in international dispute resolution.7 1 Private actors play the
important function of private enforcement agents.72 As such, pri-
vate actors can themselves ensure that the law is being followed
rather than relying on states or an oversight body (such as the
Commission in the case of the EU) to bring a case. States may
feel reluctant to bring cases against other states for somewhat mi-
nor infractions as the diplomatic ramifications may not be worth
the trouble. Furthermore, it may be in many states' interests not
to follow the letter of the law exactly or to take their time in
litigation between an individual and a government entity). Horizontal direct
effect conclusively exists in issues involving conflicts arising from articles and
regulations of the Community. See Defrenne, 1976 E.C.R. 455. However, the
question of horizontal effect in conflicts arising over directives has not been as
favorable. See Case 91/92, Faccini-Dori v. Recreb, 1994 E.C.R. 3325
(confirming the traditional view that horizontal direct effect does not exist in
disputes involving directives rather than following the Advocate General's ad-
vice to further the scope of direct effect). If the individual is denied access to
the ECJ to sue another individual, he may still have an opportunity to com-
mence an action against the Member State for noncompliance with Commu-
nity law by not properly implementing the specific directive. See Case C-
106/89, Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA,
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 305 (1992) (Spain) (emphasizing that the States have a duty to
implement directives in a manner so as to achieve the intended result of the
Community as closely as possible).
70 See MERCOSUR: Protocol of Brasilia for the Settlement of Disputes,
Dec. 17, 1991, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 691; Cherie O'Neal Taylor,Dispute Resolu-
tion as a Catalyst for Economic Integration and an Agent for Deepening Integra-
tion: NAFTA and MER COSUR?, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 850 (1996-97).
71 For a review of the most recent literature assessing the impact of indi-
vidual litigants and EU law, see Walter Mattli & Anne-Marie SlaughterRevisit-
ing the European Court ofjustice, 52 INT'L ORG. 177 (1998).
72 See Weiler, supra note 3, at 2421 (noting importance of citizens to the
EU judicial system); P.P. Craig, supra note 46 (1992)(arguing that private en-
forcement agents are critical to the EU system of direct effect). See generally
Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in Interna-
tional Judicial Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 611 (1994) (calling for greater ac-
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complying with the numerous laws set out under the EU-a kind
of willing collusion to ignore the law.
73
While an oversight body is more likely to bring cases, it also
has the problem of measuring the value of a vast number of cases
and keeping straightening out its own political agenda. In addi-
tion, an oversight body probably will not have sufficient re-
sources to check compliance with all laws nor to bring all the
cases of noncompliance to the court. Private actors, on the other
hand, do not have the political baggage of bringing a case against
another state. Private actors can make a direct economic assess-
ment about whether it is worth it to them to spend the time and
money on litigation. Where private actors are granted rights and
where the benefits of the treaty are supposed to accrue directly to
private actors, it makes sense to give private actors a remedy for
violation of those rights.
7 4
3.3. Supremacy over Domestic Law
3.3.1. Definition
A crucial factor in examining the rights of private actors is the
extent to which the system creates binding law for the member
states. Supremacy can be clearly defined for international law-be
it treaty or decision from the dispute resolution tribunal-to be
supreme to domestic law. Yet states vary widely on their use,
adoption, and interpretation of international law.
73 See Carlos A. Ball, The Making of a Transnational Capitalist Society: The
Court of Justice, Social Policy, and Individual Rights Under the European Com-
munities Legal Order, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 307 (1996).
7' This avenue provided the court with the opportunity to decide some of
the most important cases in the judicial history of the ECJ. Furthermore, the
ECJ hears more cases as preliminary references under Article 177 than directly.
In the early years of the EEC, from 1958 to 1973, nearly two-thirds of all cases
in front of the ECJ came through preliminary rulings. See Stefan A. Riesenfeld,
Legal Systems of Regional Economzc Integration, 22 AM. J. COMP. L. 415, 426
(1974) (citing to Commission's Annual General Report on the Activities of the
Communities). This use of Article 177 references continues to increase. In
1993, the ECJ received 203 references which more than doubled the number of
cases in 1980. See Sarah E. Strasser, Evolution & Effort: The Development of a
Strategy of Docket Control for the European Court of fustice & the Question of Pre-
liminary References (Harvard Law School Harvard Jean Monnet Chair Working
Papers, No. 3/95), available at Jonathan Katchen, The Jean Monnet Chair
(visited Apr. 4, 1998) <http://www.law.harvard.edu/Programs/ean Mon-
net/>.
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3.3.2. Treaties Equal with National Law
Some states, including the United States, treat international
treaties as equal to national law. For example, the U.S. Constitu-
tion states that treaties are the supreme law of the land.75 Under
rules of interpretation, this means that a later law trumps the law
which preceded it.76 The Supreme Court has thus stated that,
By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the same footing,
and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation ....
When the two relate to the same subject, the courts will
always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to
both, if that can be done without violating the language of
either; but if the two are inconsistent, the one last in date
will control the other, provided always the stipulation of
the treaty on the subject is self-executing.
77
In practice, a national law could overrule an international treaty
under this treatment of international law,78 but it still places in-
ternational treaties above state law.79
75 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land .... .") This interpretation of treaties is similar to the
one in the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries in which
courts have found international treaties to be equal to national law. In these
countries, however, separate implementing legislation beyond ratification is
needed to provide direct effect under these treaties. In reality, this has been the
case in the United States in more recent treaty implementation where treaties
are not given direct effect unless expressly provided for in separate implement-
ing legislation. See discussion supra Section 3.1.
76 See C.H. McLaughlin, The Scope of the Treaty Power in the United States,
42 MINN. L. REV. 709, 751 (1958) ("[T]he courts have consistently held that
treaties and statutes are mentioned in terms of equal dignity in the supremacy
clause, and therefore in the event of a conflict between them whichever is later
in time must prevail."). Cf United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F.
Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that a subsequent statute would only su-
persede a treaty if that were the explicit purpose of the statute).
77 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
78 See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, The Status of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 479 (1990)
(anayzing GATT).
7' The Supreme Court has declared that legislation enacted by the federal
government in order to implement the objectives of a treaty agreement will be




3.3.3. Treaties Supreme to National Law
Another approach to international law is that it is supreme to
domestic law. Therefore, no national law, no matter when it is
passed, ever trumps an international law. Examples of countries
that follow this approach include Belgium, France, and Holland.80
A modification of this approach is that international law is su-
preme to all law except for the constitution or basic law of the
state, as is the case in Germany and Italy.8'
3.3.4. Difference Between International Treaties and
International Decisions
As the U.S. Constitution discusses only those treaties con-
cluded under Article II procedures,82 it is left to the judiciary un-
U.S. 416 (1920) (holding that a treaty with Canada regulating the hunting of
migratory birds is constitutional and any federal legislation therein will pre-
empt state law). The Supreme Court furthered this notion by stating that a
self-executing treaty will preempt state law, even with no federal legislation. See
United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich. 1979) (reaffirming the
superiority of treaties to state law governing Native American fishing rights).
For more information on state law preemption see generally, Harold Maier,
Preerqption of State Law: A Recommended Analysis, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 832
(1989).
80 In Belgium, France, and the Netherlands, the constitution or courts have
accorded self-executing treaties supremacy over prior or subsequent domestic
legislation. See CONsT. art. 55 (Fr.); STATUUT NED. [Constitution], art. 94
(Neth.).
81 Article 25 of the Basic Law of Germany seems to grant both direct effect
and supremacy to international law: 'The general rules of public international
law shall be an integral part of the federal law. They shall takeprecedence over
the laws and shall drectly create rights and duties for the inhabitants of the fed-
eral territory." GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG], art. 25. In practice, the
German Constitutional Court has retained its abilit 
to review international
law, including legislation of the EU and rulings of the ECJ, to ensure its com-
pliance with the Basic Law of Germany (the German Constitution. See
BVerfGE 89, 155 (the Maastricht Decision); Internationale Handelsgesellschaft
mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel ("solange I",
BVerfGB 37, 271, translated in [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540; In re Wunsche Han-
delsgesellschaft ("Solange IF), BVeIGE 73, 339, translated in [1987] 3 C.M.L.R.
225; Dieter Grimm, The European Court of Justice and National Courts: The
German Constitutional Perspective After the Maastrict Decision, 3 CoLUM J.
EUR. L. 229 (1997). Both Germany and Italy required separate constitutional
provisions to accept the supremacy of EU law. See Mattlp& Slaughter, supra
note 71, at 203.82anU.S. CONST., art. II, S 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two
thirds of the Senators present concur.... .).
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der U.S. law whether decisions of international tribunals are to be
treated the same way. This problem exists in other states as well.
Even those states that find international treaties supreme to their
national law have not necessarily treated international decisions
the same way. While national constitutions may have envisioned
international treaties and made provisions for their supremacy,
few constitutions make provisions for decisions of international
tribunals. This can be attributed to two reasons. First, when
most state's drafted their constitutions, international decision-
making bodies did not exist. Second, in the case of arbitration de-
cisions, the arbitrator generally provides for damages and not a
change in the domestic laws. 3 The issue of supremacy does not
really arise because there is no new law created. Therefore, we
must examine what provisions the international trade treaty has
made regarding supremacy and how the member states have in-
terpreted and acted upon this treaty. Only the EU has evolved to
the point where ECJ decisions are supreme over national law in
all the member states.
8 4
3.3.5. National Judges'Ability to Overrule National Law
One last factor in determining the extent to which interna-
tional tribunal decisions have supremacy is whether or not do-
mestic judges have the power to enact this international law. Can
the domestic judge overrule national law in the face of a conflict-
ing international decision? In some states, only the highest court
of the land can overrule a law. For instance, the Italian court sys-
tem permits only the Italian Constitutional Court to address the
constitutionality of national legislation.8 5 Therefore, lower court
83 Neither the ICSID or UNCITRAL rules explicitly deny the panel the
ability to proscribe a change in the law. However, the arbitral panels have not
diverged from the issuance of monetary damages as an award. See, e.g., Ameri-
can Mfg. & Trading Inc. v. Republic of Zaire, ARB/93/1; Southern Pacific Proper-
ties Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ARB/84/3).
84 See J.H.H. Weiler & Ulrich Haltern, The Autonomy of the Community
Legal Order-Through the Looking Glass, 37 HARV. INT'L LJ. 411 (1996)
(commenting on the well-established supremacy doctrine of the ECJ and its
limitations); see also Symposium, The Interaction Between National Courts and
International Tribunals, 28 N.Y.U. J.JNT'L L. & POL'Y (1995-96).
85 This system has only been modified regarding EU law, where it was held
that if the lower Italian courts are not permitted to rule on the invalidity of an
inconsistent statute, the integration of Community law in the Member States is
significantly hindered. For the progression of Community law in Italy, see
Costa, 1964 E.C.R. 585; Amminiistrazione Delle Finanze Dello Stato, 1978
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judges are constrained by their national rules in the implementa-
tion of international rules. Similarly, in France and Great Britain,
the tradition of judicial review did not exist and took more time
to implement in light of EU law.16 For true supremacy of inter-
national law, all judges at all levels need the ability to evaluate na-
tional law in the face of conflicting international law.
3.4. Transparency
3.4.1. Why Transparency is Important
Transparency in a dispute resolution system refers to the clar-
ity and intelligibility of the procedures of the system as well as to
the outcomes. The level of transparency is important for a num-
ber of reasons, which could be called the three P's: publicity,
precedent and predictability. First, when the rules and proce-
dures are clear, parties to the dispute are more likely to use the
system. Government officials, as well as lawyers for individual
clients, will have some comfort level with the dispute resolution
system and will have an awareness of how the system works.8 7
Second, published decisions of dispute resolution tribunals pro-
vide lessons and possible persuasive authority for other dispute
resolution tribunals such as courts or arbitrations. If a decision is
published, it can provide persuasive precedent for similar dis-
putes.88 Publicity of decisions also puts pressure on states to
E.C.R. 629 (holding that Italian National Court must give full effect to Com-
munity law provisions). See generally Marta Cartabia, The Italian Constitutional
Court and the Relationship Between the Italian Legal System and the European
Community, 12MICH. J. INT'LL. 173 (1990) (discussing contradictions between
EU Court rulings and Italian law); Antonio La Pergola,Italy and European In-
tegration: A Lawyer's Perspective, 4 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 259 (1994)
(detailing growing support for EU integration in Italy and Italy's subsequent
attempt to cope with EU directives which conflict with their national law).
8' See, e.g., Mattli & Slaughter, supra note 71, at 200-04 (1998).
87 This concern with transparency and legitimacy has also manifested itself
in the EU. See Lodge, supra note 15; Maher, supra note 15, 238-40; Weiler, su-
pra note 3, at 2421 (noting importance in the EU judicial system for citizens to
act as a decentralized agent for monitoring compliance).
88 See, e.g., United Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.CJ. 116 (Dec. 18);
North Seas Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.CJ. 3
(Feb. 20). For a further discussion on precedent in dispute resolution, seeJOHN
H. JAcKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF IN.
TERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (1989); ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN,
STRENGTHENING THE GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (1988);
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comply with the rulings.8 9 Finally, transparent rules and deci-
sions increase the predictability of the system. Clear rules set
forth how the system is going to work and create confidence on
the part of the users of the system.90 The transparency of the sys-
tem provides the opportunity for both practitioners and academ-
ics to analyze, improve, and comprehend this particular interna-
tional dispute resolution system. Equally importantly, well-
reasoned decisions create confidence in the dispute resolution
body and educate the users of the system about how the body
would be likely to rule in the future.
Even if a user of the system is not happy with the particular
outcome, predictability allows the parties to decide whether or
not to use this particular route of dispute resolution. When sys-
tems are not predicable, both government officials and private
lawyers will be reluctant to advise governments and private actors
to take a chance on a haphazard outcome. The clearest example
of this has been ICSID, where the small number of cases over the
years and the unpredictability in terms of appeals has led many
government and corporate lawers to advise their clients against
this route of dispute resolution.
MOHAMMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT (1996);
Yong K. Kim, The Beginnings of the Rule of Law in the International Trade Sys-
tem Despite U.S. Constitutional Constraints, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 967 (1996).
89 See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY: COMLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
AGREEMENTS 22 (1995).
90 See Yair Baranes, The Motivations and the Models: A Comparison of the Is-
rael-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and the North American Free Trade Agreement, 17
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 145, 156 (1997) (arguing that the lack of
specificity in the Israel-U.S. Free Trade Agreement is problematic).
91 The problem with ICS1D is only partially a result of the lack of trans-
parency in the decisions. In its 32 year history, ICSID has only handled about
45 cases. ICSID lacks the history and case load to provide predictability and
assurance to investors in need of an efficient and effective arbitration facility.
Another problem with ICSID is that the decision is subject to review by an in-
ternal review committee. Any party may request an interpretation, revision, or
annulment of an award. See ICSID Convention S 5, arts. 50-52, supra note 61.
The tribunal that rendered the award or, if unavailable or not practical, a new
review tribunal shall decide on the reviewable issue. Revisions of an award may
be provided if new information is discovered within three years of the rendered
decisions. See id, art. 51. Article 52 lists five reasons why an award may be an-
nulled: (1) the tribunal was not properly constituted, (2) the tribunal mani-
festly exceeded its powers, (3) a member of the tribunal was corrupted, (4) the
tribunal seriously departed from the fundamental rule of procedure, and (5) the
award fails to state the reasons on which it was based. See iL, art. 52. Although




3.4.2. Lack ofRules and Procedure
The lowest level of transparency is when the rules and proce-
dure do not exist in advance of the dispute. Resolution is left up
to the parties and no system is set forth. This is most typical in
bilateral treaties, where disputes in compliance or interpretation
of the treaty are left to the states to negotiate as they arise.
92
3.4.3. Decisions/Agreements Not Published
When the rules and procedures are clear but the decisions of
the tribunal or the agreement between the parties are not pub-
lished, this creates an additional transparency issue. For example,
an ICSID arbitration decision can also be kept confidential if re-
quested by the parties.93  This means that this decision cannot
provide precedent or predictability in the system because unin-
volved lawyers cannot analyze the panel's thinking.94 In this case,
type of dispute resolution system, it clearly affects the overall effectiveness of
any system. In addition to further time and expense associated with the deci-
sion, in ICSID's case, it further diminished the predictability of the dispute
resolution system. See INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
TOWARD "JUDIciAIuZATION" AND UNIFORMTY? (Richard Lillich & Charles
Brower ed.) (1992); W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND ARBITRATION: BREAKDOWN AND
REPAIR 46-106 (1992); Thomas L. Brewer, International Investment Dispute Set-
tlement Procedures: The Evolving Regime for Foreign Direct Investment, 26 LAW.
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 633 (1995); David A. Soley, ICSID Implementation: An Ef-
fective Alternative to International Conflict, 19 INT'L LAW 521 (1985).
92 See example of the renegotiation of the U.S.-Japanese auto agreement
discussed infra note 99.
93 Article 48(5) of the ICSID Convention explicitly prohibits the publish-
ing of awards without the consent of the parties. See ICSID Convention, supra
note 61, art. 48(5). Thus, the transparency of such a system remains question-
able. See John B. Attanasio, Rapporteur's Overview and Conclusions of Sover-
eignty, Globalization, and Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. (1996)
(addressing the factors that make the ICSID) less credible than ICJ judgments).
Seealso J.A. Freedberg, The Role of the International Councilfor CommercialAr-
bitration in Providing Source Material in International Commercial Arbitration,
23 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 272 (1995) (stating that even though the ICSID Con-
vention requires consent to publish, many awards get published).
94 The ICSID's lack of case law precedent as well as the review process
make the arbitral facility less appealing to investors. Difficulty with interfer-
ence by national courts has made ICSJD even more unreliable. See Maritime
Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (ICSID, Case No. ARB/84/4) (refusing to enforce the ICSII) arbitral
award); Monroe Leigh,Judicial Decisions, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 206, 222-25 (1987).
(detailing AMCO Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia, 25 I.L.M. 1439, ICSID
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parties are able to understand how the system works, but are not
confident using it. Outsiders either have no idea about the out-
come of the dispute, or, when they do, the lack of an explanation
for the decision still leaves gaps in their understanding of how the
tribunal works. In addition, a body of case law with persuasive
force is not established, and the rules of the organization remain
to be interpreted on an ad hoc basis.
3.4.4. Decisions Are Published
The highest level of transparency is when the decisions of the
dispute resolution body are published regularly. In this case, the
decisions can be read byr practitioners, government officials, other
jurists, and academics. Decisions can be analyzed, explained,
and used as a basis for other cases. Only in this way can persua-
sive authority be established. This is also the best way for private
actors and their lawyers to become comfortable with the dispute
resolution mechanism. Furthermore, public decisions increase
the pressure on states to comply. This level of transparency cur-
rently exists only in the EU although the WTO has made prog-
ress towards this goal.
3.5. Compliance/Enforcement
The fifth and final factor in determining the value of individ-
ual involvement is the level of enforcement mechanisms provided
for in the dispute resolution system. Compliance and enforce-
ment are often targeted as the main weakness of the international
legal system.96 Because international courts have thus far not had
(Case No. ARB/81/1) (1986), where the Indonesian government annulled
ICSID decision on the grounds that ICSID "manifestly exceeded its powers.").
9s See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Dispute Settlement System of the Worl
Trade Organization and the Evolution of the GA 7T Dispute Settlement System
Since 1948, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1157, 1227 (1994 (explaining the neces-
sity of publishing decisions in a timely manner).
96 John Austin, for example, called international law "public international
morality" at best because he defined law to require the threat of enforcement,
while international law is merely enforced by moral obligation rather than di-
rect subjection to a nation's laws. See John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or
the Philosophy of Positive Law (New York, Jane Cockcroft & Co., 1875), vol. 1,
p. 121; see also LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN
pOcy (2d ed. 1979) (discussing the effects of international law on how nations
behave among one another); J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO TBE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE (4th ed. 1949)




military forces to enforce their decisions, many critics of the in-
ternational system focus on those cases where states choose to ig-
nore the international court.97  The apparent uselessness of the
United States bringing a case against Iran for holding U.S. hos-
tages and the attempt of the United States to avoid prosecution by
Nicaragua are often cited as classic examples of what happens be-
fore an international court. Similarly, the breakdown of GATT
in the 1980's as the most powerful states ignored GATT panel
recommendations 98 shows the weakness of relying on states to
comply without effective enforcement measures. Without argu-
ing whether international dispute resolution can ever truly
"work," it is important to assess the level of enforcement a court
can have.
3.5.1. No Formal Enforcement of the Treaty Rights
The first level of enforcement of treaties is where there is
nothing specific written into the treaty or dispute resolution sys-
tem. Enforcement under this system of dispute resolution is
clearly left to the respective states. There is no oversight institu-
tion. Any noncompliance would put the parties back at the nego-
tiation table in order to work out this dispute as well. In other
words, a negotiation system which relies on first-order compli-
97 Louis Henkin says "almost all nations observe almost all principles of in-
ternational law and a most all of their obligations almost all of ihe time."
HENKIN, supra note 96, at 47. But, skeptics point to plenty of contrary evi-
dence such as the Iran-United States or United States-Nicaragua cases before the
ICJ. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, (U.S. v. Iran)
1981 I.C.J. 45 (May 12); Military and Paramilitary Activities, (Nic. v. U.S.) 1986
I.C.J. 14 ([une 27).
'8 GATT procedure provided the losing parties with successful means of
delaying the appointments of panels, effectively blocking adoption of the panel
reports, and merely ignoring panel decisions. For instance, after the U. as-
serted a complaint in 1981 under GATT agast the EC concerning pasta ex-
port subsidies, the EC effectively blocked adoption of the panel report in favor
of the United States. The United States resorted to indirect retaliation efforts
which sparked countermeasures by the EC. See ROBERT HUDEC, ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 151-54 (1993) (citing Subsidies on Exports of
Pasta Products, SCM/43, May 19, 1983, an unadopted decision, and other cases
detailing GATT's ineffectiveness); see also Petersmann, sUtp-a note 95, at 1203-04
(enumerating some further problem areas of the GATT dispute settlement sys-
tem).
1998]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
ance requires following the agreement at all times. States either
follow the agreement, or they must negotiate a new one.99
3.5.2. Second-Order Compliance-Remedies for Ignoring the
Treaty
Second-order compliance occurs when a dispute resolution
mechanism exists under the treaty which would rule on compli-
ance by the member states. Without a separate mechanism, rules
for treaty compliance and breach follow the default rules of the
Vienna Convention.'t ° The rules of the Vienna Convention,
however, are generally perceived as insufficient in terms of deal-
ing with treaty breach,' and therefore create an incentive for in-
9 For example, Japan and the U.S. have had to renegotiate their agreement
on the auto parts market several times. See U.S. Frustrated by Japan's Progress on
Car Sales, Dealerships in Auto Talks, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1759 (Oct. 9,
1997); High Level Talks Slated with Japan on Auto Agreement, supra note 56;
David Sanger, Trade's Bottom Line: Business over Politics, N.Y. TIMES, July 30,
1995, at D5.
100 See Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention specifically address issues of treaty
interpretation. According to Article 31, a treaty shall be interpreted first by
looking at the text of the treaty itself in light of the object and purpose. Meth-
ods for interpretation shall then recognize the entire treaty taking into consid-
eration subsequent treaties and practices. The negotiation history of the treaty
will also be taken into consideration. If the treaty remains ambiguous after
those considerations, Article 32 allows for recognition of the preparatory
works for the final method of interpretation. Subsequent articles deal with the
conditions under which a party may terminate its obligations under the treaty.
For instance, Article 46 invalidates a treaty if it violates an international law of
fundamental principle; Articles 49 through 52 deal with the termination of ob-
ligations when a treaty was procured through fraud, corruption, or coercion;
Article 61 discharges a party for impossibility of performance; and, Article 62,rebus sic stantibus, allowcs for termi~nation of a treaty in which a circumstance
that was an essential basis for consent fundamentally changes to the extent of
radically transforming the scope of obligation. As a last resort, a party to atreaty may terminate its obligation by breach but must confront the conse-
quences addressed by Article 60.
01See Frederic Kirgis, Jr., Some Linering Questons about Article 60 of the
Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties, 22 CORNELL INT'L U.. 549 (1989)(discussing the unresolved issues of breach); John K. Setear,Responses to Breach
of a Treaty and Rationalist International Relations Theoy: The Rules of Release
and Remediation in the Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility, 83
VA. L. RLEV. 1 (1997) (explaining that, in addition to Article 60, remedies forbreach of a treaty exist i the form of an uncodified law); see also SHABTA
ROSENNE, BREAcH OF TREATY (1985) (generalizing breaches of treaties). Arti-
cle 60 of the Vienna Convention delineates the consequences for breach of a
treaty. In the instance of a material breach involving abilateral treaty, the ter-
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ternational organizations to set up more complete mechanisms of
dispute resolution.
Any of the formal mechanisms discussed here-including arbi-
tration under ICSID, panels under GATT, the dispute resolution
system under the WTO, and cases under the ECJ-act as second-
order compliance mechanisms. They permit cases to be brought
for noncompliance with the treaty rules. Both GATT and the
ICJ are examples of court systems that provide for little realistic
enforcement beyond censure of the international community. 02
These systems stop at second-order compliance, whereby states
should obey the law, but if they violate the law, they should pay a
fine (or change the law).
One important factor to note at this stage is how and when
cases are brought to the dispute resolution system. For example,
in the EU, the Commission acts as an oversight body and can
mination or suspension of obligations may be instituted by the nonbreaching
party. With a multilateral treaty, all nonbreaching parties must consent to the
termination or suspension of the treaty in whole or in part. Specifically, the
affected party may suspend its obligations with the breaching party, or if the
material breach radically changes the scope of the treaty any nonbreaching
party may invoke suspension or termination of the treaty. See Vienna Conven-
tion, supra note 100, art. 60.
102 Although GATT provided for retaliation and the ICJ provides for en-
forcement under the Security Council, neither of these remedies were real pos-
sibilities for enforcement. The Security Council has never authorized military
action nor economic sanctions for noncompliance with an ICJ decision. See
Mark Janis, Somber Reflections on the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International
Court, in Appraisals of the ICJs Decision: Nicaragua v. United States (Merits), 81
AM. J. INT'L L. 144, 145 n.16-17 (Harold G. Maier ed., 1987) (stating that al-
though the U.N. Charter authorizes the Security Council to enforce decisions
of the ICJ, no action has ever been taken). Retaliation authorized under GATT
was only used once by the Netherlands against the United States. See ROBERT
E. HUDEC, THE GATr LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 198
(1990). However, the enforcement of decisions in international law through
voluntary compliance in the face of international pressure should not be under-
estimated. Many countries regularly abide by unfavorable rulings in order to
remain a law abiding member of the international community. See CHAYES &
CHAYES, supra note 89, at 28. Furthermore, direct foreign aid, foreign invest-
ment, and World Bank projects are often linked to compliance under interna-
tional law. For example, the World Bank has played a major role in the com-
pliance of environmental laws in Mexico. See Mexico's Environmental
Controls for New Companies, 2 MEx. TRADE & L. REP. 15 (1992); David Bar-
rans, Promoting International Environmental Protections through Foreign Debt
Exchange Transactions, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 65 (1991). But see Stephanie
Guyett, Environment and Lending: Lessons of the World Bank, Hope for the Euro-
pean Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
889 (1992) (criticizing the shortcomings of such an enforcement mechanism).
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bring cases of noncompliance to the ECJ.1°3 Other organizations
do not provide standing for any oversight body, meaning that
cases will be brought, if at all, by other states. Under GATT,
states could also delay or avoid a case.1 4 Under the new WTO
procedures, the dispute resolution system has become much more
judicialized.'l s
3.5.3. Third-Order Compliance-Remedies for Ignoring
Decisions
Third-order compliance can be demonstrated by way of a traf-
fic law example. If we conceive that following the traffic laws is
first-order compliance and paying the traffic ticket when one does
not it is second-order compliance, an arrest warrant or contempt
citation for nonpayment of the traffic ticket would be third-order
compliance. This is yet another level of forcing one to comply
with the original laws set forth. In the international arena, the
analogy would be following the trade treaty as complying in the
first-order, and agreeing to change the tariff in response to a de-
termination that the tariff was unfair would be the second-order
103 Article 169 of the EEC Treaty gives the Commission the authority to
enforce community law compliance for all Member States. The Commission
will first give the State notice in the form of an opinion letter, detailing the
method and timeliness of compliance. If the Member State refuses to comply,
the Commission can sue the Member State in the ECJ. See Case 7/61, Com-
mission v. Italy, 1961 E.C.R. 317 (forcing Italy to terminate its ban on imported
pork in compliance with community law). See Karen Banks, National Enforce-
ment of Community Rights, 21 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 669 (1984). Article 170
gives a Member State the right to sue another Member State for the enforce-
ment of community law. The complaining State must first submit its concern
with the Commission and allow the Commission to enforce the issue. See Case
232/78, Commission v. France, 1979 E.C.R. 2729 (describing Commission ac-
tion on complaints from the United Kingdom). Although a rare occurrence, if
specific measures are not taken the complaining State can take the infringing
State directly to the ECJ. See, e.g., Case 141/78, France v. United Kingdom,
1979 E.C.R. 2923. For more on enforcement of these articles, see generalyEn-
forcement Actions underArticles 169 and 170 EEC, 14 EUR. L. REv. 388 (1989).
104 See C. O'Neal Taylor, The Limits of Economic Power: Section 301 and the
World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
209, 236-37 (1997) (discussing the delays brought about by the United States
when Brazil pursued under GATT complaints about Section 301); see also John
Jackson, The Jurisprudence of International Trade: The DISC Case in GA 7T, 72
AM. J. INT'L L., 747, 779-81 (1978) (concluding that the some GATT dispute
cases, due to interference from other states, severely injure GATT's prestige.
105 See Petersmann, supra note 95; Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The




DEMOCRA CYAND DISPUTE RESOLUTION
of compliance. The third-order of compliance would be a system
by which the affected state, private actor or even the international
organization would be able to bring noncompliance with the in-
ternational decision back to the dispute resolution system.
In some situations, this third-order compliance mechanism is
available. For example, if an international arbitration body
awards a certain amount of money to a party that is then not
paid, many states now provide that the winner of the arbitral
award can bring a case in domestic court to enforce the judg-
ment.10 6 Another example is the EU, which provides that a state
or the Commission can bring a case to the ECJ against a member
state that has not complied with a court decision. Enforcement
under the EU is even more likely because the decisions themselves
are integrated into the domestic legal fabric as is done with the re-
ferral system under the ECJ.'08 Because the ECJ makes the ruling
'06 Signatories of the New York Convention permit individuals and na-
tions access to their courts in order to attach assets of nonpaying parties to an
arbitration. See Convention of the United Nations on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 30
U.N.T.S. 38. [hereinafter New York Convention]; Parsons & Whittemore
Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie Du Papier ("RAKTA"), 508
F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974) (enforcing an award on the basis of the New York
Convention). Article V of the New York Convention recognizes only seven
circumstances in which a signatory state may refuse enforcement and, thus, this
treaty has been credited with drastically strengthening the appeal of interna-
tional arbitration. See Susan Choi, Judicial Enforcement ofArbitration Awards
Under ICSID and the New York Convention, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 175
(1995); Eric Green, International Commercial Diute Resolution, 15 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 175, 177 (1997); Elise P. Wheeless, Article V(1i (B) of the New York Conven-
tion, 7 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 805 (1993). In additon to the New York Con-
vention other treaties exist for the purpose of enforcement of arbitral awards
such as the Panama Convention, the Washington Convention, and the Euro-
pean Convention. See Inter-American Convention on International Commer-
cial Arbitration of 1975, entered into force June 16, 1976, 14 I.L.M. 336; Wash-
ington Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 532; European Commu-
nities Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 8 I.L.M. 229.
17See, e.g., Case 169/87, Commission v. France, 1988 E.C.R. 4093 (forcing
the Commission to bring France in front of the ECJ for the second time for
noncompliance with an erlier court ruling on tobacco pricing); Case 48/71,
Commission v. Italy, 1972 E.C.R. 527 (allowing a claim against Italian govern-
ment for failure to levy an EU tax); Case 131/84, Commission v. Italy 1985
E.C.R. 3531 (allowing action against Italy for failure to enforce the"Collective
Redundancies"); Case 69/86, Commission v. Italy, 1987 E.C.R. 773 (enforcing a
previous judgment against Italy for the quality control of produce).
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on the law alone, the domestic court then renders the final deci-
sion applying the EU law to the facts at hand. Since the decision
is from a domestic court, not an international court, many com-
mentators believe that states are far less likely to ignore the deci-
sions.10 9 Each additional order of compliance means that private
actors have increased ability to force states to comply with the
treaty.
3.5.4. Punishment
A final component of enforcement is the type of punishment
permitted under the treaty and dispute resolution system. Re-
taliation apart from an international treaty is generally seen as a
violation of international law."0 Treaty-approved retaliation, on
the other hand, can provide an effective enforcement mechanism.
This approved retaliation does not constitute a breach or termina-
tion of the treaty but rather an appropriate means of punishment
for the treaty violation. The retaliation can be carried out by the
state against which the harm has been committed or even by
other states.
For example, the WTO outlines stringent enforcement meas-
ures in terms of providing a menu of enforcement options.
11
108 For more information on this process see Attanasio,supra note 93, and
Lenore Jones, Opinions of the Court of the EU in National Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 275 (1996).
109 See generally Symposium, supra note 84, (portraying several views con-
cerning the problems and inconsistencies between nationa and internationalbodies).
110 See JAGDISH BHAGWATI ET AL., AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM (1990)
(describing various opinions on the debate over U.S. trade sanctions and the
GATT.); see also Clay Hawes, The Pelly Amendment Sanctions, 3 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 97 (1994) (debating whether sanctions imposed on Norwegian
goods for violation of the Fisherman's Protective Act, 22 U.S.C. S 1978 (1994)
is a violation of international law); Myles Getlan, Comment, TRIPS and the Fu-
ture of Section 301, 34 COLUM. J. TRANS. NAT'L L. 173 (1995) (evaluating sanc-
tions in the area of intellectual property); Lopez,supra note 65 (discussing the
controversy of the Helms-Burton Act as a potential violation of NAFTA).
II Under the WTO, if a party does not comply with a decision within the
specified time period, the party must start negotiations for mutually accepted
compensation. If no compensation is agreed upon after twenty days, the com-
plainant, under Article 22, can request authorization from the Dispute Settle-
ment Body ("DSB") to retaliate. The DSB consists of one representative from
each member of the agreement in dispute and has the authority to administer
rules and procedures, adopt reports from panels, maintain surveillance of im-
plementation, and authorize suspension of concessions. Unless there is a con-
sensus against retaliation, the DSB must grant authorization within 30 days.
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First, a state has the opportunity to follow the ruling and, usually,
change the offending practice. Second, the state can continue the
practice and pay damages to the harmed state. 12  If neither of
these options are taken, the harmed state can retaliate. 113  The
WTO provides that the harmed state must first retaliate in the
same sector of trade. However, if this is not seen as effective, the
WTO permits cross-sector retaliation." 4 This newer form of the
international adjudication has more teeth then its predecessors
and attempts to correct some of the problems of the past."1
5
Retaliation will first be taken in the same sector as the violation. If, however,
such retaliation is not practical or effective, action will be taken in another sec-
tor in the same general area. If this still proves ineffective or impractical, action
will be taken as a suspension of benefits under the related Uruguay Round
Agreement. The determination as to whether retaliation is practical or effective
will be made by the complaining party rather than the WTO panel or the de-
fending party. See Thomas J. Dillion, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A
New Legal Order for World Trade, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 349 (1995) (discussing
the effectiveness of the WTO with a comparison of the lack of enforcement
under compliance mechanisms of the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") or
the World Bank); Matthew Schaefer, National Review of WTO Dispute Settle-
ment Report: In the Name of Sovereignty or Enhanced WTO Rule Compliance, 11ST. JOHN'SJ. LEGAL. COMMENT 307 (1996).
Under Article 21 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU"), if
the party does not, within thirty clays, state intentions for implementing rec-
ommendations of the adopted panel report and set a time period for compli-
ance, the parties must commence negotiations for mutually ccepted compensa-
tion. See, e.g., John Maggs, US May Buck Tide, Take on the WTO, J. COM. 1
(1998) (detailing that in the face of a recent WTO preliminary report that the
U.S. embargo on shrimp imports, designed to protect sea turtles, was illegal,
speculation has begun that the United States would prefer to pay compensation
or accept sanctions rather than change the law).
113 Article 22 of the DSU allows the complaining party to request authori-
zation from the DSB to retaliate. The DSB must grant authorization within
thirty days unless there is a consensus against such retaliation.
114 Article 22 of the DSU permits cross-sector retaliation if the previous
retaliation, within the sector, is not deemed practical or effective. The deter-
mination of whether retaliation is "practical" or "effective" will be made by the
complaining party, rather than the DSU. However, paragraph four limits the
retaliation a government can impose to the equivalent of -benefits that the de-
fending country was impairing. See also 19 U.S.C. S 2411(a)(3) (1994) (imposing
the same limitations).
115 See Paul Demaret, The Metamorphoses of the GA T: From the Havana
Charter to the World Trade Organization, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 123
(1995); Mary E. Footer, The Role of Consensus in GA 7TIWTO Decision Makin,
17 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 653 (1997); Patrick Moore, The Decisions Bringing te
GATT 1947 and the WTO Agreement, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 317 (1996); Curtis
Reitz, Enforcement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 17 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 555 (1996).
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Another type of enforcement is a fine levied against the mem-
ber state for a violation of the treaty. This fine could be paid to
the international organization, the affected state or the private ac-
tor who is directly harmed. Under traditional international law,
once a state took up a private actor's claim of harm, the money to
be paid would go to the state.1 6 A more recent innovation in in-
ternational law is the idea that states can be directly liable to indi-
viduals for the harm they have suffered. This is the case under
EU law.
This type of punishment directly rectifies the harm caused by
the noncompliance with the international law and also puts a
price tag on noncompliance. The ECJ acts like a domestic court
since it awards damages directly to aggrieved private actors.
1 17
The power to award damages may alter a national government's
decision whether to comply with an international law since it
puts a price tag on noncompliance. The costs of noncompliance
can be severe and direct."' The EU has gone even further since
116 See RICHARD B. LILLICH & BURNS H. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL
CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY LUMP SUM AGREEMENTS 45 (1975). The prob-
lem arising with enforcing claims in this manner is a concern of timeliness. The
claims are only settled years after the harm was done and, thus, the settlementis often not an effective resolution. See Brice M. Clagett, Title III of the Helms-
Burton Act is Consistent with International Law, 90 AM. J. INT'LL. 434, 436, 440
n.15 (1996) (discussing the ineffectiveness of settlements in the 1980's between
the U.S. and China for less than 40% of the claim and in 1992 between the U.S.and Germany for round 6% of the claim).
117 See Case 14/83, Von Colson & Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen,
1984 E.C.R. 1891 (allowing individual workers to enforce their rights under a
Community Directive on equal employment); Case 33/76, Rewe-ZentralfinanzeG v. Landwirtschats-Kammer Fir Das Saarland, 1976 E.C.R. 1989 (forcing
Germany officials to refund illegal money charged to individuals for the inspec-
tion of imported apples even though the German statute of frauds had run on
the claim). For more on this apect of the ECJ's damages awards see David
O'Keefe, supra note 48, and April Phillippa Tash, Remedies for European Com-munity Law Claims in Member State Courts: Toward a European Standard, 31
COLU.. TRANSNAT'L L. 377 (1993).
l See Case C-271/91, Marshall v. Southampton and S.-W. HampshireArea Health Auth., 1993 E.C.R. 1-4367 (imposing damages that exceeded the
United Kingdoms statutory, limitations; Case C.6/90 & 9/90, Francovich v.
Italy. [1993] 2 C.M.LR. 66 (1993) (Italy) (forcing Italy to compensate workers
for damages suffered by nonimplementation of a community directive dealingwith woyker's protection against bankrupt employers); Case 70/72 Commis-
sion v. Germany, 1973 E.C.R. 813 (forcing Germany to not only cease the ille-
gal payments of state aid, but also, recover any aid aready granted to its nation-
ls). Remarkably, the ECJ has not imposed any fine thus far in a case brought
by the Commission. Article 171 specifically states that the ECJ may, by the re-
quest of the Commission, impose a lump sum or penalty payments upon a
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1991 and found that member states can be liable to private actors
for damages suffered through the nonimplementation of EU
laws. 1 9 And, in some ways, these fines make compliance in the
first place easier since a government can demonstrate how non-
compliance will directly hurt the national treasury. A potentially
large damage award helps the governments protect themselves
against strong domestic lobbies as well.
These damage remedies in the EU are additional to a require-
ment to change the law, unlike in the WTO system which grants
choice. By replacing the traditional international law remedy of
retaliation, a damages system is closer to a domestic court system.
Violations of international law are treated like any other violation
of the law. By eliminating retaliation, the EU avoids escalation
between states retaliating and cross-retaliating. It also avoids link-
age between different trade issues; each problem is treated sepa-
rately and judged on its own merits. An enforcement system
with damages to private actors clearly protects private actors the
most of the trade systems established.
4. INCREASING INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATION INCREASES
DEMOCRACY
The purpose of this Article has been to outline the factors that
measure individual participation in dispute resolution and com-
Member State that refuses compliance. This Article was added to the Treaty at
the request of Parliament concerned with the enforcement of Community law.
Article 171(1), stating that necessary measures shall be taken for enforcement of
compliance, has been used by the ECJ. See Lisa Borgfeld White, Comment, The
Enforcement of EU Law, 18 HoUS. J. INT'L L. 833, 898 n.207 (1996) (listing the
fifteen cases in violation of Article 171). However, the imposition of a fine,
under Article 171(2), has yet to be employed. See Kenneth M. Lord, Note,
Bootstrapping an Environmental Policy from an Economic Convent, 29 CORNELL
INT'L L.[. 571, 606 n.325 (1996) (commenting on the lack of enforcement
through use of fines). See also Michael J. McGuinness, The Protection of Labor
Rights in North America, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 579, 596 n.81 (1994) (reasoning
the lack of enforcement by use of Article 171).
119 In 1991, the ECJ instituted remarkable advancement for the enforce-
ment of Community law through the preliminary reference ruling in Fran-
covich v. Italy. See Joined Cases 6/90 & 9/90, Francovich, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R.
66 (1990); Rene Valladares, Francovich: Li ht at the Ed of the Marshall Tunnel, 3U. MIAMI Y.B. INT'LL. 1 (1995). The rulng conferred liability upon a Member
State to an individual for damages incurred by nonimplementation of a direc-tive. Thus, because Italy failed to implement a directiv e concerning the cover-
age of employees under insolvent employers, Italy was liable for the damagesth  employees suffered. See Valladares, sup ra.
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pare them to the dispute resolution models currently used in in-
ternational trade organizations. By doing so, we can understand
how each of these factors either adds or detracts from the legiti-
macy of international trade organizations. In the end, we can
recognize that individual participation has the ability to increase
democracy in several significant ways.
4.1. Judicial Decisionmaking is Lawmaking
The first step in recognizing the importance of individual par-
ticipation is to recognize the importance itself of dispute resolu-
tion. Historically, states handled trade disputes through negotia-
tion and little attention was given to other methods for resolving
them. Only with the evolution of the EU, and the regional hu-
man rights systems, has appropriate focus been given to the im-
portance of dispute resolution.
In focusing on dispute resolution, we are recognizing the evo-
lution of trade organizations that do more than rely on states to
resolve their disputes. The creation of the Dispute Resolution
Body under the WTO and the NAFTA system evolving from the
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement clearly demonstrate that fo-
cus on dispute resolution is warranted. As trade organizations
continue to evolve, it will be their dispute resolution systems that
herald this evolution.
The result of dispute resolution mechanisms is that each of the
organizations will be creating a body of law in addition to the
original agreement. This body of law may have varying levels of
precedence and supremacy but will be the area in which these or-
ganizations could primarily evolve. Therefore, it is crucial that
we also focus on ways to ensure this stage of lawmaking is demo-
cratic and legitimate.
Even when national governments determine that trade policy
and agreements should be negotiated in secret or solely by the ex-
ecutive branch, once the agreement is reached this original deci-
sion should not preclude citizen involvement in the enforcement
120 Karen J. Alter, Who Are the "Masters of the Treaty"?: European Govern-
ments and the European Court of Justice, 52 INT'L ORG. 121 (1998); Geoffrey
Garrett, The Politics of Legal Integration in the EU, 49 INT'L ORG. 171 (1995);
Geoffrey Garrett et al., The European Court of Justice, National Governments,
and Legal Integration in the EU, 52 INT'L ORG. 149 (1998); Walter Mattli and
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Law and Politics in the EU A Reply to Garrett Union, 49
INT'L ORG. 183 (1995); Andrew Moravscik, Negotiating the Single European Act,
45 INT'L ORG. 19 (1991); Weiler, The Transformation o Europe, supra note 3.
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stage. Legislating original law and resolving disputes about that
law are two separate functions. As I noted earlier, the debate over
the "democracy deficit" in the EU focuses on the first function.
We should also look to the second function and recognize the im-
portance of dispute resolution.
4.2. Individual Involvement Promotes Legitimacy
There are several specific ways in which granting standing to
private actors can remedy typical conflicts in a national govern-
ment. First, giving private actors the right to bring cases, rather
than requiring them to lobby or petition the government to take
action eliminates the problem of capture at the dispute resolution
stage.!' Otherwise, only states participate in the process and,
therefore, rely on political pressures to determine whether to pur-
sue violations of trade agreements. Understandably, a state will
not choose to spend its limited attention and energy on trade
problems which have little impact on the domestic economy.
States will weigh the impact on certain industries, the political
clout of those industries, and pressures from other domestic con-
stituencies before embarking on negotiations. A state may not
even know of any violation until a domestic interest alerts them.
For example, if a company in the US feels that another state is
violating the GATT rules, it must petition the USTR under the
301 procedure in order to pursue a judicial remedy. The USTR
must then make a decision as to whether it is worth the time and
energy to pursue a remedy through the WTO. This procedure
probably operates very well for the "Kodaks" and "IBMs" of the
world, but if the company affected by the violations is relatively
small, lacks political influence or power, or has not suffered large
losses, the USTR could, legitimately, conclude that out of the
12' Of course, there is always the issue of adjudicatory capture in which in-
terest groups are able to use the judicial system for their own interests. One
example in the context of trade dispute resolution could be the EU where pub-
lic interest roups in Great Britain have used the EU in order to advance
changes in the domestic law. See Catherine Barnard, A European Litigation
Strategy: The Case of the Equal Opportunities Commission, in NEW LEGAL
DYNAMICS OF EU 253 (o Shaw & Gillian More eds, 1995); see also Mattli &
Slaughter, supra note 71, at 185-190 (1998). Another example could be if envi-
ronmental NGO's use NAFTA to force Mexico to comply with its own envi-
ronmental laws. See Atik, supra note 26.
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numerous trade violations it polices, this particular violation is
not worth the government's limited resources.
A government may also choose not to bring a case because it
does not want the violation addressed. A state could decide not to
bring a case against a particular state for political reasons in deal-
ing with that state or because other domestic interests would pre-
fer to keep the law unchanged. Furthermore, intergovernmental
pressure may result in cases not being brought to the international
adjudicatory body. The best example of this is the controversy
over the Helms-Burton law, which restricts trade with Cuba and
punishes those who engage in such trade. 122  The EU initially
lodged a complaint with the WTO, which has repeatedly post-
poned the issue to allow the EU and the United States time to ne-
gotiate. There is no doubt that domestic pressure in the United
States has led to the United States placing pressure on the EU not
to pursue the case. In this way, the WTO has become politicized.
Rather than adjudicating appropriate restrictions on trade, the fo-
rum is hijacked by the domestic pressure and politics of U.S. pol-
icy towards Cuba. If there were private actor standing in the
WTO, this case would already be in the process of being heard.
Furthermore, giving private actors standing may be the best
method of ensuring that their own state actually follows the trade
agreement.' 23 For example, under the current system, it is un-
likely that the United States or any other state would agree to
bring a case against itself in the WTO. One only has to examine
the jurisprudence of the ECJ to recognize that the right to bring
cases in the EU has resulted, as often as not, in private actors su-
ing their own government for violations of EU law.'24 This en-
sures that a commitment to trade liberalization is not later over-
ridden by specific exceptions or changes to the law agreed to by
122 For an explanation of the Helms-Burton Act, its domestic and interna-
tional effect, and foreign responses, see Symposium, 20 7he Helms-Burton Act:
Domestic Initiatives and Foreign Responses, HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
713-814 (1997).
W See Robert Cover, The Uses ofJurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideol-
ogy, and Innovation, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS
OF ROBERT COVER 51-93 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992) (arguing that juris-
dictional redundancy, as exists between the federal and state system in the U.S.
and also between the domestic systems and the EU, can effectively deal with
the problems of the elite in a political system and is an appropriate method of
dealing with conflicting values mn a society.)
'24 See discussion supra section 3.2.4.
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lawmakers under pressure from powerful and narrow lobbying
interests.
125
In addition, individual involvement will also lead to increased
transparency and use of the dispute resolution system. Transpar-
ency of procedures and decisions is a crucial part of building the
legitimacy of any organization. As private actors use the system
and become comfortable with the rules, it will build momentum
and its use will increase. This promotes understanding and, in the
end, confirms the legitimacy of the organization and its proce-
dures.
Finally, examining the role of private actors in dispute resolu-
tion is consistent with a liberal IR approach. The level of indi-
vidual participation can vary with each of factors examined in
Section 3. This level of participation clearly affects how govern-
ments order their preferences and which segments of society are
most represented in dispute resolution. Increased individual in-
volvement would certainly broaden the spectrum of society so-
represented, and perhaps affect government preferences to act
more legitimately in its own decisionmaking.
4.3. Individual Participation Will Increase the Effectiveness of
International Organizations
Granting private actors standing will also promote the effec-
tiveness of the underlying trade agreement. Private actors can
make the determination when a violation is of sufficient harm to
bring a case. We neither rely on states policing one another, with
all of the attendant political concerns, nor rely on an oversight
body, which may have political concerns and limited resources or
research capabilities. Better policing of a trade agreement will oc-
cur if enforcement relies on those who are most invested with
protecting their rights and benefits under the trade agreement.
126
The result of better policing is twofold. First, more enforce-
ment actions will be brought, and second, these actions will be
narrowly tailored to deal directly with the particular law causing
harm. In the area of trade law, this direct involvement makes
sense. The trade agreements are designed to influence private ac-
" See Atik, supra note 26.
126 See Robert E. Hudec, Dispute Resolution Under a North American Free
Trade Area: The Importance of the Domestic Legal Setting 12 CAN.-U.S. Lj. 329,
332-333 (1987).
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tor behavior based on state promises. The state promises to lower
tariffs, or eliminate barriers, or reduce taxation. In exchange,
companies invest, start businesses, or increase trade. When those
state promises are broken-laws are not changed or new barriers
are erected-it is private actors who suffer the consequences. As is
the case with human rights, individuals should have some re-
course. 12  We have already recognized this in the area of labor
rights under the International Labor Organization ("ILO") and
even under the WTO for intellectual property rights.12 8  Under
the ILO, workers' organizations can bring noncompliance cases
in the area of human rights and labor rights against a state.1
29
Under the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Rights ("TRIPS"), private actors will be able to bring cases in do-
mestic courts for noncompliance. 30 It is somewhat anachronistic
and curious that trade rights should be moving in the other direc-
tion.
127 PETERSMANN, supra note 10, at 8 ("Political theory, and historical expe-
rience (e.g. in the context of EC law and of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights) confirm that granting actionable rights to self-interested citizens
offers the most effective incentives for self-enforcing liberal constitution.").
121 See id at 33 & 62 (1997).
129 The International Labor Organization ("ILO") utilizes a tripartite sys-
tem divided into government, employment, and labor to promote the global
recognition of human and labor rights. The Governing Body consists of 28
government members, 14 employer members, and 14 worker members. Com-
mittees and delegations for annual conferences are similarly structured. The
ILO is unique in allowing organizations of employers or workers to allege non-
compliance complaints against the contracting states. Although private indi-
viduals are not aowed direct access without the backing of an established or-
ganization, the democratic process is strengthened by the employers' and
workers' involvement. See Petersmann, supra note 10, at 433-34 (commenting
that the increase of private individual participation "reflect[s] the democratic
functions of international liberal rules and organizations for the participation of
individual rights"). See generally HECTOR BARTOLOMEIDE LA CRUZ ET AL.,
THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATON (1996) (providing overview of
the ILO procedures).
130 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Or-
ganization,.Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRumENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 31, 33 LL.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] The
TRIPS Ageement recognizes that intellectual property rights are private rights.
Although implementation is at the discretion of-the members, the agreement




4.4. Responding to the Democracy Deficit
Of the existing models of dispute resolution, clearly the EU
provides for the most individual involvement. Individuals are di-
rectly granted rights and the standing to protect those rights.
Court decisions are supreme to national law and, can be inte-
grated directly into the domestic legal fabric. The procedures and
rulings are transparent and highly accessible to private actors. Fi-
nally, enforcement through the domestic legal system gives the
best chance that the judgments of the supranational court will be
followed. While no model of dispute resolution can be com-
pletely de-politicized, the EU best tries to ensure that member
states comply with international trade law without allowing them
to make short-term, narrow decisions about compliance.
In comparison, other trade organizations fall short. Invest-
ment arbitration under ICSID or UNICTRAL does provide for
limited democracy. It has the advantages of allowing investors to
bring cases against states when their rights have been violated.
Furthermore, increased enforcement of arbitration awards makes
it likely that states will comply and pay the damages awarded.
The problem with this type of model, however, is the limited
scope of the arbitration action. First, the rights provided in
Chapter 11 of NAFTA or in bilateral investment treaties are the
most basic of free trade rights. States can protect, and have pro-
tected, their most sensitive national issues and industries in the
agreement in the first place. 3 ' Second, an arbitration decision
does not change the law of the offending state and any settlement
can also be kept private if the parties so wish. In this way, a state
can choose to pay in order to continue to break the law. Third,
since this is a single arbitration case, rather than an authoritative
court decision, a state can deal with this one instance quietly
without creating the problem of numerous cases brought on the
same issue. Although arbitration reduces the likelihood of cap-
ture somewhat in terms of the choice as to when to bring a case,
the scope of the rights and the decision are severely limited.
The WTO model also provides only partial answers to the
questions of political capture and institutional effectiveness. The
new procedures and enforcement capabilities of the WTO are de-
131 See NAFTA, supra note 65, arts. 1120, 1138, annexes 1120.1, 1138.2, chs.
21, 32 (noting several exceptions).
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signed to reduce dramatically the link between trade and domestic
political interests. Once a dispute is brought to the WTO, a state
will have much less ability to avoid complying with the law. The
fault of the WTO, and other systems that rely on states to bring
cases, is that the lack of rights and the lack of standing for private
actors make the system less responsive to the citizenry and less
democratic in the end. Under the WTO, private actors must rely
on their governments to assert and defend their trading rights.
It is ironic that the EU has been the focus of the democracy
deficit debate. While I do not dispute the validity of argument in
reference to the legislative process in the EU, we need to recog-
nize that the EU's accomplishments in providing for democracy
in its dispute resolution are unique.
4.5. Objections to Individual Participation
There are numerous objections to the increased participation
of private actors in international trade organizations. I will focus
on three of them.
4.5.1. States Will Not Join International Organizations
The first objection could well be that states will be more re-
luctant to join organizations that give their citizens such power.
Involving private actors means that the government has less con-
trol over dispute resolution and, ultimately, the legal interpreta-
tion of the treaty.132 This distribution of power to the citizens
rather than the government can be threatening to states risky for
them.
This objection has been raised most frequently in the case of
human rights organizations where states are reluctant to either
join the organization or are reluctant to sign the additional proto-
col which would permit cases being brought by their citizens.
33
Therefore, the argument goes, states will not join trade agree-
132 This objection has also been used in the application of extraterritorial
securities laws, where the argument has been made that the existence of private
plaintiffs improperly moves the locus of foreign policy decisionmaking from
the executive branch to the judicial branch. See Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterrito.
riality in an Age of Globalization: The Hartford Fire Case, 1993 SuP. CT. REV.
289, 320-21.
133 For example, of the 140 countries who are parties to the ICCPR only 93
have ratified the Optional Protocol. See ICCPR, supra note 32; Optional Pro-
tocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for




ments if their citizens can enforce it against them. However, this
objection overlooks the key difference between these types of
agreements. Other governments create human rights treaties for
the purpose of protecting citizens from the actions of their own
government.1 14  (Aliens have long had the right under interna-
tional law to be protected from abuse and their home state has
long had the right to demand reparation for their harm.) One
mechanism created to protect these individual rights under hu-
man rights treaties is to allow the individual to sue his or her own
government for violation of their rights under the international
treaty.
International trade treaties, however, are completely different
in their purpose and in the benefits accruing to each state. While
human rights treaties could be characterized as ambitious in that
all states are individually responsible for protecting their citi-
zens, 135 a trade agreement is more of a contractual treaty with
promises and exchanges between each of the member states.
There are strong economic reasons to join these trade agreements
beyond the altruism and moral leadership that motivates signature
of human rights treaties. In addition, while private actors could
bring a case against their own government if private actor partici-
134 On example is the U.N. CHARTER:
We the peoples of the United Nations determined.., to es-
tablish conditions under which justice and respect for the ob-
ligations arising from treaties and other sources of interna-
tional law can be maintained, and to promote socialprogress
and better standards of life in large freedom... and tor these
ends... to employ international machinery for the promo-
tion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples
See U.N. CHARTER, preamble. For another examples see the ICCPR, supra
note 32, pt. I, art. 2 ("Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its ju-
risdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant."); Nigel Rodley, On
the Necessity of the United States Ratification of the International Human Rights
Conventions, in HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, WITH OR WITHOUT RESER-
VATIONS?, 3, 15 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1985) ("I would be remiss if I did not
reaffirm the principle of the inherent desirability of providing individuals who
think they have been victimized by their governments with a forum for bring-
ing such alleged victimization to the attention of an international body.)
(regarding the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination).
135 See MARK W. JANis, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW,
13-14 (1993).
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pation were permitted in international trade agreements, that is
hardly the sole purpose of allowing private actor participation.
Arguably, private actor standing undermines the authority of
the government to negotiate trade treaties.1 16 Professor Nichols
argues that domestic groups opposing their governments would
create a "spectacle." 137 First, this assumes, somewhat condescend-
ingly, that other states and trade bureaucracies could not distin-
guish between the government and private parties or interest
groups if they took opposing sides in dispute resolution. 138 Sec-
ond, this misses the point of a dispute resolution procedure. Dis-
pute resolution is designed to resolve disagreements after an
agreement is signed. The extension of standing in dispute resolu-
tion does not, for better or worse, give these private actors a voice
as the trade agreement is being negotiated.
In the end, the benefits accruing from international trade
agreements will outweigh nations' reluctance to join organiza-
tions where their own citizens could have standing. For example,
Turkey has had a traditional reluctance to recoinize individual
rights and standing under human rights treaties but has appar-
ently calculated that the economic benefit of joining the EU out-
weighs these concerns and so has applied for EU membership.
A separate objection could be that individual participation is
neither appropriate nor efficient given the particular goals of the
international organization. The idea that certain organizations
would not benefit from individual participation, is an important
one in evaluating when and how private actors should be in-
volved. Clearly, a blanket statement that private actors will al-
ways improve an organization is naive. The distinction between
"facilitative" and "producing" international organizations, made
by Kenneth Abbott in outlining mesoinstitution theory, would
136 See Philip M. Nichols, supra note 22, 316-18 (1996).
137 See id. at 317.
138 See G. Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and Participation by
Nonstate Parties in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
359, 374 (1996).
139 Turkey has not signed the ICCPR or the Protocol to the European
Convention of Human Rights ("ECHR") providing for individual standing. See
ICCPR, supra note 32; Protocol No. 9 to the 1950 European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, entered into force,




perhaps shed the most light.' 40 If the goal of the organization was
"facilitative"-public awareness, convening negotiations, organiz-
ing meetings-then private actor involvement appears to be less
compelling. As the goals of the organization becomes more
"producing," i.e., adjudicating behavior, creating norms, setting
negotiation agendas, and the organization is more centralized, the
importance of private actors become more compelling. These
producing organizations become lawmakers and the concerns of
democracy and legitimacy must be recognized. Perhaps one of the
reasons this debate over democracy and legitimacy has arisen in
the first place is that more trade organizations are moving along
the facilitative-producing continuum to become more important
players in the creation of international law.
4.5.2. Individual Participation is Logistically Unfeasible
Another objection to individual participation is that the me-
chanics of such a system would overwhelm the structure of the
trade organization. A corollary of this argument is the fear that
there will be numerous frivolous suits or that individual participa-
tion will be limited to the wealthy.' 42
While the logistics of involving private actors are undoubtedly
complex, this is hardly a reason not to set up an organization
properly. Certain standing requirements or a screening system,
such as exists with the European and Inter-American human
rights systems, 4 3 could be established.'4 The issue of logistics is
140 See Kenneth Abbot & Duncan Snidal, Mesoinstitutions: The Role of For-
mal Organizations in International Politics (unpublished manuscript on file withauthors .
141 Ambassador John McDonald notes that the bureaucracy and funding
requirements of setting up such a system should not be underestimated. See In-
terview with John McDonald (Ambassador to International Labor Organiza-
tion) (March 17, 1998); see also Nichols, supra note 22, at 312-13 (casting doubt
on the practically of a system that would allow equitable, direct participation
by all the world's citizens).
142 See Nichols, supra note 22, at 318-19.
143 See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M.
673 (1970); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
144 See Glen T. Schleyer, Note, Power to the People: Allowing Private Parties
to Raise Claims Before the WTO Dispute Resolution System, 65 FoRD. L. REV.
2275 (proposing a Commission for Free Trade to screen disputes for the WTO);
see also S ell, supra note 138, at 375 (noting that both the United States Su-
preme Court and the E.C.J. have established rules regulating standing that,
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an issue of money and support for the organization. It is a ques-
tion of what the member states choose to support. The expansion
of the WTO legal service in comparison to the previous service
under GATT demonstrates what can be accomplished with the
will of the governments.
The concern about the availability of the necessary resources
to pursue international remedies is a valid one. It is, however, the
same concern that should exist in the current situation where pri-
vate actors need resources in order to lobby their governments.
Arguably, leaving it to each private actor to evaluate his or her
economic gains and losses from bringing a case provides for less
distortion than filtering that choice through the national govern-
ment.
4.5.3. Trade is Politics
A final objection to individual involvement could be that the
premise behind separating trade and domestic politics is inher-
ently flawed. This argument maintains that ultimately politics
and political interests should determine the enforcement of trade
agreements. Individual injustice, if it occurs, is not really the fo-
cus of trade policy. Trade policy focuses on the good of the state
as a whole and the government is in the best position to deter-
mine that interest. This objection goes back to the idea that di-
plomacy, secrecy, and negotiation are the best way to handle dis-
putes between sovereign states. 45 The process of judicialization-
which individual involvement moves forward-is not appropriate
for trade policy.
This objection attacks the heart of how one thinks about the
international system. If trade should be bound to politics, if states
should be the focus of the international system, if diplomacy is
the best way to resolve disputes, my proposal is yet another step
on the slippery slope of giving more power to citizens and erod-
ing the sovereignty of states. On the other hand, if increased le-
galization and judicialization of international law make the inter-
national system more effective and more responsive,146 then this
while not perfect, are sufficient to satisfy participants in the system that deci-
sions are not political judgments).
145 Nichols, supra note 22, at 319.
146 See Petersmann, supra note 95 (explaining the importance of increased
judicialization in the GATT context).
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proposal might hold some interest.1 47 It is really a question of
one's views the continuing evolution of the international system.
Increased legitimacy and democracy are appropriate goals under a
view of liberal governance.
5. CoNcLusIoN
The article intended to demonstrate two things. My first goal
was to turn the focus to dispute resolution as a way of dealing
with some of the traditional critiques of international trade or-
ganizations. Increasing individual participation addresses the lib-
eral international relations goals of examining the role of private
actors behind the state. Individual participation can also be used
as a measure for democracy and legitimacy of trade organizations.
Finally, I argue individual participation can help reduce the issue
of capture.
My second goal was illustrating that as regional and interna-
tional organizations are created, states should examine carefully
the type of dispute resolution mechanism they establish. 148 Inter-
national trade organizations diminish the returns of the treaty by
limiting their dispute resolution mechanisms to states. By provid-
ing rights without a remedy, these international trade organiza-
tions are limiting both their impact and their legitimacy. The so-
lution is to reduce the link between domestic or short-term
147 See Joel P. Trachtman, The International Economic Law Revolution, 17
U. PA. J. INT'LECON. L. 33, 58 (1996) (arguing that judicial institutions make
international trade agreements more binding and more attractive); see also Steve
Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade
Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'LECON. L. 331, 343-46 (1996) (arguing that in-
creased transparency of the WTO system is inevitable and appropriate); G.
Richard Shelf, supra note 138, at 374 (arguing that issues which pit governments
against governments and governments against interest groups will not result in
confusion on the position of each entity);YARBROUGH & YARBROUGH, supra
note 21, at 86-106 (discussing how the development of"minilateralism" or the
creation of supranational institutions for small groups of countries leads to
more effective trade liberalism).
141 Some focus has already been given to the impact of different dispute
resolution mechanisms on emerging organizations and I this will hopefully con-
tinue. See Taylor, supra note 70 (examining NAFTA and MERCOSUR); Gar-
cia, supra note 11 (a-nalyzing the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA")
and applyingthe mesomstitutional theory); David Lopez, Dispute Resolution
under a Free Trade Area of the Americas: The Shape of Things to Come, 28 INTER-
AM. L. REV. 597 (1997) (discussing the alternatives for developing a dispute
resolution mechanism under the FTAA).
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political interests of states and their trade policy by granting pri-
vate actors standing to bring cases for treaty violation.
The arguable purpose of international trade treaties is broad
encouragement of trade by requiring, at the outset, that member
states do not take actions that would adversely affect individual
players. The rights provided in these treaties and the benefits
therefrom accrue most directly to private actors, and only to their
governments indirectly through better economies, more tax in-
come, and reelection. The benefits of trade treaties are best pro-
tected and enforced by those most directly affected.
To examine the EU, although it poses its own questions about
the democracy deficit, is to observe an international organization
committed to ensuring that the guidelines set forth in the Treaty
of Rome are followed. The dispute resolution system in the EU
guarantees more compliance by allowing private actors directly
affected by each country's actions to bring cases in the national
courts (and in certain cases to the ECJ directly).
This result allows for the use of private attorneys general to
enforce the law based on their own assessment of the harm they
are suffering and the cost of litigation devoid of political concerns.
In the EU system, we do not rely on states, each of which may
have an interest in allowing others to continue violating the treaty
or may not want to bring a case against another state for political
reasons. When we are left to rely on states to enforce the law un-
der a trade treaty we are left with an incomplete system.
If states are actually committed to the trade treaties they sign
and to bringing the benefits of those treaties to their constituents,
they must allow their own citizens to bring cases directly to the
dispute resolution mechanism established under the treaty. Fur-
thermore, these cases should not be decided under arbitration, as
is the system under NAFTA for investor disputes. An ever-
changing arbitration panel creates neither a uniform body of law
nor precedent and, in the end, can never carry the weight of an
international standing body.
As the number of regional and international trade agreements
grows, their dispute resolution mechanisms will only increase in
importance. In order to ensure real change in the trade laws and
real compliance by the constituent states, we must provide for in-




OBSERVATIONS ON TRADE AND INVESTMENT,
AND TRADE AND LABOR
C. O'NEAL TAYLOR*
One of the consequences of the growth in world trade, the ex-
pansion in the jurisdiction of the World Trade Organization
("WTO"), and the new and ongoing experiments in regionalism has
been a re-awakening of interest in the linkage between all areas of
economic activity. The international community has always been
aware of linkage. The International Labor Organization ("ILO")
Constitution of 1919 discusses the link between trade and labor
rights.' The Havana Charter of the International Trade Organiza-
tion contained an article on labor standards and trade, as well one
on investment and trade.2 The re-awakening of this interest is im-
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sions at the conference and later correspondence. The author is particularly
grateful for the input from Steve Charnovitz and Philip Nichols. The author
would also like to thank her research assistants, Simon B. Purnell '98, Cary
Louihman '99, and Natalia Geren '99.
The International Labor Organization ("ILO") was established by the
Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, pt. XIII, 225 Consol. T.R. 188, 112 B.F.S.P.
1, amended on several occasions and current revision reprinted in, CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION AND STANDING
ORDERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE 3-23 (1963)
[hereinafter Treaty of Versailles]. The Preamble of the ILO Constitution ex-
pressly discusses one possible link between trade and labor. It reads,"[w]hereas
also the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obsta-
cle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their
own countries ..... Treaty of Versailles, pmbl.
2 The Havana Charter, which established the International Trade Organi-
zation ("ITO") recognized that:
[A]ll countries have a common interest in the achievement and main-
tenance of fair labour standards related to productivity, and thus in the
improvement of wages and working conditions as productivity may
permit. The Members recognize that unfair labour conditions, par-
ticularly.., for export, create difficulties in international trade, and,
accordingly, each Member shall take whatever action may be appro-
priate and feasible to eliminate such conditions within its territory.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, HAVANA CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ORGANIZATION 32 (1948), Pub. No. 3206.
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portant because calls for examining linkage have often been accom-
panied by calls for the negotiation of new international rules to be
overseen by the World Trade Organization. Studying linkage now
may, therefore, help to explore how the world's operating trading
system operates, and spur, if necessary or timely, the development
of additional international rules.
The addition of the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights
("TRIPS")3 and Trade-Related Investment Measures ("TRIMS")
4
Agreements to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as
amended in 1994 ("GATT 1994") the formation of the WTO
Working Groups on Environment and Investment' and the battle
The Havana Charter also contains provisions related to investment. The
Charter recognized that "international investment, both public and private, can
be of great value in promoting economic development and reconstruction, and
consequent social progress."Id. at 35. A signatory country was to pledge not to"take unreasonable or unjustifiable action within its territory injurious to the
rights or interests of nationals of other Members in the enterprise, skill, capital,
arts or technology which they have supplied." Id. at 34. Nevertheless, the
Charter did reserve rights of a signatory to "prescribe and give effect on just
terms to requirements as to the ownership of existing and future investments."
Id. at 35. The Charter was never ratified and, therefore, the ITO never came
into existence. Instead, the international community signed and ratified the
limited portion of the charter that dealt with trade, which was the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
For further information on the ITO, see William Diebold, Jr., The End of
the ITO, in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE (No. 16, 1952); Jacob Viner,
Conflicts of Principle in Drafting a Trade Charter, 25 FOREIGN AFF. 612 (1947);
CLAIR WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE (1949).
3 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]; Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement].
4 See Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROuND vol. 2, 33 I.L.M.
1244 (1994) [hereinafter TRIMS Agreement].
5 The World Trade Orgaiation has confronted the push of some of its
Member states for increased inkage by establishing working groups to examine
the relationship between trade and environment as well as trade and invest-
ment. See Steve Charnovitz, A Critical Guide to the WTO's Report on Trade and
Environment, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 341 (1997) (discussing the efforts of
the Working Group on Trade and the Environment). The Working Group on
the Relationship of Trade and Investment held its first meeting in June 1997.
At the first meeting, the Group identified a checklist of issues it would pursue
in its future work: I. Implications of the relationship between trade and in-
vestment for development and economic growth...; II. The economic rela-
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over linkage preceding and during the WTO's first Ministerial
Meeting6 reveal that the multilateral body which creates and en-
tionship between trade and investment... ; I. Stocktaking and analysis of
existing international instruments and activities regarding trade and invest-
ment... . WORLD TRADE ORG., The Growing Impact of Investment and Trade,
FOCUS (une-July 1997) at 2.
The goals of the working p arty are to identify: (1) common features and
differences... as well as possible gaps in existing international instruments; (2)
advantages and disadvantages of entering into bilateral, regional and multilateral
rules on investment, including from a development perspective; (3) the rights
and obligations of home and host countries and of investors and host countries;
and (4) the relationship between existing and possible future international co-
operation on investment policy and existing and possible future international
cooperation on competition policy. See id.
The WTO's first Ministerial Meeting was held in Singapore in December
of 1996. The developing countries, with support from some developed coun-
tries, including the United Kingdom, blocked efforts by the United States to get
the issue of the relationship between trade and labor standards on the work
agenda of the WTO. The argument against inclusion of trade and labor stan-
dards in the WTO's work was that the lack of high standards would lead some
developed countries to seek imposition of trade sanctions. See Gary G. Yerkey,
Developing Countries Block U.S. Plan to Include Labor Issue in Work Agenda, 13
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1925 (Dec. 11, 1996).
At the end of the Singapore meeting, a Ministerial Declaration was issued
which contained the following statement about labor standards:
We renew our commitment to the observance of internationally
recognized core labour standards. The International Labour Or-
ganization (1LO) is the competent body to set and deal with these
standards, and we affirm our support for its work in promoting
them. We believe that economic growth and development fos-
tered by increased trade and further trade liberalization contribute
to the promotion of these standards. We reject the use of labour
standards for protectionist purposes, and agree that the compara-
tive advantage of countries, particularly low-wage developing
countries, must in no way be put into question. In this regard, we
note that the WTO and ILO Secretariats will continue their exist-
ing collaboration.
Singapore Ministerial Declaration, Dec. 13, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 220, 221. This por-
tion of the Ministerial Declaration closely follows the four points for labor
consensus that had been suggested by WTO Director-General, Renato Rug-
giero, at the beginning of the meeting. Those four points were as follows:
1. All WTO member nations oppose abusive work place practices,
through their approval of the United Nations UniversalDeclaration of
Human Rights;
2. The ILO holds primary responsibility for labor issues;
3. Trade sanctions should not be used to deal with disputes over labor
standards; and
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forces trade rules has begun to recognize and accept some linkages.
Activities in other organizations further illustrate the interest of the
international community in linkage and rule-making. For example,
ILO, energized by the trade-linkage debate, has been rethinking its
approach to fostering labor rights. Member states of the Organiza-
4. Member states agree that the comparative advantage of low-wage
countries should not be compromised.
WTO Ministers Reach Consensus on Labor, Investment, Procurement, Int'l Trade
Daily, (BNA) (Dec. 13, 1996).
See Brian A. Langille, Eight Ways to Think about International Labour
Standards, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 27, 49 (1997) (discussing linkage, and how a
move to the WTO led to a refocusing on the International Labor Organization
and its operations, and to that group refocusing its efforts).
Even before the Singapore Ministerial Declaration, the ILO had set up a
working party to discuss how it should respond to demands to link labor and
trade. Discussions on the linkage were first held by the ILO Governing Body
in 1994. See Virginia A. Leary, Workers' Rights and International Trade: The So-
cial Clause (GAT, ILO, NAFTA, U.S. Laws), in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HAR-
MONIZATION 177, 190 (Gagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996). Prior
to that discussion, the ILO Director-General, Michel Hansenne, had written
about linkage in his 1994 Annual Report to the ILO Labour Conference. See
Report of the Director-General: Defending Values Promoting Change-Social
Justice in a Global Economy, INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORG., International
Labor Conference, 81st Sess. (1994). The Director-General expressed concerns
about the use of a social clause that allowed trade sanctions to be used in re-
sponse to substandard labor conditions, and suggested possible ILO responses.
Id. at 58-60. After the 1994 Governing Body meeting, a working party was set
up to discuss all aspects of the social dimension of the liberalization of trade.
The ILO Office produced for that working party a working paper entitledThe
Social Dimensions of the Liberalization of World Trade, International Labour Of-
fice, Governing Body, 261st Sess., ILO Doc. GB. 261/WP/SLD/1 (1994). The
ILO Office Report discussed several ways in which social issues could be dealt
with in the GATT/WTO framework:
(1) considering abnormally low social conditions to be a subsidy under
Article XVI of the GATT; (2) extending the General Exceptions arti-
cle of the GATT (Art. XX) to cover workers' rights; (3)through use of
the GATT art. XXIII dispute settlement provision's concepts of nulli-
fication and impairment.
See Leary, supra note 7, at 193-94 (describing the Social Dimensions Report).
The Social Dimensions Report was never acted upon.
Following the Singapore Ministerial Meeting, the ILO again refocused on
the linkage between trade and labor. The 1997 Director-General's Report also
questions how the 11O should deal with the social dimensions of globalization.
Report of the Director-General: The ILO, Standard Setting, and Globabliza-
tion, International Labor Org., International Labor Conference, 85th Sess.
(1997) [hereinafter 1997 Director-General Report]. During the 1997 Interna-
tional Labor Conference, Director-General Hansenne tried to get the Organiza-
tion to establish a program on the relationship between trade and labor rights.
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tion for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") are
in what is supposed to be the final stages of negotiations on the
Multilateral Agreement on Investment ("MAI"). 8
Some of the areas "linked" to trade have gained rules and en-
forcement mechanisms for them (i.e., trade-related intellectual
property rights). In other areas, linkage as a foundation for rule-
making has been more deliberate (i.e., trade and investment)9 or
heavily resisted (i.e., trade and labor rights). 0 Why have some link-
The developing countries strongly resisted some of the suggestions made in the
1997 Director-General's Report, particularly that there be some new ILO su-
pervisory mechanism to assess Member State compliance with the mandates of
the ILO Conventions and voluntary "social labeling" of products (to show the
products were made under adequate labor conditions). See John Parry, United
States Supports ILO Official's Call for Linking Trade and Labor Standards, Int'l
Trade D-aly (BNA) (June 13, 1997). The ILO Governing Body has put the is-
sue of core labor standards on the agenda for the 1998 International Labor Con-
ference. See infra note 11.
' The current status of MAI negotiations and any ultimate agreement is
unclear. The OECD member states have issued the February 14, 1998 draft of
the MAI. The MAI Negotiating Text, as it is referred to, was made public by
its posting on the OECD home page. A proviso on the cover page states that
[t]he text reproduced here results mainly from the work of expert groups and
has not yet been adopted by the MAI Negotiating Group." MAI Negotiating
Text, available at MAI TEXT (visited Feb. 14, 1998) <http://www.oecd.
org/daf/ cmis/mail/MAITEXT > PDF >. During the February meeting of the
OECD States, the United States argued that the MAI will not be ready for
submission to the membership in April 1998, which is the deadline for the
MAI. See U.S. Negotiators See No Chance of Signing MAI at OECD April Ministe-
rial, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 251 (Feb. 18, 1998).
9 The linkage of trade and investment has proven difficult in the
GATT/WTO system. The Uruguay Round did adopt two agreements which
cover some aspects of investment: the TRIMS Agreement and the GATS
Agreement. See Bernard Hoekman, General Agreement on Trade in Services, in
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: READINGS 177 (1994); Joseph W.P. Wong,
Overview of TRIPS, Services and TRIMS, in THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM:
READINGS 173 (1994).
Nevertheless, it is clear that neither the TRIMS nor the GATS represents a
full treatment of investment rights and protections. This is made obvious by
the fact that the WTO decided to take up the issue of investment again at the
end of the Singapore Ministerial by setting up a Working Party on Trade and
Investment. See supra note 5.
10 The gap between the views, of the developing and developed countries
over the need for or value of linking trade with labor, has remained wide since
the United States got the issue on he agenda for the WTO's first Ministerial
Meeting. The setback of the United States on this issue during the 1996 Minis-
terial Meeting, has consigned the issue to the ILO. See supra note 5. Given the
ILO's most recent discussions on trade and labor, however, it is unclear what
will occur in that organization. At the conclusion of the International Labor
Conference in June 1997, the ILO displeased both developing and developed
1998]
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ages been more readily accepted and acted upon by the interna-
tional community than others? This Article will attempt to arrive
at some answers by examining both trade and investment, and trade
and labor from several different perspectives.
First, this Article will attempt to explain why linkage does not
play out the same for both trade and investment and trade and la-
bor. The first section will examine the essential nature of invest-
ment rights and labor rights, along with the implications of this
analysis for linkage as well as how investment and labor rights re-
late to trade. Second, this Article will analyze the current process
of multilateral trade and trade-related rule-making" and offer an
analysis of what trade-related investment and labor rules might
look like. Finally, this Article will discuss what would be achieved
and who would gain if trade-related investment and labor rules
were negotiated and adopted.
countries by leaving the linkage issue on its agenda without specifying what
would be done. See John Parry, ILO Balks at Trade, Labor Rights Link; U.S. May
Press Harder, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (June 24, 1997).
The Asian governments and unions which oppose the linkage concept have
asked that the United States and other develope& countries refrain from push-
ing the linkage of trade and core labor standards at either the ILO or WTO un-
til there is consensus between the groups of nations. See Eileen Drage O'Reilly,
Asian Governments, Unions Oppose Linkage Between Trade, Labor Standards,
Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (uly 2, 1997).
In November 1997, the ILO's Governing Body decided to put a
"declaration of principle" concerning fundamental workers' rights on the
agenda of the June 1998 International Labor Conference. The proposal will in-
dude an ILO "follow-up" mechanism that would allow the organization to re-
view whether countries are in compliance with seven core labor standards
which cover freedom of association and collective bargaining, forced labor, non-
discrimination and minimum age for employment. See Eileen Drage O'Reilly,
Singapore Minister Urges Asian Nations to Reject ILO Proposal on Core Standards,
BNA Int'l Trade Daily, Dec. 15, 1997 [hereinafter Singapore Minister Urges].
Although Asian nations remain opposed to the ILO's efforts, the United
States has taken the position that the ILO will not be a credible institution if it
fails to adopt the dedlaration and a follow-up mechanism. See Pamela M. Prah,
pponents of Labor Standards Declaration .eed Protectionism, U.S. Tells Asian
Nations, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Dec. 15, 1997).
11 The approach taken towards examining the process of multilateral rule-
making is not based on any scheme of international rule-making. Rather, it is
based upon a review of how trade-related rules have recently been negotiated in
the WTO. See supra Section 2.1. (discussing what may be the theoretical un-




1. LINKAGE OBSERVED: WHY LINKAGE IS NOT ALWAYS THE
SAME
1.1. Unpacking the Linkage
Both investment and labor are part of trade; each is a factor of
production. Yet an examination of how the world perceives the
linking of investment and labor rights to trade reveals that linkage
does not always succeed by fully considering and negotiating new
rules are fully considered or negotiated. In the case of labor rights,
for example, trade linkage has been firmly resisted in the WTO1
and shows signs of moving slowly, if at all, in the ILO.1 3 The link-
ing of trade and investment was turned back or truncated in the
GATT,14 accepted for study at the WTO15 and is actively being
12 See supra note 6 (discussing how linkage between trade and labor rights
was left at the WTO).
13 See supra notes 8 and 11 (discussing the ILO's efforts regarding linkage).
14 The "turning back" is a reference to the fate of the TRIMS Agreement.
Before the Uruguay Round, the United States pushed for a comprehensive set
of rules on investment. See Daniel M. Price & P. Bryan Christy, IIM, Agreement
on Trade-Related Investment Measures (RIMS): Limitations and Prospects for the
Future, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: MULTILATERAL TRADE
FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21sT CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGIS-
LATION 447 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996) [hereinafterMULTILATERAL TRADE
FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY].
According to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, which,
after The Round, began to set out the negotiating objectives for investment, the
focus was to be as f6llows: (1) reducing and eliminating artificial or trade dis-
torting barriers to investment; (2) expanding the concept of national treatment;
(3) reducing unreasonable barriers to the establishment of investment; and (4)
developing hles, including dispute settlement procedures. See Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 104-418, Sect. 1101(b)(11), 102 Stat. 1107,
1124.
The TRIMS negotiations proved difficult to get on the Uruguay Round
agenda. See generally Carl W. Schwarza & Bennett A. Caplan, Trade Related
Investment Measures (TRIMS): Scrutiny in the GA TTand Implications for Socialist
Countries, 11 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 55 (1987). The Ministerial
Declaration for the Uruguay Round provided for discussion on the"trade re-
strictive and distorting effects" of trade-related investment measures. See Uru-
guay Round Ministerial Declaration, Sept. 20, 1986, GATT B.I.S.D. (33rd
Supp.) at 19 (1987).
From the beginning, the United States' agenda, as demanded in the round,
was completely different from that of the developing countries. See Trade-
Related Investment Measures, in 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NE-
GOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 2001, 2073 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993)
(describing the developed countries as seeking a new regime which would pro-
hibit certain behavior of governments towards investment, versus the develop-
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pursued by the OECD.16 The difference in the treatment of trade
linkage regarding the two areas seems to spring from two sources:
the nature of investment and labor rights and their varying degrees
of trade-relatedness.
1.1.1. Examination of the Nature and Reality of Investment
Rights and Labor Rights
The response of governments and the international community
to labor and investment (and the rights that come from each), as
well as any trade linkage, appears to be dictated by the differences
in their inherent natures. What follows is a descriptive and com-
parative catalogue of the essential characteristics of labor and in-
vestment, accompanied by a commentary on how each relates to
trade.
Capital is a factor of production. Capital is a property which is
a commodity under the control of persons. Capital, and invest-
ment as a use of this property, exists because legal systems created a
medium of exchange and then dictated its uses. Investment exists
when capital is devoted to a purpose. The trade-related aspect of
investment is its contribution to the creation of goods and services
that are traded. 17
ing countries which wanted to limit TRIMS negotiations to an elaboration of
existing GATT articles that would be accompanied by an "effects" test to de-
termine whether an activity was covered by the agreement). The TRIMS
Agreement that came out of the Uruguay Round was not exactly what the de-
veloped or developing countries sought; however, it is closer to the latter's
views. The TRIMS Agreement, Article 2, is based around a listing of the in-
vestment measures which are prohibited because they violate Articles III
(National Treatment) and XI (Prohibition on Quantitative Restrictions) of the
GATT. See TRIMS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 2.
The truncation refers to the GATS Agreement which covers only one as-
pect of investment, the right to establish. -The GATS had to reach this invest-
ment issue because commercial presence was recognized by the agreement as
one of the four modes by which services are traded. See General Agreement on
Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO,
Annex 1B, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol.
31, 33 I.L.M. 142 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
15 See supra note 5 (describing the WTO Working Party on Trade and In-
vestment).
16 See supra note 8 (discussing the MAI).
17 See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Factors Influencing the Flow of Foreign Invest-
ment and the Relevance of a Multilateral Guarantee Scheme, 22 INT'L LAW. 671,
675 (1987) (pointing out that foreign direct investment provides "an integrated
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Labor is a factor of production. Yet, the international labor
community has frequently reiterated that "labor is not a commod-
ity." 8 Labor derives from the efforts of human beings and, there-
fore, implicates human dignity. Unlike capital (and investment)
human beings and their efforts exist beyond commerce and legal
systems.
Limiting the comparison between labor and investment to this
level, may suggest some of the reasons why trade linkage provokes
different responses. The trade and trade-related rules of the
GATT/WTO system as they currently exist can be viewed as re-
sponses and prescriptions for economic and governmental policies
concerning the commodities, services or property rights that are
part of or are related to trade. For example, the core rules of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT "1947") seek the
progressive liberalization of trade in goods and elimination of dis-
crimination in that trade.' 9 The General Agreement on Trade in
Services ("GATS") is devoted to defining the different modes of
supply for the services that exist in commerce and the liberalizing
of services trade.20 The TRIPS of GATT 1994 was negotiated to
18 The ILO adopted this American Federation of Labor ("AFL") motto as a
basic principle of the organization during its early history. See generally THE
ORIGINS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (James T. Shotwell
ed., 1934). The 1997 Director-General, reporting on a financial expert's com-
ments that social justice cannot be achieved through unrestrained competition
in the market, noted that "[tihese words are very close to the ILO's basic tenet:
labour is not a commodity. Even if it were proved that child labour brings
economic advantages to those resorting to it, it must still be abhorred by any-
one with a healthy conscience." See 1997 Director-General Report, supra note
7, at 5.
19 See GATT, supra note 2, art. II (discussing tariff binding which provides
for countries to lower tariffs and bind them.). The lowering and binding of tar-
iffs have been a crucial part of the eight negotiating rounds of the
GATT/WTO.
20 See GATS, supra note 14, arts. I (on defining the modes of supply), XVI,
XVII, XVfiI (dealing with market access, National Treatment and additional
commitments which explain the limitations that countries were allowed to
make on the schedules that represented their service commitments).
Specific commitments are scheduled by modes of supply and apply
only to listed service sectors and subsectors (that is, a positive-list ap-
proach was taken towards sectoral coverage), subject to sector-specific
qualifications, conditions and limitations that may continue to be
maintained, either across all modes of supply or for a specific mode
(that is, a negative-list approach for po"cies that violate national treat-
ment or market access).
Hoekman, supra note 9 at 178.
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create minimum levels of intellectual property rights protection
and enforcement. 2' In the case of intellectual property rights, the
owner is allowed to exclude others from activities related to their
property, the products of their mind,22 and thereby, gain the true
value of that property. The trade-relatedness of intellectual prop-
erty rights stems from their existence as essential elements in the in-
ternational trade of technology.
z3
Investment rights and protections fall within the ambit of exist-
ing trade and trade related rules. Investment rights24 are created
when a country chooses to allow foreign investors into its eco-
nomic system by granting them the right to establish themselves in
the market and to control and/or own assets that produce goods or• 25
services. Investment protections are designed by governments to
21 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, pt. II, arts. 9-39 (setting out the sub-
stantive minimum standards for the intellectual property rights recognized by
the agreement, which include: copyright, trademarls, patents, geographical in-
dicators, layout designs of integrated circuits, protection of undisclosed infor-
mation (trade secrets) and industrial designs). Part 111 of the TRIPS Agreement
contains provisions regarding the enforcement of intellectual property rights
such as, civil and adiinistrative procedures, provisional and final remedies,
criminal penalties, and border enforcement. See id. arts. 41-61.
22 See Laurinda L. Hicks & James R. Holbein, Convergence of National In.
tellectual Property Norms in International Trading Agreements, 12 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 769, 772 (1997).
According to Jagdish Bhagwati, "[R]ules about intellectual property pro-
tection while different in essential respects in economic logic from those regard-
ing trade, do have some essential trade aspects: the transfer and diffusion of
technology, and payments for the same, across countries can be legitimately
viewed as international trade in technology .... " Jagdish Bhagwati,Policy Per-
spectives and Future Directions: A View from Academia, in INTERNATIONAL
LABOR STANDARDS AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: PROCEEDINGS
OF A SYMPOSIUM 57-58 (Bureau of Int'l Labor Affairs, U.S. Dept. of Labor,
eds., 1994) [hereinafterINTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS].
24 Investment rights are those which allow the investment to exist in the
first place, such as the right to establish, own and control. The GATS covers
investment because one of the modes for the supply of services is commercial
presence establishment. See GATS, supra note 14, art. I, 2(c). In the MAI draft
text, these rights are combined with the crucial standards of national treatment
and most-favored nation ("MFN ") treatment. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra
note 8, art. 3(1) (setting forth the national treatment standard), and art. 3(2)
(setting forth the MFN standard).
2 Investment protections are generally deemed necessary for the creation
of a favourable investment climate," and include provisions on government
measures, such as expropriation, which could cause the investor to lose most if
not all of the investment and other measures, such as limits on the repatriation
of funds, which could cause disruption in an investment. UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT ("UNCTAD"), WORLD
INVESTMENT REPORT 1996: INVESTMENT, TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL
[Vol119:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss2/7
LNKA GE AND R ULE-MAKING
secure the continuing existence of or non-interference with the
property rights obtained through investment activity. The creation
and recognition of international investment rights and protections,
therefore, facilitates international trade.
By contrast, the usual focus in a discussion of labor rights is on
the human factor. There is emphasis on the premise that labor
rights are an aspect of human rights.26 Labor is not a commodity
because acceptance of such a characterizationwould demean human
dignity. Viewing labor rights only in this way, however, cuts off
most trade-related dialogue. Labor rights, so viewed, must be pro-
tected by a system which focuses on the unique nature of the
rights.
POLICY ARRANGEMENTS 189, 190 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 WORLD IN.
VESTMENT REPORT]. No WTO agreement currently covers investment protec-
tions.
The MAI draft text has provisions listed under Section IV, Investment Pro-
tection. Those provisions include: General Treatment (IV, 1.) (Contracting
Parties are to accord investments and investors "fair and equitable treatment
and full and constant protection and security"); Expropriation and Compensa-
tion (IV, 2.); Protection from Strife (IV, 3.); Transfrs , 4.) (Contracting Par-
ties are to "ensure that all payments relating to an investment in its territory...
may be freely transferred in and out of its territory without delay."). MAI Ne-
gotiating Text, supra note 8, at 57.
26 There is general agreement among scholars that core labor rights are apart of human rights. See Langille, supra note 7, at 34 (discussing the impor-
tance of defining a core list of labor rights and not simply looking at all labor
standards, because if they are rights, they cannot be taken away);see also Steve
Charnovitz, Trade, Employment and Labour Standards: The OECD Study and
Recent Developments in the Trade and Labor Standards Debate, 11 TEMP. INT'L
& COMP. L.J. 131 (1997). According to Charnovitz, it is important to argue
that the best motive for international labor law is based upon altruism, with the
goal of raising labor conditions in all countries. Of all the motivations, includ-
ing commercial concerns and domestic welfare, "[t]he altruistic motivation is
the most compelling of the three motivations since it interweaves labor stan-
dards into the larger framework of human rights."Id. at 159; see also Virginia A.
Leary, The Paradox of Workers' Rights as Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS,
LABOR RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 22 (Lance A. Compa & Stephen
F. Diamond eds., 1996) (stating that "workers' rights are human rights, yet the
international human rights movement devotes little time to the rights of work-
ers ... [a] regrettable paradox: the human rights movement and the labor
movement run on tracks that are sometimes parallel and rarely meet").
27 This argument is frequently made to explain why the ILO is the interna-
tional institution most capable of dealing with labor rights. See Charnovitz,
supra note 26, at 160-63 (observing that ILO is better suited than WTO to deal
with the labor rights issue, although ILO needs to extend its powers); Langille,
sup-a note 7, at 49-50 (asserting that the ILO cannot simply rely on its history
and record of accomplishment, but rather needs to decide what to do about
linkage).
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A reconceptualization of labor rights may be necessary, there-
fore, if there is ever to be a useful trade-related discussion of these
rights. A useful alternative description would involve seeing labor
rights, like investment rights, as necessary for the creation of a type
of property.2" Those entitled to labor rights should be seen as hav-
ing a property right in the product of their efforts. Such a recon-
ceptualization makes the recognition and protection of "core labor
rights,"2 9 as rules devoted to ensuring minimally acceptable stan-
dards for the exploiting of these property rights, more closely akin
to investment and intellectual property rights. Once such analo-
gies are drawn, it becomes difficult to argue that the international
trade community has no interest in labor rules. Expanding the tra-
ditional understanding of labor rights to include their consideration
as protections for a property right would not undercut the human
rights view. Rather than demeaning the nature of labor, a property
rights description captures the role labor plays in the commercial
world. Defining core labor rights would also establish the limits
that must be placed on government's restrictions of these property
rights for human dignity to be ensured.
Other large differences between investment and labor rights af-
fect how each area relates to trade. The capital of investment is in-
herently mobile.3' Capital can be transferred easily if a currency is
freely convertible. The restrictions that exist on this inherent mo-
bility come from government regulation aimed at restricting, at-
tracting and retaining capital or by the market value of the invest-
ment. Labor, by contrast, is more likely to be less mobile.
32
2' The suggestion for this rethinking of the nature of labor rights came
from a question posed during the IELIG Linkages Conference by Steve Char-
novitz.
29 Recent academic literature and other studies on labor rights have made a
distinction between core labor rights and labor standards. See supranote 7, for
the universe of core rights identified by the Director-General of the ILO, and
infra notes 78 and 87 for those identified by the OECD.
30 The reconceptuaization is not that drastic a step to take. It is common-
place to talk about intellectual property, which simply is a legal characteriza-
tion of the creative work product of individuals.
31 See generally WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1995:
WORKERS IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD 61 (1995) ("[O]ne fact is indisputable:
capital crosses borders more easily than labor and despite the best efforts of na-
tional governments to control it. ") [hereinafter 1995 WORLD DEVELOPMENT
REPORT].
32 Labor is currently less mobile than capital. See id at 62. This was not
always the case. According to Rodrik, "[R]estrictions on immigration were not




People tend to live and work in their own countries because their
market value is low, they choose to do so, 33 or their options for ex-
iting and working in another country are limited by government
policies.34 Assuming that there is a demand for their work, work-
ers frequently choose to limit their mobility because economic
goals are not their only considerations. Labor, as discussed earlier,
cannot simply be understood as an element of commerce. Work,
which is the non-economic name for the productive activity of in-
dividuals,35 is a major component of the social structure of a coun-
try. Work is so crucial to the individual's sense of identity, and so
linked to a particular society's values,36 that workers frequently fol-
low goals other than purely economic ones. Even if this is not true,
workers may be limited in their options because other countries'
mobility was more comparable to that of capital. Consequently, the asymme-,
try between mobile capital (physical and human) and immobile 'natural' labor,
which characterizes the present situation, is a relatively recent phenomenon."
DANi RODRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE Too FAR? 8 (Institute for Int'l
Econ. ed., 1997).
33 There is a difference in labor mobility for certain portions of the labor
force. The globalization of the world economy has only intensified this. As
Rodrik points out:
[R]educed barriers to trade and investment accentuate the asymmetry
between groups that can cross borders (either directly or indirectly,
say, through out sourcing) and those who cannot. In the first category
are owners of capital, highly skilled workers, and many professionals,
who are free to take their resources where they are most in demand.
Unskilled and semiskilled workers and most middle managers belong
in the second category.
RODRIK, supra note 32, at 4. Not all workers would relocate if they could.
They choose to remain in their home country and work there because work is
part of their social experience. See infra note 36.
34 Immigration is treated differently by governments from other issues
such as trade. Why do governments liberalize trade but manage migration?
According to the World Bank, there are non-economic and economic reasons.
The non-economic reason is that "large migrations disturb the way a society
thinks of itself.... ." 1995 World Development Report, supra note 31, at 67.
The economic reasons are that migrants would not necessarily move to enhance
their productivity. Industrial countries with welfare states are afraid of attract-
ing too many migrants, and, therefore, admit them selectively "using instru-
ments ranging from visa restrictions and border controls to legislated criteria
for admission." Id.
35 See RICHARD C. HALL, DIMENSIONS OF WORK 13 (1986) ('Work is the
effort or activity of an individual performed for the purpose of providing goods
or services of value to others; it is also considered to be work by the individual
so involved.")
36 See generall Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 Nw. U. L.
REV. 658, 682-83 (1996).
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immigration policies do not encourage their exit.37 The crucial dis-
tinction between mobility for investment and labor has conse-
quences in any discussion about trade-relatedness and the need for
international trade-related rule-making. Given capital's mobility,
an international set of standards for investment would provide cer-
tainty for investors which would facilitate more investment and ul-
timately more trade. By contrast, mobility of most workers, par-
ticularly the limited mobility of that part of the workforce that
suffers most from low labor standards, means that their main con-
nection with the international community is through the products
they produce for trade. The existing rules of the international trad-
ing regime, however, are not based on how goods are produced.
Indeed this is one reason why it is frequently argued that there
should not be rules on trade-related labor rights or that we should
not use trade sanctions to enforce compliance with such rights.
The final difference between investment and labor is how each
is shaped by market forces. Investment is highly responsive to
market forces. Given its mobile character, investment would tend
to flow where it can obtain the best rate of return. Investment does
not flow freely, however, because governments often dictate limits
as to its mobility, by either by limiting investment to certain indi-
viduals38 (usually because of nationality) or into certain sectors.39
Either for reasons of sovereignty or economics no government be-
lieves in complete freedom of investment.
40
Labor is affected, but not solely influenced, by market forces.
Some governments resist labor rules, or develop certain kinds of
37 See HALL, supra note 35.
38 There are a wide variety of measures that governments can take to re-
strict investment that can be divided into categories. There are measures that
restrict admission and establishment, those that restrict ownership and control,
and those affecting how an investment operates. See 1996 WORLD IN-
VESTMENT REPORT, supra note 25, at 174-78 for a comprehensive list of the dif-
ferent types of measures. A large number of these are aimed at protecting local
producers. See id. at 175.
39 The reasons for restricting entry and ownership are that a country has
made a decision about "the proper apportionment ol resources between the
public and private sectors;" as a result, some sectors may be closed to private
entrz or ownership altogether. Seeid at 174.
The best illustration for this comes in the form of the MAI itself. The
text of the agreement is attached to a long list of country specific exceptions
that the Member states will be taking to MAI obligations. No OECD Member
State of the developed world wants a completely liberalized investment regime.
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rules, in order to exploit the full comparative advantage of labor
costs.41 Nevertheless, most government actions regarding labor
rights reflect, to some degree, the basic requirements and prefer-
ences of the work force since that work force is the body politic.42
The social values of work are so fundamental that all governments
have some rules about labor rights and working conditions that are
not focused on the economic benefits of the rules.
43
1.1.2. How Investment and Labor Relate to and Interrelate
with Trade
1.1.2.1. The Economics of Trade Linkage
The frequent international debates over linkage in the last few
years inevitably have begun with some type of economic justifica-
tion for linking an issue to trade.44 The reason for this focus is
41 See DAVID RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND
TAXATION 74-76 (1969) (pointing out the comparative advantages of labor). Of
course, those advocating protection of core labor rights argue that some coun-
tries resist such standards to gain an unfair competitive advantage.
We're not trying to impose our standards or values on other countries.
We're not trying to deprive low-wage developing countries of their le-
gitimate comparative advantage. That concept is a foundation for free
trade in the global trading system. However, we are opposed to a
comparative advantage built on the unfair abuse of people.
Mickey Kantor, The Perspective of the U.S. Trade Representative, in INTER-
NATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS, supra note 23, at 15-16.
It is interesting to note that in public statements of this type it is not un-
common to see the United States try to distance itself from a perception of pro-
tectionism rather than concern about proper comparative advantage.
42 "Societies intervene when unfettered labor markets fail to deliver the
most efficient outcomes, or when they want to move market outcomes into
line with their preferences and values. Four reasons are often given for inter-
vention: uneven market power, discrimination, insufficient intormation, and
inadequate insurance agaifist risk." 1995 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, su-
pra note 31, at 70.
43 "Governments also intervene directly in the labor market to achieve par-
ticular social goals. Some of the more common interventions include bans on
child labor, protection for women and minority workers, setting of minimum
wages, and legislation on workplace safety and health standards." 7d at 71.
44 See OECD, TRADE, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR STANDARDS: A
STUDY OF CORE WORKERS' RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1996)
[hereinafter OECD STUDY] (discussing labor standards); Richard B. Freemen,
International Labor Standards and World Trade: Friends or Foes, in THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM: CHALLENGES AHEAD 87 (1996); T.N. Srinivasan, Interna-
tional Labor Standards Once Again!, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS,
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fairly obvious: why should the international trade community add
to or transform existing multilateral rules unless doing so would
further trade and economic efficiency?45 Accordingly, the linkage
debate has sgurred attempts to analyze the economics of trade and
investment, and trade and labor.47  An examination of these
analyses, and their critiques, reveals that the economics of the two
linkages are not the same.
1.1.2.1.1. Investment
There is a body of academic literature on the general economics
of foreign direct investment ("FDI").4' The most recent and com-
prehensive report for the purposes of linkage analysis, however,
was done by the WTO Secretariat and is entitled 'Trade and For-
eign Direct Investment.49 This 1996 Secretariat Report focused on
the "interlinkages--economic, institutional, legal-with world
trade."50 According to the Secretariat Report most of the empirical
work on the economic linkage between trade and FDI has not fo-
cused on causation,5 ' but rather on whether trade and FDI are sub-
stitutes (negatively correlated) or complements (positively corre-
supra note 23, at 73; see also 1996 WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 25,
at 95-128.
15 "[Tihe trade rules are for economic efficiency, which generally helps
everyone (with internal distribution problems being tackled by other policies);
they are not there simply to assist specific factors of production (i.e., capital) or
economic agents (i.e., multinationals). Bhagwati, supra note 23, at 57.
a The literature on the economics of the linkage between trade and in-
vestment is fairly large. For the best compilation of sources seeWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, TRADE AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (Oct. 9, 1996),
available at Annual Report-Investment (visited May 8, 1998) <http://www.
wto.org/wto/archives/chpiv.htm > [hereinafter TRADE AND FDI].
47 The most recent study of the economics of the linkage between trade
and labor rights is the OECD Study. See supra note 44. The OECD Study it-
self is not without problems. For a thorough critique and analysis, see Charno-
vitz, supra note 26. Another study on the issue is supposed to be forthcoming
from Rodrik. See RODRIK, supra note 32 (summarizing the author's conclu-sions.4s See generally KAR-YIU WONG, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN GOODS AND
FACTOR MOBILITY (1995); J.R. Markusen, The Boundaries of Multinational En-
terprises and the Theory oflnternational Trade, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 169 (1995).
49 See TRADE AND FDI, supra note 46.
50 Id at 2.
51 "[T]he empirical work.., has not tried to establish causation-that is,
to determine, for example, whether inflows of FDI cause exports to be greater
than they would otherwise be or if, instead, expanding exports attract increased
FDI." Id- at 7.
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lated).52 The Secretariat Report reviews and analyzes this work
from two perspectives: (1) what the driving force (motivation) is
behind FDI at the level of the firm; and, (2) the empirical evidence
of linkage.5 3 Since the motivations for why a firm invests rather
than exports or licenses its technology help to explain the phe-
nomenon of FDI, they are examined first. Multinational corpora-
tions come about as the result of three circumstances. First, a firm
may own assets that can be profitably exploited on a large scale.
54
Second, profitability of the firm is increased if it produces in differ-
ent countries.5 5  Third, the profits to be made from such invest-
56ments are greater than from licensing the assets.
The empirical evidence on the linkage is far from complete:
most of the useful work has been done only on relationship be-
tween FDI and trade in goods57 and there is limited availability and
quality of data.5" Despite these limitations, the Secretariat Report
52 The WTO Secretariat does not believe that it is important for linkage
purposes to establish whether FDI and trade are substitutes or complements
since "[a] substitute relationship can create just as strong an interlinkage as a
complementary one. And if they are interlinked, it means that trade policy af-
fects FDI flows, .. and therefore that both sets of policies would benefit from
being treated in an integrated manner." Id.
s3See id
4 See id, at 8. The Secretariat points out that research conducted on why
firms invest rather than export or license has been studied for forty years and
there is a general consensus on this and the other points.
55 See id
56 See id.
5' See id at 12-13
" Id. at 13. According to the report:
The available statistics on FDI, which are far from ideal, come mainly
from three sources. First, there are statistics from the records of minis-
tries and agencies which administer the country's laws and regulations
on FDI. The request for a license or the fulfillment of notification re-
quirements allows these agencies to record data on FDI flows. Typi-
cally, re-invested earnings, intra-company loans, and liquidation's of
investment are not recorded, and not all notified investments are fully
realized in the period covered by notification.
Second, there are the FDI data taken from government and other
surveys which evaluate financial and operating data of companies.
While these data provide information on sales (domestic and foreign),
earnings, employment and the share of value added of foreign affiliates
in domestic output, they often are not comparable across countries be-
cause of differences in definitions and coverage. Third, there are the
data taken from national balance-of-payments statistics, for which in-
ternationally agreed guidelines exist in the fifth edition of the IMFBal-
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assesses the information available on FDI and its effects on the
home and the host countries.59 FDI and trade are not simpr sub-
stitutes or alternative means for reaching a foreign market.6 The
relationship between trade and the dynamic effects of FDI are more
generally complementary. However, the trade policies of coun-
tries can affect whether FDI is a complement or substitute. Low
and bound tariffs (the WTO goal) attract export-oriented FDI,
while high tariffs serve to induce tariff jumping FDI to serve the lo-
cal market.6" FDI can also be undertaken as a quid pro quo, which
would be a way of lessening the impact of protectionist trade poli-
cies.63 The FDI which responds to low costs of production and a
liberal trading regime is likely to be complementary with im-
ports. By contrast, the tariff-jumping FDI acts as a substitute for65
trade. Overall, a combination of liberal trade and investment
policies increases FDI.66 The Secretariat Report also concludes that
FDI adds to overall economic development of states by producing
ance of Payments Manual. The three main categories of FDI described
above are those used in balance-of-payments statistics.
d at 3.
5 See id. at 13-14.
o See id. at 14-18.
61 "[T]here is no serious empirical support for the view that FDI has an
important negative effect on the overall level of exports from the home coun-
try." Id. at 12. Rather, the empirical evidence points to a modestly positive re-
lationship between FDI and home county exports and imports. Id. at 13-15
(which contains a review of the empirical evidence).
62 See id
6' See id
64 See id at 13.
65 See id at 10, 39.
6 See id. at 37. Trade policy is only one aspect of which determines
whether FDI will enter a country but it plays a special role in assisting with the
largest FDI problem at the level of the firm-the degree of risk and uncertainty
over time.
It follows that the structure and stability of current and possible future
trade polices, both of potential host countries and of potential foreign
markets, will be important influence on the willingness of firms to
seek customers in foreign markets, locate production processes in host
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intangibles, particularly the transfer of technology, 67 and by stimu-
lating growth and competitiveness.
The economic evidence illustrates that FDI is linked with trade.
While FDI is much more than simply another way of trading it
clearly facilitates trade with benefits running to countries at all lev-
els of development. The WTO Secretariat believes that taking
some measures, such as achieving some form of policy coherence




A review of the existing literature on the economics of linking
labor rights and trade leads to several conclusions. First, there is an
extraordinarily limited base of empirical evidence. 69 Second, there
are disagreements between those who have studied the limited em-
pirical data.70 Third, because of the limited data and disagreements
only a few observations can be made.
The first issue-a lack of a thorough empirical study of the links
between core labor rights and trade flows-poses a serious problem.
The 1996 OECD Study bases its conclusions about the trade link-
age solely on statistical evidence about freedom of association and
collective bargaining.7 ' As a result, it is impossible to calibrate how
and to what extent governments discriminate, use forced or ex-
ploited child labor, and, consequently, how much these practices
67 See id at 7-8. The transfer of technology that occurs through FDI,
which is the primary channel for developing countries, leads to greater produc-
tivity. See iad at 7. The characteristics of the countries does matter. The more
competitive the conditions, the higher the levels of local investment in fixed
capital accompanied by the fewest restrictions on affiliates increases in the
amount of technology transfer. See id.
" See id. at 40.
69 See OECD STUDY, supra note 44, at 11, 48, 86; see also Charnovitz, supra
note 26, at 138. Charnovitz criticizes the OECD for failing to make estimates
of the value of annual trade in products made by violating core labor rights es-
pecially given some of its own findings. For example, the Secretariat provides
evidence of child labor exploitation in a few export-oriented industries in some
countries. See id at 138, n. 64.
70 OECD STUDY, supra note 44, with the conclusion reached by Charno-
vitz, supra note 26, at 143 & n.111-12. Rodrik also suggests a different result
from the one reported in the OECD STUDY conclusion. See RODRIK, supra
note 32, at 4546.
71 See OECD STUDY, supra note 44, at 86.
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affect trade performance.72 Prescribing new international rules to
encourage the enforcement of minimum standards seems unlikely
in the face of limited information about the scope and dimension
the "problem."7 3 Without a clear picture of the extent to which
low standards exist and what their effects are, it is unclear whether
there will ever be an agreement on the need to develop trade-related
rules regarding labor, much less what the proper set of multilateral
rules and any enforcement mechanism should look like. This data
gap demands that additional studies be conducted which may offer
a more complete picture and help resolve the second problem.
7 4
The second problem is the disagreement about what the exist-
ing data reveals. The OECD Study, which examines the linking of
trade and labor, begins by identifying what it considers to be the
limited universe of "core labor rights."75 Some attempt must be
made to identify core labor rights in order to compile and make
sense of the limited economic data on government practices. The
list arrived at by the OECD is identical to that adopted by the
World Social Summit in 199576 and by the ILO itself when it has
discussed "core" labor rights 7 The body of core labor rights iden-
tified by the OECD for its economic analysis includes the freedoms
of association and collective bargaining, and the prohibitions of
forced labor, exploitative child labor, and discrimination. 7
8
72 See id at 11. ("The lack of reliable indicators of enforcement of stan-
dards on child labour, forced labour and non-discrimination is especially acute.
Available evidence in this area is mostly anecdotal, making any attempt to ana-
lyse the economic implications of these standards problematic.").
73 The collection of data on labor standards would be a logical job for the
ILO. If that organization could set core labor rights identified and put a super-
visory mechanism in place there would ultimately be a reliable data base.
74 This same observation was made following a symposium on interna-
tional labor standards in 1994. See Kenneth A. Swinnerton & Gregory K.
Schoepfle, Emerging Themes, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS, supra
note 23, at 63.
75 See OECD STUDY, supra note 44, at 25-73.
's See id at 25.
7 The ILO Office produced a report in 1994 which pointed to the same
core labor standards as those the ILO Governing Body has suggested by consid-
ered at the 1998 International Labor Conference. See infra note 7.
78 All of the core rights, with the exception of exploitative child labor, are
embodied in existing ILO Conventions:
Freedom ofAssociation: is the right of workers and employers; to estab-
lish and join organizations of their choosing without previous authori-
zation; to draw up their own constitutions and rules, elect their repre-
sentatives, and formulate their programs; to joint in confederations
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The study then proceeds to examine whether protection of
these core rights enhances or impairs economic efficiency.!9 It con-
cludes that the protection of the identified core labor rights actually
enhances economic efficiency.80 The reasons for this effect differs
and affiliate with international organizations; and to be protected
against dissolution or suspension by administrative authority.
Faye Lyle, Workers Right in U.S. Policy, FOREIGN LABOR TRENDS, at 20
(Bureau of Int'l Labor Affairs, U.S. Dept. of Labor ed., 1991);cf. Convention
Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, as Modified by the Final Articles
Revision Convention, Sept. 15, 1946, 39 U.N.T.S. 55, 56 [hereinafter Conven-
tion Concerning Forced Compulsory Labour].
Collective Bargaining (the right to organize and bargain collectively) is
the right of workers to be represented in negotiating the prevention
and settlement of disputes with employers; to protection against inter-
ference with union activities; to protection against acts of anti-union
discrimination; and to protection against refusal of employment, dis-
missal, or prejudice due to union membership or participation.
Lyle, supra at 22; f Convention (No. 98) Concerning the Application of the
Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively, July 1, 1949, 96
U.N.T.S. 257, 258.
Forced Labor: "[W]ork or service exacted from any person under the men-
ace of penalty and for which the person has not volunteered. 'Menace of pen-
alty' includes loss of rights or privileges as well as penal sanctions." Lyle,supra
at 24; cf Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, supra at 58.
Discrimination in Employment: "[D]iscrimination implies that if discrimi-
nation is practiced, employment and earnings opportunities are allocated based
on considerations not related to how well someone does a job, intuition sug-
gests that some individuals may end up not employed in jobs to which they are
best suited." Kenneth Swinnerton, An Essay on Economic Eiciency and Core
Labour Standards, in THE WORLD ECONOMY 73, 78 (1997T; cf Convention
(No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupa-
tion, June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31, 32-33.
The issue of exploitative child labor is more difficult to define. Obviously,
the issue of how ola a child worker should be is an issue. The ILO does have a
Convention on the Minimum Age of Employment. See Convention (No. 138)
Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, June 6, 1973, 1015
U.N.T.S. 297, 298.
According to United Nations Children's Fund ("UNICEF", child exploi-
tation is "characterized by children who work too young, too iong hours, for
too little pay, in hazardous conditions or under slave-like arrangements."
OECD STUDY, supra note 44, at 37. See also Janelle M. Diller & David Levy,
Child Labor, Trade and Investment Toward the Harmonization of International
Law, 91 AM.J. INT'LL. 663, 666, n. 24 (Oct. 1997) (noting that while a defmi-
tion of exploitative child labor has yet to be adopted, the ILO is in the process
of working on a new convention, based upon the existing ILO conventions
such as forced labor, for a convention that will be considered by the Interna-
tional Labor Conference in 1999).
79 See OECD STUDY, supra note 44, at 77-82.
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according to the type of rights. The core labor rights that are based
on prohibitions-of forced labor, exploitative child labors ' and dis-
crimination-enhance economic efficiency by being the appropriate
response to distortions in the allocation of labor resources created
by the prohibited practices. 2 For example, in the case of forced la-
bor, such laborers by definition are not allowed to maximize their
utility or move to other activities that match their abilities and de-
sires. 83 Similar distortions arise both from the use of exploitative
child labor and discrimination in labor laws and regulations. 
8 4
The other core labor rights, specifically the freedoms, are im-
portant because they can produce positive efficiency effects. 85 The
freedom to associate and to bargain collectively do this by counter-
balance the market power of employers, providing organizational
and legal support for individual workers and providing the channel
through which workers share their knowledge of the business with
employers.8 6 Since the protection of core labor rights enhances
economic efficiency, the crucial issue becomes why all countries do
80 See id at 215-30; Analytical Appendix entitled Core Labour Standards,
Economic Efficiency and Trade, 215-230; see also Swinnerton, supra note 78.
1 [E]mployment discrimination unambiguously reduces economic ef-
ficiency. The reason is that such a practice causes a misallocation of re-sources while also reducing the availability of production factors.
Forced labour and child labour exploitation also cause a misallocation
of resources, thus reducing economic efficiency, but they might also
raise the quantity of labour available for production.
OECD STUDY, supra note 44, at 230.
82 See id. at 80.
83 See id. at 79.
84 See id The OECD concludes that as a result, prohibition is the appro-
priate policy response for forced labor and exploitative child labor and dis-
crimination. See id. at 80, 82.
85 See id. at 80-81.
86 See id. at 81. The OECD Study, however, points out that there are other
issues that arise concerning the freedoms of association and to collectively bar-
gai. It is not Clear, for example, what level of bargaining is likely to produce
the best results. See id. Unions also produce costs. See id at 82. As a result the
OECD concludes that:
theorm of union and employer or ganiztion that is conducive to the
highest level of efficiency islikely to differ from country to country, as
it depends on specific historical and cultural factors. Although free-dom of Association is a basic human right and may help reduce certain
distortions in the economy, it is no less true that particular forms ofunion organization an collective bargaining may introdu e new ones.
I n at 82.
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not act accordingly.87 The existing commentary disagrees on the
number8 8 of reasons and why. 9  Among the various reasons for
non-compliance, however, it is clear that some are trade-based. 90
Some countries remain persuaded that protecting core labor rights
limits their ability to enhance trade performance.
There is disagreement among those reporting and reviewing the
existing data on the correlation between the protection of core la-
bor rights and trade. 91 According to the OECD, the empirical re-
sults of its study fail to support the view that countries with low la-
bor standards have gains in export market share as compared to
high standards countries.92 The OECD conclusion may have lim-
ited value in persuading errant countries, however, because as Steve
Charnovitz has pointed out, the conclusion in the study does not
appear to fully match the OECD data. 93 Some of the OECD sta-
tistics do, in fact, indicate that countries with low standards have
benefited in the shape of increased trade gains. 94 This OECD data
87 The OECD offers five reasons why states may fail to adopt core labor
standards: (1) Public Good Argument: public goods cannot be accomplished
by market forces alone because of the free rider problem; (2) Blocking Minor-
ity Argument: if a country lacks standards and then takes them on, a signifi-
cant minority (perhaps powerful) would be worse off and try to block; (3) En-
dogeneiry Argument: that core labor standards are not shaped by policies but
by market outcomes that are influenced by economic growth; (4) Economic
Development: non-observance of standards is used as a strategy for promoting
export trade and attract foreign direct investment. Ia at 83-85.
" Charnovitz argues that the OECD does not consider, at this point, one
other argument it does raise later for countries that fail to adopt core standards.
It may be argued that they lack the financial and legal resources to enforce such
standards. See Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 141, n. 101. Chamovitz also offers
yet another reason for failure to adopt standards. Countries may want to raise
standards but feel constrained because of fears about competing with other
countries that will not. See id. at 142.
89 Charnovitz points out that the public goods argument makes no sense
and that the blocking minority and enaogeneity arguments are not proven by
the OECD analysis. See id. at 140-41.
90 The economic development argument proffered by the OECD and
Charnovitz's suggestion about the perception/reality of fear of competition are
trade based. Under both theories, governments are failing to adapt core labor
rights protections because they believe that acting otherwise will increase trade
and economic growth.
91 Compare OECD STUDY, supra note 44, at 80-101, with Charnovitz,supra
note 26, at 143, n.112-13.
92 See OECD STUDY, supra note 44, at 92.
93 See Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 143 & n.112.
94 See OECD STUDY, supra note 44, at 92-93, 132-33.
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thus may be more in line with another study which has indicated
that "comparative advantage in labor-intensive goods... was asso-
ciated with indicators of labor standards in the expected manner:
the more relaxed the standard, the larger the revealed comparative
advantage in labour-intensive goods."9 The disparity between the
OECD conclusion and its own evidence could explain why the de-
veloping countries cling so fiercely to the belief that the introduc-
tion of international labor standards would be harmful to their ul-
timate economic development. If this is true it is not clear that
these same countries will alter their views simply because they en-
gage in trade liberalization. While there appears to be a positive re-
lationship between the liberalization of trade and the actual protec-
tion of labor rihts, the OECD Study failed to find any causality
between them.
The observations that can be reached despite the limited data
and disagreements are that: (1) the protection of core labor rights
can promote economic efficiency; (2) there may or may not be some
link between a low level of labor rights protection and increased
trade performance; and, (3) there is a generally positive relationship
between the protection of labor rights and trade liberalization. For
the purpose of the debate about linking trade and labor rights the
second observation could pose the most serious barrier to obtaining
trade-based rules on core labor rights. If low standards countries do
obtain a trade advantage then those advocating that countries
should adopt such rules are robbed of the argument that protecting
core labor rights will not impair trade gains or growth.
1.1.2.2. The Interests andA bilities of Governments and the
International Community
For both investment and labor, a government has a sovereign
interest in regulation. Labor and capital are core components of a
country's wealth, productivity and competitiveness. Whether a
government should regulate all aspects of labor and investment,
however, is not clear. In some areas to achieve both the most eco-
As Charnovitz points out, the OECD's statistics reveal that the countries with
low and little to no standards had significant increases in exports (44.1% and
45.3%) compared to the groups with high standards and somelimitations (2.6%
and 5.1% respectively). Charnovitz also points to other evidence. See id at 143
n.113.
95 RODRiK, supra note 32, at 46. But see Freeman supra note 44 at 101-04.
96 See OECD STUDY, supra note 44, at 112.
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nomically sound and humane results a government must see a mix-
ture of restrictions and comprehensive intervention and near or to-
tal withdrawal from regulation. 97 Whatever a country does regard-
ing investment or labor, however, it cannot insulate its decisions
from outside influences.
The interests of the international community in both areas
comes from globalization. 98  World wide trade and investment
make it impossible for most countries labor and investment rules to
be without some consequences both for other countries and for ul-
timate overall world wide economic growth. The international
community has ways of pressing or encouraging change in gov-
ernment laws and regulations. Intergovernmental organizations,
like the WTO, the ILO, the OECD, and non-governmental or-
ganizations can monitor existing governmental practices and rules
while governments can negotiate new multilateral rules (binding or
nonbinding) on the protection of investment and labor rights. Any
such rule-making process may or may not be accompanied by a
mechanism for enforcing the multilateral rules, such as binding dis-
pute settlement and sanctions.
With regard to current international efforts regarding labor
rights, there are numerous multilateral conventions that identify
rights and standards. The ILO conventions, however, only bind a
country if ratified by that country.99 Moreover, the conventions
are voluntary as to scope of convention adoptions and enforcement
comes from persuasion exercised by ILO Member states. Regional
integration arrangements have identified labor rights as a concern
to monitor (National American Free Trade Agreement) or a com-
ponent of the operation of a single market (European Community)
and have acted accordingly. In the sense of investment rights and
protections, bilateral, regional, and multilateral efforts exist to lib-
eralize and protect investment.'' Although they differ in applica-
97 See generally 1995 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 31, at 70-
79; see also Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 139-40.
98 See generally Eddy Lee, Globalization and Labour Standards: A Review of
Issues, 136 INT'L LAB. REV. (1997).
" The ILO has adopted over 170 different conventions dealing with labor
rights and standards.
100 See TRADE AND FDI, supra note 46, at 23-38 (analyzing the current
status of national regulations, bilateral investment treaties, regional and pluri-
lateral agreements and multilateral agreements); see also, 1996 WORLD IN-
VESTMENT REPORT, supra note 25, at 131-59 (surveying the same field). Given
the focus of the WTO and UNCTAD, it is not surprising that the WTO report
is concerned with policy coherence, while UNCTAD is interested in the devel-
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bility, scope, and enforcement power, all attempt some general
harmonization of the basic rights and protections to give some cer-
tainty or stability for an investor's decisions.
The interplay between a government's interest in regulating
each area and its inability to control completely the consequences
of its choices currently spurs arguments about the need for multi-
lateral trade-related rules. Multilateral arguments for trade-related
rules on investment and labor have often begun with the statement
that the existence of lower standards acts as an unfair trade practice
or as an unnecessary restraint on possible trade growth. Nongov-
ernmental organizations and scholars often argue for strong and en-
forceable multilateral rules because they believe only a worldwide
recognition, and agreement on how to combat abuses, will solve
the identified problem. 101
2. LINKAGE AND THE PROCESS OF TRADE-RELATED
RULE-MAKING
2.1. Possible Rule-Making Preconditions for Trade-Related Rule-
Making
Another perspective from which to examine the linkage be-
tween trade and investment and trade and labor focuses not on the
nature of each, and of its trade-relatedness,' 0 2 but on how linkage is
made concrete. When and why should the international commu-
nity, as represented by the WTO, °3 choose rule-making in re-
opmental aspects of FDI rules. Compare TRADE AND FDI, supra note 46, at 42,
with 1996 WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 25, at 158-59.
101 Even then, the advocates do not always agree on the method to be used.
For example, those arguing for labor rights er on whether it is a trade or la-
bor issue for rule-maing and institutional oversight. See generally Erika de
Wet, Labor Standards in the Globalized Economy: The Inclusion of a Social Clause
in the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade/World Trade Organization, 17
HUM. RTS. Q. 443 (1995); Ray Marshall, Trade-Linked Labor Standards, 37
PROC. OF AcAD. OF POL. ScI. 67 (1990); Gijsbert Van Liemt,Minimum Labour
Standards and International Trade: Would a Social Clause Work?, 128 INT'L L AB.
REV. 433 (1989); Brian A. Langille, General Reflections on the Relationship of
Trade and Labor (Or. Fair Trade is Free Trade's Destiny), in FAIR TRADE AND
HARMONIZATION, supra note 7, at 231.
102 See supra Sections 1.1. and 1.1.2. (discussing of the nature of labor and
investment and the economic linkages each has with trade).
103 The WTO is chosen as the focus for this part of the article because its
focus has been on the linkage to trade. As the organization with jurisdiction
over trade, and some trade-related rules, the WTO is the logical choice.
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sponse to a suggested linkage? Different approaches exist for find-
ing an answer to that question. One approach would be to exam-
ine whether a suggested linkage constitutes a proper subject for
consideration by the WTO.'04 This type of examination focuses on
the WTO as an institution 105 and can illustrate the desirability of
such a linkage. 1 6 Another approach is to study linkage by examin-
ing not the object but the process of trade-related rule-making.
This section of the article follows the second approach.
In order to conduct such an analysis some retracing must be
done of the recent past and of how trade-related rules were negoti-
ated in the Uruguay Round.'07 After this review of the history,
104 Philip Nichols has chosen this approach in recent articles. Drawing
upon the theoretical work by Paul Taylor on the typology of international or-
ganizations, Nichols points out that the WTO can be best explained as engaging
in coordination style of intergovernenta cooperation. 
See Philip M. Nichols,
Corruption in the World Trae Organization: Discerning the Limits of the World
Trade Organization's Authority, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 711,721 (1996).
'0' Applying Taylor's coordination model to the WTO leads Nichols to
characterize it "as an organization [that] is legally mandated to create a frame-
work for the regulation of international trade, and will supervise the compli-
ance of members' national policies with this framework." IdL It is against this
characterization that Nichols poses his question of what issues should be pur-
sued by the WTO. He arrives at four criteria drawn from Taylor's characteri-
zation. The criteria are as follows: (1) whether an issue is within the legal ju-
risdiction of the WTO; (2) whether the issue is substantial; (3) whether the
WTO will be able to enforce compliance with any requirements it imposes; and
(4) whether the issue requires international coordination by the WTO. See icL
at 72240.
106 While this article does not follow the Nichols' aproach his explication
of the theory of institutionalism and its relevance to rule-makin is quite
enlightening and useful. Applied to the issue of whether the WTO should in-
volve itself with labor standards Nichols points out that it should not because
the issue of labor standards fails to meet the second and third criteria. If the
WTO had supervision of labor rights such a resolution would not significantly
increase trade (thus, it is not a substantial issue) and the WTO would have great
difficulty enforcing labor rules. See Philip M. Nichols, Forgotten Linkages-
Historical Institutionalism and Sociological Institutionalism aid Analysis of the
World Trade Organization, in Symposium, Linkage as Phenomenon: An Interdis-
ciplinary Approach, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L EcoN. L. 201 (1998).
107 This article focuses on the recent past during the Uruguay Round be-
cause that set of negotiations marked the first time new" sulbjects were pro-
posed for the agenda. The focus on history does appear to be in line witl his-
torical institutionalism, a theory of international relations. See Nichols, supra
note 106. In designing his criteria for whether a subject belongs before the
WTO, Nichols explains that they are drawn from regime theory and examines
the characteristics of the World Trade Organization regime an applies them,
but states that the WTO fails to constraints imposed upon the World Trade
Organization. Id. According to Nichols, attempting such an examination
would be an exercise in historical institutionalism. See a
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some analysis must be conducted of the steps and the rule-making
process itself. The history of past rule-making is not being exam-
ined for its predictive value. How trade-related rules were negoti-
ated in the Uruguay Round does not necessarily predict how future
linkages can or should be approached. Rather, examining the Uru-
guay Round experience is necessary because it marked a critical
change in the GATT approach to rule-making.
The history of the GATT is replete with illustrations of the in-
stitution's expanding legal jurisdiction. The core rules for trade in
goods were followed with the Tokyo Round Codes aimed at non-
tariff barriers and later with new rules in the Uruguay Round
which either recaptured areas of trade never properly disciplined
(agriculture and trade in textiles) or left uncovered by the old defi-
nition of trade (trade in services). 108 The Uruguay Round broke
new ground, however, in the area of rule formation because it first
tackled, and subsequently struggled with trade-related areas, par-
ticularly in the negotiations over intellectual property rights and
investment. The tackling of trade-related issues in the Uruguay
Round uncovered in stark detail some of the realities of rule-
making as conducted by an institution such as the GATT. First,
the GATT was regarded as an institution rooted in its primary mis-
sion: the liberalization of trade. For many of the negotiating coun-
tries, this history required opposition, or at least hostility towards
expanding beyond trade as it was then understood. Second, the
GATT was comprised of Contracting Parties with drastically di-
vergent levels of economic development, who were inclined to
view any expansions of GATT jurisdiction through the eyes of self-
interest. Any expansion of GATT rules to cover trade-related
108 See John H. Jackson, The Uruguay Round and the Launch of the WTO:
Significance and Challenge, in MuLTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE
21ST CENTURY, supra note 14, at 5 ("[O]ne of the major Uruguay Round ob-
jectives was to extend a GATT-type treaty rule-based discipline to three new
subject areas: trade in services, agriculture product trade and intellectual prop
erty matters.") Of these three, services and intellectual property were truly
new for GATT. GATT had always formally applied to agricultural product
trade, but for a variety of reasons agriculture had escaped the GATT discipline.
19 The best illustration for this is the prolonged fight to bring "new" is-
sues into the Uruguay Round. For discussions of the battles between the de-
veloped and developing countries over the content of the agenda, see generally
Carlos A. P. Biaga, The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights and the GA T:
A View from the South, 22 VAND. J. TRANsNAT'L L. 243 (1989); A. Jane Brad-
ley, Intellectual Property Rights, Investment and Trade in Service in the Uruguay
Round: Laying Foundations, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 57 (1987).
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rules was bound to come under attack if viewed as clearly in the in-
terest of one set of GATT parties over another. Third, the GATT
process of rule-making with its open-ended agenda, accompanied by
need to compromise over the scope or discipline of rules, has cre-
ated a tradition whereby the content of some agreements are influ-
enced by choices allowed in others.
110
A brief examination of the history of the TRIMS and TRIPS
agreements illustrates these points. Both the TRIMS and TRIPS
agreements were so named to emphasize the only acceptable link-
age: the rules covered in each agreement were "trade-related." Lim-
iting the agreements to issues that were properly related to trade
was regarded a necessary precondition to their completion."' The
rules on trade-related investment measures and trade-related prop-
erty rights were developed in similar fashions. Each agreement
reached the Uruguay Round agenda in the same way. In both cases
the United States, acting as the demander in negotiations, pushed
for inclusion of each area in the ministerial meeting that launched
110 The GATT negotiating process is often described as involving trade-offs
between the interests of the negotiating countries. See Frederick M. Abbott,
Commentary: The International Intellectual Prop erty Order Enters the 21st Cen-
tury, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 471 (1996); John H. Jackson, GA TT and the
Future of International Trade Institutions, 18 BRoOK. J. INT'L L. 11, 13 (1992).
l In the case of the TRIMS negotiations, the United States had been seek-
ing an expansive set of rules while the developing countries viewed such laws
"as inimical to their development interests and as a one-sided approach which
failed to account for the restrictive business practices of multilateral enter-
prises." Price & Christy, supra note 14, at 448. The investment measures issue
actually reached the Uruguay Round agenda only as a compromise and was
added to the list of "New Subjects." See Edward M. Graham & Paul R. Krug-
man, Trade-Related Investment Measures, in COMPLETING THE URUGUAY
ROUND 147, 150 Jeffrey Schott ed., 1990). Notably, the Ministerial Declara-
tion for the Uruguay Round provided that "following an examination of the
operation of GATT Articles related to the trade restrictive and distorting ef-
fets of trade measures, negotiations should elaborate, as appropriate, further
provisions that may be necessary to avoid such adverse effects on trade." Uru-
guay Round Ministerial Declaration, supra note 14. The declaration had similar
anguage with respect to TRIPS:
In order to reduce the distortions and impediments to international
trade, and taking into account the need to promote effective and ade-
quate protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that
measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not
themselves become barriers to legitimate trade, the negotiations shall
aim to clarify existing GATT provisions and elaborate, as appropriate,
new rules and disciplines.
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the round.112 Similarly, both agreements provoked sustained resis-
tance at the time and during the negotiations themselves. Both the
TRIMS and TRIPS Agreement negotiations were marked and uli-
mately defined by the gaps between the positions of the developed
and developing countries." Initially, the developing countries
wanted neither issue in the Uruguay Round, viewing neither set of
rules as in their interest. The developing countries strongly argued
that the GATT was not the proper institutional home for TRIPS,
claiming that only the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WEIPO") had jurisdiction.11 4 As the negotiations proceeded, the
developed and developing countries compromised. The developed
countries moved their negotiating objectives on TRIPS and Services
ahead of those for TRIMS. l l5 TRIMS emerged as the agreement
where both sides limited their initial goals."
6
Although both TRIMS and TRIPS represent exercises in trade-
related rule-making and faced similar obstacles, the agreements
reached were quite different. The TRIMS Agreement does not rep-
resent a complete set of investment rules. Instead, TRIMS achieved
only the following: (1) established which core GATT rules prohib-
112 See Graham & Krugman, supra note 111, at 147-50 (regarding TRIMS);
see also Michael P. Ryan, The Function-Specific and Linkage.Bargain Diplomacy of
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, in Symposium, Linkage as Phe-
nomenon: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 201
(1998) (discussing the U.S. business communities' efforts to develop a GATT
strategy to move intellectual property rights onto the GATT agenda). The
United States also used Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to push trading
partners in particular, to adopt "adequate" intellectual property rights and in-
vestment legislation. This strategic use of Section 301 was aimed at setting the
Uruguay Round agenda. See C. O'Neal Taylor, The Limits of Economic Power
Section 301 and the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System, 30
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 209, 218-37 (1997).
113 See Price & Christy, supra note 14, at 445; see also 2 THE GATT
URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 2072-119 (on
TRIMS) and 2213-75 (on TRIPS) (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993).
114 The issue of whether WIPO rather than the GATT was the appropriate
institutional home for intellectual propery issues was not dropped fiom discus-
sion during the TRIPS Negotiations until 1989, three years after the Uruguay
Round began. See Gail Evans, Intellectual Property as a Trade Issue-The Making
of an Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1
WORLD COMPEITON 169 (1994).
115 See Patrick Low, Market Access Through Market Presence: A Look at the
Issues, in NEW DIMENSIONS OF MARKET ACCESS IN A GLOBALIZING
ECONOMY 49, 55 (OECD, 1995).
116 See Price & Christy, supra note 14, at 451.
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ited certain investment measures;117 (2) provided for the gradual
phasing out of the identified non-conforming measures; 118 and (3)
committed the WTO Member states to a review and possible
amendment of the agreement within a short time.119 By contrast,
the TRIPS Agreement is a comprehensive set of rules that dictates
not only minimum international standards for intellectual property
rights but also how Member states must align their domestic legisla-
tion to achieve these goals.120 The WTO process for promulgating
trade-related rules appears capable of producing limited agreements
that reiterate existing concepts (TRIMS) and equally capable of
producing innovative agreements (TRIPS) that setting international
standards and specify, in a manner never before used in trade
agreements, how to guarantee enforcement of those standards. 
121
The history of the TRIMS and TRIPS negotiations and the con-
tents of the resulting agreements suggest that there may be several
preconditions for successful trade-related rule-making. The pre-
conditions constitute three levels of consensus that should be
reached before trade-related rules can be successfully promulgated.
These three levels of consensus do not have to be reached in any
117 TRIMS Agreement, supra note 4, at art. 2 (noting that member states
are supposed to refrain from applying a trade-related investment measure that is
inconsistent with the GATT obligations of National Treatment (Art. In), and
the Prohibition on Quantitative Restrictions (Art. XI).). An illustrative list of
TRIMS that are inconsistent with those obligations was attached as an Annex
to the Agreement.
118 See / art. 5.
119 See id art. 9 (calling for a review of the operation of the agreement
within five years as well as a consideration of whether the agreement should be
complemented with provisions on investment policy and competition policy).
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, at pt. I (covering copyrights,
trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, lay-out designs
of integrated-circuits, and protection of undisclosed information in arts. 9-39),
and Part III Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (arts. 41-60). It was
acknowledged that countries had the right to use measures to control anticom-
petitive practices in contractual licenses. Id art. 40.
121 The portion of the TRIPS agreement dealing with enforcement pro-
vides, for the first time, binding international obligations for the effective en-
forcement of intellectual property both internally and at the border. The im-
portance of this innovative section of the TRIPS agreement cannot be
overstated. It will make domestic legal procedure subject to international dis-
pute settlement, not in the context of establishing an appeals procedure for the
domestic courts' individual cases but in ensuring the effective operation of each
WTO member's domestic system in enforcing intellectual property rights. See
John Gero & Kathleen Lannan, Trade and Innovation Unilateralism v. Multilat-
eralism, 21 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 81, 91 (1995).
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particular order. Practically speaking, it is only after all three levels
have been reached that an issue becomes acceptable to the interna-
tional community as one for trade linkage.
The first consensus is on the core principles that must be vindi-
cated or rights that must be protected. Rule-making must be aware
of its subject. To develop rules that will bind and inspire compli-
ance, there needs to be agreement on what problem is being ad-
dressed and how best to address it. Illustrations from the TRIMS
and TRIPS experience may prove illuminating. One reason why
commentators have described the TRIMS Agreement as a failure is
because it did not address many of the investment issues raised by
the United States and other capital-exportingstates as key aspects of
investment protection.'" The history of the negotiations reveals
that the limited scope of the TRIMS rules can be traced to the uni-
verse of investment rights and protections not being conclusively
determined prior to the round.! By contrast the TRIPS Negotiat-
ing Group had the benefit of a well-defined universe of intellectual
property rights as developed by existing international intellectual
property agreements and the efforts of WIPO.124 The TRIPS nego-
tiating group was thereby capable of reaching the issue of what in-
tellectual property rights were and how they should be protected
during the first phase of negotiations.12
The second consensus that must be achieved is about how the
issue or area is linked to trade. No issue has ever been accepted for
study by the GATT/WTO, for working group examination, or as
an agenda item for a negotiating round unless trade-relatedness was
offered as a justification. There is no common understanding of
how trade-relatedness must be established. 126 Clearly, if rules have
122 See Jonathan Startup, An Agenda for International Investment, in THE
NEW WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: READINGS 189 (OECD ed., 1994); Wong, su-
pra, note 9.
M See Price & Christy, supra note 14, at 455 (comparing the TRIPS experi-
ence with that of TRIMS).
124 See id; see generally Ryan, suera note 112 (arguing that the TRIPS
Agreement was possible because it built upon the "function-specific" work al-
ready done by the intellectual 'property community, and because linkage-
bargain diplomacy was available in the Uruguay Round to facilitate trade-offsY.
12 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra
note 113, at 2265-67; but see Ryan, supra note 112 (pointing out that it was actu-
ally the creation of the Draft Composite Text in 1991 by the chair of the nego-
tiating committee that crystallized the form of the final agreement).
12 See Nichols, supra note 104, at 733-34 (acknowledging that there are




the capacity for liberalizing or distorting trade, they would be
trade-related. The GATT has frequently expanded its jurisdiction
to include rules on government practices that act as barriers to
trade. The newer subjects proposed for linkage, such as labor and
investment rights, however, do not fall neatly into this characteri-
zation. In the case of both labor and investment, new rules would
provide a standard of treatment for those participating in the crea-
tion of tradable goods and services. At best, such rules might facili-
tate trade. There is precedent for this type of trade-relatedness. By
negotiating the TRIPS Agreement, the GATT went beyond focus-
ing on liberalization of trade or barriers to trade. 127 Adopting in-
vestment standards would appear to facilitate trade given what is
understood about the economic inter-linkage between trade and
foreign direct investment.1 28 By contrast, the adoption of mini-
mum standards in the area of labor rights may or may not facilitate
trade given what is currently known about the economics. Rather,
the creation of trade-related labor rules would arguably legitimize
trade and make it fair trade. 129 Justifying WTO jurisdiction under
be limited to a statistical measurement of trade flows; at the macro level, it is
ossible that there are issue that cannot be depicted through statistical evidence,
ut whose resolution is critical to international trade governance); see also
Leary, supra note 7, at 220.
It is argued that only "trade-related" issues, and not issues such as workers'
rights, should have a place in trade negotiations (i.e., note the use of the terms
"trade-related" intellectual property to justify the inclusion of intellectual prop-
erty issues in Uruguay Round negotiations). The categorization of "trade-
related issues," however, appears to depend on the eyes of the beholder.
127 See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Rethinking International Trade, in Symposium,
Linkage as Phenomenon: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 19 U. PENN. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 201 (1998) (describing the TRIPS Agreement).
128 See supra Section 1.2.1.1.1. (discussing the relationship between trade
and investment).
129 See Langille, supra note 101, at 236 (pointing out the long-held assump-
tion of trade theory, that there is a natural or non-controversial mode of eco-
nomic ordering and that distortions or perversions of this "normalcy" can be
detected, measured and taken into account by trade theory). But this is not the
case. This is why the debate over fair trade is so intractable. There is no way
for trade policy or its economic principles to be insulated from the political is-
sues at stake. Fair trade is free trade's destiny. That is, once governmental ac-
tion or non-action in labor policy (for example) is problematized a potential
subsidy, then there is not alternative to engaging in the debate about the appro-
priate scope of market regulation (of labor relations, for example). Id.
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such a theory of trade-relatedness, however, strikes at the heart of
the efficiency model of the trade regime. 
130
The third level of consensus that must be reached for multilat-
eral rule-making concerns how it should be realized and enforced.
Multilateral rule-making takes place in an institutional framework
and requires institutional oversight and enforcement once the rules
are negotiated. Before reaching this consensus, the international
community must be convinced that there is a need for cooperation
or coordination, and that the issue is best dealt with at the interna-
tional level.' 3 ' Given the nature and reality of investment and la-
bor, and the current international regime for dealing with both,
there is an argument that such international cooperation and coor-
dination is necessary. Assuming that an international solution is
required, concrete issues of the proper institution to conduct the
rule-making and the proper enforcement mechanism for any rules
that might be developed, must be addressed. Selecting an institu-
tion (along with its enforcement methods) for rule-making, to a
large extent, dictates the form, scope, and content of the interna-
tional rules. What is less clear is what kind of international coop-
eration is needed. Does the area present the case for one exclusive
jurisdiction by one institution, for shared jurisdiction, or for true
collaboration?
2.2. How Investment and Labor Rights Satisfy or Fail to Satisfy
the Preconditions for Trade-Related Rule-Making
2.2.1. First Consensus
Both investment and labor satisfy, in some fashion, the first
consensus by identifying what core rights or principles need to be
protected. With regard to investment, there has been an extensive
attempt to develop a comprehensive understanding of the rights
130 Dunoff reaches this conclusion by indicating that as 'trade and' disputes
increase, the efficiency model's welfare for maximizing calculus does not cor-
rectly account for these non-economic values. Dunoff, supra note 127.
The WTO Secretariat Report on Trade and Investment argues that a
lack of rule and policy coherence,both of which exist in the investment regime,
pose a "danger to security and stability, which are basic goals of trade and in-
vestment agreements." TRADE AND FDI, supra note 46, at 44; see also Nichols,
sura note 104, at 738-40 (setting this out as one of the criteria for judging
whether the WTO should have jurisdiction over a subject).
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and protections necessary to create a liberal investment regime.
132
The views of the capital exporting states have coalesced around sev-
eral crucial ideas, building from the earliest international invest-
ment agreements, the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation trea-
ties,133 through the European and American bilateral investment
agreements, 13 and into regional efforts, such as the Energy Charter
Treaty and the NAFTA investment chapter.' 3 First, for a set of
international investment rules to be effective, there must be an ex-
pansive definition of "investment." 136 Second, the traditional in-
vestment problem of discrimination against foreign capital and in-
vestments must be addressed. 137 Third, a core of investment rights
must be included in any investment regime such as the rights of es-
tablishment, and operation. Investment protections, such as a
thorough standard for expropriation, adequate compensation, and
the right to transfer funds, should be included as well. Whether the
capital importing countries share the view that all of these elements
are required at all, much less in the form represented by an agree-
ment such as NAFTA, is doubtful. During the Uruguay Round,
there was active opposition to such ideas and the MAI negotiations
by the OECD have had only limited developing country participa-
tion. 139
132 See 1996 WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 25, at 161-200
(compiling the policy issues (i.e., whether there should be a comprehensive
multilateral frarmework) as well as a surveying all the existing international
See Price & Christy, supra note 14, at 440.
134 See generally KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT
TREATiES: POLiCY AND PRACTIcE (1992); see also 1996 WORLD INVESTMENT
REPORT, supra note 25, at 134-47 (comparing existing BITs).
135 The North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
605, 639-48 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
136 Compare Model U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 1(b), reproduced
in 1 Basic Documents of International Law 655 (Stephen Zamora & Ronald A.
Brand eds., 1990), with NAFTA, supra note 135, art. 1139.
137 The non-discrimination issues are addressed by adopting National
Treatment and MFN provisions. Most bilateral agreements riave both. See
TRADE AND FDI, supra note 46, at 23. Chapter 11 of NAFTA extends the Na-
tional Treatment and MFN standards to pre- and post-establishment aspects of
an investment. See NAFTA, supra note 135, arts. 1102(1), (2), 1103(1), (2).
"3 See 1996 WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 25, at 189-92.139 See Joanna R. Shelton, Symposium on the MAI (presented on Oct. 20,
1997), available at OECD/MAI Symposium in Cairo, (visited May 7, 1998) at
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/mai/shelton.htm> (noting that those non-
OECD Member states that expressed interest in acceding to the MAI, including
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In the case of labor, a review of the recent multilateral discus-
sions and negotiations, 40 as well as scholarly efforts, reveals that a
consensus is developing about what constitutes core labor rights. 141
Although different sources exist from which these rights are drawn,
such as human rights treaties, domestic legislation with social
clauses and ILO Conventions, a small list of rights has increasingly
been identified as enumerating core rights. That core list includes:
the freedom to associate, the freedom to bargain collectively, the
prohibition of forced labor, discrimination in employment, and ex-
ploitative forms of child labor.'42 Given the comprehensive nature
of what could be described as labor rights, which cover all realities
of the workplace from establishment of the basic relationship, to
wages, to working conditions and safety, a recognition of this list is
a necessary first step towards any contemplated set of internation-
ally mandated labor rights. Not all ILO Member states have yet
ratified the conventions which establish these rights; nevertheless,
they are among the most ratified.' 43 The core list has grown from a
recognition that there is a minimum level of labor standards. The
freedoms to associate and to bargain collectively are seen as the nec-
essary procedural rights for the labor force.'" Without the right to
meet and discuss common issues and concerns and gain leverage in
establishing the terms of employment with management, workers
will be without the ability to influence labor standards. The prohi-
bition of forced labor is necessary to enshrine properly the
worker's right to choose his work.' 45 The prohibition of discrini-
nation limits the ability of employers and governments to treat
workers differently on the basis of some characteristic unrelated to
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Hong Kong, China and Slovakia, were invited to be-
come observers in the Negotiating Group).
140 See supra notes 7 and 11 concerning recent efforts by the ILO Govern-
ing Body regarding core labor rights.
141 See Langille, supra note 7; OECD STUDY, supra note 44. However,
there is no universal agreement. See generally Leary, suprpa note 26 (arguing for a
shorter list); R. Michael Gadbaw & Michael T. Medwig, Multinationl Enter-
prises and International Labor Standards: Which Way for Development and Jobs,
in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 141, 153
(Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996) (arguing for a different set
of rights altogether).
5 See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
143 See OECD STUDY, supra note 44, at 33-36.
144 Langille, supra note 7, at 32.
145 See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying notes.
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their abilities. 146  The prohibition of exploitative child labor is
aimed at restricting, if not curtailing, child labor either by establish-




With regard to developing the second consensus, investment
and labor differ significantly on how an issue relates to trade.
There is a growing consensus on the economics of trade linkage for
investment, as witnessed by studies and the numerous attempts to
create trade-related investment rules.148 Nevertheless, the interna-
tional community has not yet been able to agree upon the need for,
or the content of a truly international investment regime. The po-
litical reality of the GATT and its manifestation in the Uruguay
Round produced limited or structurally-flawed trade related rules,
such as the TRIMS Agreement and the GATS, respectively. 149 De-
spite these flawed attempts to create some type of trade-related in-
vestment regime, the WTO has not abandoned the field. During
the Singapore Ministerial, the member states agreed to establish a
Working Party on Trade and Investment. The WTO Secretariat
also issued its report on Trade and Investment. Although the
Working Party has begun its work, which focuses not only on
trade-relatedness (i.e., the economics of investment and trade) but
also noticeably on the relationship between trade and investment
and development, its agenda suggests a lengthy process focusing on
educating Member states about investment and its ramifications.
Conspicuously absent from the current goals of the Working Party
is any mission to modify TRIMS or the promulgate new trade-
related investment rules.
Regionally, the OECD has moved ahead of the WTO by work-
ing towards the MAI. Given its membership, the OECD is sensi-
tive about the relationship between the MAI and the WTO's trade-
related investment rules. Consequently, the OECD Member states
146 Id
147 See generally Diller & Levy, supra note 78.
148 See generally TRADE AND FDI, supra note 46, at 23-37.
149 For a discussion of the limits of TRIMS, see supra notes 11147 and ac-
companying text. For a discussion of the GATS limitations see generally
Hoekman, supra note 9 at 177-83; Richard B. Self, General Agreement on Trade
in Services, in THE MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY, supra note 14, at 523.
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have acknowledged that the OECD must work with the WTO,
and has formulated MAI obligations which are consistent with the
WTO rules.
150
By contrast, there is no consensus on how labor rights relate to
trade. Those favoring linkage and those opposing it disagree re-
garding the economics of the linkage of labor rights to trade.
1 51
Moreover, these groups also disagree about the value and utility of
international trade-related rule-making in this area.
2.2.3. Third Consensus
Investment and labor also differ regarding the third consensus.
They differ on how international rule-making regarding each area
should be realized and enforced. With regard to both areas, the
WTO now has a limited or non-existent role despite suggestions
that it should be the rule-making institution. 152 The WTO com-
mands this attention because it is currently regarded as a competent
and powerful institution. The Uruguay Round succeeded in replac-
ing the GATT with a membership organization that required states
to adopt an expansive set of legal commitments and to submit to
what is perceived to be an effective dispute settlement system.
Given its already extensive jurisdiction and mandate to promulgate
additional rules, the WTO is competent to negotiate new trade-
related rules. 153 Moreover, the WTO's Dispute Settlement Under-
standing is equipped with the most effective method for enforcing
its obligations, which is an adjudicative dispute settlement sys-
tem 5 5 backed by the power to authorize trade sanctions.156  De-
spite or because of these institutional attributes, however, the
150 See infra Section 3.1. for a discussion of the MAI design and core prin-
ciples.
151 See Srinivasan, supra note 44; Van Liemt, supra note 101.
152 See supra note 11 and accompanying notes.
153 See Nichols, supra note 104, at 727-28.
154 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multinational Trade Negotiations, Annex 2, app. 1,in THE RESULTS
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 404
(1994) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding].
155 See Taylor, sup-a note 112, at 24249, 296 & n.399 (listing all the major
discussions of the adjudicative nature of the DSU System).
156 See Dispute Settlement Understanding, sup-a note 154, at art. 22
(recognizing that the Dispute Settlement Understanding authorizes sanctions
only if the offending party in a WTO dispute fails to withdraw the non-
conforming measure pointed out by a WTO panel report). Id. art. 22.3.
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WTO may never be the institution to promulgate comprehensive
international rules on investment or labor rights. In the investment
area, it is clear that the WTO has jurisdiction because it has invest-
ment and investment related agreements. The WTO, however,
will not be the first institution to complete a set of international in-
vestment rules. Instead, it appears that the OECD, if it does finish
the now delayed negotiations, will promulgate such an agree-
ment.15 7 Certain consequences flow from this institutional choice.
The OECD, as an institution comprised of similarly situated coun-
tries, is developing a MAL that represents its members views rather
than the compromise of competing visions that marks a WTO
agreement. The OECD also has freedom regarding the form of the
agreement (a free standing treaty) and how to enforce its obligations
(through the state to state methods, as well as private investor ver-
sus state methods). This is not available to the WTO unless it
adopts several alterations to its current structure
15 8 and focus. 5 9
157 As noted earlier, the WTO Working Party on Trade and Investment
lacks any mandate beyond reviewing the linkage issue. The WTO would move
ahead of the OECD only if the MAI is never completed, which is a prospect
that currently seems unlikely.
158 In the current structure of the WTO, all Member states are subject to all
major obligations. This in turn means that any violation of a WTO obligation,
whether it is a GATT 1994, TRIPS, TRIMS or GATS obligation, is subject to
the Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU"). Because the DSU was estab-
lished for sovereign-sovereign complaints only, the WTO would have to alter
the structure of the DSU to offer an additional type of dispute settlement for
investment disputes if the investor-state disputes are to be kept directly under
WTO supervision. See Edward M. Graham, Direct Investment and the Future of
the World Trade Organization, in THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: CHAL-
LENGES AHEAD 205, 212 (1996) (suggesting alternative ways to establish stand-
ing for investors).
Changing the structure of the DSU in such a fashion, however, raises the
issue of why investment disputes should be treated differently than other trade
and trade-related disputes. The answer that the rights of an individual investor
are involved is not sufficient because the rights of individual holders of intellec-
tual property rights are implicated by the TRIPS Agreement, as are those of
service suppliers in the GATS, and yet they lack access to the DSU System.
Private party-sovereign investment disputes can be characterized as contract
disputes. Such a characterization would differentiate them from intellectualproperty rights which are benefits conferred by a state. Of course, the other
option would be to ow such disputes to be handled 
through I nSID Arbitra-
tion or ad hoc arbitration and not give the WTO true jursdiction. See i.
(noting that a U.S. position on the efforts is needed by the WTO).859 The expansion of the WTO to allow for private parties to have access is
a controversial idea, even if it is potentially meritorious. See Andrea K. Schnei-
der, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Individual Rights in International Trade
Organizations, in Symposium, Linkage as Phenomenon: An Interdisciplinary Ap-
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The completion of the MAI as a free standing treaty will, if it
can gain membership outside the OECD itself, provide two inter-
national institutions with overlapping competence regarding in-
vestment rules. Whether and how the two institutions can coordi-
nate their efforts to implement and enforce the rules will become
major issues. Ultimately, this dual competence could lead to a
WTO decision to adopt the MAI as a beginning, even if not as a ba-
sis for its own Trade-related Investment Agreement.
In the labor rights area it is fairly clear that the WTO has no
role to play in the short term. The Singapore Ministerial Declara-
tion effectively assigned jurisdiction over labor rights to the ILO.
The ILO now has to grapple with having the issue of trade linkage
returned to it. Initial moves towards expanding the ILO power
further to monitor labor rights protection were stymied in the 1997
International Labor Conference. However, in November, the
Governing Body of the ILO agreed to allow a director-general led
effort to increase ILO powers regarding core labor rights to be put
r 160on the agenda for the 1998 International Labor Conference. 0 For
the near future, labor rights advocates will have to see if the ILO
can better protect fundamental labor rights. If that organization
fails to address the issue in some way, it is likely that pressure to
move labor rights onto the WTO agenda, at least from the United
States, will not cease. 161
3. TRANSFORMING EXISTING AND PROPOSED RULES INTO
TRADE-RELATED RULES
3.1. Trade and Investment
Different models for an investment regime exist including the
bilateral investment agreements, APEC guidelines, 162 the existing
proach, 19 U. PENN. J. INT'L ECON. L. 201 (1998) (arguing that private access
would bring a level of legitimacy to WTO dispute settlement).
160 See Singapore Minister Urges, supra note 10.
161 Id.
162 The Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation forum issued Non-Binding
Investment Principles in November 1994 that dealt with, among other things,
transparency, national treatment, investment incentives, performance require-
ments, expropriation and compensation standards, repatriation of funds (aid its
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OECD codes, 163 NAFTA,'4 and the TRIMS165 and GATS166
Agreements. During the MAI drafting process, all of these mod-
els were reviewed and studied for common principles and design.
The MAI is not completely based on any of these models. In
most cases, there were limitations as to the scope of the agreement
(either in the definitions or number of commitments) or with
their enforcement mechanism. 167 Nevertheless, it is fairly clear
that the MAI has been strongly influenced by its models. The
most obvious models appear to be the GATT (and the GATS) for
structure168 and NAFTA, Chapter 11 for substance and enforce-
ment mechanism.
169
In many ways the MAI resembles the GATT and the GATS-
the framework agreements of the WTO. A framework agree-
ment for trade rules is one which sets out core general principles
(subject to some general and other specific exceptions) and a proc-
ess for achieving the ultimate goals of the agreement. The trade
framework agreements contemplate progress over time with each
new negotiating round reaching and fixing a new level of com-
mitments. In the case of the GATT 1947, the core principles
were the Most Favored Nation 170 and National Treatment Provi-
sions 171 and the process was contained in the article on Tariff
163 OECD Code on the Liberalization of Capital Movements and the
OECD Code of Liberalization of Current Invisible Operations. For a survey
of these Codes, see OECD, INTRODUCTION TO THE CODES OF LIBERALi-
ZATION (PARIS, 1987).
164 See NAFTA, supra note 135.
165 See TRIMS Agreement, supra note 4.
166 See GATS, supra note 14.
167 See the analysis of these models in TRADE AND FDI, supra note 46, at
25-28.
168 The GATT and GATS are framework agreements. See i at 35.
Like the GATT before it, the GATS is a framework designed to permit
the progressive liberalization of trade in services through further negotiations.
Indeed, the GATS contains a built-in commitment in Article XIX to continue
to negotiate liberalization through successive rounds of negotiations with the
first such negotiation scheduled to begin no later than the year 2000, and to
continue periodically afterwards.
169 The scope of the MAI, its provision on performance requirements, and
its adoption of the two forms of dispute settlement appear to -be heavily pat-
terned after similar NAFTA provisions.
170 GATT, supra note 2, at art. I.
171 I art. InI.
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Binding.'72 The framework format has proven remarkably work-
able for eliminating tariffs and other barriers to trade. In fact, the
success of the GATT in lowering tariff barriers ultimately re-
vealed other barriers to trade and subsequently led countries to
push for other agreements to deal with areas that the framework
did not cover but which clearly impacted on trade, the non-tariff
barriers.
During the Uruguay Round, the GATS was also designed, us-
ing the GATT model as a basis, as a framework agreement. The
GATS has one general principle, 7 3 scheduled service sector com-
mitments 174 and a commitment to progressive liberalization.
7 5
Designing an agreement for trade in services as a framework
agreement, however, created several problems. The contracting
parties were not able to adopt completely either MFN or Na-
tional Treatment. In addition, the services schedules submitted
by many countries were considered to be so inadequate by others
that later, sector specific negotiations were required. 176 These de-
partures from the GATT model have led many to view the
GATS as structurally flawed. The struggle to fit services trade
172 Article II was conceived as a device for getting the contracting parties to
liberalize trade by conducting an ongoing process of negotiations to lower
worldwide tariffs. For this process to work the contracting parties had to nego-
tiate over levels of tariff reduction, submit country-specific schedules which il-
lustrated those commitments, and commit to bind (or keep in place) those tar-
iffs or tariffs of comparable amount. Crucial to the concept of binding is that
the countries agreed both to a standstill, not increasing tariffs (unless an excep-
tion applied), as well progressive liberalization of tariff commitments. See j.
art. II.
173 GATS, supra note 14, at art. II (Most-Favored-Nation). Although the
GATS does have MFN as a core principle, it is subject to exemptions contained
in an Annex to the agreement. Moreover, unlike the GATT, the Uruguay
Round negotiators did- not establish national treatment as a general principle.
Instead, it falls under the section on specific commitments by Member states,
which means that limitations might be placed on the principles for any service
sector for which a committee is made. See id. art. XVII.
174 Id arts. XVI, XVII, XVII.
175 Id. art. XIX.
176 See Self, supra note 149, at 546-50 (briefly discussing the extended nego-
tiations required for financial services, and basic telecommunications). In addi-
tion, there was dissatisfaction with the "positive list" app roach taken for sched-
uling commitments. Under this method, countries only scheduled the sectors
they were willing to liberalize and, subsequently, limits were placed on those





into such a model could raise some issues about the MAI attempt
at a framework investment agreement.
The MAI legal rules and obligations are contained in the
following parts of the treaty: Section I is a lengthy preamble
which sets out the goals of the treaty; Section II sets out the scope
and application, which defines investor, investment and the geo-
graphical scope of application; Section HII addresses the treatment
of investors and investments, which lists the core principles of na-
tional treatment, MFN and transparency17 8 and other investor
rights17 9 ; Section IV discusses investor protection; Section V deals
with dispute settlement; Section VI codifies exceptions and safe-
guards; Section VII is the financial services provision, which is a
carve out chapter which creates special rules for this type of in-
vestment; Section VII deals with taxation; and Section IX articu-
lates country specific exceptions, which will ultimately be com-
prised of the schedules of each signatory when negotiations are
finished.
The core concepts regarding the treatment of investors and
investments are National Treatment and Most Favored Nation.
18 0
Aside from the use of the legal term of art, these two MAI provi-
sions are worded exactly the same as one another. The general
principles of the MAI are, therefore, the same as those of the
GATT. Legal terms that focus on non-discrimination such as na-
tional treatment and Most Favored Nation, however, take on dif-
ferent meaning when aligned to the specific goals of a commercial
agreement. In the trading regime, the crucial form of non-
177 Other portions of the MAI are devoted to the Relationship to other In-
ternational Agreements (Section X), Implementation and Operation (Section
XI), and Final Provisions (Section XII).
178 The MAI, like newer trade agreements, has raised transparency to the
level of core principles.
179 Other investor rights specified by the MAI include temporary entry for
investors, a prohibition of nationality restrictions for executives, managers, of-
ficers and board members, prohibitions on performance requirements. See MAI
Negotiating Text, supra note 8, at Section II.
180 The National Treatment provision is as follows:
Each Contracting Party shall accord to investors of another Contract-
ing Party and to their investments, treatment no less favourable than
thUe treatment it accords (in like circumstances) to its own investors
and their investments with respect to the establishment, acquisition,
expansion, operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment and
safe or other disposition of investments.
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discrimination is between trading partners. As a result, MFN is
the cornerstone of the GATT. By contrast, in an investment
agreement, the most common discrimination is against outside
investors or investments. Consequently, the most important con-
cept in the MAI is National Treatment. Using these concepts to
explain how investment and investors must be treated, however,
necessarily involves specifying some level of investment rights. In
the MAI, the two general principles are linked to the broadest
possible scope of investment rights. 8 1 Investors are given rights
to establish, acquire, expand, operate, manage, maintain, use, en-
joy, sell, or otherwise dispose of investments in a fashion no less
favorable than that of a country's nationals or any other country's
citizens. 182 Investors and investments are also to be entitled to the
better national treatment or MEFN. 83 This latter provision is
important since any derogation from national treatment would
still provide the investor with the same treatment offered to other
outsiders.
Given the breadth of rights established by the national treat-
ment and MFN provisions of the MAI, they cannot be viewed in
isolation from the list of country-specific exceptions. The MAI
employs the negative list approach for the exceptions schedules
where any exceptions that a country plans to take must be sched-
uled.184 In its current form, the MAI has opted for strong general
principles and many exceptions.8 5  The list of country-specific
"' The MAI text recognizes that true national treatment is not possible in
some areas, such as financial services and taxation, and so it has taken a carve-
out approach with respect to these concepts. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra
note 8, at Sections VII-Financial Services and VIII-Taxation. See also OECD,
MAI Briefing for non-OECD Countries: Scope of the MAI (Sept. 17, 1997)
(presentation by Xavier Musca, Treasury Directorate, Ministry for the Econ-
omy and Finance, France) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/mai/musca.htm >("Total and unconditional liberalism of international investment could lead to
economic destabilization and would have been counterproductive. The MAI
negotiators thus established limits to its scope of application.").182 Iad The scope of the MAI, therefor , gives investors and investments
pre- and post-establishment rights.
183 See id. Each Contracting Party shall accord to investors of another
Party and to their investments the better of the treatment required by Articles1.1 (National Treatment) and 1.2 (MFN), whichever is the more favorable to
those investors or investments. See id.
184 This is in contrast to the GATS positive list approach that had been
heavily criticized. See Hoekman, supra note 9.
18hSee Sol Picciotto, Linkage in International Investment Reation and
the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, presented at the L fage as Phe-
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exceptions still being negotiated is several times the size of the
treaty itself. Negotiations slowed over the need for OECD states
to find acceptable levels of country-specific exceptions, as well as
to determine what the other general exceptions 8 will be allowed,
and their form. Even more controversial has been the fight over
whether there will be exceptions for such things, such as ones for
regional economic integration arrangements 8 7 and cultural indus-
tries.
188
Extensive exception scheduling, as well as carve-outs, are also
necessary given what unconditional national treatment would
mean in the investment context. Investment measures tend to be
internal. Some, but not all, of a country's rules that limit or re-
strict investment are designed to discriminate. Other measures
are aimed at ensuring the proper functioning of the market, the
economic security of the country, or efforts by governments to
achieve certain industrial policy goals. 8 9 True national treatment
would mean treating outside investors no less favorably than na-
tionals, but for the purpose of some of such rules and regulations,
differentiation in treatment is necessary.
The country-specific exceptions schedules also play a role be-
yond limiting the reach of the national treatment and MFN obli-
gations. The schedules will serve as the framework for how fu-
ture liberalization will take place. The MAI, as drafted, allows
countries to grandfather-in existing non-conforming measures, or
any amendments to them that do not increase the non-conformity
nomenon: An Interdisciplinary Approach symposium sponsored by the
American Society of International Law ("ASIL") (1997).
186 The current proposal for General Exceptions in Section VI has only
been proposed for discussion by the Chairman. MAI Negotiating Text, supra
note 8.
187 Two different proposals have been submitted on Regional Economic
Integration Organizations. Neither is included in the draft text at this point.
See id.
See id There is one proposal for an Exception Clause for Cultural In-
dustries. It also has not been included in the draft text to date. See also Invest-
ment Talks Continue at OECD; MAI Now on Course for 1999 Completion, 15
INT'L TRADE REP. 525 [hereinafter Investment Talks] (describing this impasse
over the cultural industries and regional integration exceptions).
189 See Graham, supra note 158, at 210 & n.10 (noting that none of the
countries of the OECD, which is certainly the group with the most liberal in-
vestment regimes, grant "full national treatment to all foreign controlled firms
in all industries").
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of the measure.1 90 A decision has been unreached as to whether to
keep this as a standstill measure191 that does not allow new non-
conforming measures to be issued by countries once the MAI goes
into effect. If there is standstill, then the next issue would logi-
cally be rollback, an indicator of how the exceptions list would
shrink over time as countries adjust to the new liberalized in-
vestment regime. The MAI currently has chosen a method for
rollback which requires countries to list any commitment to fu-
ture liberalization on the exceptions schedule itself. 92 Conduct-
ing rollback in this manner means that any commitments to re-
duce and eliminate non-conforming measures would be made at
the time the MAI goes into force. In this respect, the current
MAI draft does not have one element of a GATT/WTO frame-
work agreement: the commitment to later rounds of negotiations
concerning future liberalization. The MAI, as drafted, has no
provisions for successive rounds of negotiations, or for monitor-
ing of signatories' compliance.
193
Beyond the breadth issue, the MAI differs from the existing
WTO agreements on investment in two ways that are bound to
affect its consideration as a potential model for a comprehensive
WTO investment agreement. The MAI covers not only the lib-
eralization of investment rules, but also investment protection.
These provisions and the method used to ensure them in some
ways appear to put the interests of investors in a privileged posi-
tion. The content of the provision on expropriation and adequate
190 MAINegotiating Text, supra note 8, at Section DC, A, which contains the
following provision:
a. Articles X (National Treatment), Y (Most Favored Nation Treat-
ment), [Article 2 ,... and Article... ] do not apply to:
(a) any existing non-conforming measure as set out by a contracting
Party in its Schedule to Annex A of the Agreement, to the extent that
the measure is maintained, continued or promptly reserved in its legal
system.
191 The draft text reveals that the negotiators are still considering whether
to allow new non-conforming measures to be introduced after the MAI comes
into force. See id., at X, (B) and (C). According to an explanatory note for this,
there are two views. "[O]ne view is that such a provision might undermine the
MAI disciplines to which it applied. The other view is that Part B would make
it easier to preserve high standards in the disciplines of the agreement by allow-
ing flexibility to countries in lodging their exceptions." Id.
192 See id. at X, Annex A, 1.
193 These are the other methods that were discussed by the negotiating
group. See MAI Commentary (on file with author).
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compensation closely resembles the high standard set in
NAFTA, 194 as does the provision on free transfer of funds.' 95
Moreover, the MAI drafters have specified two methods for dis-
pute resolution which are traditional state to state procedure, and
the more controversial investor versus host state arbitration.
While there is precedent for the investor/state dispute in bilateral
investment agreements and NAFTA, including such a method in
the WTO might require extensive readjustment of that institu-
tion's traditions regarding dispute settlement.
3.2. Trade and Labor
To date, there have been only proposals about how to create
trade-related labor rules. This section of the article will therefore
concentrate on explaining the three existing proposals, and offer-
ing one new one. This analysis is not offered as a prescription for
what should be done or considered. Rather, attempting to set out
what labor rights rules might look like seems necessary for reveal-
ing their amenability to trade-related rule-making. All of the
proposals have limitations that arise either from the nature of la-
bor rights themselves or from the institutional efforts that would
be required to negotiate and enforce such rules. The proposals
will be discussed in order of least complex (although not necessar-
ily the least feasible) to most complex.
The first proposal, espoused by Steve Charnovitz, is to expand
ILO competence to include the power to authorize trade controls.
Charnovitz argues that the ILO organic act, the Treaty of Ver-
194 Compare NAFTA, supra note 135, at art. 1110, with MAI Negotiating
Text, supra note 8, at IV.2. Both require that expropriation be direct or indirect
or be by a measure having an equivalent effect. In addition, both give the same
exceptions of public purpose and non-discriminating basis, in accordance with
due process and accompanied by adequate compensation. The only major ele-
ment of the expropriation and compensation section that does not match
NAFTA's is that there is currently no valuation criteria specified for the MAI's
fair market value ("FMV") provision. Most of the countries did not want the
kind of explicit options set out in NAFTA. However, in order to avoid possi-
ble uncertainty about the definitions of FMV, the Negotiating Group chairman
has suggested that an interpretive note could be added so that "in the case of
undue delay in the payment of compensation on the part of a Contracting
Party, any exchange rate loss arising from this delay should be borne by the
host country." MAINegotiating Text, supra note 8, at n.2.
195 Compare NAFTA, supra note 133, at art. 1109, with MAI Negotiating
Text, supra note 8, at IV.4.
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sailles, 196 interpretations of it 197 and the history of several ILO
conventions 198 suggest that such power could be available. Char-
novitz goes on to suggest that if the ILO were to claim such com-
petence, it could focus on drafting at least one new convention on
forced labor that committed states not to trade in products made
in violation of the convention.1 99 Charnovitz argues that his sug-
gestion is for trade controls on odious products, particularly if
pre-approved by the ILO, rather than trade sanctions. 
200
Several limitations exist with regard to this proposal. First,
the ILO membership would have to approve any such expansion
of its powers. Given the ILO history on trade-related rights to
date, this seems unlikely. ° t Second, even if politically feasible, a
system of trade controls, such as a total ban on the odious prod-
ucts, would be a trade measure subject to WTO scrutiny.
196 See Treaty of Versailles, supra note 1, at art. 405. The treaty contains no
limits for the scope of ILO Conventions.
197 See Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 160-61.
198 See id. at 161-62.
199 See id. at 162.
200 See id
201 There have already been sharp objections to Director General-
Hansenne's proposal that the ILO adopt a declaration of principle identifying
core labor rights and a follow-up mechanism to review Member State compli-
ance. See supra note 10.
202 A trade ban would qualify as a quantitative restriction under Art. XI of
the GATT. While it is true that a country could unilaterally deploy such a
measure, there is always the possibility of a response by the target country.
None of the GATT's general exemptions would provide a defense if the target
country took its case to the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body. The only Arti-
cle XX exception that deals with labor is (e), which allows a country to take
measures relating to the products of prison labor. While an analogy can be
drawn to prison-labor from some core rights, for example, forced labor or ex-
ploitative child labor, that would not necessarily mean that the state using the
ban would prevail. The GATT general exceptions have been construed strictly.
See generally Jan Klabbers, Jurisprudence of International Trade Law: Article XX
of GA 7T, 26J. WORLD TRADE L. 63 (1992). It is, therefore, far from clear that
any reasoning from analogy would be accepted when the wording of Article
XX(e) itself is precise. A recent interpretation of Article XX by the first WTO
Appellate Bod[ panel report also gives another reason to avoid relying upon
Art. XX as a defense. In the Reformulated Gas case, the panel found a measure
that fit a XX exception to be unavailable because it failed-the test of the article's
chapeau which states that:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of unjustifiable discrimina-
tion between countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised re-




Third, the argument assumes that the issue of trade-relatedness has
been resolved in favor of those pushing labor rights. As estab-
lished earlier, there is no consensus on whether labor rights are
related to trade. Finally, this proposal would be of true value in
protecting labor rights only if it covered all core labor rights. In
that instance, the ILO would have to consider redrafting all of the
conventions dealing with the core labor rights to equip them with
this power. Moreover, this proposal would require either moni-
toring by the ILO 203 or an expansion of the ILO's system for re-
viewing complaints about Freedom of Association. 20
strued to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any number of
measures.
United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 35
I.L.M. 603 (1996).
This suggests that even if an art. XX defense is available, a country must
make efforts not to discriminate in how it applies a measure. For the purposes
of Charnovitz's proposal, that would mean that there would have to be some
method for verifying all trading countries that used forced labor so as to apply
the ban appropriately.203 lih,.nersin.o.oe.oa
In this ight, is interesting to note the ILO's decision to consider at
this year's International Labor Conference setting up a"follow-up" mechanism
to check whether countries are providing the core labor rights. See supra note
10. It is not dear whether this would actually be monitoring by the 1LO, it
may be a complaint procedure. Seeinfra note 204.
204 There is reason to believe that the proposed follow-up supervision, cur-
rently being proposed by Director-General Hansenne, is based on his 1997 re-
port suggestion that the Freedom of Association process be expanded. If a dec-
laration of principles establishing core labor rights was adopted, which required
that all ILO Member states had to adhere to the rights as a membership obliga-
tion, then review could be done as it is under the Freedom of Association proc-
ess.
[U]nder this special procedure, governments or workers' and employ-
ers' organizations may submit complaints concerning violations of
trade union rights by States, irrespective of whether or not they have
ratified the Conventions on freedom of association. These complaints
are examined by the Committee on Freedom of Association, a tripar-
tite body of the Governing Body with an independent Chairperson.
The Committee carries out a preliminary examination of the com-
plaints taking into account the observations submitted by the govern-
ments. It may recommend to the Governing Body, as appropriate:
that a case requires no further examination; that it should cfraw the at-
tention of the government concerned to the problems that have been
identified and invite it to resolve them; or attempt to obtain the
areement of the government concerned for the case to be referred to
the Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission, which would be a
much more cumbersome procedure which is used sparingly.
1997 Director-General Report, supra note 7, at 9.
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The second proposal, suggested by one country,2 0 5 various
scholars,2 06 and international labor unions,20 7 has been to establish
a collaborative ILO/WTO process. Not all of the proposals are
exactly the same. What follows is a summary of the major ele-
ments of the proposals. The first ILO/WTO collaboration pro-
posal would involve the ILO and WTO acting together as the
screening body for complaints about violations of core labor
rights. If the complaint process used by the ILO/WTO Joint
Advisory Committee leads to the conclusion that there were vio-
lations, the Joint Advisory Committee would ultimately 208 make
recommendations to the WTO Council for consideration of pos-
sible trade measures. A second variation on this scheme, sug-
Director-General Hansenne believes that such a procedure could be effec-
tive. In describing the Freedom of Association process, he notes the following:
Since it was set up in 1951, the Committee has examined more than
1,900 cases, which has enabled it to build up a very full body of princi-
ples on freedom of association and collective bargaining, based on the
Sroisios ofthe 10 Cnstiutio and trelvant Conventions,
Recommendations and resolutions, and to take action which, even in
the eyes of the outside world, is considered "reasonably effective."
Id.
Even if the Freedom of Association process were expanded to cover core
rights by the LO, it would not actually provide a way of verifying, for the
purposes of applying a trade ban, which countries were not in compliance.This kind of process relies on parties submitting complaints rather than moni-
toring. See OECD STUDY, supra note 44, at 158-60, which contains the follow-
ing criticisms of the 110 Freedom of Association process: (1) since the system
is complaint driven, it does not reach countries where unions have no power to
complain; (2) the Freedom of Association Committee does not properly distin-
.i between major and minor problems; and (3) even if the Committee makes
finings, it does not publicize them widely.
205 France suggested such a possibility in 1996. See Paul Waer, Social
Clauses in International Trade, 30 J. WORLD TRADE 25, 33 (1996).
206 See Daniel S. Ehrenberg, From Intention to Action: An ILO-
GA TT/WTO Enforcement Regime in International Labor Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 163 (Lance A. Compa
& Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996);Leary, supra note 7, at 192-97, 202.
2 See Leary, supra note 7, at 202-03 (describing the proposal by the In-
ternational Confederation of Free Trade Unions ("ICFTU"), the World Con-
federation of Labour ("WCL"), and the European Trade Union Conference
("ETUC")).
208 The labor union prop~osal does not contemplate that trade sanctions
would be the first response. nstead, if violations were found, the Joint Advi-
sory Committee would be charged with recommending measures to be taken
within a certain time frame. Only if the country failed to take action would





gested by a 1995 ILO Working Paper on "The Social Dimensions
of World Trade, " 2 09 argues that adhering to core labor rights
could be adopted as membership requirements for the WTO. If a
WTO member then violated these rights it would be subject to
dispute settlement under Art. XXHI of the GATT under the con-
cept of nullification and impairment.21 0 A third variation on the
collaborative idea is based on using the WTO's Dispute Settle-
ment Understanding ("DSU"). Under this proposal, the ILO
would accept complaints (by an ILO or WTO member state or an
employers' or workers' association from such a state) about "a
pattern of gross and persistent practices of labor rights violations."
1 A joint ILO/WTO committee would then decide on the ad-
missibility of complaints. If found admissible, a complaint would
then be submitted to a joint ILO/WTO Dispute Panel which
would issue a report. As a final step, an offending state would be-
come subject to an ILO remediation committee established to de-
termine what corrective measures should be taken, a timetable for
the state's response and a timetable for possible sanctions if the
state did not comply. 
212
Most, if not all, of these proposals are based on the assump-
tions that there is a clearly established universe of core labor
rights, that there is a consensus on whether labor rights are re-
lated enough to trade to command WTO participation, and that
ILO and WTO collaboration is politically achievable or practi-
cally feasible. As this article suggests, the first two assumptions
are far from clear. With regard to ILO/WTO collaboration for
such an effort to occur, there would have to be a major shift in
the GATT/WTO tradition of standing alone. Although the
Uruguay Round ended with suggestions that the WTO coordi-
209 See supra note 7.
210 See GATT, supra note 2, at art. XXIII, 1(a);see also Leary, supra note 7,
at 194-96. Actually, this is one of the three proposals suggested by the Social
Dimensions Report. The other two proposals (1) making ow labor standards a
subsidy under GATT article XVI; or (2) extending GATT article XX on gen-
eral exceptions to cover labor rights, were considered ill-founded. Both were
objected to because either woulc[ allow a WTO Member to make a unilateral
determination of when to take action against a trading partner. See Leary, supra
note 7, at 202.
211 Ia at 167.
212 See Ehrenberg, supra note 206, at 167-75. Ehrenberg's proposal for
ILO/WTO collaboration tracks all of the major aspects of the DSU System,
including panel reports, negative consensus, and appeal (only this is to the ICJ
instead of the Appellate Body).
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nate with other international organizations, the WTO has not yet
done much in this respect.
The two other proposals would give jurisdiction to the WTO
rather than the ILO. One possibility would be for the WTO to
adopt a list of core rights as general exceptions to GATT obliga-
tions. This would require amending Article XX so that products
made in violation of core labor rights were treated like products
made from prison labor. Another possibility would be the
promulgation of a WTO Trade-Related Labor Rights ("TRLR")
Agreement linked to trade in goods.213 Assuming that any such
agreement is ever politically possible, it would focus on establish-
ing the minimum labor standards necessary for fair trade. There
is a model for such a treaty in the TRIPS Agreement.214 Any
TRLR Agreement would have to have a section on minimum
standards, which are based upon core labor rights around which a
consensus appears to exist, as well as a section on domestic en-
forcement measures. A TRLR Agreement could be made subject
to the existing DSU, as was the TRIPS Agreement. However, in
this instance, there is a serious problem created by only states hav-
ing access to dispute settlement. Workers in a state not providing
such rights would have to rely upon other states to pursue their
cause.
The WTO-based proposals suffer from many of the problems
pointed out with regard to the other proposals. First, they as-
sume that any negotiations would begin with a list of well-defined
core labor rights as the minimum standards. The ILO does have
conventions on all the core rights, but they would need to be re-
drafted from a WTO perspective; at least with regard to the pro-
hibition of exploitative child labor, some complete definition
would first have to be developed. Second, such proposals would
never be considered without some understanding of trade-
relatedness which currently does not exist. Finally, it is not clear
that such an agreement would really improve labor conditions in
errant WTO Member states. A large measure of the TRIPS
Agreement's value as a model for future trade-related rule-making
remains unrealized. It is one thing to establish minimum interna-
213 Any such agreement would have to be linked to trade and goods in or-
der to satisfy the basic requirement of trade-relatedness. Besides, the core labor
standards are important precisely because they would establish a minimal level
of acceptability or products produced by workers.
214 See supra Sections 1.1.1. and note 21 (discussing the TRIPS Agreement).
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tional standards, as arguably the TRIPS and any TRLR Agree-
ment could do. It is yet another thing to ensure that the Member
states enforce those minimum standards. Since the transition pe-
nod for TRIPS has not yet run for the developing countries, it
is impossible to judge whether they can or will comply. Thor-
ough compliance under TRIPS may not be achieved unless other





The actors in the process of international rule-making are
many: governments, inter-governmental organizations, regional
organizations and economic integration arrangements, non-
governmental organizations and interest groups, the affected con-
stituencies, and scholars. States, behaving as unitary actors and
acting strategically,217 are not the only, or even necessarily, the
driving force behind rule-making. The ongoing debate regarding
linkages is symptomatic of a world having to come to grips with
"globalization and its discontents."218 While institutions provide
a forum in which rule-making takes place, the cooperation and
coordination within that institution and its traditions and/or
process for rule-making change the nature of rules adopted.
Moreover, as the process of rule-making proceeds, through the
consensus levels suggested above, the goals of some if not all of
the actors can change. Given the nature of the arguments for
215 See TRIPS Agreement, suTra note 3, at arts. 65-66. The developing
countries and countries in transition from a centrally planned economy were
given five years from the time the WTO Agreement went into effect (1995) to
meet TRIPS obligations. See id. art. 65.2. Least developed countries were given
eleven years. See id. art. 66.
216 In the earliest tests of developing country compliance, the United States
brought cases under the DSU against both India and Pakistan for their failure
to set up "mail boxes" during the TRIPS transition period. The mail boxes, to
receive patent applications, were required because under TRIPS art. 65(4), de-
veloping countries were given an additional five year period to extend patent
protection to areas of technology that had been previously unpatentable under
their laws. India lost before the dispute settlement panel and appealed.
217 These ideas, about states, represent structural realist assumptions about
how the world works. See Anthony Clark Arend, Do Legal Rules Matter? In-
ternationalRules and International Politics, 38VA. J. INT'L L. 107, 112 (1998).
21S See Langille, supra note 7, at 29.
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linkage and the wide variety of linkages being argued for such as
trade and environment, trade and labor rights, trade and invest-
ment, trade and competition law, trade and anti-corruption the
goals of some groups will be altered by the linkages ultimately ac-
cepted 19 for trade-related rule-making and acted upon. It is sim-
plistic to argue that developed countries alone are pushing certain
agendas only for the strategic advantage of protectionism, al-
though, both trade and labor rights and trade and investment do
qualify, in some aspects, as developed-country issues in this re-
spect. Characterizing the advocacy being done for linkage and
trade-related rule-making in such a narrow fashion, however, re-
quires one to ignore the human rights concerns many groups have
219 An illustration of this came from the OECD's process for negotiating
the MAI. After a text on the core investment rights and protections was
drafted, the OECD consulted with non-governmental organizations, particu-
larly environmental groups. This interaction led the MAI Negotiating Groups
to consider some of the issues they raised about linkage. The MAI draft text
now contains two alternative proposals on "Not Lowering Standards" which
read as follows:
Alternative 1
The Parties recognise that it is inappropriate to encourage investment
by lowering [domestic] health, safety or environmental [standards]
[measures] or relaxing [domestic] [core] labour standards. Accordingly,
a Party should not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive
or otherwise derogate from, such [standards] [measures] as an encour-
agement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention in
its territory of an investment of an investor. If a Party considers that
another Party has offered such an encouragement, it may request con-
sultations with the other Party and the two Parties shall consfilt with a
view to avoiding any such encouragement.
Alternative 2
A Contracting Party [shall] [should] not waive or otherwise derogate
from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from [domestic] health,
safety or environmental [measures] [standards] or [domestic] [core] la-
bour standards as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition,
expansion or retention of an investment of an investor.
MAINegotiating Text, supra note 8, at 50.
The MAI draft, therefore, has apparently accepted a linkage, at some level,
between investment and the environment, and between investment and labor.
See Investment Talks, supra note 188. In addition, the delegations have been con-
sidering an "additional clause" on labor and environment. The form of that
clause, if adopted, has not yet been determined. Among those forms officially
proposed by delegations, one would involve a variation of GATT Art. XX lan-
guage and another would be based on NAFTA Chapter 11's provision (Art.
1114(1)) on not lowering standards. See id.
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regarding core labor rights220 and the developmental interests ex-




What exactly would be the gains to the States and all the other
actors of the international community from the creation of inter-
national trade-related rules for labor and investment rights? It is
not possible to catalogue all of the suggested gains from the two
linkages examined in this article. Nevertheless, it is possible to
identify some gains from the protection of core labor rights:
moral (from the promotion of human dignity by protecting core
labor ri hts); the long term economic interests of the state in-
volved; and legitimacy (for the world trading system as it grap-
ples with the growing arguments that economic gains are not the
only value). For investment rights, examples of some gains would
be facilitating investment, trade, and business by providing some
measure of certainty/stability in the rules (rule coherence); and
contributing at some level to the economic growth and potential
development for all countries.
4.3. Which Institution?
Given the process-oriented focus of this article, any profitable
institutional discussion should be limited to analyzing the existing
alternatives. Consequently, what follows will be a short summary
of the advantages and disadvantages of the institutions currently in
play. In the investment area, the two institutions are the OECD
and the WTO. The OECD advantages would appear to be that it
has been negotiated by a group of countries with similar interests
and goals, which may be able to come up with a coherent set of
220 See supra nn.26, 119-20 and accompanying text.
22 See Investment Talks, supra note 188 (describing how the MAI negotiat-
ing group adopted a provision on Not Lowering Standards (see supra n.219) in
response to reactions from environmental groups and labor unions).
2n See Langille, supra note 7, at 39.
There is really no interesting economic argument as to whether it is in
a nation's long-term interest to pursue polices of utilizing child labour,
forced labour, or discrimination in the labour market. It is not. The
only economic issues here are difficult issues of transition from current
conditions to a better world.
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rules representing those views. Since the OECD will be a stand-
alone treaty, other countries will have the freedom to accede if they
believe, or later, obtain evidence that it would be in their best inter-
ests. During the drafting process itself, the OECD Secretariat has
made efforts to educate non-OECD States about the MAI's goals
and its scope. Since there are no plans to create an institutional
structure around the MAI, 223 at least not as currently drafted, it can
easily deal with the establishment of a two-track dispute settlement
system built around international arbitration.2
4
The advantages of the WTO as the institution for international
investment rule-making, is that it is a global organization. Any
rules it adopts will represent a wider, if not deeper, consensus. The
WTO has the authority to make any agreement part of the mem-
bership obligation of the organizations, if the Member states so
choose. The GATT/WTO process of rule-making in negotiating
rounds creates the possibility of other agenda items that can be
traded off to gain an investment agreement or an investment
agreement with a particular level of standards. Finally, WTO has
had historical experience with drafting framework agreements that
have proven successful over time.
The disadvantages of the two institutions involved are reverse
images of the advantages of the other. For example, since the MAI
is not being negotiated by a global group, any OECD set of rules
will not reflect the consideration and potential accommodation of
the views of developing countries. Given the limited OECD
membership and the content of the MAI, it may have difficulty get-
"' This has been an issue during the negotiations.
The Parties Group will come into operation when the MAI comes
into force. There is still some uncertainty about its character. Some
see the MAI as simply a framework of rights and obligations together
with a procedure for settlement of disputes. The Parties Group would
therefore concentrate on the important task of handling new acces-
sions. Others see the Parties Group as a new institution to act as a fo-
rum for debate and for carrying forward a wider policy agenda. In
practice, it is probable that its character will evolve to suit the actual
future needs of MAI members.
Statement of Nick Griffiths, U.K. Permanent Delegation to the OECD (on file
with author).
224 See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 8 at Section V-Dispute Settle-
ment, State-State Procedures and Investor-State Procedures. The dispute set-
tlement section is still undergoing further elaboration. According to explana-
tor notes "different options remain in the field of multilateral consultations
and scope of dispute settlement." IdL at n.1.
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ting other nations to accede. In the case of the WTO, one per-
ceived disadvantage, but not a necessarily a universally held one,
could be that the global membership will adopt a less ambitious set
of investment rules. Consequently, liberalization will take longer.
The WTO would also have to grapple with what to do with the is-
sue of dispute resolution.2
In the case of trade-labor rights, the two institutions are the
ILO and the WTO. It is important to note here that none of the
discussions about international competence regarding trade-related
labor rights have imagined the ILO going on as it has in the past.6
As a result, the discussions about the ILO's advantages relate to its
inherent strengths. The 1LO advantages are that it is an institution
devoted to labor issues and the promotion of labor rights. Moreo-
ver, the 11O's tripartite membership structure actually means that
labor, through representation by the unions and management,
through representation of that group, each has a voice in the nego-
tiations and deliberations of the organization. Both of these aspects
together make the institution sensitive to the human rights and
commercial aspects of trade-related labor rights.
The WTO may or may not have any advantages acting as the
sole competent institution in this area over the ILO. Most of the
proposals made for trade-related labor rights involve the WTO and
ILO working in some collaborative form. 7 The WTO, however,
has taken over jurisdiction from another function specific organiza-
tion, WIPO, for the purposes of developing trade-related rules. As
a result, there is precedent for such a step.
The disadvantage of sole ILO jurisdiction appears to be limited
powers of ensuring compliance. The ILO tradition of voluntarism
has, in the views of many, left core labor rights at substantial risk.
Nevertheless, there are equally serious concerns about turning to
the WTO, whether it stands alone or acts in some collaborative ef-
fort, solely to obtain the rules compliance power that would come
from WTO authorized trade sanctions since labor has two aspects
(involving human rights and its role as a factor of production). In
See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.226 ..Currently, the constituencies pushing such a view are the most outspo-
ken of the developing countries. See supra note 10. Director-General Hansenne
has been signaling his strong belief that some alteration and expansion of the
ILO role regarding core labor rights is needed. See id.; see also supra note 204
(discussing the limitations of the most active ILO process).
n7 The only exceptions are the Charnovitz proposal, which does raise
trade issues, and the TRLR proposal which was made largely to reveal its limits.
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the near term it is the ILO which must struggle with linkage.
Whatever happens in the next phase of ILO negotiations and dis-





This symposium represents a historic opportunity to study
the phenomenon of linkages. The subject of linkages is the next
logical step in the growing movement to address the impact of in-
ternational trade rules on other areas of the law formerly con-
ceived of as either autonomous to international trade concerns or
as purely domestic concerns. Conceiving of this set of issues as a
coherent body of rules and theories is different from the tradi-
tional conception of the "trade and..." problem which seeks to
incorporate or privilege one or more traditionally non-trade issues
within the multilateral or regional trading rules. The interna-
tional economic law community has moved beyond the consid-
eration of the individual relationships between trade and the envi-
ronment, trade and competition, trade and intellectual property,
trade and human rights as isolated phenomena vying for the at-
tention of the trade community. Thinking about linkages re-
quires the construction of new theories and teaching methods to
show how the various "trade and..." problems compare and
contrast to each other and how linkages more generally challenge
the trading system beyond the needs of any particular "trade
and.. ." constituency.
2. THE FRUSTRATIONS
Teaching American law students about either the many "trade
and.. ." issues or the broader subject of linkages is particularly
frustrating for several related reasons. First, at many schools in-
ternational trade and international business transactions are corn-
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor, Brooklyn Law
School. Thanks to all the organizers and attendees of the conference and the
panel on teaching linkages for their suggestions on this topic. I would welcome
any reactions if readers undertake similar teaching experiments using versions
of my model or their own models for introducing linkage issues in their inter-
national economic law courses. I can be reached at swaller@brooklaw
.edu.
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bined into a single survey course which all but rules-out coverage
of any of the advanced topics a teacher may wish to pursue. Even
when international trade is a separate course, the need to cover
the development of the GATT/WTO system, regional trading
blocs, the role of national implementing statutes, and the sheer
weight of the material leaves exploration of linkages for the end of
the course when the teacher is rushed and students are crabby. In
addition, studying linkages requires at least a nodding familiarity
with such diverse topics as antitrust, intellectual property, envi-
ronmental, labor, and human rights law, which the student (or
teacher) would not necessarily have seen before in either the trade
course or any other class at the law school.
Finally, legal scholarship on linkages is still in its embryonic
form* and published materials geared toward the teaching of link-
ages are basically non-existent. The nature of the currently avail-
able teaching materials requires the teacher to craft her own mate-
rials on linkages or force the students to wade through literally
hundreds of pages surveying the various linkages in the existing
published course materials.
In this Article, I describe and evaluate my most recent ex-
periment to introduce linkage issues in a three credit international
trade course.2  Previously, I had only explored the linkages be-
tween trade and competition in a small seminar devoted to that
subject where students having completed the basic trade course
wrote advanced research papers. I had sought for some time to
teach linkages more comprehensively in the basic trade course to
introduce the topic to the broadest student audience possible at
the earliest possible stage. In the past eight years, I have taught in-
ternational trade law using just about every different international
1 The proceedings of this conference, and the other writings of Steve
Charnovitz and Jeffrey Dunoff, form a significant body of the legal scholarship
on the question of linkages in international trade, as opposed to the vast
amount written on specific "trade and..." issues. See Steve Charnovitz, The
World Trade Organization and Social Issues, J. WORLD TRADE L., Oct. 1994, at
5; Jeffrey L. Dunoff, "Trade andS: Recent Developments in Trade Policy and
Scholars-i and their Surrising Political Implications, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. &
BUS. 759 (1996-97).
2 At Brooklyn Law School, there is a separate International Business
Transactions class for three credits which Professor Lan Cao and I each teach
using a problem method and the most recent edition of the RALPH H.
FOLSOM, MICHAEL WALLACE GORDON & JOHN A. SPANOGLE, JR., IN-
TERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSE




trade casebook on the market without any systematic effort to
teach linkages.3 In past years, I had simply assigned one or two
chapters on specific linkage issues as time permitted. Based on a
combination of student interest and my ongoing research, most
often these materials consisted of some combination of competi-
tion and/or environmental law issues.
3. THE ExPERMIENT
In the spring of 1997, I taught seventy international trade stu-
dents using the third edition of Jackson, Davey & Sykes's case-
book on International Economic Relations.4 I followed the basic
outline of the casebook beginning with the constitutional struc-
ture of the United States regulation of international trade, the his-
tory and development of the GATT and the world trading sys-
tem, the structure of the WTO and its dispute mechanism and
then an in-depth analysis of the various import relief mechanisms
under international and United States law.5  The class sessions
consisted of a mixture of Socratic dialogue, lecture, class discus-
sion, problems, and the occasional role playing exercise.
On the syllabus, I designated two sessions about seventy per-
cent of the way into the course to discuss "trade and..." issues
broadly construed. About halfway through the course, I asked
the students to indicate their top three preferences for linkage top-
ics. I asked the students to choose from the chapters toward the
end of the book on environmental, competition, intellectual
property, trade and services, lesser developed countries, non-
market economies, and other linkages (labor, human rights, and
national security). Once I received the preferences, I divided the
' These have included JOHN H. BARTON & BART S. FISHER, INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE AND INvEs mENT (1989), JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J.
DAVEY, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (2d ed. 1986); ALAN C.
SWANN & JOHN F. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE REGULATION
OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1991) and for the
coming year, RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (1996).
4 JoHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ALAN 0. SYKES, LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS
AND TEXT (3d ed. 1995).
5 I do not discuss or assign Chapter two, reviewing the private law aspects
of international business transactions, other than make this a purely optional
matter for students who have not taken the separate International Business
Transactions class offered at the law school. I do at most one session on cus-
toms law often with a practitioner guest lecturer because of a separate, two-
credit Customs Law class offered at the law school.
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students into seven groups based on the topics chosen and as-
signed each group to read the chapter in Jackson, Davey on their
particular topic. I made it first-come, first-served to encourage
prompt submission of preferences and gave everyone their first
choice until groups had nine students. Only then did I move
onto the second and third choices. In a big class, choices distrib-
uted fairly randomly both across subject interest and I had enough
late filers that could be used to round out the less popular groups.
In only a few cases did I have to drop down to students' third
choices.
I provided each group with a nearly identical outline of ques-
tions to guide their discussion.6 The questions asked students to
think about how linkages and non-traditional economies have
been treated under the GATT and WTO, how they can or should
be incorporated into the future work and dispute resolution sys-
tem of the WTO and whether other institutional arrangements
would be more successful in grappling with these issues.
At the same time, I also assigned a student to act as group
leader to initiate the discussion based on my observations in class
as to the sensible talkers who would initiate, but not dominate,
the discussion and not lead the small group astray into a discus-
sion of peripheral issues. On the appointed day, the students met
in different corners of the classroom and two additional rooms
near by. I floated from group to group to monitor progress, an-
swer questions, and guide discussion back onto track if necessary.
I made one visit to each group over the seventy five minute class
session. Most of the groups had vigorous discussions, at least
while I was present. Most of the groups used my all too brief
presence to ask me factual questions about developments in their
field or test preliminary hypotheses about approaches they were
considering.
The class regrouped as a whole for the next session two days
later. The team leaders briefly reported on each small group dis-
cussions and the class as a whole discussed the linkages between
the various linkage phenomena. Finally, each student was re-
quired to prepare a four page think piece without any additional
research to discuss their particular "trade and.. ." topic in light of
the larger group discussion. The paper was graded as part of the
classroom component of the course, which effectively meant that




it was an additional piece of information I used in making border-
line determinations when the exam grade was at the edge between
two grading tiers.
The exercise had three complementary purposes. First, it was
both an attempt to improve the content of the course and to
avoid the frustration of both teacher and student that after all the
hard (and often dry) work, the course would not end before we
got to "good stuff." Second, it sought to allow the students to
study in-depth topics of interest without having to force the
whole class into that area. Finally, it was also a conscious attempt
to nudge the students into more active learning, an increased sense
of perspective, and a higher degree of self-reflection, all of which
are established techniques suggested by cognitive science as effec-
tive learning and problem solving methods.
The experiment was more than satisfactory. The discussions
in the small group were on average wonderfully stimulating for
both me and the students. The students generated many intrigu-
ing ideas, almost always on track and often quite innovative. My
personal favorite came from the trade and environment group
which not only proposed the bare outline of a multilateral envi-
ronmental agreement for inclusion in the WTO system, but also
created its own acronym, the General Agreement on Trade and
the Environment, or the GATE.
The subsequent session when the class met as a whole helped
complete the picture. The group leaders briefly presented their
findings and proposals which took about half of the class. For the
remainder of the period, I sought to maintain a conversation be-
tween members of different groups (other than the group leaders)
as to how the themes developed in one linkage applied to other
linkages. In particular, I focused on whether particular linkages
depended on whether the current trade regime under-valued non-
market considerations (environment, labor, human rights) or
failed to properly value market considerations (competition, intel-
lectual property). I focused to a lesser extent on whether there
were universalist values underlying creating global regimes for
these issues and whether there were any legitimate boundaries
remaining between international trade and domains of domestic
law. In addition, I tried to put the conversation into the context
of North-South issues and to get students to discuss which link-
7 See Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: La'yering Expertise, Cognitive Sci-
ence, and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 358-60 (1995).
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ages promoted the interests of non-market economies and less de-
veloped countries, which issues favored the wealthier market
economies, and how gains in one area were paid for in another.
This session became the basis for, reference in the remaining
classes to linkage issues as they arose in other frontier areas of the
WTO, NAFTA, and a consideration of the Helms-Burton con-
troversy.
4. THE PRoGNOSIS
This modest attempt at interdisciplinary teaching of linkages
could be improved in a number of ways. First, I learned that I
needed to be more careful in selecting group members and team
leaders. In honoring student preferences, the groups on lesser de-
veloped countries and non-market economies ended up being
dominated by students from countries falling into one or both of
these categories. Many of these students were more reticent to
express their views and the conversations lagged in places, even
when I was present to encourage the group and throw out new
ideas.
The other issue I noticed was that I obviously was spread too
thin. For me, the seventy five minute class session sped by as I
rushed from group to group buoyed on by the enthusiasm and
ideas that I heard. However, the students would have benefited
from more direction, information, and suggestions if I had been
able to stay longer with each group. Upon reflection, I would
suggest turning necessity into virtue by involving other faculty
colleagues in the exercise. Had I thought of it in time, I could
have asked colleagues teaching in related fields to assist the small
group discussions. At my school, I could draw upon people with
considerable expertise in issues relating to environmental, finan-
cial services, human rights, economic development, intellectual
property, labor, and national security law. Adding their expertise
would have enriched the small group discussions, provided exper-
tise beyond anything I could do, and freed me up to concentrate
on one or two of the groups. Perhaps more importantly, I missed
a golden opportunity to involve my colleagues in the interna-
tional curriculum and to promote the internationalization of their
own important slices of the law school curriculum.
The papers submitted on the last day of the course spread out
surprisingly well along the basic curve for grading purposes. The
best papers showed a real sense of excitement with the subject
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss2/7
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matter and some innovative thoughts about the type of issues un-
der discussion today at the WTO and the OECD. The weaker
papers tended to summarize the information from the reading as-
signments or discussed several topics without advancing a real
thesis.
Overall, the students seemed to enjoy the experience. The
students who took the time to comment on the whole process on
their evaluations were quite positive about the linkage classes and
requested more such exercises throughout the semester.
5. CONCLUSIoN
The more that linkages can be integrated into a traditional in-
ternational trade course the better. The students will receive a
more accurate picture of contemporary international trade law
and policy as well as a better appreciation for the contentious is-
sues being debated and resolved in the World Trade Organization,
the European Union, NAFTA, and the many other international
organization dealing with portions of the trade agenda. In short,
this is where the action is, and any course which fails to even at-
tempt to cover these issues presents an old-fashioned and danger-
ously incomplete picture of the current legal landscape.
The challenge to cover the richness of the linkages debate is
formidable. It requires careful budgeting of time and pushing the
existing teaching materials to introduce such issues into the intro-
ductory international trade course.
The method I tried was borne more out of desperation than
anything. The modest success of this approach is only an ama-
teurish beginning. My model can easily be improved and sup-
plemented. Other kind of group discussions and problems can be
designed. New materials or modules can be developed either
through commercial publishers, electronic media, or more infor-
mal shared materials among academics. There are advanced re-
search seminars which can deepen the knowledge of both faculty
and students on linkage issues. There are interdisciplinary and
practice oriented simulation classes which force students naturally
into linkage discussion and analysis in order to solve problems.
Discrete class sessions in traditional classes can be devoted to par-
ticular linkages. E-mail and internet home pages can be used to
access primary documents from the front lines and provide a fo-
rum for ongoing discussion of linkage issues throughout the se-
mester. Coming to grips with the many forms of emerging link-
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ages in trade policy ends up forcing the teacher out of old habits
and to start fresh in designing a trade course and determining the
core knowledge a student needs and how best that knowledge can
be taught and learned. I found the whole process invigorating as a
teacher and look forward to reporting in future years on my im-




ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION AND OUTLINE FOR SERVICES,
ENVIRON ENTAL, COMPETITION, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND OTHER LINKAGES SMALL GROUPS
* The purpose of the small group discussions is to focus in-
tensively on some of the frontier issues that the WTO is just be-
ginning to address. In the small group the focus should be on the
relationship between your topic and the more traditional tariff
and non-tariff barriers that are the subject of the GATT/WTO
system. Are these frontier issues really barriers to trade which
must be reduced in the name of further trade liberalization or are
they issues with a radically different set of values not amenable to
a trade solution? Are these really issues that governments can
deal with, or are they more cultural issues geared toward private
behavior? Please use this framework in addressing the specific
questions below in your small group discussion, in the large
group continuation the next class, and your four page detailed
outlines which are due on the last day of class.
* How did the GATT deal with your issue before the Uru-
guay Round?
9 How did the Uruguay Round incorporate these new values
in the WTO and the world trading system?
9 Does the GATT/WTO system fairly incorporate these
principles and values or does it over or underprivilege your par-
ticular area?
* What further work should be done in terms of crafting new
codes or other mechanisms to address your particular "trade
and..." problem?
* Can the new WTO dispute resolution mechanism ade-
quately address any disputes that arise in this area? Does the
WTO have the technical expertise to do so? Will the WTO
mechanism inevitably emphasis the "trade" aspect of the issue to
the exclusion of other values? Is this a bad thing if it does?
o Is the WTO the best place for this work to take place? Are
there existing international organizations which are better fora for
the resolution of these issues? Are there other mechanisms avail-
able to better harmonize the law of the different member coun-
tries with regard to your particular topic?
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* How does your particular "trade and..." problem affect
lesser developed countries and non-market economies? Does the
existing WTO structure on your issue adequately affect their
needs?
* What does your particular issue tell us about how the WTO





ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION AND OUTLINE FOR LESSER DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES AND NON-MARKET ECONOMIES SMALL GROUP
DISCUSSIONS
Your small group discussions are a little different from the rest
of the groups which deal with various aspects of the "trade
and..." problem. Instead, your focus is on one of two groups
which have largely outsiders to full participation to the
GATT/WTO world trading system. The fall of the Soviet Un-
ion and the decline of support for protectionism as the appropri-
ate path to economic development has led to an increased interest
in LDCs and NMEs wanting to be members and full players in
the WTO. The focus of your small group discussions, the large
group discussion in the next class, and the four page detailed out-
lines due on the last day of class should be how your particular
group has been treated under the GATT/WTO system and
whether the likely agenda of the WTO will make matters better
or worse.
e How did the GATT deal with your group before the Uru-
guay Round?
* How did the Uruguay Round incorporate these values in
the WTO and the world trading system?
* Do the WTO rules and codes make adequate provisions for
your interest group?
9 Can your particular interest group meaningfully participate
in the world trading system as currently constituted?
e Does a lesser developed or transitional country have to
adopt a traditional market economy in order to join or participate
fully in the WTO?
e How, if at all, should accession to the WTO be different for
your interest group? What interim rules or grace periods should
be allowed to make the transition to full WTO membership and
compliance with all rules? On what basis should your group be
entitled to special treatment? Has your group actually benefited
from the special treatment it may have received in the past?
* How does the current WTO "trade and..." agenda affect
your particular group?
0 Is the WTO fundamentally a club to protect the interests of
rich Western market economies or a true general international
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organization working toward a viable trading system for all na-
tions? Are there other international organizations which better
protect your interests?
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